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The central problem around which the research is located concerns the 
rivalry between - the different forms of unionism in banking, and the 
response of the employers to this, particularly through national 
negotiating machinery. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first, the attempts to 
develop national machinery during and after the war are examined. This 
is an historical account which seeks to illustrate the special nature 
of the inter-union rivalry between, on one side, the staff 
associations, committed to a co-operative relationship primarily with 
their own bank, and on the other the TUC union which was committed to 
an industry-wide basis of organisation. It also demonstrates how the 
associations, initially very dependent upon the employers, became more 
independent and operated like trade unions through bargaining while 
retaining their distinctive ethos. Thirdly, it demonstrates the 
evolution of employer strategies on this issue. 
Having formed national machinery, the second section considers the 
conflicts between the unions which, while formally co-operating 
together, were still opposed to each other's principles. It looks at 
the two employer sponsored attempts to resolve this difficulty through 
the promotion of a merger, and the reasons for their failure. 
In the third section the operation of national machinery is examined. 
The thesis considers the bargaining strategies of the unions, arguing 
that there were in fact considerable points of agreement between them 
despite their ideological disputes. It also considers the strategies 
of the employers, and relates these to their corporate objectives in 
order to contextualise the inter-union rivalry as part cf a broader 
strategy of stability and control. 
In the concluding chapter the developments since the demise of joint 
union working are examined. It is argued that employer strategies have 
shifted significantly under the influence of corporate developments, 
and that these have impacted upon the banks' policies towards the 
competing unions, which are currently operating separately. 
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The title of this work is descriptive of its objectives.. Broadly itis 
concerned with the institutional development of industrial'relations 
in the London Clearing banks (see table 1) although it focuses upon the 
specific problem of the creation and working ofcnational machinery. 
This begs the question of what is particularly problematic about the 
operation of national machinery in the banking industry. It is after 
all one which would appear conducive to national co-ordination, (1) 
 having long been seen as an oligopolistic and cartelised sector 
dominated by a few large units with highly homogeneous operating 
techniques, and a low degree of price competition. (2) Indeed, as will 
be shown a considerable degree of informal co-ordination on some 
staffing matters existed within the clearers even prior to the 
introduction of formal employer co-operation. Again, although matters 
have been complicated by the existence of more than one union, this is 
typical of British industrial relations. The issue of multi-unionism 
has been extensively analysed elsewhere, and although often seen as 
either a "problem" or a feature which has complicated the conduct of 
British industrial relations, has rarely been seen as an issue which is 
fundamental to the whole nature of collective bargaining. (3) Clearly 
an important reason for this is that unions have been willing to 
operate jointly, or have developed informal arrangements to by-pass 
the existence of institutional duplication. Such courses were not 
possible in the banking industry however. Rather the special problem 
in creating a national forum related to the persistent tension between 
the orthodox trade union recruiting nationally throughout the banks, 
now called the Banking Insurance and Finance Union amt)* and the 
staff associations of the individual banks (see table 2) which were 
opposed to orthodox trade union methods and ideology. Crucially as 
well, this problem was profoundly influenced by the responses of the 
banks' management teams to this division. It is this which forms the 
central question of the work, and which the thesis is designed to 
explore. 
In considering the instability created by this specific form of 
divided representation, the aims of this work are twofold. Firstly, to 
*Initially called the Bank Officers Guild, and then the National Union 
of Bank Employees. 
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look at how this division influenced the effortS to create national 
bargaining; second, to explore the ways in which it led bo instability 
in the operation of the national machinery when it was set up, as well 
as the attempts to-limit or deflect this instability. This is not to 
(imply that divided representation was inevitably bad for all of the 
parties all of the time. One of the further objectives of the work is 
to tease out the conditions under which it could prove advantageous or 
disadvantageous to the banks or staff bodies. But here it is argued 
that we can only understand and explain the manifestations of the 
division, and the actions of each of the parties involved, by reference 
to what may be called their strategic objectives, that is, the over-
reaching goals of each of the organisations. Furthermore the dynamics 
of the union and associations, that is their guiding principles of 
action, as well as the constraints they faced in trying to achieve 
their goals, may only be comprehended if the historical nature of their 
rivalry is made clear. So, in the abbreviated account of their origins 
and development which follows, the intention is to explain the 
entrenched nature of their hostility, and the polarisation of their 
principles of organisation in terms of the unequal treatment afforded 
to each by the banks. 
THE BANK OFFICERS GUILD/NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES  
Looking first at the national trade union, it is important to note the 
timing of the inauguration of its forerunners, in England the Bank 
Officers Guild (BOG) and in Scotland the Scottish Bankers' 
Association. Both were founded before the staff associations at the 
end of the First World War, several attempts to organise in the 
previous decade having been unsuccessful. Their two bodies combined 
to form the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBS) in 1946. 
The national orientation of the union and its objectives of all-grades 
representation throughout all the clearing banks derived from certain 
structural developments in the organisation of the industry as well as 
changes in the conditions of employment which affected all categories 
of staff. Certainly the BOG appears to have been founded as a reaction 
to the decline in the standards of living (4) of bank clerks 
particularly during the war, combined with an increase in work-loads 
0 	
O 
	 C 
 
as staff joining the services werecnot replaced.. (5) Several authors 
also cite the' concentration in ownership which was accelerating from 
the turn of the century, and the increasing bureaucratisation•and 
depersonalisation of work and employment relationships; factors which 
affected staff ,throughout the banking. industry. (6)  The Guild's 
initial rapid rise in membership was seen as evidence of how widespread 
these factors were. 
Another element of its national ethos derived from the desire to 
imitate the Whitley Schemes which were being implemented elsewhere in 
industry and government. Furthermore, the BOG emphasised its 
moderation as a 
"conciliatory guild and not a militant trade union", (7) 
and tried to distinguish itself from the orthodox methods of 
bargaining pursued by organisations of manual workers. It preferred 
instead a system of joint consultation with the representatives of the 
employers on matters of mutual interest concerning the staff 
throughout the industry. 
Clearly, the origins of the union were located not only in 
deteriorating conditions throughout the whole banking industry, but 
also in response to the process of cartelisation and concentration of 
capital ownership. These generated substantial similarities in 
conditions throughout all of the banks, as management controls became 
highly centralised, and each developed a similar range of functions in 
lending and deposit-taking to the public based on the branch networks. 
Crucially as well the banks were inter-dependent on each other because 
of the operation of the clearing system, and the national orientation 
of the union thus derived from the relatively homogeneous organisation 
of work throughout the industry, a factor which was reinforced by the 
introduction of similar pay structures for clerical staff, (the 
largest group in the banks) in all of the major banks in the inter-war 
period. From this common age-based structure similar pay levels were 
contrived by collective agreement between the banks, a practice which 
led the union to reassert the need for national level bargaining on the 
grounds that this was the level at which pay decisions were actually 
taken. 
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Despite its rapid gains in membership and its ..moderation, the BOG 
A failed to achieve recognition in the clearing banks. It was,faced with 
an implacable opposition which took several forms. Most overtly there 
was evidence of hostility and victimisation of Guild members by the 
management of some banks. More generally the banks argued that there (  
was no necessity to recognise the Guild because the alternative system 
of domestic representation offered by the staff associations, with 
which they preferred to deal, was more appropriate to the banking 
industry. Yet in several cases the associations, which were set up 
just after the Guild was inaugurated, had been established by the banks 
themselves and particularly in the inter-war period the associations 
acted largely as the passive adjuncts of management. At that time 
there was very little to suggest that proper negotiations between the 
two sides were taking place. 
This preferential treatment by the banks was the crux of the 
institutional rivalry between the union and the associations. 
Although initially relations between them had not been hostile, when 
it became clear to the union that it would be denied recognition 
because of the associations the opposition to internalism and to all 
domestic principles became axiomatic. Very quickly the union formed 
the view that the associations were not a proper form of representative 
body, but primarily an obstruction to real, that is, trade union 
representation and the instrument by which the latter was resisted by 
the employers. They were therefore the principle element of an 
employer strategy which Bain has called "peacefulcompetition", (8) and 
in the view of the union the major reason why national machinery 
remained a frustrated objective. Given the logic of this argument it 
is then understandable why the union saw only one solution to the 
existence of divided representation. Rather than, as two trade union 
bodies might do, adopt a compromise solution such as joint working or 
limited spheres of recognition, the ultimate objective of the unicn 
was sole recognition. As the associations were a "spurious form of 
representation" its aim was to displace them and thus to see them 
dissolved. 
Moreover, because it saw the associations with which it had 
umsuccessfully competed for recognition as spurious, the unicn 
developed organisational principles which were designed to dichotomise 
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c , its position from 'them. Fbr iristance,*to 'emphasise that it* was 
diametrically opposed to internalist principles, the union developed a 
geographically based branch structure which had no institutional 
boundaries. This was meant to guarantee and express its externalism to 
rthe employers and thus its independence, while by inference the 
institutional structures of the associations were said to reflect 
their dependence upon and control by their respective banks. 
Similarly, although started by bank employees, the union always argued 
the need to employ its own fulltime officials as another means of 
ensuring independence; again this policy was essentially a reaction 
to the associations' practice of relying entirely upon lay members 
who, until the 1960's at least, remained fulltime employees of their 
banks as well. This the union regarded as another means by which the 
banks continued to control the associations. So the union's 
organisational principles and their bargaining objectives were 
reinforced by the desire to be seen as the antithesis of their rivals. 
At one time NUBE, for example had favoured a two-tier bargaining model, 
with domestic arrangements supplementing national agreements where 
only minimum standards would be fixed. (9) After formal domestic 
bargaining rights were offered to the associations in the 1950's 
however, the union began to press for single-tier bargaining at the 
national level instead, because support of domestic activity carried 
with it the risk of legitimising the associations' policies.(1 .0)  
However a second influence upon the objectives of the union was its 
constituents. The moderation and concerns with status and 
respectability, as well as the limited instrumentalism of their union 
membership which has been seen as typical of white collar workers 
appeared to be highly applicable to the bank clerks. (11) Certainly 
this was reflected in the BOG/NUBE's objectives, notably in the very 
restrictive strike clause which made industrial action virtually 
impossible until it was reformed in 1960; instead the union favoured 
arbitration as a means of conflict resolution. Secondly, the union 
emphasised its non-political nature by never affiliating to the Labour 
Party, and while it has maintained political connections, these have 
been through members of Parliament of both of the major parties. 
However the Guild did join the TUC in 1940, not only to take advantage 
of the wartime statutory legislation, but also to express its position 
as a mainstream trade union in contrast to the associations, which have 
remained consistently opposed to° TUC affiliation. 	However, •an' 
indication of the 'character of its membership was revealed in the 
persistent motions put to NUBE's Annual Delegate meetings in the post-
war years, on the ground that membership was not cost-effective, was 
too political, and that it associated the union too closely with the 
extremist activities of the dominant manual unions. (12) These motions 
were however rejected. 
TO summarise: while the overwhelming objective of national bargaining 
reflected NUBE's origins, this industry-wide orientation was 
reinforced by the domestic nature of the associations. Because it was 
believed that the internal bodies were the principal reason for the 
failure to achieve recognition, and that they were an obstruction to 
real representation, the possibility of joint working being acceptable 
to the union was remote. Nevertheless, a crucial constraint ypon the 
ambition of sole recognition was the undoubted moderation of the 
union's membership, and while the associations were criticised for 
their moderate policies which were seen as tantamount to passive 
acquiescence, the union could hardly adopt more aggressive policies to 
pursue its objective without the risk of alienating its own 
supporters. It was constrained by the fact that it could not enforce  
its demands (except in the most exceptional circumstances) so as long 
as the banks remained recalcitrant upon the question of recognition 
the union had either to rely upon external mechanisms, or face the 
contradiction of looking for assistance through an alliance with its 
declared rivals. 
A central and continuing tension of whether (and how far) to compromise 
with internalism consistently confronted the union because of its 
inability to enforce the objective of sole recognition nationally. 
Indeed, even when recognition was achieved and the union opted to 
negotiate jointly with the associations, it will be argued that the 
issue was not resolved because the intention to dominate the 
representative channels as a means of displacing its rivals remained 
the ultimate objective of the union. The failure of this strategy 
however prompted a resurgence of the debate within the union between 
those groups which were prepared to compromise the fundamental 
principles of organisation at least in the short term, and the more 
purist elements who regarded this as intolerable. This dichotomy 
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represents the framework by which it is intended to analyse (in 
conjunction with the constraints imposed by external conditions) - the 
union's policies on the whole question of whether to merge with the 
associations, as well as the decision to now to separate 
representation. , 
THE STAFF ASSOCIATIONS 
It is important to clarify the dynamics of the staff associations: 
what was it about their principles of organisation which made NUBE 
regard them as a spurious form of representation? And if this was the 
case, why then were the associations able to survive and flourish as 
popular representative bodies under the pressure of competition from 
NUBE? It would appear that this was not simply due to the support via 
recognition, given by the banks, but also that this success related to 
the status preoccupations of bank employees which led them to approve 
of internalism as a more appropriate form of representation than 
orthodox trade unionism; secondly, the importance of what was called 
the special employment relationship in banking; and thirdly the 
ability of the associations to reconcile their objectives with the use 
of orthodox methods of representation, and thus to become plausible 
bargaining agents. 
Despite their desire to remain distinguishable from orthodox trade 
unions, staff associations like unions may be characterised in 
Flanders' phrase as an amalgam of Novement and organisation", (13) 
being the self-elected representative bodies of a certain group of 
employees. However the basis of the distinction between two types of 
organisation derives from the ethos of internalism upon which the 
functioning and ideals of the staff associations are established. 
"Internalism" is not a highly developed abstract theory, but a working 
description of the mode and style in which the staff associations have 
approached their functions. It also embodies a notion of 
distinctiveness from orthodox unionism and is therefore to a degree 
predicated upon the nature of this orthodoxy. However, there are 
consistent ideas enshrined in the term as well; the definition offered 
in 1960 still has relevance, internalism being: 
"a system by which _the staff of any particular business negotiate with their own management on all mattersooncerning staff conditions with qq 4 basis Limn the common interest of employer and employed"," - 
(a statement which neatly encapsulates the functionalism, the 
institutional orientation and the co-operative ethos of the term. 
A staff association may be defined as an organisation of employees for 
representative purposes which is internal to one employer, and 
operating exclusively within the boundaries of one company. (15) So, 
internalism is evidently a descriptive term which embodies the 
organising principle of associations as "house", "company" or 
"enterprise" unions. 
Internalism also embodies an ideological dimension, which pre-supposes 
the predominance of common interests and cooperation between staff and 
management. The following declaration expressed this clearly: 
"The foundation of (the association's) existence is a joint furthering of the interests of the Bank and the Staff w4R 64re equally dependent won one another for their wellApeing.""" 
Similarly, the objectives of the associations have typically 
emphasised a desire to: 
"foster a spirit of goodwill, mutual dependence and trust 
between(1/) the Directorate and Management of the Bank and the Staff". 
While they have denied the more comonly held view of trade unions that 
an objective conflict of interests exists between employees and 
employer, it is accepted that disputes may arise. It is argued that 
these may generally be settled with mutual satisfaction, through 
reasoned and "common-sensical" negotiation (that is without the 
ideological rhetoric to which it is felt that trade unions resort), and 
also without the use or threat of sanctions, because of the trust and 
recognised mutual dependency of each side. Consequently, only very 
recently and mainly in response to statutory pressures have the 
associations adopted tightly limited strike clauses in their 
constitutions. 
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At its most extreme this doctrine led to the assertion that cooperation 
would inevitably maximise the benefits of the staff. Consider for 
instance the following plea for "cannon-sense" policies from National 
Provincial Staff Association in order, 
"to avoid any potential sources of friction ... (as) the 
association is convinced that its duty is to seek to have eliminated all unnecessary frictions, to minimise staff wastage, 
and indeed establisAA level of moral so high as itself to act as a recruiting aid." 
But this statement was perhaps more reminiscent of the pre-war 
policies of the associations, representing the apotheosis of a co-
operative philosophy which subordinated them entirely to management 
objectives. By the time it was written, the actual role and methods of 
the internalist bodies were similar to orthodox trade unions. They had 
evolved from passive adjuncts into bargaining agents which relied upon 
joint regulation or collective bargaining to achieve their objectives, 
one of the standard methods of trade unions as the Webbs noted. (19) 
This also highlights one of the major complications in accurately 
conveying the character of the associations in a dynamic context. As 
the phrase "movement and organisation" suggests, these bodies have had 
to change in response to new demands from their members as well as 
external conditions. Indeed the ability to develop new policies and 
methods in a relatively pragmatic manner and to reconcile these with 
the continuation of their internalist ideals will be emphasised as one 
of the strengths of the associations which have allowed them to 
survive. 
The associations consistently emphasised the utility and indeed the 
superiority of domestic bargaining. Not only did this accord with the 
internalist principle, but it was derived from the more concrete 
argument that each bank differed in its staff management methods and 
organisation. It made no sense therefore to bargain about these at a 
national level. Associated with this was the view that important 
decisions on pay were taken domestically; thus the associations 
emphasised that the differences between each bank within the clerical 
pay scale were significant, and a result of bargaining pressure. It 
was also pointed out that the pay of senior "overscale" clerical staff 
and managers was established independently by each bank, and only the 
-16- 
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broadest coordination on pay was admitted to take place on a collective c 	. basis between the banks. Even on a purely factual basis this 
contradicted with the case for national bargaining made by NUBE. 
Related to this, the associations opposed the idea of negotiations 
being conducted by outside officials who had no experience of bank 
employment. Not only was it presumed that their expertise would be 
inferior to that of an official drawn from within the banks, but it was 
also argued that they could not fully appreciate the special nature and 
problems of banking. Their officials were drawn from the banks' own 
staff, and until the 1970's inmost cases were paid by the banks rather 
than the associations. The argument put forward by NUBE•that this 
policy of using "home-grown" officials, and the financial support that 
they received via payment of salaries, pensions, and premises being 
prima facie evidence of domination was completely rejected by the 
associations. 
Instead, internalism was seen as a more appropriate form of 
representation because of the putative special relationship existing 
in the clearing banks, which their organisations mirrored. 
Essentially, the special nature of this relationship revolved around 
the life-long employment which the banks claim to offer to their staff, 
it being suggested that as a result, employees identified with'their 
particular bank rather than with bank staff in general, because of the 
agreement amongst the banks not to recruit from each other. This 
attitude was reinforced by the fact that their life-chances were 
clearly tied up with a single bank. Another factor of great importance 
was the career nature of bank employment. Moreover, because of the 
practice of promoting exclusively from within their own ranks, this 
offered a very high chance of reaching a managerial rank. One out of 
every two male recruits was the figure usually quoted (20) by the banks 
in their recruitment literature, although as Marsden's (21) recent case 
study showed this sort of chance was actually available to those male 
recruits who remained in the banks' employment above the age of 25. As 
such, it was argued that bank staff tended to identify to an 
exceptional extent with the objectives and views of their managements, 
and see their interests as coinciding with those of the bank, a point 
which was evidently based upon concrete facts and highly rational 
thought. 
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In that the organisational structures of the associations were 
designed to reflect the divisional structures of the banks'this 
emphasised the notion of common interests between the two sides. It 
also meant that the local units of each association varied in size 
quite considerably between each other. Moreover the associations 
emphasised their all-ranks constituencies (although several barred 
non-clerical staff until the 1960's) thus forming a series of 
integrated organisations mirroring the banks, rather than one which 
integrated staff horizontally into a single industry-wide arrangement, 
as NUBE aimed to do. 
So it is evident that the principles of organisation of NUBE and the 
associations conflicted in several fundamental ways. But it must be 
reiterated that it was the decision of the banks to refuse recognition 
to the union in favour of the associations which made the rivalry so 
sharp and irreconcilable. There was for example nothing inherently 
anti-trade union in a company based bargaining strategy; several trade 
unions including NUBE's erstwhile rival, the Association of Scientific 
Managerial and Technical Staffs, have favoured this approach and 
criticised the strategy of national negotiations in banking. Yet it 
was because it was associated with the internalist philosophy that the 
banking union remained so adamantly opposed to domestic bargaining 
strategies. 
The success of the associations in continuing to survive and attract 
members cannot however simply be seen in terms of the approbation they 
received from the employers. Arguably, this also related to their 
policies which emphasised their distinctiveness from orthodox/manual 
trade unionism, and their connotations of a professional body which 
was expressed both through the dislike of conflict, the emphasis upon 
reasoned negotiation (as opposed to conflict-oriented bargaining), (22) 
and the organisational structure which linked all grades in the bank 
together and emphasised the career structure of banking employment. 
It has been generally acknowledged that a closer identification with 
managerial aims and doctrines is a typical trait of white-collar 
workers; (23) clearly, in the banks, the associations represented an 
institutional expression of the cooperative ethos. Marxist 
explanations for this have focussed upon the ambiguous structural 
position of white-collar workers between labour and capital, (24) other 
analyses have looked at the superior status of clerick workers 
historically, and their proximity (often physically) to emloyers. (25) 
 In the banks several other factors further served to emphasise the 
close relationship between the clerical and managerial staff. Fbr 
instance, the chances of promotion to the ranks of management in a 
relatively high status quasi-professional job were exceptional. This 
was arguably reinforced by the structure of the banks, which were 
divided into a large number of units each with a relatively small 
number of staff. Hence the large overall size and bureaucratic nature 
of banking which might have encouraged a tendency to trade . unionism (26)  was therefore mediated by this pattern of organisation 
which brought staff into much closer contact with a representative of 
management and the bank. 
Apart from the important question of status however, the success of the 
associations reflected their role in defending the monetary interests 
of their members as well. In this thesis it will be argued that 
whatever their expressed ideological preferences for cooperation, the 
ability to complement this with an effective bargaining role was a 
crucial component of their success, because status concerns and 
monetary concerns were deeply interrelated amongst bank staff. What 
Roberts et al noted of technicians' organisations elsewhere, also has 
relevance for the situation in the banks: 
"The history of the technicians' union suggests that this 
category of workers is strongly status-conscious; but status is seen primarily in labour market terms. Professional 
associations that are concerned with non-pecuniary aspects of status do not fully satisfy the strong desires of technicians 
for higher relative levels of remuneration. On the other hand 
appeals mq, class concepts of trade unionism make little impact.'" 
Similarly, the historical development of the associations is 
predicated upon their concern with the pecuniary aspect of their 
members' interests, along with their ability to satisfy the status 
aspirations and cooperative orientations of bank staff. The 
essentially pragmatic nature of the doctrine of internalism meant that 
the associations could transform themselves into effective bargaining 
agents while reconciling this with the cooperative ethos underpinning 
their popularity. Hence despite changing conditions they have 
0 
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remained a viable alternative to trade unionism in banking whilst in a 
real sense beoaming trade unions 'themselves, and this ability to 
respond to developing circumstances has ensured that the rivalry 
between the two sides has remained a continuous , one. Tb give one 
example (regarding strike action) twenty years ago the associations 
were thoroughly opposed to the use of sanctions in bargaining, it being 
contrary to their cooperative principles; but in response to the 
pressures of statutory changes, as well as the changes in the 
bargaining environment, and particularly the ending of compulsory 
arbitration, they have adopted strike clauses which are however 
extremely limiting. While the possibilty of them taking action 
remains slim the internalists now admit to the presence of conflict as 
part of the bargaining process. In this way they challenge the union's 
argument that they are powerless and ineffective while remaining 
aligned with the tradition of cooperation. 
So while there is a continuous theme in the rivalry between the 
associations and the national union, the thesis explores the changing 
nature of both sides and the conditions under which this development 
took place. It is then concerned to relate this to the problem of 
establishing and operating national machinery. 
THE IANDON CLEARING BANKS  
Yet, given this inter-union rivalry, the intention is to demonstrate 
how the employers collectively attempted to deal with it. We argue 
that the policies of the banks could influence the actions of the staff 
bodies and their relationship significantly, but that ultimately they 
were unable to dissolve the competition between the two sides, as they 
wished. 
In the historical approach the thesis tries to emphasise how the banks' 
strategies did alter in the post-war period. Although the entrenched 
nature of the inter-union rivalry was in part due to the longstanding 
policy of hostility towards the union, the first part of the thesis 
explores the shift towards a preference for an institutionalised 
bargaining relationship. At the same time it draws out the differences 
within the ranks of the employers and in particular the contradictions 
between on one side the need to ensure stability and on the other, the 
_`G_ 
ideological opposition among some managers to the prospect .clf 
encouraging "orthodox" trade unionism. Moreover we argi that for 
both ideological and practical reasons the banks were always loathe to 
abandon recognition of the staff associations, which were seen as 
popular representative bodies and a moderating influence. Bence 
national negotiating machinery was in part s an attempt by the banks to 
resolve the instability of competition between the staff bodies. But 
because their differences could not be dissolved the machinery was, we 
shall argue, fundamentally unstable; recognising this the banks were 
thus involved in the attempts to procure a permanent solution to the 
division through industry-wide discussions on a merger. The thesis 
explores why the banks collectively decided to adopt such an 
interventionist strategy on this issue, arguing that they saw this as 
the key to the priority of long-term stability and predictability in 
bargaining relationships; but it also considers the limits of their 
interventionism and tries to explain why ultimately they felt unable 
to enforce a merger, notwithstanding their wish for an end to the 
division. 
Yet the existence of national machinery does beg the question of why 
the banks preferred to act in concert. One important reason was that 
historically such collective action was customary, cooperation in the 
operation of the clearing system being well established: the banks 
were thus bound by their mutual inter-dependence in processing each 
other's work. Moreover, their common relationship with the central 
bank (the Bank of England) meant that there was a longstanding 
tradition of oligopolistic cooperation, and a virtual absence (until 
very recently) of any form of price competition. Operating through 
their branch networks each developed highly similar systems of work 
organisation and staffing structures. 
From this product market position the banks' decision to cooperate in 
the market for their most expensive factor-labour - is explained. 
Particularly in the context of consistent expansion of employment and 
within the competitive market for clerical staff prevailing in much of 
the post-war period, the banks recognised that to compete between 
themselves for labour might only raise the price without guaranteeing 
a higher supply in the longer term. Hence the decision to take wages 
out of competition. But when we consider the operation of the national 
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machinery• we also seek to demonstrate how an employer's federaticn 
could protect domestic prerogative, or avoid the possibility of an 
individual bank being "picked-off" by the staff side. The thesis does 
however consider the disadvantages of national Cooperation for the 
banks, principally relating to the loss of autonomy and control over 
those areas of the pay structure which are to some extent insulated 
from the external market. 
Finally, it should be noted that the thesis seeks to contextualise the 
banks' strategies. It attempts to show that managerial decisions at 
national as well as domestic level on labour relations policies were 
not autonomous, but were conditioned by the broader business policies 
of the banks. At the same time it tries to draw out the differences 
within the banks, arguing that despite their oligopolistic nature a 
significant degree of managerial choice existed and could often result 
in varying strategic policies. Bow this has influenced the employers' 
response to the division of representation is considered throughout 
the work. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Because the state of existing knowledge about the clearing banks' 
industrial relations is relatively imperfect, it has been necessary to 
offer a framework of analysis which is based upon an historical-
institutional approach, or what Kochan, (28) following Kuhn, (29) has 
described as a "preparadigm" stage of theory, at least for the first 
section of the work. This first part sets out to explain why the banks 
decided to institute national bargaining and recognise the TUC union 
NUBE, after a long record of hostility to it and preference for 
domestic negotiations with their respective staff associations. The 
decision is related to the particular structural conditions 
confronting the banks, and in particular the discontent which 
developed among their staff from reductions in their standards of pay 
in the post war period, a trend which was aggravated by the lack of 
opportunities for promotion and the restrictions upon career 
advancement imposed by the internal labour markets operated by the 
banks. In this context it is argued that the staff associations (under 
pressure from NUBE) became increasingly aggressive bargaining agents, 
quickly reducing the utility of domestic negotiation because of the 
opportunities for "leapfrogging" agreements between the banks. 
0 	 0 
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But the recognition of NUBE is also explained in . terms of political 
pressures to conform to "accepted industrial relations practices", or 
statutory standards. While it is emphasised that the preference for 
"voluntarist" solutions to the question of representation permitted 
the banks some discretion in their choice of bargaining partner, 
nevertheless it will be suggested that Governmental pressures did have 
an indirect influence upon the banks' final decision to recognise 
NUBE. In effect public scrutiny induced considerable concern with the 
prospect of compulsory direction by the state, leading to reform of a 
"voluntary" type to head off further criticism. 
The analysis does however seek to emphasise the importance of 
managerial choice in this question, and to demonstrate that 
recognition in a national forum was by no means an inevitable solution 
to institutionalise discontent. In examining the reasons why the 
employers did choose to formalise their co-ordination by establishing 
a federated organisation for bargaining at national level, this is 
considered in terms of the advantages usually adduced to collective 
action, such as resistance to trade union pressure, support and 
defence of managerial prerogative, and the minimalisaticn of wage (30) competition. 	In so doing, the analysis attempts to show in what 
ways these issues actually were problematic for the banks, by asking 
for example what specific challenges trade unionism presented to them 
ideologically and in terms of the shift in decision making from 
unilateral control to joint regulation. 
Having argued that the central objectives of the union were to obtain 
recognition at the national level, and to displace the associations in 
the same move, thus establishing itself as the sole representative 
body, it is necessary to explain why it was eventually persuaded to 
enter joint working under conditions which by no means guaranteed the 
demise of the associations. 
The basis of our argument is as follows. Firstly, the long period of 
non-recognition indicated to the union that it was insufficiently 
strong to enforce any of its policies upon the banks as long as they 
remained recalcitrant. Its central internally based strategy of 
obtaining sole recognition through achieving a majority membership was 
inadequate and unrealistic as long as the associations provided a 
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source of coapetition. NUBE thus tended•to rely heavily upon external 
support for its case both from the government arid the wider trade union 
=relent, but this led it mistakenly to assume that the adoption of 
favourable policies by these bodies would be sufficient to enforce its 
claim for sole recognition, and particularly that statutory 
regulations would compel the banks to do this. 
A crucial change of policy, emerging from the failure of this strategy 
was to relinquish the claim for sole recognition. After the banks 
successfully pre-empted the pressure of statutory legislation by 
establishing domestic agreements with their associations, the union 
reformed its policy. A more pragmatic approach emerged, which 
entertained the possibility of joint working with the internalists, 
demonstrating the realisation that recognition under any terms had to 
be achieved as bargaining power was a necessary preliminary to 
achieving representative pre-eminence. While the long term objective 
of the union as regards the associations remained consistent, it is 
evident that the strategies adopted by NUBE did in fact reflect its 
limited power. It therefore continued to press its case principally 
through political pressure and specifically by making a complaint that 
it was the object of discriminatory policies by the banks to the 
International Labour Office, to which the banks were obliged to 
respond with reform initiatives. 
Tb understand the apparent contradiction that the domestic 
associations were persuaded to enter national machinery, it is 
necessary to focus upon the question of the methods by which they 
functioned, as well as upon the objectives of internalism. These were 
in fact fundamental differences between the associations on this 
issue, which are explored in the first section, but it is argued that a 
majority were prepared to overlook their internalist principles 
because their priority was to establish bargaining rights at the level 
at which decisions were de facto being taken. As such, when it became 
clear that the banks were determined to co-ordinate policies over pay 
and conditions nationally, the associations were prepared to act at 
that level as well. Indeed, throughout the thesis it is emphasised 
that the only way the associations have been able to survive as viable 
representative bodies is by consistently revising their internalist 
principles, based essentially upon an identity of interests between 
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employer and employees, so that they prove ccapatible with the reality 
of the differences of interests expressed in the bargaining process, 
in an essentially pragmatic and undoctrinaire manner. In addition, as 
the associations were locked into the institutional competition for 
members with NUBE, once national machinery had been established they 
could not relinquish bargaining rights at that level, because that 
would be tantamount to allowing the union sole control over the 
negotiation of pay. Their internalist principles were therefore 
conditioned ty, and had to be moulded round, the decisions of third 
parties (the banks) on the structure of negotiation. 
This historical investigation is derived from the primary material 
sources of the staff bodies and the banks as well as secondary sources. 
In the former category may be listed the minutes of conferences and 
meetings, magazines and other sources of information and propaganda 
put out by all sides. Additionally, the minutes of meetings between 
the banks and staff bodies, and between representative of Government, 
which have not been examined by any external party before, have been 
drawn upon to provide new knowledge about the process of decision 
making. 
The second part of the thesis continues the examination of the 
influence of the unique form of divided representation upon the 
structure and process of bargaining, and the attempts of the banks to 
resolve the instability it created, by looking at the initiatives for a 
merger between the two sides sponsored by the Federation. It is argued 
that despite the constitutional co-operation of the joint staff side, 
the fundamental ideological differences were sustained. Indeed the 
institutional competition was heightened by the power accruing to the 
body with the superior membership to control the formulation of policy 
in the banking staff councils, nationally and domestically. We argue 
therefore that NUBE's failure to achieve the majority position was the 
fundamental cause of this instability, and this is related to its 
central objective of controlling the staff side. 
The analysis seeks to emphasise the context of these reform 
programmes: notably, in the first instance the financial difficulties 
NUBE faced; the failure of the union to see the associations outlawed 
by statutory legislation; and the pressures upon the staff bodies from 
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the expansionist policies of other trade unions. Through this it is 
intended to demonstrate that the mergers were viewed by the actors 
themselves very much as defensive reactions, "forced-marriages" rather 
than opportunities,b0 dissolve unnecessary divisions. And both 
attempts, the ABFU talks and the Johnston Enquiry, thus had to confront 
the opposition to merger from strategically powerful groups on each 
side who saw this as a second-best alternative because of the 
compromise of principles it necessitated. 
Nevertheless it will be argued that the Johnston Enquiry came much 
closer to success that the first initiative. In the ABFU talks, the 
failure to come to terms with the problem of the location of - power in 
the new organisation was a crucial error which Johnston avoided. 
Mbreover the inability of the banks to deal with the entrenched 
differences in attitude was another failing of the ABFU talks. Hence 
although there was agreement over the structure of the new body, this 
only disguised the problems of its organisational style: was it to be 
a domestically oriented body with the minimum of centralized powers 
and resonant of the internalist ethos in the limited provisions for 
industrial action or participation in the wider union movement; or a 
NUBE-type model with centralized powers and membership of the TUC? 
Again we suggest the Johnston Enquiry provided explicit answers to 
these questions, thus confronting the central difficulty of 
organisational design in his model. 
In our conclusions on the Johnston Enquiry, we accept his view that 
NUBE was largely to blame for the failure to amalgamate. It is argued 
that the NUBE/BIFU representatives were keen to enact the merger, but 
were unable to persuade the union's lay activists that the 
organisational structure Johnston proposed was capable of sustaining 
the national basis of the union against a domestic fragmentation, and 
these lay groups were therefore loathe to see the merger take place 
without further safeguards. 
We also conclude that a crucial weakness of both programmes related to 
the difficulty of enacting the voluntary reform process while the 
parties remained suspicious of each other's intentions and thus 
reluctant to compromise. In this situation the role of the banks was 
of great importance, because it was only they who had the power to 
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exert sanctions to enforce change. 	Because' of the historical 
accusations of preferential treatment for the associations it is 
argued that the banks were disinclined to adopt a strongly 
interventionist strategy; furthermore because some banks saw 
intervention via the Federation as an incursion upon domestic 
prerogative they were opposed to any national level policy 
initiatives. We also conclude that the. banks particularly held 
reservations about the advantages of a merger if it was to lead to the 
dissolution of the distinctive elements of the internalist philosophy, 
and the creation of an "orthodox" trade union. Fbr each of these 
reasons, the need for an active programme to enforce at least the 
initial steps of the merger was missing. 
To support the arguments put forward in this section, we will draw upon 
unpublished and original material including minutes of every major 
meeting in each of the two reforming initiatives. Additionally, 
supplementary notes and doctmentation used by many of the leading 
actors has been consulted, and interviews conducted with 
representatives of all the parties including many of those officials 
who were involved in the talks. 
Tb recapitulate, the central problem which is addressed in this thesis 
concerns the effects of the particular form of divided representation 
upon the process and structure of bargaining. It has been argued that 
the competition between the representative bodies was endemic and that 
this was a persistent source of instability. How then did this rivalry 
affect the working of the national machinery; and how, given the 
instability, was the machinery made to work for nearly ten years? 
Because of the competitiveness of the staff bodies, the formal 
cooperation between them established by the joint staff side (the 
Banking Staff Council) did not actually dissolve their real 
differences, although it did largely neutralize the effects of these 
from spilling over into the bargaining process. In particular, NUBE 
entered the national machinery with the associations as a tactical 
move because it was believed that through recognition nationally its 
superiority in terms of bargaining strategies and bargaining 
effectiveness would subsequently ensure the control of the staff side, 
in the longer term leading to the demise of the internalists. 
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4Sindlemly„ the associations recognised that they had bra dominate the 
Staff Council if they were to continue to haVe an effective voice in 
° pay bargaining. 
C 
Recognising the continuing rivalry between the staff bodies, the 
employers' strategy in the design of the constitutions governing the 
operation of national bargaining was to minimise the destabilising 
effects of this competition. Secondly, the value of the associations 
as a constraint upon the union was acknowledged, and as a result, 
several mechanisms were constructed to ensure that the superior 
bargaining strength of the union, which derived from its ability to 
call upon stronger sanctions, did not permit it to dominate the staff 
side as the minority body. 
So, it is argued that initially the objectives of the employers were 
focussed upon the avoidance of overt conflict in the process of 
negotiation, and the development of several forms of protection 
against the instability of divided representation. However the price 
of this caution was the creation of certain profound rigidities in the 
design of the constitutions which placed considerable restrictions 
upon the development and successful achievement of the other 
bargaining objectives of the employers. 
TO an extent, these restrictions were overcome by informal mechanisms 
which allowed the procedure to be by-passed; otherwise they required 
formal reform processes as for example in the structure of pay 
bargaining, but the price of these changes was that the banks were 
obliged to compromise by offering a larger role for the trade unions 
(and particularly NUBE) than was originally proposed, and thus a 
reduction in the unilateral prerogative of management. This was not a 
complete solution however, and as the strategic objectives of the 
banks became more concerned with controlling the cost of labour under 
the pressure of high wage inflation and sustained competition from 
other financial intermediaries, the rigidities of the constitutions 
became an increasing penalty. 
The very success of the strategy of neutralizing the effects of divided 
representation was an important factor in explaining why the 
bargaining machinery operated satisfactorily for nearly ten years. At 
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the same time however this was only a superficial form of stability, 
because the union was frustrated in its prime objectiire of 
demonstrating its superiority as a bargaining agent and thus obtaining 
control of the staff side. While NUBE claimed that its bargaining 
strategies were more thoroughly researched and that its officers were 
more professional, this made little impact upon bank staff because the 
union was not able to demonstrate that these factors actually made a 
difference to bargaining outcomes as long as the Joint Staff Council 
continued to be controlled by the associations, whose subscriptions 
were substantially lower. 
A further source of frustration for the union derived from the manner 
in which the supposedly domestically oriented associations were able 
to come to terms operating at the national level. The internalists 
Bound no contradiction in reconciling their new roles as national 
bargaining agents with their philosophy and were indeed prepared to 
pursue strategies which were designed to extend the range of joint 
regulation by exploiting ambiguities in the JNC constitution. This 
again meant that NUBE was unable to demonstrate that the associations 
were less effective bargaining agents because of their cooperative 
ethos, and it is suggested that considerable similarities emerged in 
the bargaining strategies of the two sides. These were reinforced by 
the poll vote mechanism as each body had to avoid any policies which 
appeared to favour one group at the expense of the others, for fear of 
provoking a loss of members to its rival. As a result, NUBE was unable 
to demonstrate the superiority of its strategies, nor generate an 
advantage by gaining the overwhelming support of any single group, 
such as the junior clerical staff. 
This is demonstrated most clearly in the bargaining over national 
salary scales, where the all-grades constituencies of both staff 
bodies largely determined their similar pay strategies which were 
located around maintaining the internal differential structure in a 
stable state. The opportunities for overtly competitive strategies 
were also diminished by the context of high inflation and frequent pay 
controls, because both sides of the JNC then regarded free bargaining 
periods as opportunities to adjust for pay anomalies. Moreover in this 
context the banks accepted the legitimacy of cost of living 
adjustments, less restrictive pay policies, than prior to 1968 when 
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their more rigorous and inflexible bargaining strategies had exposed 
the weaknesses of the associations, to the advantage of the union. And 
particularly after the national job evaluation exercise in 1970/71 the 
banks were broadly concerned to preserve the stability of their 
internal grading structures, thereby finding it relatively easy to 
accommodate to the bargaining strategies of the staff side. 
But this brings us to the question of the rigidities in the design of 
the constitution, for while highly stable in terms of the outcome of 
negotiation, the structure of pay bargaining was one area where the 
restrictions built in to insulate domestic management from the area of 
joint regulation proved problematic, because the discretionary powers 
of each bank were over-constrained as a result. This was because the 
national machinery fixed actual rates of pay for the majority of 
clerical staff, thus conflating career and non-career staff into a 
single category. The banks could not therefore develop their pay 
systems as a component of manpower development policies and quickly 
found this arrangement over-restrictive. NUBE was however opposed to 
any substantial decentralization of bargaining, although the 
associations supported this, and as the constitutions were due for 
formal revision when restructuring came under review, this issue 
represented a point of considerable instability. 
The reform process, which developed a two-tier bargaining model 
represented a considerable departure from the original intention of 
the employers to separate joint regulation, and recognition of NUM 
from the domestic level. Moreover in the bilateral application of the 
job evaluation exercise at domestic level, there was a significant 
departure from the restrictions of the original constitution which had 
been predicated upon a highly economistic model of trade union 
functioning. Insofar as job evaluation necessitated the involvement 
of the staff bodies in the "governmental" and managerial  
functions of applying decisions at the domestic level this represented 
a substantial compromise by the banks to their original strategies to 
limit joint regulation. Importantly however, the decisions to retain 
a high degree of centralized pay determination, which were effectively 
made unilaterally by the banks in the process of designing the 
restructuring exercise, were accepted by the associations despite 
being against their wishes. Moreover, while NUBE obtained domestic 
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•recognition, it remained restricted within the-same structure of-joint 
representation and the poll-vote procedure which, as‘ at national 
level, stifled its opportunity to demonstrate any differentiation. .So 
while the banks were obliged to ccapromise by extending the system of 
joint regulation, nevertheless the reform sustained the strategy of 
neutralizing the effects of division from which NUBE's frustration was 
derived. 
Another major rigidity which was embedded into the design of the 
constitution related to the bargaining procedure. Again this was 
predicated upon the priority of conflict avoidance, but unlike the 
problem of the pay structure it remained unmodified throughout the 
operation of the machinery. In particular, the compulsory and 
unilateral arbitration facility which was the final stage of the 
tightly defined procedure was incorporated to overcome the banks' fear 
that NUBE would be inclined to foster conflict as a means of 
demonstrating its superiority. Additionally it was recognised that as 
the associations were effectively powerless without arbitration, 
unilateral compulsory arbitration was necessary to obviate the need 
for any reliance upon the ability to employ bargaining sanctions. 
While this mechanism worked satisfactorily as a peace-keeping measure, 
it did create several fundamental problems for the JNC. In particular 
the rigidity of the constitution tended to promote very inflexible 
bargaining processes such that the procedure was quickly exhausted. 
Although the desire of all parties not to be seen as being over-reliant 
upon arbitration did lead to several informal procedural by-passes 
which alleviated this problem, for the banks the prioe of this 
arbitration facility was substantial, because it is suggested that 
several key issues became unchangeable or "trapped" and this had 
important cost implications. So while arbitration arguably helped the 
unions which therefore did not have to defend these decisions by 
collective action, and achieved the objective of equalising the power 
of the staff bodies in negotiation, it did place a considerable burden 
upon the value of the national machinery to the employers. 
Yet the "trapping" of items in the bargaining process was not simply a 
technical question of constitutional design. It related to the fact 
that competitive pressures between the staff bodies while largely 
neutralized were not dissolved, and one expression of the underlying 
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coopetition for Timbers, and thus control, was the .attempt to extend 
the area of joint regulation by exploiting certain constitutional 
ambiguities in order to prove superior bargaining effectiveness. 
These ambiguities derived from the inclusion of several matters for 
negotiation which inevitably interfaced with areas of unilateral 
prerogative such as hours of work/hours of business and holidays/Bank 
Holidays and Christmas Holidays. Again in the context of competition 
for members, the associations were obliged to pursue bargaining 
policies which were as expansionist as those of NUBE, despite their 
supposedly moderate and domestic orientation. This had the effect of 
forestalling any opportunity for NUKE to demonstrate its greater 
effectiveness. 
Employer dissatisfaction with the joint machinery also related to the 
other items which were "trapped" by arbitrated decisions. The 
difficulties in initiating discussions on ways round these problems 
were further complicated by the absence of facilities for 
consultation, and any item discussed in the JNC was therefore defined 
as arbitral. More fundamentally however the tension in the national 
machinery related to the increasing concern with costs and their 
competitive position expressed by the banks. Although only an 
emergent trend, this tension was evidence of a growing contradiction 
between the objective of conflict avoidance through the strategy of 
neutralizing instability and that of more control on costs through 
greater control over the bargaining process. The break-up of the JNC 
therefore coincided with the emergence of doubts on the employers' 
side about the utility of national machinery because the rigidities 
inherent in the constitutional framework were perceived to put them at 
a considerable disadvantage. While not wishing to disband the joint 
staff side, it being assumed that separate negotiations were a recipe 
for greater instability, it is argued that the need for procedural 
reforms was emerging in the Federation. 
Tb conclude this section therefore, it has been argued that the 
strategy of neutralization did largely resolve the destabilising 
effects of competitive unionism. The very success of this did however 
undermine the operation of the machinery ultimately, because NUBE was 
frustrated in its objective of obtaining control of the staff side. 
For the banks there were costs associated with neutralization, notably 
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in the rigidities within the constitution, and these could only be 
overcome by informal by-passing and formal compromise which `extended 
the role of joint regulation at the expense of managerial prerogative. 
Such modifications did not resolve all the restrictions however and in 
several important issues the banks remained frustrated by the 
restrictions upon bargained change imposed by arbitration. In 
addition the competitiveness of the staff bodies encouraged attempts 
to expend the scope of joint regulation which the banks found difficult 
to resist. There were therefore serious problems for the employers, as 
well as NUBE, in the bargaining arrangements particularly as they 
began to develop more cost oriented policies. The strategy of 
neutralization may therefore have had only a limited life-span even if 
the staff side had not collapsed. 
In the concluding chapter a discussion of developments since 1978 
indicates how changes have been made in the light of the shifts in the 
priorities of the employers, as well as the inter-union developments 
since 1978. Separate negotiations without the facility of compulsory 
arbitration have thus far exposed significant weaknesses in the 
bargaining strategies of the staff bodies, enabling the banks to 
implement successfully a much harder and cost oriented programme of 
negotiated change. Mbre fundamentally the growing use of new 
technologies and the more competitive orientation of the banks with 
each other as well as the other financial intermediaries bring the 
prospect of a radical alteration to the branch networks. With this, 
the lifelong career structure which has been central to the special 
employment relationship in banking may also decline, bringing a period 
of rapid and fundamental change in objectives of the staff bodies and 
their relationship, as well as managerial strategies. 
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TAME 1.1  
LONE= CLEAR(N3 BANKS  
(listed by asset size) 
1968 	 1982 
Barclays Barclays1 
Lloyds 	 National Westminster 2 
Midland ) "Big Five" 	Midland 
Westminster Lloyds 
National Provincial ) 	Williams & Glyn's3 
District 
Martins 
Glyn Mills 
National 
William Deacons 
Coutts & Co 
1. Barclays took over Martins Bank. 1969 
2. Westminster merged with National Provincial and its fully 
owned subsidiary, the District Bank, to form National 
Westminster 1969. 	Coutts and Co is a fully owned 
subsidiary, operating independently. 
3. Williams & Glyn's was formed from a merger of Glyn Mills, 
Williams Deacons and the English branches of the National 
Bank 1970. 
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TABLE 1.2  
MAW ASSOCIATIONS IN IBE LONX:01 CLEARING BANKS 1960  
Barclays Bank Staff Association 	BBSA 
Lloyds Bank Staff Association LBSA 
Midland Bank Staff Association MBSA 
Westminster Guild 	 - 
National Provincial Staff Association 	NPSA 
National Provincial Ladies Guild 
District Bank Staff Association DBSA 
Martins Bank Staff Association 	MaBSA 
Glyn Mills Staff Association GMSA 
STAFF ASSOCIATIONS 1974 =DIEM 
Barclays Bank Staff Association 
Lloyds Bank Group Staff Association 
National Westminster Staff Association 
	
Note: 1. 	MBSA was absorbed by the Association of Managerial Scientific 
and Technical Staffs in 1974. 
2. 	The GMSA was absorbed by NUBE in 1974. 
STAFF ASSOCIATIONS (UNIONS) 1980 
Barclays Group Staff Union 
Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union 
National Westminster Staff Association 
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SECTION 1  
THE ESTABLISEMENT OF fall'IONAL.2411CHINERT 
2. Attenpts to Establish National Negotiating Machinery 1940-1956. 
3. Changes in the Bargaining Environment After 1960. 
4. 1964-1968 The Crisis in Industrial Relations and the Establishment 
of National Bargaining. 
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(ii) Sources of Discontent 
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Our central theme concerns the special form of inter-union rivalry 
between the union and staff associations, and the responses of the 
banks to this phenomenon. This first section comprises three chapters 
which examine how this influenced the attempts to establish national 
machinery between 1940 and 1968. In so doing, the objective is to 
explain why, despite their fundamental ideological and organisational 
differences, the staff bodies were prepared to consider joint working 
on several occasions before coming together as a joint staff side in 
the national machinery instituted in 1968. The intention is secondly 
to demonstrate how the policies of the banks developed in response to 
economic and political factors, and how these employer policies 
influenced the relationship between the staff bodies. 
Before looking at the factors which led up to the introduction of 
national machinery an examination will be made of the reasons why the 
previous attempts to establish a joint forum failed. In particular, by 
considering the policies and positions of the parties involved, the aim 
will be to clarify what changes prompted them subsequently to come 
together. 
CHAPTER ourLINE  
The chapter commences with a narrative of the efforts to institute a 
national forum which were fundamentally in response to two different 
sources of pressure. Firstly, the introduction of legislation in the 
war banning strikes and implementing compulsory arbitration. This was 
extended in a modified formatter the war had ended and finally removed 
in 1959. Secondly, in the post war period the banks faced the novel 
phenomenon of overt dissatisfaction on the part of their staff with pay 
and conditions to which their response was to consider the possibility 
of national negotiating machinery once more before opting for domestic 
links with their associations which excluded NUBE from recognition. 
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In the discussion which then follows the intention is to explain the 
failure to institute national• bargaining , in terms of the objectives of 
the parties. We attempt to demonstrate the fragility of any 
initiatives for joint cooperation instituted by either. of the staff 
bodies because of their longstanding hostility and differences in 
organisational principles. It is suggested that such initiatives were 
usually defensive reactions rather than positive programmes to 
overcome the existing division of representation and failed because 
either-one of the parties, or a strategically important group within 
it, believed that the preferable option of sole recognition could be 
obtained. Thus in the belief that legislative rules would probably 
lead to the demise of the associations, NUBE became unwilling to assist 
them by establishing joint working, because of the required compromise 
with internalist principles. Conversely, after the introduction of 
domestic agreements which excluded NUBE but ensured the associations' 
survival, the attractions to the latter of joint working at national 
level quickly subsided. 
The crucial role of the banks is also considered, it being argued that 
they were disinclined to entertain joint regulation as a means of 
decision-making voluntarily, until statutory legislation and pay 
problems necessitated such a strategy. Recognition of NUBE alone was 
consistently resisted because of the longstanding antipathy to 
"orthodox" trade unionism for bank clerks, and national machinery was 
only envisaged if a joint staff side could be developed, but it 
remained a second-best alternative to working with the associations 
alone. However, given the apparently irreconcilable differendes in 
principle between the staff bodies it is concluded that a necessary 
pre-condition for joint working at any bargaining level had to be a 
positive policy of support from the banks, and their hostility to NUBE 
as a fully recognised bargaining agent had therefore to be dissolved 
before this could occur. 
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During the war the first attemptcto organise national machinery was 
made as a direct consequerice of the conditions of EMployment and 
National Arbitration Order (Order 1305) which came into effect on 
25 July 1940. This was applicable only to independent unions, and 
conferred won the Bank Officers Guild (BOG) the right to appeal to the 
National Arbitration Council in the event of a deadlock in any trade 
dispute with the employers or their representatives. However the 
staff associations were excluded from the aegis of the legislation as 
they could not satisfy the criteria of independence from the 
employers. 
The BOG soon realised this was a potential route to recognition, 
reporting in "The Bank Officer" that, 
"The Guild has already reported under this new order to the 
Minister of Labour, disputes with banks upon our cost of f ilving 
proposals and the Ministry is giving attention to them."' ' 
This manoeuvre was intended to invoke the National Arbitration 
Tribunal and, as no procedure existed for the clearing banks to deal 
with the claim, to compel them to recognise the union rather than be 
subject to external regulation of wage rates. The response of the 
banks both domestically and collectively was to attempt to mediate the 
threat of exclusive recognition of the BOG through ensuring the 
continuing presence of their associations. Two steps were therefore 
taken. Firstly the position of the associations vis-a-vis the law was 
strengthened by measures designed to make them more independent 
constitutionally and financially. (2) Secondly the banks sponsored a 
series of meetings between the Guild, the Staff Associations and 
themselves with a view to setting up a tripartite "Council of 
Conciliation". A draft constitution was agreed by July 1941, but the 
BOG subsequently rejected the proposition of a joint staff side for 
fear of loss of autonomy. (3) Meanwhile the Ministry of Labour were 
unwilling to invoke the statutory arbitration machinery whilst the 
efforts to set up voluntary conciliation were unresolved, and the 
original claim of the BOG remained unsettled throughout the war. 
The National Arbitration Order 1940 (Number 1305) was subsequently 
replaced with the Industrial Disputes Order, in 1951. (4) This, while 
• 
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removing the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs under the wartime 
legislation retained the institution of compulsory arbitration' under a 
new body, the Industrial DisputeiTribunal which 'replaced the National 
Arbitration Tribunal. As with the previous legislation, disputes 
could only be reported to the Ministry of Labour and hence come under 
the arbitration procedure by organisations of employers, individual 
(employers, or trade unions, thus potentially including NUBE, (5) but 
excluding the staff associations. Cbinciding with the introduction of 
this new legislation another proposal for joint national conciliation 
machinery was floated by the Central Council of Bank Staff 
Associations (Cara) as a response to the threat of de-recognition and 
because of the development of widespread discontent among many of 
their members with the post war pay policies followed by the banks. 
Their initiative was, for similar reasons, received with .interest by 
the employers, but NUBE was again cool towards the idea. As during the 
war, it believed that it could achieve sole bargaining rights and would 
not have to compromise by working with the staff associations. These 
were described as "that spurious form of staff representation" in a 
motion condemning collaboration with "internalism" passed at the 
union's Annual Delegate Meeting in 1952, (6) and tentative efforts to 
reconsider the union's objections to the 1941 proposals through a 
working party with CCBSA came to nothing. (7) 
Between 1953 and 1956 most of the banks introduced domestic procedure 
agreements to regulate pay and conditions with their respective staff 
associations. This was seen by Robinson as a response to pressure from 
the associations themselves, (8) but it must be regarded principally as 
an employer initiative to maintain domestic prerogative, which was 
implicitly threatened by the statutory machinery of Order 1376. It 
resulted from a crisis in the Midland Bank whereby disagreement over a 
claim by the staff association for a Christmas bonus led to the 
association dissolving itself because it appeared to its executive to 
be powerless. This left NUBE the sole representative body (albeit not 
recognised) and the bank was exposed to a campaign on the part of the 
union to obtain bargaining rights. Another staff association was 
constituted in 1953 (with the support of the chief general manager) and 
to get round the problem that the association could take no action to 
back up its claims, a compulsory arbitration clause, which could be 
unilaterally invoked and using an independent arbitrator, was 
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introduced. This also neutralized any threat from the statutory , t  machinery, it being inadmissable where existing procedures were 
already operating. During 1954 and 1955 each of the major cbanks, with 
the exception of Barclays, introduced similar arrangements. Barclays 
had previously recognised both their association and NUBE on separate 
but equal terms in response to Order 1305, in 1941. 
Realising that it had been pre-empted, NUBE subsequently attempted to 
use the statutory machinery to institute an industry-wide claim, but 
was unsuccessful, its application being rejected by the Ministry of 
Labour on the grounds that there was no officially constituted 
employers' body to apply an award. It also appears that the TUC and 
the Ministry both put pressure on NUBE to modify their earlier, more 
• extreme stance, (9)  with the result that it adopted a more Conciliatory 
line with regard to joint representation. Its executive committee 
sponsored a motion to reopen negotiations on national machinery at the 
1954 Annual Delegate Meeting (ADM) which confirmed this change of 
policy: 
"But this, it has been realised after thirty six years, can not be done (at present at any rate) without the participation of ihr banks' internal associations as represented on the CCBSA."' 
Indeed NUBE officials approached the Ministry of Labour as an 
intermediary in the summer of 1954 between themselves and the 
employers, but the Ministry, having met with the employers'in the 
latter part of 1954 on two occasions, subsequently informed the union 
that: 
"The employers are not convinced there is now any need for national machinery as circumstances have cha997d since 1951, 
when they were willing to take part therein." 
It was evident that national arrangements had been rendered 
superfluous by the introduction of institutional arrangements in 
several banks. (12) 
NUBE therefore turned for support to the CCBSA in the latter part of 
1954, and the principles around which a national forum could be 
developed were quickly agreed. Robinson argues that the staff 
associations were prepared to entertain the notion of some form of 
national machinery because of dissatisfaction with the pay settlement 
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 of 1954, (13)  a year in which no, consolidation of the "bonus" took 
place. Significantly however, none of the associations had sought 
redress by invoking their right to independent arbitration. 
The basis of the agreement in December 1954 between NUBS and the CCBSA 
contained the following points: 
(1) Equal representation on the staff side between both 
bodies. 
(2) National negotiations would be concerned with both 
managerial and clerical staff. 
(3) Pension rights and pension levels should be included in 
national negotiations. (14) 
(4) An independent arbitration procedure should be included in 
the agreement, and failing acceptance of a suitable 
arbitrator between the parties, the Ministry of Labour 
would make the appointment. (15) 
However, in the spring of 1955 the Ministry of Labour informed the 
staff bodies that the employers were not happy with the proposals for 
national negotiations, (16) and that it was not inclined to force them 
to enter into a commitment unwillingly. Whilst the situation dragged 
on without progress being made, there were attacks by NOSE delegates on 
"internalism" at the Annual Delegate Meeting, and in press statements, 
which soured relations between the two staff bodies. (17) These were 
ostensibly patched up however, via the mediation of the Ministry of 
Labour, and by the end of the year a statement of intent reiterating 
the principles agreed in December 1954 was issued. 
Meanwhile several difficulties had occurred which were to bring about 
the collapse of this agreement. First, Lloyds Bank Staff Association 
stated in a circular to its members in January 1956 that it could not 
gain satisfactory assurances from the bank on the status of its 
domestic arrangements. (18) Subsequently it transpired that National 
Provincial had also determined not to support the CCBSA prior to the 
(19) December announcement. 	Given that the Midland Bank Staff 
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three of the "Big Five" staff associations were outside, the 
agreements, making theM seriously weakened. -These problems were 
compounded by disagreement between the CC13SA'and NUBE over the 
operation of the joint machinery. Whilst the former envisaged 
conciliation taking place as a sort of Court of Appeal, with 
arbitration attached to it if necessary but with no prior joint 
development and negotiation of claims at a national level, the union 
had entertained the idea of negotiating machinery with the joint 
agreemeht and presentation of claims prior to any form of negotiation 
and arabitration. In early 1956 the CLCB informed the Ministry of 
Labour that no useful purpose could be served by any further meetings, 
and this news was conveyed to the staff bodies. (20) This was the last 
attempt to form national machinery until 1964. 
STAFF DISCONTENT AND THE RESPONSE OF THE BANKS AND STAFF BODIES  
Having examined the attempts to construct joint working between the 
union and staff associations, it is now intended to explain the failure 
of these in terms of the policies and objectives of the parties 
involved. These policies will be seen in the light of the two factors 
which, as argued in the introduction, were behind the pressure to 
establish joint regulation. The first factor was the Government's 
statutory recognition orders; the second the post-war discontent over 
pay in the banks. 
It will be argued that while accepting the need to respond to these 
factors by instituting formal channels of joint regulation, the banks 
were disinclined, principally for ideological reasons to favour 
recognition of the trade union, NUBE. If they were to have to share 
power they preferred to deal with their associations although at least 
initially it was assumed that they would not be able to ignore the 
union completely: hence their policy of joint recognition of the 
associations and NUBE. This however was unacceptable to the latter, at 
least until it was positively excluded from the domestic arrangements 
because of the longstanding hostility to internalism. The union 
therefore declined to accept the compromise of a joint staff side 
believing, mistakenly, that it could enforce sole recognition through 
the use of the statutory orders. 
0 
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Before this however it is necessary to consider , the discontent over pay 
in some detail; and why it emerged in all of the banks. This is 
explained by reference to the payment systeml .Couron to all of the 
clearers. This industry-wide framework established broadly equal pay 
rates throughout the banks for the majority of staff, and was the basis 
of the calls for national institutions of collective bargaining by 
`both of the staff bodies. 
(1) The Payment System 
Despite their variations in size, all of the banks operated a similar 
categorisation of staff into three main groups. The main body were 
clerical workers responsible for the routine tasks in the branches and 
departments. Senior staff with responsibility for branches and the 
operation of the bank's policies were designated in management grades 
up to the office of Chief General Manager. A third smaller group of 
non-clerical staff performed duties such as messengers, cleaners, and 
other predominantly manual tasks. (21) Within the clerical group there 
were two categories: those staff between the ages of 17 and 32 known 
as "onscale", while above that age those staff not holding a managerial 
rank were "overscale" staff. The management ranks were also 
subdivided into "appointed" and "unappointed" categories. Appointed 
officers held full management rank and normally were in charge of a 
branch or department. Those of unappointed rank were more junior, and 
held supervisory postions or performed clerical tasks which required a 
considerable element of responsibility and experience. 
All of the banks promoted exclusively from within their own 
organisations, and transfers of staff between banks were not 
permitted. The payment system was based upon age, with a standard 
grading structure for onscale staff existing in each of the banks. 
Above that scale increments were not automatic but depended upon 
individual performance and responsibilities. Nonetheless because of 
the exclusively internal labour market, and the usual degree of 
wastage of staff between the ages of 17 and 25 the banks could normally 
offer a 50% chance for all male recruits of reaching a managerial 
rank. (22) 
c 0 
Although management pay scales were not subject to .coordination, it 
was the policy of the banks toxemain broadly in harmony on pay scales 
for the onscale clerical group. The procedure for changing the 
clerical pay scales was, as the MOB emphasised, largely infoiMal; 
"There is however an understanding that the banks will discuss any proposed general alteration in remuneration with the other members of the CLCB before takingtgption, but inter-bank agreement goes no further than that. ' 
and typically an individual bank would introduce a change in its salary 
rates which would then lead to adjustments by the others. The salary 
scales thus remained similar, but not identical. The changes which are 
mentioned below therefore affected clerical staff throughout all of 
the banks in much the same way. The exception from 1952 onwards was 
Lloyds Bank which introduced a merit grading system for its male clerks 
to supplement the basic age scale, and this bank also extended the 
basic scale up to 39 years of age. Despite its non-recognition these 
modifications were similar to those put forward by NUBE in 1949 (24) to 
reward higher quality staff and at the same time recompense the 
"overscale" group more generously, in an effort to deal with the banks' 
already evident problems of over-recruitment which will now be 
considered. 
(2) Sources of Discontent  
There is little doubt that the campaign to institute collective 
bargaining to which the banks responded so positively was at least in 
part the result of an unprecedented degree of staff discontent over 
trends in pay after 1940, to which both NUBE and the staff associations 
responded with vigorous policies, particularly after the war. 
One element of this discontent resulted from the compression of the 
differential for clerical staff, and in particular between the 
overscale and the younger onscale groups. This trend is illustrated in 
the accompanying table which shows that between 1939 and 1952, the 
salary offered on entry for male clerks at 17 had tripled while over 
the same period, the level of pay for staff aged 31 (that is with 
15 years service) had not even doubled, and the position of the 
overscale staff was probably worse, although their pay was not 
published. 
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It should be emphasised however that there was not only a change in the 
, structure of pay iii the clearing banks, but also an absolute decline in 
real terms cbipared to the pre-war levels, forh11. grades of staff. - By 
1951 this trend was already marked, as the'"The Banker" cOminented:' 
"But the fact remains that a clerk with 15 years service who did not receive any ... special allowances in 1950 (except for a 170 or 20% cost of living payment) would have received at most 67% 
more than his predecessors did in 1938; this contrasts with a rise of 90% in the Oxford Institute of Statistics 'Salaried Cost of Living Index' between 1938-49, and a rise of 129% in average industrial earnings. It is *possible to give any comparable figures for changes in 'overscale' salaries (which ariwevised annually and which differ widely from bank to bank)."' 
Not only had real pay levels for most of the experienced bank staff 
declined but, in general, bank pay relative to the manual sector, where 
stronger trade unions were operating and wages were regulated by 
collective bargaining, had also suffered. Whilst the decline in white 
collar remuneration as compared to the manual sector was a general 
trend in this period, (26) from 1938 onwards there is little doubt that 
it was a source of dissatisfaction for bank clerks particularly, who 
regarded themselves as the "aristocracy of clerks". (27) 
The banks' staff bodies were also concerned about the practice of 
making non-consolidated bonus awards in substitution for changes in 
basic salary. This practice was adopted during the war, and continued 
until the late 1950's. The bonus, calculated as a percentage of gross 
pay, was usually unilaterally determined by the managements on the 
basis of changes in the cost of living but was not included in pension 
or sick pay calculations. In fact the banks would allow these bonus 
payments to be repeatedly increased, rather than consolidated, over a 
period of several years, say from 1946 to 1951 for example, during 
which time the non-consolidated element had reached 271% of basic pay. 
This was consistently opposed by the staff bodies. 
These policies were a consequence of a combination of the recruitment 
practices which have just been outlined, and the trends in their 
corporate growth. Firstly, because of their policies of exclusively 
internal promotion the banks annually had to recruit a large number of 
school leavers for their future staffing needs. Yet these people were 
in a market characterized by a growing demand for those with clerical 
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skills and as such the banks had little'option but to meet the rising 
market price. On the other hand, (the banks did have more leeway with 
the senior clerks because the age related pay scale conferred a premium 
on experience which with the potential for promotion and the standard 
"perks" offered by the banks of cheap mortgages and non-contributory 
pensions made the cost of transferring employment increase as an 
employee's length of service rose. 
The demand for school leavers was relieved to an extent by the 
increasing recruitment of females, a practice which had become more 
coalman during the war and led to the growth of an informal tiering of 
career/Male and non-career/female staff, (28) the latter being employed 
on the assumption that the large majority would leave during their 
twenties. But the staff bodies argued in the 1950's and 60's that the 
effect of this constant turnover of staff was to place further strain 
on the "overscale" experienced clerks, who had to shoulder the burden 
of coping with the expansion of services as well as training and 
supporting new recruits. Yet this group of staff was at the same time 
having to tolerate a reduction in the premium paid to them over the 
younger recruts. (29) Both the staff associations and the union 
repeatedly based claims for a restoration of the earlier differentials 
between the "onscale" and "overscale" staff on this argument of 
increasing responsibility being assumed by the older unappointed 
staff. 
In addition to this the whole question was aggravated by the existence 
of an over-supply of staff who had been recruited in the inter-war 
period, and who faced reduced opportunities for promotion to 
managerial rank because the banks had failed to grow at the rates they 
had previously planned. This problem of the "bulge" as it was 
known, (30)  derived from the stagnation in the growth of the banks in 
the 1950's largely as a result of the decision of the Governments from 
1951 onwards to use interest rates as a means of monetary control, (31) 
whilst other financial intermediaries expanded at the expense of the 
clearing banks. Hence while in December 1951 they had held nearly 80% 
of total deposits, by the end of 1967 their share had dropped to nearly 
30%. By 1966 clearing bank deposits were only three times the size of 
those held by the secondary market, having been 15 times their size in 
1951. Similarly, advances stagnated in the 1950's: while in the pre- 
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war.years the ratio of advances to deposits had averaged about 50%, 
this dropped to a trough of around-30% by 1958. (32) 
Undoubtedly this slow growth served to intensify the existing 
discontent of career oriented staff whose opportunities for 
advancement and better pay were significantly lower than the pre-war 
years. This encouraged the growth in union membership and the calls 
for more aggressive pay strategies. By 1950/1 both the union and the 
staff associations were campaigning vigorously against the pay 
policies of the banks although no formal negotiating channels existed. 
Fbr the associations this was in marked contrast to their pre-war 
passivity, and culminated in the collapse and dissolution of the 
Midland staff association. The union also claimed increases in 
membership to the extent that in the Midland for example, it argued 
that it represented over 50% of the staff. (33) 
If we look at the nature of the protests by the staff it is evident 
that they were in fact quite moderate. Discontent was mainly expressed 
through the correspondence in newspapers and magazines, or by 
individual staff to management. The most overt form of organised 
protest was the petition organised by NUBE in 1950 which gathered 
53,167 signatures out of a total staff of about 90,000, although NUBE's 
membership at the time was only 30,000. (34) 
Nonetheless this was sufficient to alarm the banks and the rapidity 
with which the employers each contracted to enter domestic bargaining 
agreements must therefore be seen as an attempt to institutionalise 
this growing discontent. Indeed it will be remembered that the banks 
had been prepared to establish bargaining arrangements at national 
level in 1951, indicating that their priority was not initially to work 
at the domestic level and exclude NUBE, but rather to introduce greater 
stability into the process of changing pay levels. 
(3) THE, RESPONSE OF THE PARTIES TO PAY DISCONTENT 
(i) The Staff Associations  
Firstly it is pertinent to note that the associations were repeatedly 
prepared to consider the prospect of working with NUBE in national 
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machinery. 	Despite their internalist philosophy they were not 
exclusively institutional in:theif orientation (exCept for the hard-
line Midland association) even if the enthusiasm for national 
bargaining was principally to head-off the threat posed by the 
Statutory Orders of exclusive recognition for NUBE. Nonetheless, even 
after domestic bargaining had been established it was claimed by one 
chairman of the CCBSA that they had never "closed the door" completely 
to the idea of a joint national forum with the union. (35) Mbreover, as 
Blackburn (36) noted, the very existence of the CCBSA was an 
institutional expression of their extra-domestic interests. There 
appeared to be a persistent tension between internalist principles and 
the desire to optimise bargaining effectiveness by being party to 
machinery at national level where pay decisions were agreed by the 
employers. In this respect, it is pertinent to not that the 
discussions on national machinery took place during periods of evident 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of pay settlements, in 1951/2 and 
1954/5, and that the latter discussions were also conducted after the 
domestic agreements had been signed. 
In these discussions, there was however a fundamental constitutional 
problem in the CCBSA's position. This derived from a suspicion of any 
centralised rule-making body among the associations on the grounds 
that this presented a threat to the principle of domestic autonomy. 
Hence, the CCBSA could only make decisions with unanimous consent, and 
could not compel the constituent associations to abide by its 
agreements being only a forum for exchange of information and 
consultation. This made agreement between the staff bodies difficult 
to achieve without some form of external compulsion, either from the 
employers or from the state. In the absence of this pressure, because 
there were some associations which were suspicious of NUBE's 
longstanding antagonism to internalism and its declared aim of sole 
negotiating rights, these could easily undermine any deals between the 
union and the CCBSA. While one condition for a joint forum between the 
staff bodies therefore appeared to be the support of all or a large 
majority of the associations of the "Big Five" banks, given the 
unequivocal opposition of the Midland, and the (weaker) opposition of 
the National Provincial and Lloyds bodies throughout this period, this 
was unlikely to be achieved voluntarily. 
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Secondly, the character of , the associations "began to change in 
response to the°post-war pay changes and they developed the functions 
of trade unions. The dissolution of the Midland association after the 
row in 1951 was the first clear indication that being confronted with 
widespread staff dissatisfaction, they could no longer remain passive 
adjuncts to management, as in the inter-war period. Their role in 
defending the interests of their members through formal regulatory 
channels meant that in one sense they became more like NUBE, a factor 
which, technically at least, enhanced the possibilities of working 
with it. Over the question of sanctions however, the associations 
continued to oppose the possibility of invoking "orthodox" trade union 
means. 
This presented a serious problem to inter-union cooperation because 
without arbitration it meant that they would be powerless. If they 
entered joint working with NUBE they would therefore be effectively 
swamped by it, and unable to demonstrate their distinctive philosophy 
in practice. Alternatively, if they tried to operate in competition 
with the union to protest the living standards of their members their 
lack of bargaining power would soon be revealed. 
The facility of compulsory arbitration which was incorporated into the 
domestic agreements was therefore a crucial innovation. On the one 
hand, being invokable by either party (the banks or the associations) 
it obviated the need to introduce any threat of sanctions into the 
bargaining process, enabling the associations to claim that they were 
effective representatives, while sustaining the internalist 
proposition of cooperation between staff and employer based on common 
interests. At the same time the banks had to forego their previously 
unilateral control over pay and conditions and confer a degree of power 
upon the associations by accepting their rights to request a third 
party adjudication in the event of a dispute. Nevertheless, sharing 
power in this way did at least avoid the threat of conflict. It also 
removed any necessity for the associations to cooperate with NUBE, and 
thus having to compromise their principles or even risking their 
continued existence. 
In fact this innovation was considered sufficiently successful for the 
associations subsequently to develop a rationale justifying the 
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intrinsic superiorly of domestic bargaining on practical as well as 
ideological grounds. These were: c 
C. (1) that the introduction of domestic machinery began to pay 
dividends in terms of halting the decline in the standard 
of living of their members from 1955 and providing a 
satisfactory means of coping with the issue of internal 
pay differentials. The data on onscale salaries would 
suggest that this was broadly correct. See table 2.1. 
(2) that domestic arrangements offered the best opportunity to 
maximise bargaining expertise, because the bargainers were 
close to the questions at hand, and because the decision 
makers on management's side were those who were involved 
in negotiating. 
(3) allied to the "expertise" argument, that domestic 
arrangements between the staff association and management 
enabled a special relationship to be bulit up, and 
confidential information to be divulged by the latter 
which would be witheld in the presence of competitors or a 
negotiating body such as NUBE which was not purely 
internal. 
(4) that any joint national arrangement would impinge upon the 
status of the staff association as the sole representative 
body in domestic negotiations. Thus the bank would not 
feel able to negotiate upon a matter domestically if it 
was thereafter to be discussed by differing bargaining 
agents at another level, and implicitly, the arbitration 
arrangements would have to be dismantled or re-jigged. (37) 
Furthermore, these principles not only accounted for the withdrawal of 
the association from further discussions on joint national machinery, 
but they came to represent the basis of a permanent justification for 
superior utility of domestic bargaining which was sustained even after 
the introduction of national negotiations. 
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(ii) !JBE 	narrative highlighted the longstanding nature of the 
union's demand for sole recognition in national machinery, the origins 0 and reasoning behind this policy having been discussed in the 
introductory chapter. While the union still felt it could enforce its 
demands it refused to countenance joint working at' several. key 
junctures, and only. adopted this as a second-best , olicy when it became 
aware that its primary objective was unachievable. Because it was only 
with the associations incorporated into the arrangements that the 
banks would entertain the prospect of union recognition, the failure 
to establish a national form in this period is ultimately explained by 
the union's decision not to compromise its principles until too late. 
This in turn is related to a series of mistaken judgements as regards 
the effectiveness of its policies to enforce the demand for 
recognition in the face of recalcitrant employers. 
Firstly, it would seem that the ideological abhorrence of joint 
working led the union to over-estimate its strength in the context of 
the Statutory Orders. 	It was over-optimistic in seeing this 
legislation as a means to enforce recognition, and repeatedly 
surprised by the preference of the Ministry of Labour for voluntary 
agreement rather than compulsion. This enabled the banks to present 
alternative initiatives which predictably included the associations, 
and were therefore unacceptable. Until 1954 the union was confident 
that no such compromise would be necessary. 	Similarly it 
optimistically assumed that the achievement of majority membership in 
the clearing banks as a whole would necessitate recognition; however 
not only did this policy prove unachievable overall, but even in 
specific banks where a majority was reached, the union was disarmed by 
the hostility of individual managements (most notably in the Midland 
after the collapse of the old association) and the voluntarist 
approach of the Ministry of Labour to which it turned. The measure of 
the union's misjudgement is shown by the fact that it was still trying 
to invoke Order 1376 against the associations at the time of its repeal 
several years after the domestic agreements had been signed. 
Thirdly, a more pragmatic approach of cooperation had actually emerged 
within some sections of the union in the post-war period, as was 
evident in the initially cautious response to the 1951 initiative of 
the CCBSA. And after the introduction of the domestic agreements 
-56- . 	 c . „ 	. 	, 	. . I, 	. . 	- MBE's executive, aware that the initiative had been taken away, , 	. endorsed this Hi* wholeheartedly. However the diitaste for a more co- o operative strategy which persisted among some sections of the union c contributed to the suspicions of the by now securely recognised CCBSA ,, members, and undermined the chances of success of any conciliatory 
approach. Henceforth in fact a persistent themein NUBE's policies as 
(regards its relations with the associations was the division between 
traditionalist and cooperatist elements within the union. As will be 
shown, it is a point which is fundamental to an understanding of the 
structure of staff representation in the clearing banks. 
There was, then, a sequence of misjudged policies which left the union 
isolated and unrecognised. With no new policy proposals it fell back 
upon the policy of pursuing majority membership which had already 
proved not only to be highly difficult to achieve throughout all the 
banks, but also inadequate as a means of enforcing recognition in the 
face of employer recalcitrance. It also adopted political lobbying in 
the latter part of the decade, but without success, (38) and it was in 
the light of the evident failure of its policies that the complaint 
which led to the Cameron Inquiry was formulated and which is discussed 
in the next chapter. 
(iii) The Clearing Banks First is it accurate to group all the banks 
together? In that they were confronting similar problems, yes; 
furthermore they broadly appeared to want the same sort of mechanisms 
to regulate staff conditions, and to oppose the same things in this 
context. Hence the Midland Bank initiative with regard to formalising 
a domestic procedure and the arbitration facility was quickly copied 
by the majority of the other banks. 
The problem confronting the employers was that discontent over pay 
suggested the need for more formal channels of communication, and some 
form of joint wage regulation. This coincided with the post war 
attempts to gain stricter control over wage costs which required the 
maximum discretion to adjust pay structures as the banks saw fit. 
Joint decision-making therefore presented the contradiction of being a 
means to institutionalise discontent but simultaneously of reducing 
the discretion of the banks in determining changes to the pay 
structure. In the event the outcome was a compromise whereby the 
0 policies of compressing the differentials  was largely halted after 
1955 but there was no return to the real levels of pay of the pre-war 
era. 
In the light of the pressures to control labour costs and because the 
banks believed that the Statutory Orders would necessitate some sort 
of formal bargaining relationship, their chief concern appeared to be 
with the nature of the bargaining agent. They were hostile to 
recognition of NUBE on its own, believing that having to deal with a 
trade 'union would be incompatible with the paternalism of the 
"special" employment relationship in banking, and were keen to include 
the associations in any arrangement as a means of moderating the 
union's potential to use its bargaining power. In this sense the 
associations, which had been extremely docile in the pre-war period, 
could act as a form of "peaceful competition" (39) to the union even if 
it was recognised. There was also the view that separate bargaining 
rights with more than one union, whatever its character, was not 
conducive to stability or efficiency. (40) In 1951, and later in 1964 
the policy of the banks was therefore to create a joint staff side if 
they had to recognise both staff bodies. But until 1953 the 
possibility of excluding NUBE completely did not seem to have been 
considered a realistic policy, presumably because of the assumption 
that it could invoke the assistance of the Statutory Order and the 
Ministry of Labour's intervention. 
Although the preference for domestic recognition emerged initially as 
a somewhat ad hoc response to a crisis in the Midland Bank, it was 
quickly copied elsewhere, ostensibly reflecting a common concern to 
stabilise bargaining arrangements by dealing with a single 
representative body. But the crucial decision for the banks concerned 
the nature of the bargaining agent rather than the particular 
bargaining level. Although some were to claim that the associations 
were selected because they were the majority body, this was factually 
disputable, particularly in the case of the Midland where the staff 
association was given recognition immediately it was reconstituted and 
before its membership was established. In general it appears that the 
banks found it more desirable to avoid dealing with the union which 
could theoretically resort to using sanctions, particularly when they 
were imposing unpopular controls on wage costs. 
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Domestic bargaining did not per se guarantee lower wage rises than 
national agreements. Indeed by virtue,of the banks' policy of -staying 
in line on pay levels they could be faced with a sequence of individual 
claims which, if successful, would lead to rises throughout the 
industry as the banks were played off against each other. The 
susceptibility to "leapfrogging" was also enhanced by the existence of 
the compulsory arbitration facility which could take pay decisions 
ultimately out of the hands of the parties themselves. It was this 
point which made the selection of the bargaining agent the critical 
factor for the banks, their decision being based it would seem upon the 
assumption that the associations would remain relatively quiescent. 
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We have. shown What conditions prompted the introduction of domestic 
machinery. What was it then that made the employers turn bo national 
machinery and recognition of NUBE some ten years after they had 
explicitly declared this preference for internal arrangements which 
excluded the unori? In the following section we will explore the 
`changing conditions and the pressures upon the banks which made 
national collective bargaining a more appropriate mode of managing the 
terms and conditions under which their staff were employed. 
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CBRESS IN THE BANdAINING ENVIECRENT• AFTER 1960  
INIRODUCTION 
Ihe following two chapters will trace the emergence of new conditions 
in the banking industry which influenced the decision of a majority of 
the banks to overturn their previous preference for domestic 
bargaining, and to recognise NUBE in national negotiating machinery. 
In this chapter it will be argued that two factors contributed to this. 
Firstly it will be suggested that the utility to the banks of domestic 
negotiations declined after 1960, as the new bargaining, strategies 
adopted by several of the associations were shown to be incompatible 
with those of the employers. By resorting to arbitration to press 
their claims, the associations also significantly diminished the 
banks' discretion over their costs. The traditional annualised basis 
of pay bargaining began to disintegrate with "leapfrogging" 
settlements, under pressure both from economic factors, and from 
renewed efforts by NUBE to discredit the associations as a means of 
obtaining recognition. Inter-union competition therefore influenced 
the conduct of negotiations even though NUBE had still not gained pay 
bargaining rights. 
Secondly, the banks' decision to institute national bargaining stemmed 
from a broader political factor. This arose out of a renewal by the 
union of its strategy of using external parties to pursue its 
recognition claim. Specifically, NUBE complained to the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) that several banks were allegedly pursuing 
unfair labour practices by using their associations as the means to 
avoid entering proper representative channels. This resulted not only 
in extensive (and unwelcome) publicity for the banks, but a formal 
enquiry instituted by the Government. 
It is argued that NUBE's decision to make this complaint derived from a 
realisation that, alone, it was insufficiently powerful to compel the 
banks to recognise it. Yet whilst the ensuing inquiry (under 
Lord Cameron) was successful in persuading a majority of the banks to 
consider establishing a national negotiating forum, the union was 
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unable to institute a broad ranging investigation into the nature of 
representation in the clearing. banks as a whole. This is explained -in 
terms of Lord Cameron's preference for the narrowest interpretation of 
his terms of reference, and the legalistic style in which his inquiry 
was conducted. 
As a result NUBE was unable to secure its fundamental aim of outlawing 
the associations and securing sole recognition. Under the Cameron 
proposals, if it was to achieve national bargaining rights it had to 
accept the legitimacy of the internalist organisations and their 
claims to recognition by working with them. It is concluded that 
although NUBE acquiesced to this proposal, it still saw this 
essentially as a step towards its ultimate goal of sole negotiating 
rights, rather than as a permanent compromise. The 'underlying 
competition between the staff bodies was thus by no means resolved. 
Moreover a significant group of banks and associations remained 
unconvinced of the need for national bargaining for reasons which are 
explored in some detail. The instigation of a national forum could not 
be guaranteed when talks started in 1964. 
(1) PAY BARGAINING DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1960  
This section considers the changes in pay bargaining after 1960 
developing from: 
(a) Reference to a wider range of determinants by the associations 
in more aggressive bargaining strategies. 
(b) The willingness to have recourse to arbitration. 
(c) The development of more overt "leapfrogging" in domestic 
bargaining. 
On their own, we would argue that the changes to pay bargaining were 
insufficient to stimulate the introduction of discussions on national 
machinery. Nonetheless they must be regarded as a stimulus to reform 
insofar as the increasingly unpredictable bargaining environment and 
growth of overt competitiveness between the staff associations reduced 
the utility of the existing arrangements for the banks. 
Firstly then let us consider the implications of the bargaining 
strategies adopted by some of the larger associations. Until 1960, 
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while expressing concern about the "overscale position" they limited ,  
• the basis of claims'to changes in the cost of living. These were 
inevitably retrospective catching-up exercises which moreover offered 
no scope fcr increases in real income. After this rpoiht the 
associations called upon a much broader range of determinants in an 
effort to re-establish the spending power of their members at its pre-
war position. These determinants included rising productivity and 
increased effort, the profitability of the bank, comparability, and 
resistance to further narrowing of differentials. (1) 
The response of the banks was largely to reject the relevance of these 
criteria or challenge the basis of the associations' calculations even 
where some acknowledgement of newer determinants was granted. Fbr 
example, Lloyds denied the legitimacy of any arithmetical.comparison 
between the salary structure on the one hand and on the other the 
productivity of the staff, however measured, and the profitability of 
the bank. (2) 
Furthermore the banks tended to reject or seriously question the 
argument that productivity among more senior staff had risen markedly, 
at least in the negotiating environment. In the absence of access to 
precise data, the associations' cases were shown to be weak, which did 
throw into question their ability to bargain effectively. Mbre 
generally it demonstrated the difficulties of productivity bargaining 
in banking, both because of a lack of data, and the lack of a clear and 
agreed definition of the means of measuring it. 
The banks also rejected the argument that staff had not shared in their 
increased prosperity. For instance, the Midland suggested that the 
trends in salaries and published profits between 1957 and 1961 were 
closely related. The fact that the banks did not publish actual 
profits, and could therefore "massage" their figures, in theory rather 
undermined the force of this argument, although it was not questioned 
at the time. (3) The tendency of the associations to return to their 
old argument which used the pre-war position as a base-point in their 
pay claims was also rejected. Instead they argued that market 
conditions had to determine pay: it was, 
"quite impossible to relate salary levels to those existing twenty years earlier - it was the responsibility of a bank to 
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assess realistic levels of remunerqtion for all grades of staff 
applicable to current conditions."" 
But -from'1960 onwards the divergence in the principles of pay 
determination was further elaborated by the recourse to arbitration 
because both sides had to present explicit justifications for their 
claims. The influence of third parties upon the outcome of (  
negotiations also further complicated the ability of the employers to 
restrict pay determination to market needs as they saw them. While 
factors' such as productivity and the responsibilities shouldered by 
senior staff were acknowledged to be relevant pay determinants in 
these tribunals, they were not accepted as legitimate by the banks. 
Their persistence with the "going rate" and recruitment needs was 
therefore not only increasingly incompatible with agreement at the 
bargaining table it was also out of tune with official policy which was 
becoming more concerned with productivity as the prime determinant of 
pay, (5) and with the decisions of the tribunals. 
At the time restricting wage costs was of central importance to the 
banks, because of their slow post-war growth record, and then because 
of the direction in which their corporate objectives developed. As 
noted in the last chapter, in the early 1950's the banks' lending and 
deposit base stagnated under the imposition of official controls, but 
from 1958 they were able to expand more as credit restrictions were 
lifted. However, their typical mode of growth which was to extend the 
branch networks was extremely expensive as it necessitated not only a 
higher investment in fixed capital but the employment of more staff. 
As a result there was a substantial rise in the number of bank staff in 
this period from 105,819 in December 1959 to 144,775 in December 1965 
and 196,875 by the end of 1970. (6)  Yet as labour was the principal 
item of expenditure in the banks' accounts, constituting about 67% of 
total operating costs, controls on wages could have a significant 
impact on profit margins. Mbreover, as other substantial costs such as 
premises, money transmission and technological investment were largely 
fixed, operational management controls tended to focus upon the item 
of employment costs where there was arguably room for some discretion. 
Secondly, because the banks were facing an increasingly tight labour 
market they turned to the recruitment of females to staff this 
expansion. Between 1960 and 1964 two female recruits entered banking 
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to every one male, the proportion of female staff rising from-40% of 
the total at the beginning of the decade to 48% by recember,1965, and 
representing an increase in absolute terms of 26,108 females. (7) But 
it was thought that as this group were less likely to want to pursue " a 
lifelong career, their pay had to be nom closely linked to comparable 
rates in the market. To offset the costs involved, the banks opted to 
try and compress the differentials in favour of the younger age-cohort 
of staff once more, despite the previous unpopularity of this. 
It is arguable however that the more robust bargaining strategies 
adopted by the associations were not solely in reponse to employer 
policies however, but also a response to pressure from NUBE. 
Explaining their new policies the staff associations argued that while 
the settlement of 1955 temporarily stopped the post war decline in 
conditions, this was resumed in the late 1950's (8) but a sense of 
responsibility in the face of the national economic crisis and years of 
credit restraint led them to postpone more aggressive bargaining until 
1960. (9) Recourse to arbitration was threatened a couple of times 
prior to 1960 but more determined bargaining was non-existent, until 
NUBE's proposed complaint to the ILO was publicised. So it may 
plausibly be argued competitive pressures were instrumental in pushing 
the associations into action, although they strongly denied this. (10) 
Certainly it seems significant that the three associations which were 
subsequently most hostile to the idea of joint negotiation with NUBE 
were among those which pursued arbitration both before and during the 
Cameron Inquiry and the start of talks on national machinery. (11) 
In particular, the Midland association submitted an interim claim in 
1964 which contravened the 12 month pay settlement rule and which 
subsequently led to the NBPI's investigation just as it was 
orchestrating the "considerable opposition" (12) to the CCBSA joining 
the working party on national machinery. This claim also flew in the 
face of the association's erstwhile concern for responsibility and the 
national interest. Its action is more plausibly explained if we accept 
that the possibility of an alternative to domestic machinery appeared 
to present a threat to the ultra -internalist associations which it was 
thought could best be subdued by generating membership support by 
demonstrating the superiority of internal arrangements. 
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Finally, the effects of income policies were beginning to be'felt, 
restricting pay rises in 1962 and 1963, although this factor was more 
directly influential after 1965. (13) Already it had restricted the 
banks' ability to adhere to the market rates. The official restraint 
also led to a much more explicit coordinating policy on the part of the 
employers to adjtist pay back to a national norm, enhancing NUBE's 
assertion that it was not an institutional matter and should not be 
dealt with as such. In the face of this argument the response of the 
more militant associations was to try and reassert their effectiveness 
by threatening a sequence of domestic claims on the resumption of free 
bargaining. Hence the effect of incomes restraint was also to 
highlight the competitiveness of the staff bodies, with NUBE arguing 
that the associations and institutional arrangements were quite 
evidently inadequate in the light of new influences upon the process of 
pay determination, and the response of the associations being to try 
and disprove such allegations. 
We have then evidence of collapse in several dimensions of the 
established method of pay negotiation. A sequence of claims led to a 
more aggressive bargaining climate in which failure to reach agreement 
became more frequent because of reference to fundamentally differing 
pay criteria. Moreover the banks found that arbitrators were 
sympathetic to associations' cases and awarded in their favour. 
Subsequently the twelve month interval between rises was broken, after 
the strain of official controls and more overt "leapfrogging" claims 
developed, and while the result in terms of costs may not have been 
highly damaging to the banks, it was evident to several of them that 
the utility of domestic negotiation had declined, and that more formal 
coordination would be appropriate. 
It was also evident that despite the non-recognition of NUBE it was 
still able to assert pressure upon the associations, forcing them to 
become more aggressive in bargaining. This pressure was centrally 
related to the union's decision once again to seek help from an outside 
body, to secure recognition. 
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(2) THE CAMERON INXIRY • 
• 
Introduction  
Through the Cameron Inquiry (14) NUKE achieved its aim of obtaining a 
public investigation into the whole question of representation in the 
London clearing banks, although the Inquiry was specifically concerned 
with four banks where NUBE claimed its relationship, with the employers 
was particularly poor. In the following section NUBE's complaint to 
the ILO (15) which preceded the Inquiry will be examined, then the 
arguments within the Cameron Report. Finally, the Inquiry will be 
placed in the context of the events which took place afterwards, 
leading to the signing of the national agreement. 
There are two main arguments made about the influence of the Inquiry. 
The first relates to the narrow construction which Cameron placed upon 
it. This meant that while NUBE achieved partial success, it could not 
enforce an examination into industrial relations in general in the 
banking industry. As a result it could not achieve an outlawing of the 
staff associations under the ILO conventions, and the enforcement of 
its claim to exclusive recognition on the banks. Rather, the result 
was a compromise in which NUBE finally had to accept the . rights of 
recognition of the associations and thus the prospect of sharing power 
with them in any national body. 
Secondly however, the significance of the Inquiry is assessed in terms 
of the crucial change of policy by the banks with their decision to 
institute talks on national bargaining soon after. It is argued that 
sensitivity to political and public scrutiny did influence this 
decision, as well as the problems emerging in pay bargaining at the 
time. The divisions between the banks over this are examined in some 
detail however to demonstrate that the reform Cameron proposed was by 
no means inevitable when talks between the parties started. On the one 
hand several banks were keen to institute national negotiations which 
included NUBE with the associations to establish more formalised and 
stable arrangements. On the other, the ideological hostility to 
dealing with a trade union persisted despite the shortcomings of the 
existing situation. There were also divisions within the 
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associations. So recognition was not assured at this point, despite 
the post-1960 changes and the shift in attitudes among the majority of 
the clearers, the old obstacles to national arrangements still being 
considerable. 
The Basis of NUBE's Complaint to the ILO 
NUKE argued that the events leading up to the Inquiry were a reflection 
of the unique position in which it was placed with regard to obtaining 
recognition. In effect the frustrated attempts to deploy the 
Statutory Orders (1305 and 1376) as a means of forcing the banks to 
recognise the union nationally, and the disinclination of the Ministry 
of Labour to compel the employers to do so obliged the union to look 
elsewhere. By establishing domestic arrangements with the staff 
associations, the banks had effectively isolated the union and 
successfully countered the union's recognition strategies. It 
therefore turned to the International Labour Organisation, complaining 
about what it saw as unfair labour practices which prevented it from 
fulfilling its role as a trade union, through the offices of the 
( TUC. (16)  
The basis of the Cbmplaint was the transgression of Article 2 Clause 2 
of the ILO convention Number 98 which reads: 
"In particular, acts which are designed to promote the 
establishment of workers' organisations under the domination of 
employers or employers' organisations, or to support workers' 
organisations by financial or other means, with the object of 
placing such organisations under the control of employers or 
employers' organisations shall be deemed to constWite acts of 
interference within the meaning of this Article." 
The first seven paragraphs of NUBE's Complaint set out the general 
basis for their action. Charges were levelled specifically against 
four banks, the District, Martins and National Provincial amongst the 
London clearing banks, and the Yorkshire Bank, at that time 
predominantly a savings bank. However the phrasing of the charge made 
clear the general nature of the accusation that, 
... the banking employers are able to prevent this union from exercising its normal trade union function because of the exbanksistence8) of internal staff associations in the major ."1 1 
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and that they had been able to perpetrate 
"... the facade of sf representation through internal house 
staff associations. " 
Indeed, the four banks were only named specifically on the grounds that 
the discrimination against the union and support of the staff 
association was most blatant. 
The phiasing of the Complaint also indicated NUBE's unwillingness to 
enter into a working relationship or even to tolerate the existence of 
the house associations, its aim being sole representative rights. The 
internal bodies were accused of being evidence per se of contravention 
of the IIA's convention. (20) Nonetheless the main thrust was against 
the employers who ostensibly sustained the dependent staff 
associations through various measures of support, financial and 
otherwise. The need to sustain such a relationship stemmed from the 
employers' intention to frustrate NUBE's 
prope 
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f5id normal function as a trade union in the banking 
industry." 
The proposition implicitly advanced here was that any trade union 
which had established membership among a group of employees had the 
right to full recognition from their employer, for collective 
bargaining purposes. This contradicted the employers' argument, as 
expressed by Sir Oliver Franks as the Chairman of the CLCB, which 
contended that no such right existed and that it was the prerogative of 
an emplOyer(s) to select which representative body it would deal with, 
and to ignore those which it deemed inappropriate. (22)  
NUKE also argued that Article 4 of the same convention was tantamount 
to a justification for the introduction of national machinery. The 
union did not however attempt to found their case upon this article. 
As a signatory to the ILO convention, the UK Government was approached 
by the MO to submit a response to the allegations. After gathering 
evidence from the accused parties, via the Government, the Committee 
of Freeko of Association concluded that, in view of the contradictory 
nature of the submissions as between plaintiff and accused, the whole 
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matter had to be referred back for clarificatiOn. The UR ariernrreht 
was to hold, 
" ... an impartial, full and prompt inquiry into the facts of the case and to endeavour to rote an agreed settlement on the basis of such an inquiry." 
In other words the ILO favoured placing the obligation of solution in 
the hands of the signatory power rather than intervening directly, and 
the Government's obligation to be actively involved in this process 
was made clear. Yet the emphasis of the ILO's instructions appeared to 
be essentially pragmatic, as it was primarily concerned with effecting 
a compromise solution, rather than pursuing a prosecution. 
The Government agreed to the ILO request to hold an inquiry, and the 
Minister of Labour appointed Lord Cameron, Scottish Judge and chairman 
of previous Courts of Inquiry into industrial relations disputes, (24) 
to convene and report subsequently. Three assessors, one each 
nominated by the CLCB, the CO3SA and the union were also appointed to 
sit with Lord Cameron, whose terms of reference were to inquire into 
the Cbmplaint made by NUBE to the ILO and to report to the Government. 
Lord Cameron held no powers to settle the dispute directly nor to 
conciliate, mediate or arbitrate between the parties to it. His job 
was to hear the evidence of each party and to draw some ordered insight 
from the apparent factual confusion. Evidence was given between 
30 April and 29 May 1963, and the Report was published, after 
presentation to parliament, on 28 November that year. 
The Narrow Remit of the Inquiry 
From the outset NUBE's strategy of using the Complaint and the Inquiry 
as a means of drawing attention to the question of recognition and 
national machinery was frustrated by the narrow interpretation of the 
terms of reference preferred by Lord Cameron. The remit was limited to 
the particular matters set out in the Complaint concerning the named 
banks, (25) the function of the Inquiry being to establish the factual 
veracity of the allegations, or otherwise. The central issue of 
domination of the staff associations was to turn on this point, and was 
to be kept separate at all times from the question of recognition and 
national machinery, upon which Lord Cameron emphasised he was not fit 
to judge. 
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Thisrnarrow remit meant that evidence submitted by MBE which was 
either not directly relevant to the allegations in the Complaint, or of 
a circumstantiil nature was not accepted. Fbr instance the question of 
the effectiveness of the staff associations as negotiating bodies was 
thought by Lord Cameron, 
n
... only faintly (if at all) relevant to the issue that a 
particular association might be employer-dominated, not at some 
distant period of time, at the period to which the Complaint 
was properly directed." 
From Cameron's interpretation of Article 2, domination could be 
detected from two classes of acts, both of which constituted acts of 
interference in a worker's organisation. These were, 
"... either initial promotion of the type of organisation described or 
support of an organisation, whatever its origins ..." (27) 
In each case the objective of the employer was the crucial test of 
guilt. As Cameron noted, 
n
... the promotion or support must be for the purpose of 
domination so that the mere fact of promotion or support of 
workers' p anisations is not per se a contravention of the 
Article." 
It was noted as well that the Article was not specific in categorising 
any employer actions which might be held to impute guilt.( .29)  In 
contrast to the legislative codes existing in the United States for 
example which offered specific criteria in order to test the 
proposition of domination in practice, this Article remained highly 
generalised. 
The process of cross examination of the witnessess revealed the 
shortcomings of much of the factual evidence offered by NUBE. Not only 
did many of the allegations predate the signing of the convention, and 
thereby become irrelevant, but there were also inaccuracies and 
mistakes, particularly in respect of subscriptions charged by the 
associations, the extent of their financial independence from the 
banks, and their membership figures. NUBE had also suggested that the 
staff associations had put their houses in order directly as a result 
of the initial announcement of the intention to bring the Complaint in 
1960, (30)  for example by contacting the Registrar of the Friendly 
O 
Societies with a view to registering as trade unions.in the cases of 
A 
the District arid National Provincial Bank Staff Associations, 	and 
more overtly, by pursuing claims to arbitration, whereas in cthe 1950's 
no arbitration was held in the clearing banks. (32)  No proof of this 
argument could be produced however. These shortcomings were 
unsurprising, given that NUBE had based its allegations on assumptions 
and hearsay, and would have had little opportunity of checking the 
evidence it was bringing against the staff associations with those 
bodies. The cross examination of the union officials (33) by the 
counsels for the banks and staff associations naturally focused upon 
the weak factual evidence which in several points the officials were 
obliged to admit was incorrect and to withdraw. (34) This clearly did 
little for the weight of the union's case. 
The Report's Conclusions  
The chairman's concluding remarks took up a substantial section of the 
Report, and were split into two parts, Conclusion in Fact, (35) and 
General COnclusions. (36) Lord Cameron clearly attempted to relate the 
specific questions to which the Inquiry had been addressed to more 
general features of the conduct of industrial relations in the 
clearing banks, and to move beyond the immediate task of settling the 
facts, into one of proposing fundamental reforms of the relationships 
between employers and staff bodies. (37) There is then a fairly clear 
dividing line between the narrow construction of the remit of the 
Inquiry, and the broader area of reference of the conclusions which, to 
continue the legal analogy, approximated to the contrast between the 
specificity of statutory regulations and the broader principles of 
equity which are part of case law. 
The conclusions relating to the specific allegations  unsurprisingly 
went against the complainants as Lord Cameron considered them item by 
item and pointed to each shortcoming. In his general conclusions on 
the evidence, Lord Cameron dismissed the underlying argument in the 
Complaint relating to employer domination of the staff associations as 
unproven by the evidence presented. 
"From all the evidence it did not appear to me that any firm 
basis could be found for the suggestion that the staff associations were not independent, or that they were dominated 
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, 	• • 	. by the employers, or that they received financial" -other support for the object or opRose set out in Article 2, 
paragraph 2 of the Convention." 
C". 
The other allegations against the associations were'also dismissed: it 
was pointed out that there would have been no need for an Inquiry if, 
as NUBE had alleged, the staff associations were per se a contravention 
of Article 2. Nor could the union's contention regarding Article 4 
and national machinery be sustained. 
Despite this complete defeat for NUBE on the specific charges it had 
made, some hope was offered by the chairman's final remarks, where he 
proposed ways of improving the relationships between the parties 
involved in the Inquiry. It was also pointed out that these 
observations had implications for industrial relations in the clearing 
banks as a whole. 
Lord Cameron specifically rejected NUBE's argument that a fundamental 
trade union right to recognition existed, stating that this could not 
be sustained de facto or de jure, whilst the assertion of the employers 
with regard to their right to choose a negotiating partner was 
perfectly valid. This much had been previously established in 
law. (39) Nevertheless strict application of the legal rights and 
duties left what were to the chairman various shortcomings, because 
the source of the conflict between the parties was not resolved. Nor 
would any comfort be offered to the group which Lord Cameron regarded 
as the real losers in the whole affair: the banks' staffs. By 
suggesting that they represented a distinct group whose interests had 
been neglected in the process of institutional rivalry, the chairman 
believed there was sufficient justification to encourage broad 
changes. In effect by clearing up "factual misconceptions" the Report 
claimed to demonstrate there was sufficient common ground to effect a 
pragmatic compromise between the staff bodies. 
"A fresh look at the realities of the situation as now disclosed in this Inquiry should, I suggest, lead responsibly-minded men 
both in NUBE and the Staff Associations to a recognition and 
acceptance of each other under present conditions as honourable 
and representative organisations of workers in the same industry 
and theref with a community, if not an indentity, of interest."  
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Having acknowleged the union's intention to bring the question of 
recognition to the public eye, LordTameron made two recommendations. 
As far as the four named banks were concerned, he noted that they had 
been singled out purely because of their preference for written. 'as 
opposed to oral "representation", which in itself was noted as a 
reflection of the , 
" ... narrow basis on which the Complaint is brought. „ (41) 
Yet at the same time, given this fine distinction there seemed to be 
little stopping the four banks from acquiescing NUBE's wishes. The 
adoption of oral representation rights for the union was therefore 
proposed. 
It was accepted that the creation of a national forum could prove more 
difficult. Not only had the union displayed, 
"... an axiomatic hostility and an inference that no Staff 
Association in this case (or indeed as a general rule) was or 
could be ipendent, but that all were "dominated" by the 
employers. 
They had claimed the (unproven) right to exclusive national 
recognition which both flew directly in the face of existing practice, 
and appeared to be completely unrealistic. (43) Not surprisingly the 
staff associations had therefore displayed apprehension at the thought 
of any further measure of recognition for NUBE, (44) and the employers, 
Lord Cameron felt, were also inhibited in any attempt at compromise by 
this dogmatic extremism. 
Nonetheless, in his view there were grounds for introducing national 
machinery, although these had to be balanced against other elements, 
such as the existence of purely domestic matters, the apparent 
satisfaction of the employers with arrangements as they stood, and the 
domestic orientation of the staff associations. (45)  But in particular 
the existence of common features such as basic pay levels and the 
recruitment of staff from the same labour market suggested there were 
"national" issues which should be treated as such, and that the present 
arrangements were not entirely satisfactory. 
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"If the parties immediately concerned ... were able successfully 
to agree on this initial.matter . .... the way could then be open for consideration on a wider basis ... of a more general issue - namely whether certain employers on the one side and MBE and the relative Staff Associations on the other - can find it possible to agree on a definition of what they would regard as "national" issues or (as I think it might preferably be put) issues of 
general concern or the acceptance of a formula for what should be treated as such, and further to agree on a method of joint 
consultation and discussion with the object of settling questions arising upon such issues ... if this suggestion should 
commend itself its application would not be limited to the four Banks concerned here, but would be o for consideration and 
exploration throughout the industry.'"' 
Indeed the Report pointed out that industry-wide representative 
institutions already existed, demonstrating that matters of common 
concern did occur and were best dealt with jointly. Formalisation of 
the relationship between CLCB, CCBSA and NUBE therefore seemed only 
logical. (47) 
The Influence of the Inquiry 
NUBE admitted that it brought the Complaint in order to try and secure 
recognition in a national forum as the sole representative body of the 
staff. The plan involved stirring up public examination of the banks' 
policies towards the union in order to exert pressure upon them, NUBE's 
own requests and other strategies to secure such recognition having 
failed. The union envisaged an inquiry which put their position'in the 
broadest context, including comparisons with practices in banking 
industries in other countries, and with other employers at home. Such 
a debate, the union believed, would demonstrate the hostility it had 
encountered in both actions and attitudes on the part of the banks. It 
would also demonstrate that the associations were used to obstruct its 
claim for recognition, and thus lead to them being discredited. 
But this strategy was immediately rendered impossible because of the 
narrow construction which Lord Cameron placed upon the interpretation 
of his duties and the manner in which the Inquiry was conducted. The 
focus of the proceedings was upon the concrete facts involved in the 
Complaint about the four named banks, and the putative domination of 
their staff associations. 	But as Lord Cameron emphasised the 
contravention of the ILO convention was not proven simply by 
ascertaining that an employer promoted or supported a workers 
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organisation; the objective of the'employer in so doing also.had to be 
dmonstrated as being for the :purpdies'of domination or control. In 
essence the article was referring to motivation rather than directly 
to action. Yet the exclusive reliance upon "facts" meant that any 
investigation into motives would be extremely difficult particularly 
in the absence of more specific guidelines or criteria. 
Secondly it was emphasised that no analysis of the recognition 
question in the clearing banks as a whole would take place, nor of the 
matter of domination or control by the employers in the other banks. 
No generalised conclusions could therefore be drawn from NUBE's 
allegations, as a result. 
Thirdly, the legalised mode of conducting the Inquiry, as pieferred by 
Lord Cameron reinforced this narrow construction. The Inquiry placed 
the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and its procedure mirrored that 
of a courtroom with counsel representing each party and cross-
examining witnesses, after opening submissions. There were then 
closing submissions from both sides. Counsel for the banks opted to 
offer no evidence nor to stand witness however, so NUBE was obliged to 
try and substantiate its case without the opportunity to question the 
party whose motives were central to the Complaint. Again Lord Cameron 
argued that this was consistent with his desire to deal exclusively 
with concrete facts, (48) but this mode of procedure meant that NUBE's 
intention to draw out the context of its non-recognition in terms of 
comparisons with other countries and other industries through the 
calling of expert witnesses was completely blocked. 
Fburthly, as much of the evidence produced by NUBE was outdated or 
imprecise it was predictable that the allegations in its Cbmplaint 
should prove unfounded. Clearly the relationship between the banks 
and associations was not as clear cut as the union had argued, and 
particularly after 1960 there was evidence of moves toward greater 
bargaining and organisational independence by most of the 
associations. 
Because of these factors, NUBE's strategy of using the complaint as a 
means to displacing the associations was undermined. It was clearly 
unable to prove that they were mere instruments of an employer 
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0 strategy, and thus use the specific charges against the named banks as 
the basis of a general charge against the banks, and in that.sense the 
effects of the complaint still fell short of NUBE's objective. 
Furthermore the Inquiry had no statutory backing, although the 
Government felt under some pressure to make sure that the banks were 
'complying with the ILO articles. (49) As a result the specific 
recommendations directed towards the four named banks that they should 
offer NUBE verbal representational rights was not completely enforced. 
In particular the National Provincial ignored Lord Cameron's 
proposals, continuing to receive only written communications from 
NUBE, although the union regarded this as a minor point if it could 
ensure that national machinery was instituted. But in fact this non-
compliance had implications for the proposed national forum as well, 
because there was no guarantee that a sufficient number of banks or 
associations would take up that point either. 
However it would seem that the Cameron Report was highly instrumental 
in bringing about bargaining reform. Within eight months of its 
publication changes broadly in line with those prescribed were 
initiated, despite the lack of unanimity among the CLCB which was 
traditionally necessary before any collective employer initiatives 
were instituted. So its prime importance stemmed from the effect it 
had upon the banks as a group, even though Cameron refused to make them 
the subject of his Inquiry, and even pointed out that their action in 
denying NUBE full recognition was entirely legal. 
Certainly it appears that it was the Inquiry which prompted a majority 
of the CLCB into instigating the talks on national machinery, starting 
in July 1964. The CLCB itself stated in evidence to the Donovan 
Commission that reform had been initiated in keeping with the 
proposals of Lord Cameron, (50)  and the Working Party minutes also 
emphasise this point. (51) In interviews with representatives of 
management, as well as officials of the associations and the union who 
were directly or indirectly involved with the working party on the 
national constitutions the importance of Lord Cameron's proposals in 
bringing about the discussions was confirmed. (52) Indeed the opponents 
of the talks in the Midland staff association criticised them on the 
grounds that the CLCB representatives had admitted the main advantage 
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of national machinery would be "political" acceptability. (53) It must 
also be remembered that the banks were strongly concerned to 
counteract the growing public interest in several key matters where 
they regarded confidentiality as of great importance. Principal among 
these was the issue of disclosure of profits, which was being called 
for in the press and political circles, but which was resisted by the 
banks until 1970. Similarly the question of Saturday closure was also 
coming to the public's attention. The question of union recognition 
was therefore one further factor where the banks felt that their image 
of secrecy and rather old fashioned or outdated attitudes could be 
damaging to their public image, and thus render them subject to 
political interference. (54) 
On this point, Lord Cameron's conclusion that the real victims of 
neglect by all the parties (including the employers) had been the staff  
was particularly worrying to the banks, implying as it did that they 
had become the victims of a battle of political principle. The banks 
had after all prided themselves on the manifest success of their 
paternalist approach and the identity of interests between employer 
and staff. Similarly Lord Cameron's point that NUBE represented large 
numbers of "responsible" men and women despite its relative 
disadvantages in terms of costs and benefits did apparently enhance 
the union's claim for recognition. (55) In effect, although the 
longstanding strategy of obtaining a majority membership among bank 
staff had not been achieved, and in fact its density of membership was 
static or declining, the union had a sufficient body of members to make 
this a relevant factor. (56) 
The Banks Reactions to the Proposals for National Machinery  
It should be emphasised however that the decision to initiate the talks 
on national machinery was by no means unanimous, and the fact that the 
CLCB opted to proceed despite this was highly significant, because it 
contravened their customary policy of abiding only by consensus 
decisions. Evidently those chairmen in favour of starting talks 
accepted Lord Cameron's advice that the situation was of such 
importance and urgency that it was not necessary to wait for the usual 
unanimity before proceedings. 
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Opposition to the Cameron proposal for a national forum'wailfocussed 
most strongly in two banks, the Midland and the-National Provincial, 
but this did present a problem because both were members of-the "Big 
Five" and together acoounted for one third of the total market share of 
the London clearers, and an equivalent proportion of their staff. 
Without their participation there could clearly be no fully national 
body. Evidently the policies of these banks mainly derived from their 
chairmen's personal hostility to trade unionism among bank clerks, so 
that national machinery was rejected primarily because of the proposed 
inclusion of NUBE. (57) The Midland's position was reinforced by the 
exceptional hostility of its staff association to any form of joint 
working with the union, which led it to conclude that a national forum 
would be chronically undermined by the competitiveness of the staff 
bodies. 
Other executives, although showing less antipathy to NUBE were 
concerned about the legality of breaking the existing domestic 
agreements, particularly in view of the binding arbitration clause. 
Interestingly as well, another factor which tempered the commitment of 
the banks to union recognition was the likelihood of hostility to such 
a move on the part of certain sections of their staff. (58) In 
particular it was felt that many of the older and senior staff would 
oppose any change and that to introduce the national form would 
therefore lead to greater problems of morale, which was of course an 
inversion of the Cameron view that to exclude NUBE was unreasonable and 
detrimental to the banks' staff relationships. The outcome of these 
considerations was that several of the banks were therefore initially 
reluctant to entertain reform unless the associations were willing to 
(59) do so. 	In most of the small banks this was not a problem, because 
either associations did not exist, or they were not opposed to change. 
Moreover although ideological opposition to NUBE had previously been 
expressed by chairmen of these smaller banks, they now appeared to be 
supportive of an employers' association and more formalised mechanisms 
of pay change because under the existing system they usually followed 
salary revisions initiated by the bigger banks. The acceleration of 
the leapfrogging process had therefore reduced their discretion over 
pay to a minimum. 
4proval for the proposals was positively expressed by the chairmen of 
Barclays and Lloyds Banks, two of the biggest at.the'time:' BarclayS 
had no arbitration . arrangements and thus had become something of: a 
bystander in the process of domestic leapfrogging, but the bank. saw 
several advantages of national forum with a joint staff side. This 
would both formalize the coordination between the employers over pay, 
and dissolve the competitiveness between the individual associations 
to establish the premium rates in their banks (which was the drawback 
of the present system) as well as the rivalry between the associations 
as a group and NUBE. It is also evident that Sir John Thomson, 
Chairman of Barclays, adopted a less traditional approach to the 
question of representation than was then the norm among senior 
managers in the banks. (60) Certainly he accepted the view that trade 
union representation was a legitimate proposition within the banks as 
a whole, as well as in Barclays, an argument which was by no means 
typical. (61) It was he, in the capacity as chairman of the CLCB who 
convened the initial round of talks which brought the staff bodies 
together into a working party, and undoubtedly was a key figure in 
establishing the groundwork for reform. 
It was also argued that the strong support for union recognition in 
Barclays was conditioned by the relatively decentralized management 
structure in that bank. (62) Unlike some of the other big banks 
(notably the Midland) whose boards were predominantly non-executive, 
Barclays' main board had a large element of executive local directors. 
Not only did this mean that less power was concentrated in the chairman 
and his general management team, but it also brought into greater 
consideration the views of the banks' staff at the ground level via the 
local directors who were more closely attuned to them. These officers 
broadly confirmed Cameron's point that the effective 
disenfranchisement of the union over matters of pay was unsatisfactory 
for morale and that this could not ultimately be to the advantage of 
the bank. Of course it must be remembered as well that NUBE was in the 
exceptional position of having a majority of staff in membership in 
Barclays, and thus its claims to full recognition on these grounds 
alone were regarded as strong. Nevertheless this bank was keen to 
institute recognition of the union throughout the London clearers, 
taking the view that until this was achieved, the banks as a group 
would be subject to political pressures, and perhaps compulsion to 
recognise the union by the new Labour Government. 
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The chairman of Lloyds Bank, - Sir Oliver Franks, ,(later 
Lord Franks) (63) also favoured union recognition on grotids which 
reflected his ideological predisposition and the structural changes 
occurring in the banks. (64)  As a civil servant and • diplomat he 
apparently brought a broader view to the area of staff affairs which 
was not so conditioned by the traditional paternalistic ethos of the 
banks. The prospect of dealing with a trade union did not therefore 
seem to present an inevitable threat to the collapse of existing 
relationships between staff and management, but could in fact engender 
increased stability through effective representation. Because of the 
rising pace of technological change which was, with the 
computerisation of accounting, going to affect staff at every level, 
coupled with the rapid growth of the banks, there was an increasing 
need for the most efficient and stable bargaining environment. This 
suggested that a more formalised approach to pay and the incorporation 
of the union into negotiation would be advantageous. 
Within the ranks of the employers there was then a clear division 
deriving from the traditional ideological hostility to trade unionism 
on one side, and on the other a perception of wider political and 
economic pressures which favoured more orthodox collective bargaining 
arrangements. While a majority endorsed the initiative for national 
arrangements, the position of the banks was by no means settled in 
1964, because two (at least) of the "Big Five" remained uncommitted. 
The Response of the Associations to Cameron  
Similarly the associations were deeply split over the Cameron 
proposals along a line which approximately mirrored the division 
between the banks. NUBE's argument that this demonstrated the 
domination of the associations by their respective banks cannot be 
upheld however, the reality being more complex. The Westminster Guild 
for instance was initially in favour of reform, but reversed this 
policy in 1967 after considering the proposal of constitutional 
arrangements finalised by the Wbrking Party, while the Westminster 
Bank remained (weakly) supportive of national machinery. 
In contrast the National Provincial associations were always more 
critical of the proposals, but while the men's body remained open to 
persuasion, the Ladies Guild was firmly against the change. - In both 
the NPSA and the Westminster Guild there was considerable debate 
between various sections of the organisation, some districts 
supporting reform others opposing it: in the National Provincial 
association for example, both the powerful Birmingham and Manchester 
Districts favoured reform. But when presented with ratification of 
the constitutions in 1967 a majority were unconvinced that the 
safeguards to enable domestic negotiation to continue in a meaningful 
and effective manner were insufficient: national machinery would, it 
was concluded, swamp the domestic arrangements. (65) 
Like the Midland Bank, the MBSA maintained an implacable opposition to 
reform from the outset, and refused to join the working party 
discussions in 1964. The association maintained that it had 
negotiated the premium conditions in the banks, and saw national 
machinery as a threat to these, but this assertion does seem 
exaggerated, given the similarity between each bank's pay scale. More 
significantly, the association had remained closely linked to the 
Midland Bank, financially and operationally, having been resurrected 
with management support in 1953; fear that it would be especially 
subject to attack by NUBS was therefore prevalent because the union had 
always singled it out as an example of obstruction to "real" unionism. 
Additionally, the views of the associations' General Secretaries could 
be particularly influential. In the MBSA, Claude Smith had declared 
himself completely opposed to joint working with NUBE for personal as 
well as ideological reasons, and this Was recognised as a substantial 
stumbling block to reform. (66)  S imilarly the change of policy by the 
Lloyds association in favour of national machinery was directly 
related to a change of General Secretary. Although the formal 
affirmation of support occurred in 1964, the LBSA had been moving away 
from its anti-NUBE position, established with the breakdown of the 
last talks in 1955 since the new secretary was appointed in 1960. 
Significantly, Mr S H (John) Bealey had formerly been a NUBE official 
and consistently rejected the more extreme internalist position which 
opposed any reconciliation with "orthodox" trade unionism. F011owing 
his appointment, the LBSA also began to move towards greater financial 
independence from the bank, and to register as a trade union for 
instance, as well as adopting more aggressive bargaining strategies 
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that included the use of arbitration. (67)  This is not to argue that in 
every case the General' Secretary simply determinedasdociation policy. 
Clearly debates occurred within the associations but as (usually) the c 	. only fulltime official in the organisation, and a member of the central 
policy making councils, the General Secretary had considerable 
opportunities to ,influence matters, as staff association officials 
subsequently confirmed in interviews with the author. 
In contrast the position of the Barclays Bank Staff Association (BBSA) 
which also supported the proposal for national machinery, had always 
been exceptional. Having only established similar but separate 
negotiating rights to NUBE in domestic arrangements which excluded any 
right of recourse to compulsory arbitration, it was more sympathetic 
to the prospect of reform and a joint staff side either at national or 
domestic level. This derived from its powerless position which the 
association acknowledged in its own magazine, being unable to rely 
upon any form of sanction (including arbitration) in negotiation. (68) 
Throughout the 1960's the association was therefore pressing for 
national machinery as a means to achieving formal negotiating rights 
with arbitration and had even passed a resolution at its General 
Council recommending industrial action if no recognition was 
forthcoming in 1965. (69) In short, the Barclays association saw NUBE 
as an ally, with which it had to work for the common cause of 
recognition. This policy was also reinforced by the consistently 
superior membership positin of the union which, to the association, 
meant that it could not be ignored: BBSA membership was 10,222 in May 
1963, rising to 12,939 in December 1967, but NUBE's was 15,349 in 
December 1962 and 20,584 at the latter date. 
The smaller associations were also broadly supportive of national 
machinery, arguably because they could not take up a lead position in 
the domestic negotiating round and had to follow the larger banks. 
National machinery therefore offered this group a larger voice in 
negotiations through a position in the CCBSA and on the joint side. 
Incidentally as well, the Yorkshire Bank staff association also wished 
to join the national machinery, as a means of enhancing pay in the 
Yorkshire Bank which was a non-member of the CLCB. Indeed the vote of 
the association had been decisive in the decision of the CCBSA to join 
the working party, but subsequently the bank was excluded from the 
Federation because of its non-clearing status. 
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In summary, while the responses of ,the associations did approximately 
mirror the views of their respective banks, an argument of -simple 
domination of policy-making by the employers cannot be sustained. The 
reality was more complex. 
CAMERON'S PROPOSALS-AND THE INFER-UNION CCMPETITION 
Nonetheless because of these differences there was no guarantee that 
the outcome of the talks in 1964 would be any more successful than 
previous attempts. Indeed it was only as a result of significant 
developments on the issues of pay and hours of work, emerging during  
the conduct of the discussions, that the opposition to reform was 
overcome and national machinery was instituted. 
Furthermore, although Cameron recognised the limits to the 
possibilities of joint working between NUBE and the associations, 
there was no guarantee that his proposals would resolve what he saw as 
the prime cause of disorder, the persistence and growth of 
institutional rivalry. Hence his intention was that ... 
n
... out of this Inquiry some useful action may be taken to end 
what must be regarded as unhappy disagreements and rivalries and 
bring a greater degree of agreed order into the relations 
between the represen ive organs of the employees in the banking industry ..." 
and the process of re-establishing order was mainly to be generated by 
the pragmatic "community of interest" which could bring the two staff 
bodies together in some sort of joint national forum, even if an 
"identity of interests" remained unachievable. It is arguable however 
that the grounds for constructing even a "community of interest" were 
smaller than Cameron envisaged despite persuading the union of the 
futility of its claim for exclusive recognition. 
First, it must be said that despite the factual errors of NUBE's case 
very few new facts came to light, and not enough to alter the thrust of 
NUBE's central argument that the employers had favoured the 
associations at its expense from which the longstanding rivalry was 
derived. And second, there was no proof that simply by establishing 
the facts the existing rivalry between the staff bodies could be 
replaced by institutional cooperation. 
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But this crucial sassumption was made on the basis of the argument of 
the then Assistant General Secretafy of the TUC,.Victor Feather, who 
had accepted that NOBE's claim to exclusive rights was, in the 
circumstances, unrealistic. Mr Feather also stated that joint trade 
union representative channels were the normal manner of solving the 
existence of multi-unionism and suggested that such a proposal was 
applicable in the banks. Lord Cameron was highly impressed with the 
apparent practicality of such a solution, (72) but in recommending it 
to the parties to this dispute, it appeared that he, like Mr Feather, 
underestimated the unique nature of the inter-union rivalry, to which 
NUBE had of course referred in its COmplaint. (73) 
As subsequent events were to show, the union and staff associations 
were able to accommodate to joint working, but this did • not reduce 
their ideological differences, because in this instance each side 
continued to regard the other as fundamentally misguided in its 
philosophy. While Cameron accepted that an identity of interests (74) 
between the two sides was probably untenable, it seems clear that the 
extent and durability of ideological (and hence institutional) 
competitiveness was underestimated. Indeed subsequently it will be 
argued that joint working, while creating on one level an area of 
agreed order also sharpened instability at another level, because in a 
joint staff side the only means of demonstrating the distinctiveness 
of their policies to the constituents whom both sides aimed to recruit 
was through the pursuit of competitive bargaining strategies. 
So while Cameron's strategy to bring a greater degree of order into the 
relations between the representative bodies was the basis upon which 
reform was subsequently undertaken, in the longer term it could not 
resolve the underlying "disagreements and rivalries" between them, as 
the following chapters will demonstrate. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Tb summarize, we have examined the emergence of two factors which 
disturbed the stability of the industrial relations arrangements 
established between the banks and their associations in the early 
1950's. 
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The first factor, pay bargaining, was characterised by the growth of 
overt disagreement between the banks and associations as regaids the 
determinants of pay levels. In addition, there "was an unprecedented 
use of arbitration as the means of pay settlement, which took the 
decision making process out of the hands of the banks. A heightened 
competitiveness between the associations, and the emergence of more 
overt "leapfrogging", combined with frustration at official incomes 
controls, led to the collapse of the 12 month interval between pay 
rises and the use of interim claims. The utility of the existing 
bargaining arrangements to the banks was therefore under strain at the 
time of the Cameron Inquiry. 
It has been suggested that this inquiry was highly instrumental in the 
banks' decision to instigate talks on national machinery. W. looked at 
the background to NUBE's Complaint to the ILO, and its investigation by 
Lord Cameron. In a legally stylised procedure there was an extremely 
narrow interpretation of the object of the Inquiry, with the context of 
the union's complaint being ruled as irrelevant. Despite finding 
against NUBE's specific allegations however, Lord Cameron's general 
conclusions proposed a national forum in which the union and 
associations might act in a community of interest together. We 
suggested that concern with the public image of staff relations and 
fear of further intervention led to Cameron's proposals being enacted, 
despite opposition from some of the banks, but concluded that the 
proposed joint staff side by no means ensured that the existing rivalry 
between the representative bodies would be resolved. 
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CHAPTER 4  
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATICNAL BARGAINI/C  
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8. Conclusions 
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THE wnwmasmare or tiliTIONAL M Will  
INIRCIDUCTION 
In view of the lack of unanimity between the banks as well as the staff 
bodies at the start of talks on national machinery, the end product of 
the ratified constitutional framework had to be seen in the light of 
the changes occurring between 1964 and 1968. In particular it is 
necessary to explain why, despite the withdrawal of several staff 
associations in 1967 from the working party, the national 
constitutions were ratified by all parties less than a year later. 
This chapter explains the volte-face in terms of the crisis over pay 
and hours and the impact of strike action taken by NUBE at the end of 
1967 which culminated from it. 
It will be argued that this crisis compelled the banks to reverse their 
traditional disinclination to force the two competing staff bodies 
together. This was a funamental difference from their policy in 
previous discussions where a preference for avoiding union recognition 
had prevailed. A second factor was the government's role; here it 
will be argued that the Ministry of Labour, while consistently 
sympathetic to NUBE's cause, became more actively involved after its 
strike action in putting pressure upon those bankers who remained 
recalcitrant to the proposition of union recognition. This was 
significant both in terms of the banks' change of policy and in pulling 
the unwilling staff associations into national machinery. It is 
concluded therefore that an element of coercion had brought the 
competing unions together and fundamental disagreements still remained 
between the staff bodies despite their constitutional alliance. This 
was to have a profound impact upon their relationship in the operation 
of national machinery which the following chapters then proceed to 
consider. 
The chapter is set out as follows. The reasons for the collapse in 
talks on national machinery which precipitated the crisis in the 
autumn of 1967 are discussed. Despite the support for national 
bargaining by a majority of banks and associations an important group 
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were'still opposed: ° the sake weaknesses which collapsed the 1955 
initiative were still evident. In this case however NUBE was able to 
mobilise its rapidly growing membership into strike action in support 
of its recognition claim. The explanation for this unprecedented 
display of action is related to the discontent over pay and hours, both 
of which are then considered to understand why they could provoke this 
sort of reaction from the normally "moderate" bank staff. 
The strike campaign is documented to demonstrate its success in 
obliging the employers to reopen the national machinery talks. The 
intention here is also to show how decisive the strike was in 
influencing the Government to take up a more interventionist role and 
put pressure on the banks to come to terms with NUBE. It is concluded 
that the strike action was therefore critical in overcoming the 
recalcitrance of the minority of banks and associations which opposed 
working with NUM. 
TALKS ON NATIONAL MACHINERY 
It will be remembered that the impetus to organise a national forum had 
come from the CLCB in 1964. By February 1965 a working party of nine 
was formed, consisting of three representatives from the banks, three 
from NUBE and three from the CCBSA, with the secretary to the 
Chairmen's Committee of London Clearing Bankers acting as secretary to 
the working party. 
As with the talks on national machinery in the 1950s, it is notable 
that the staff associations had departed from their tradition of 
individual autonomy, by agreeing to delegate members from their 
collective body. This was done to keep the working party to a more 
manageable size, but it raised the old constitutional question 
regarding the authority of the CCBSA to make binding agreements on 
behalf of its constituents. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the 
decision to enter the working party had not been taken without 
disagreement: the Midland Bank Staff Association had disaffiliated 
and the National Provincial Association remained uncommitted, although 
it continued to send representatives to the CCBSA meetings convened on 
the subject. 
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0 The outline of procedural and'substantive matters, as well as:some 
discussion on'the question of union recognition and the disparity of 
subscription rates were 'dealt with relatively quickly.. By 
October 1965, after four meetings of the working party, an interim 
report was issued for discussion among each of the parties. The report 
dealt with: 
1. An outline of the negotiating procedure. 
2. Scope of the negotiations. 
3. Other 	matters, 	including 	domestic 	recognition, 	and 
subscriptions. 
Following acceptance in principle of this outline, the constitutions 
covering the proposed employers' body, the joint staff side and the 
negotiating council were drawn up in conjunction with a firm of 
solicitors. (1) These were developed through a process of legal 
guidance and negotiation at the meetings of the working party, and 
during this period each party was constantly referring back to its 
governing body for guidance and advice. It was therefore a slow 
process of compromise, taking until March 1967 before the outline 
constitutions were accepted by all of the parties. 
OPPOSITION TO THE NATIONAL MACHINERY 
However, even whilst the talks on joint working were taking place, the 
underlying competition between the staff bodies continued. In 
particular the "leapfrogging" in domestic bargaining had resumed, 
again apparently under the influence of inter-union rivalry, because 
it was those associations least committed to national bargaining which 
applied the most pressure. Not only did the Midland Association's 
1964/65 claim break the 12 month interval between salary revisions, 
but it was finally settled only as a stop-gap measure pending the 
lifting of official controls. This was followed by an arbitration 
reference from the National Provincial in an attempt to circumvent the 
settlement some two months later, unsuccessfully in the event.(2) 
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0 In 1967 it was the Midland Association which again initiated the annual 
claims, and in the exsiting total pay freeze ,implemented by the 
Government this was only allowed as in exception after reference to the 
Ministry of Labour.'  the Westminster Guild, having just 
withdrawn from the talks on national machinery, insisted on taking the 
claim to arbitration to try and force a higher award. 
Moreover the NPSA and MRSA both developed an extensive rationale for 
the continuation of existing domestic arrangements. Their arguments 
included the following: 
1. Suspicion of NUBE's motives and the view that the union regarded 
national machinery as a means to the achievement of sole 
bargaining rights. If this was to occur the banks would not be 
able to rely upon the associations as a moderate brake upon the 
union. 
2. Belief that the linkage of pay and productivity criteria, which 
was becoming central to Government incomes controls, required 
closer doemstic consultation in order to develop clearer 
standards of measurement. Linked with this was the argument 
that pay rises could be restrained by national bargaining with 
less profitable banks pulling down the industry average. 
3. Belief that the national machinery would inevitably concentrate 
on general salary movements, to the neglect of rewards for 
ability, thus threatening differentials of senior staff. 
4. A reassertion of the expertise argument used previously: that 
those officers of the association who were in closer contact 
with the bank and had worked for it were capable of more 
sophisticated and sensitive bargaining than an external and 
unacquainted national union official. 
5. That domestic bargaining was enhanced because the banks could 
reveal confidential information to staff associations which 
nationally they would be afraid to do for fear that it might be 
used by their competitors. This was also referred to in 1955. (3) 
-100-- 
O 	 0 
There was also criticism of the militancy of those trade unions which 
had taken actionin opposition to the Government's pay controli. , It 
was pointed out that this sort of behaviour was inappropriate in 
banking, the implication being that in the proposed' national 
negotiations such action might well occur. (4) 
The associations also argued that their majority membership was 
evidence of the satisfaction of most staff with the existing 
arrangements: the NPSA emphasised for instance that it had about 62% 
of staff in membership in the 1960s (5) while NUBE's density was around 
20% in 1967. In effect then there was considerable criticism of the 
proposal to move away from the special arrangements which the 
associations still believed to be appropriate to banking and an 
effective means of representation for their members,. as their 
continuing popularity suggested. 
In response NUBE continued its criticism of the associations and 
applied further pressure in two new arguments. Firstly, it proposed a 
complete reform of the salary structure based upon job evaluation. (6) 
Not only did it suggest that this should justify an increse in pay 
above the national "norm", which the associations had not been able to 
achieve, but it would also offer adequate rewards for responsibility 
and ensure a proper path for career development. Given past 
difficulties and current restraints, this sort of proposal was thought 
likely to appeal to a broad section of staff. In this it was supported 
by the Barclays Association which published similar proposals in 1965 
based on a "rate for the job" and criticised the existing age-based 
system as "paternalistic" and "backward looking". (7) 
Secondly, NUBE argued that in the light of the Government's 
intervention into wage determination the parochialism of the 
associations was disadvantageous. Instead NUBE emphasised the value 
of its affiliation to the TUC which was closely associated with the 
Government in developing its incomes policy. In these new conditions 
those associations which remained opposed to reform of the bargaining 
structure came under increasing pressure. 
It was therefore perhaps not wholly surprising that the NPSA and the 
Westminster Guild announced their withdrawal of support for the 
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SALARY SCALES 
New Job Evaluation system Introduced 1 April 1971 with salaries 
backdated to 1 	January 
CG1 
Minimum 
£ 
1971. 
CG1 
Age 21 
£ 
CG2 
Age 21 
£ 
CG3 
Minimum 
 £ 
CG4 
Minimum 
£ 
Minimum 
Managerial 
£ 
1 	January 	1971 485 750 - 1000 1250 2770 
1 	January 	1972 522 804 - 1074 1341 2967 
1 	October 	1972 
xx 1 	January 	1973 
522 
561 
804 
861 
1020 
1092 
1228 
1317 
1494 
1599 
2967 
3098 
1 	January 	1974 693 993 1224 1449 1731 3408 
1 	August 	1974 
(including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
876 1242 1554 1857 2220 4221 
1 	July 	1975 1073 1521 1904 2275 2720 5171 
1 	July 	1976 1338 1833 2216 2587 3032 5483 
1 	July 	1977 1449 1963 2346 2717 3184 5691 
1 	July 	1978 1683* 2122 2534 2962 3471 6374 
1 	July 	1979 1978' 2494 2978 3510 4114 7617 
1 	April 	1980 2335' 2943 3532 4185 4953 9348 
1 	April 	1981 2569' 3238 3886 4604 5449 10283 
1 	April 	1982 2788* 3514 4217 4996 5913 11158 
(age under 	18 - 	previously under 17) 
lz 	Paid 	from 	1 	April 	1973. 
TABLE 8. 1 
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proposed national machinery in July 1967. 	With the continuing 
opposition of the MRSA this meant that three large associations'were , 	• . agaifist national machinery. As in 1955 it was enough to end the talks, 
the CLCB announcing it could hardly continue under the prevailing 
circumstances. 
THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE BANKS  
In fact throughout the talks the banks had remained split on the 
proposal for national machinery. In the last chapter it was suggested 
that those favouring reform were responding to a combination of 
political and economic factors. To managers in these banks these 
became more significant between 1964 and 1967. In particular the 
formalisation of incomes control and the development of "corporatist" 
modes of managing the economy by the Labour Government were factors 
which argued for a stronger national voice with regard to pay 
settlements. (8) Although the majority of senior managers was opposed 
to encouraging the growth of influence of outside bodies such as the 
TUC on the determination of bank pay, it was realised that more and 
more the wider union movement, of which NUBE was a part, was being 
brought into the processes of government decision making. To have a 
greater say in this bigger forum therefore seemed more realistic than 
trying to ignore it, and implicitly those ultra-internalist 
associations which wished to pursue the latter course were revealed as 
increasingly parochial. Although some associations had recognised the 
influence of the wider world and made attempts to become more 
integrated into organisations which would give them a voice outside 
the banks, (9)  they remained outside the TUC and therefore beyond the 
institutions concerned with pay determination. Meanwhile the NBPI had 
criticised the parochialism of domestic bargaining which it implied 
was shortsighted and rather amateur, (10) and in terms of incomes 
controls indicated that the banks were to be treated as a single group, 
whether they bargained nationally or domestically. 
On the other hand, those banks which had opposed bargaining with NUBE 
(principally the Midland, National Provincial and Westminster) largely 
on the traditional grounds of an ideological hostility to trade 
unionism in banking remained unconvinced of a need to change. Their 
views were reinforced by the arguments of the associations against 
reform, which they found convincing, and particularly by the fact that 
0 	 , a larger number of their staff were association memberi rather than 
NUBE•members. 'lb support the working party was therefore seen as 
tantamount to opposing "the wishes of the majority of our staff" as one 
of the banks put it. (u) 
Thus, following the collapse of the talks in 1967, the chairman of the 
Westminster and National Provincial Banks declined to compel their 
associations to join the national machinery against their declared 
policies. Their expressed priority remained the maintenance of 
amicable arrangements with the existing recognised body in spite of 
pressure from the Minister of Labour upon the banks to force the 
associations to return to the discussions. (12) In effect then, both 
sides saw good arguments to support their cases, and a reconciliation 
between the two therefore appeared unlikely. Yet unless the three "Big 
Five" banks (Midland, National Provincial and Westminster) could be 
persuaded to change their views national machinery would not be 
instigated. The situation had close parallels with a previous 
stalemate in 1955: this time however, the union was able to force a 
shift in the banks' position by its strike action. 
Why then was NIJBE able to galvanize its membership into action in 1967 
when this had not appeared feasible previously? Our argument is that 
despite the views of the pro-domestic bargaining group of 
associations, NUBE managed to persuade a significant number of bank 
staff that the existing arrangements had proved inadequate in the face 
of the outcome of two issues of concern to all staff: pay and hours of 
work. It then managed to exploit the dissatisfaction on these to press 
its recognition claim. However it will be argued that the adoption of 
more militant tactics by the union was not simply an exceptional 
reaction to circumstances, but the culmination of a longer term 
policy. Firstly, however let us consider the pay and hours issues. 
PAY BARGAINING 1965-1967  
During this period bank staff were subject to stringent controls 
imposed by the Government. That the associations could not negotiate 
rises above the national "norm" in 1965, was, it will be argued below 
in chapter 9, not entirely due to their bargaining abilities, but 
reflected the nature of the industry and structure of bargaining. In 
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particular the growing concern with productivity bargaining by the 
Government was difficult to apply in a service industry like banking. 
Nevertheless the MBSA manifestly failed to obtain anything like its 
10% claim in December 1964 when a final agreement to a 5% rise was 
reached in June 1965. This was quickly referred by the Government to 
the National Board for Prices and Incomes, the other clearing banks 
meanwhile copying the Midland settlement. The Board's 
investigation (13) led it to conclude that the rise was unjustifiable 
under official policies and bank pay was frozen for 20 months from 
November 1965 to July 1967. 
Despite the increasing severity of official restraint in 1966 and 
1967
(14)  retail prices rose by 4.4% in the 12 months to January 1966 
and a further 2.9% in the following 12 months. Hourly wage rates rose 
at around 5% per annum for the two years from September 1965, (15) 
thereby exceeding the official norm, and the pay increase to which bank 
staff were restricted. Table 4.1 demonstrates how the average weekly 
earnings of banking and insurance staff declined between 1959 and 1968 
(but particularly after 1964) compared to the all-industry figure, and 
it may reasonably be asserted that this deteriorating relationship was 
especially pronounced in the case of the clearing banks staff. 
In this situation the criticisms of "strong-arm" tactics of more 
militant trade unions (16) made by the internalists were hardly 
adequate compensation for their members whose standards of living were 
falling compared to other groups. The position was also not alleviated 
by the 21% rise negotiated in June 1967 by the MESA despite the fact 
that this was the maximum the Ministry of Labour would allow. (17) It 
was the first general pay rise in the banking industry for nearly two 
years but did not match the average rise in prices and incomes during 
that period, nor the increase in weekly earnings from July 1967 to 
January 1968 which was 4%. 
Clearly then, although the associations were restricted by official 
policies (and the banks themselves would liked to have paid more) they 
failed to defend the interests of their members satisfactorily in this 
period. This exposed them to the criticisms which we noted above that 
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NUBE made, and were reiterated 	licitly by the NBPI, that the 
existing domestic arrangements were parochial and inappropriate, given _ 
the prevailing modes of macro-eocaoatic management. (18) 
THE HOURS OF WORK ISSUE  
The second major issue concerned hours of work, and particularly the 
banks' practice of opening on Saturday opening. In discussing the 
developments on this issue the intention is to highlight the 
protracted process of decision-making by the banks as well as the 
changes in their decisions which were made unilaterally. All of these 
factors contributed to growing dissatisfaction among all grades of 
bank staff over the way the "hours" question was handled, and to the 
response of the associations to the banks' decisions which NUBE was 
able to exploit in pressing its claim for national machinery through 
industrial action. 
During this period the banks were open from 10.00 am to 3.00 pm Monday 
to Friday, and 9.30 am to around 11.30 am on Saturdays. Staff worked a 
five and a half day, 411 hour week. For the banks, the issue of 
whether these hours of opening were appropriate related to two 
factors; staff recruitment, and competition for business, however the 
effect of these factors tended to be contra-directional. On the one 
hand working a 51 day week was becoming more unpopular with the staff, 
who compared their position with the growing practice of a five-day 
week in other areas of clerical employment. Related to this it was 
thought that the increasing employment of female staff in a non-career 
capacity, who were therefore less prepared to make the sacrifice of 
Saturday work, aggravated the problem and resulted in a higher 
turnover, (19) despite the fact that NBPI's surveys suggested turnover 
of staff was similar to areas where a five day week existed. 
Nonetheless, the banks consistently maintained that difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining the right nutter and type of staff were 
related in part to their hours of opening. (20) 
COnversely, the banks were aware of their declining share of the total 
market for deposits, and of the large proportion of adults who did not 
have a bank account, which it was recognised was due in part to the 
existing over-restrictive banking hours. This point was also made in 
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1963 by lord Cromer; °then Governor of the Bank of-England, who -publicly 
questioned whether, 
"... the traditional hours within which bank customers are 
expected to transact th94v,business (were) in step with demands of potential customers. '`'' 
lb reduce opening'hours further therefore only threatened to increase 
the difficulties in attracting new business. Furthermore, throughout 
the 1960s the banks were aware that the •competitive threat from the 
Trustee . Savings Banks, the building societies and the Post Office 
Savings Bank was increasing and that hours of business were a critical 
factor in the market place. 
It was in this context that the question of hours was intermittenly 
examined by the banks through a sub-committee of the CIJCB. in 1960 for 
example, it recommended no changes to the existing arrangements. But 
in reconsidering the matter intermittently over the next few years it 
appeared that the banks moved more closely to accepting Saturday 
closure although no final announcement was made until 1965 when the 
banks declared their intention to introduce Saturday closure. However 
the whole matter was then referred to the NBPI for investigation by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
This Report, published in May 1967, rejected the idea of complete 
Saturday closure, and proposed more flexible opening times between the 
banks and in different localities instead. (22) As part of a whole 
recipe of proposals to improve the competitiveness of the banks it was 
sound advice; but it hardly satisfied the growing pressure from bank 
staff for complete Saturday closure. The banks were thus sandwiched 
between the Government on the one hand and its staff on the other. 
The long period of indecision was in itself frustrating but the banks 
then compounded this by a change of policy. Having raised expectations 
of a complete Saturday closure, the banks announced in October 1967 
their decision to retain opening on that day, arguing that closure was 
not "feasible" at that time. This was included in a "package deal" on 
the working week, which in fairness did go some way towards meeting the 
NBPI's recommendation of greater flexibility to serve the needs of the 
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public. But the element of flexibility was considerably diluted from 
the proposals in Report Number 34. More importantly for immediate 
events, the CLCB changes not only reneged on the-previously declared 
policy of closure, but, as they stood, lengthened the opening hours by 
five hours per week. The outcome of these changes was therefcre likely 
to be a greater workload which had to be completed within a five 
accounting-day-week, effectively leading to longer hours of work. 
Both NUBE and the CCBSA confirmed their opposition to the proposals, 
but whereas the latter agreed to use them as the basis of further 
discussion, NUBE declared it would not. 
This was a crucial development because it established a clear 
differentiation in policy between the CCBSA and NUBE which the latter 
was able to exploit. By taking the stronger stand the union was able 
to exemplify its uncompromising response to the October proposals as 
concrete evidence of its claim to be the more effective representative 
body, and the proper defender of the interests of bank staff. It 
therefore linked this issue with pay and its claim for national 
recognition, developing the slogan of "Ten percent - 35 hours" for its 
campaign in October 1967. It argued that it could obtain much more 
than the recently agreed 21% rise and that the banks could afford to 
pay more but were hiding behind the pretext of the Government's incomes 
policies, again indirectly criticising the bargaining competence of 
the associations. (23) 
THE 1967 STRIKE ACTION 
The Autumn campaign culminated relatively quickly in strike action, 
but was itself the outcome of a longer term move to more militant 
strategies by the union, which will be considered before the influence 
of the action is explored. 
Fundamentally the shift in union policy derived from recognition that 
its failure to obtain bargaining rights in the 1950s reflected an 
inability to compel the banks to offer these. Constitutionally the 
most important change resulting from this was an alteration to the 
strike clause in 1960. The amendment to Rule 11.D meant that strike 
action could take place on the simple majority vote of a section of the 
membership. Prior to that a ballot of the whole membership had been 
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required, so the effect of the change was to facilitate the use of 
action much more'reidily. 
Subsequently, the union was successfully involved in strike action in 
the Trustee Savings Banks which led not only to recognition but also 
resulted in a stbstantial boost to its membership. (24) The union also 
became party to a national procedure agreement which included an 
arbitration clause and enthusiastically endorsed this form of 
oollective resolution, (25) but the use of strike action to gain 
recognition appeared to be a viable tactic. 
Second, there was a change in the General Secretary of the union in 
1963, with Alfred Brooks assuming control after a policy disagreement 
in the NEC had ousted the former Secretary, J L Hornby. A more 
strident tone immediately emerged on the question of achieving 
recognition, Mr Brooks arguing that this would not be given passively 
by the banks, but that it would have to be won, and that union policy 
should be derived fram this assumption. (26) 
So, during the 1960s the use of action in support of its recognition 
claims therefore became both a plausible and a desirable strategy for 
the union in the view of its executive. This was because experience 
suggested not just that militancy was a viable tactic, but furthermore 
that the union would not lose members in pursuing such action, if the 
cause was right. On the contrary it might gain in membership. From 
the beginning of 1966 the union executive canvassed the possibility of 
industrial action several times. (27) As a supporting tactic it also 
tried to whip up popular feeling, as it had done in 1950/51, by the 
circulation of petitions on the hours issue and against the NBPI's 
Report on the Midland Bank in 1965 - with mixed success. (28) With the 
combination of discontent over pay and hours of work the militant 
approach appeared to be justified however. The executive were aware of 
the rise in union membership which started to accelerate in the summer 
of 1967 from around 43,000 (in the clearing banks) and had reached 
58,000 by the end of 1967. Indeed between the end of September and the 
end of November, when the "October compromise" was struck on the hours 
issue between the CLCB and CCBSA, NUBE's membership rose by over 
12,000, easily the most significant gain since the founding period of 
the Bank Officers Guild. All of which appeared to vindicate its 
policy. 
-309- 
Despite calls for moderation from the Ministry of Labour (29)_ and the 
suggestion that ,the, issue be shelved pending the publication of the 
Donovan Report, (30) the union declared its intention to strike on 
24/25 November in a letter to the CLCB dated 13 November L1967. No 
• reply was forthcoming from the CLCB until the 20th. EVen when it came 
little else besides the "wait for Donovan" proposal was offered. (31) 
Strike action therefore took place for the first time in the clearing 
banks on 24/25 November in South Wales, during which the union claimed 
that three hundred offices were affected and 3,000 staff took 
part. (32) The banks claimed that the impact was much smaller. A 
second phase took place in selected English towns where membership was 
high and feelings known to be strong on 8/9 December. Up to that point 
the banks had refused to modify their position, but they were more 
concerned by the potential effects of the third phase timed to take 
place over the year-end accounting period as this threatened to 
disrupt work more widely. However, it was only following personal 
intervention by the Minister of Labour, who insisted that the CLCB meet 
the union for the first time ever, that this was called off at the last 
moment (28 December). (33) The employers agreed to reopen talks on 
national machinery and 9 of the 11 CLCB members and their associations 
declared their willingness to take part. The National Provincial and 
Westminster reversed their previous policy of opposition, as did their 
associations, leaving only the Midland and Coutts uncommitted. The 
inclusion of all but one of the major banks made national negotiations 
a viable proposal. Then in April 1968 Midland too changed its 
position, joining the employers' Federation. (34) Its association 
reluctantly agreed to enter the machinery as well. 
It seems that NUBE's strike campaign was highly effective. Not only 
did it compel the employers to reopen the talks, but ultimately it 
forced those banks which had been opposed to national machinery to join 
the forum, and override the wished of their associations which 
previously had been of paramount importance. Moreover, its campaign 
had proved popular, the rise in membership vindicating the 
unprecedented militancy in the view of the union's executive. 
Arguably the most significant influence of the strike was upon the 
Ministry of Labour. Although the union had concluded that ultimately 
it had to secure recognition for itself in the light of the previous 
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failures, it was the Ministry which, in response to the strike' action, 
exerted the necessary pressure upon the errployers to make them alter• 
their position. Until then, they would not acknowledge that the 
failure of the talks was anymore than an inter-union disput6'of which 
they were no part. (35)  It was the Ministry which insisted that the 
banks held the key -to resolving the dispute, advising the CLCB to 
recognise the union over the heads of the recalcitrant associations, 
and brought the union and the CLCB together for the first time. As a 
means to ensuring that the associations join the machinery, the 
Minister also proposed the resolution of the hours of work issue in the 
national forum. (36) 
Although the pressures which were brought to bear were apparently 
influential, direct compulsion was never employed. However, the banks 
were reminded that the ILO would require a report of the Cameron 
proposals, and further investigation might ensue from this. Secondly, 
it was pointed out that Bain's Research Paper "Trade Union Growth and 
Reccgnition" (37) written for the Donovan Commission had been noted 
within the Government. This had been highly critical of the banking 
industry, resurrecting the old change that the associations were 
instruments of the employers in a strategy of "peaceful competition" 
to exclude trade unionism. Like Flanders, (38) Bain concluded that an 
independent recognition tribunal should be established to deal with 
such cases, and it was expected that the forthcoming Donovan 
Commission would incorporate this recommendation, possibly within a 
statutory legal framework. Thirdly, being concerned about their 
public image over the issue of full disclosure of profits, to which the 
banks objected strongly, it was thought necessary to undertake 
voluntary change on this issue as a means of showing a readiness to 
reform. This was certainly one major reason for the change of policy 
by the National Provincial and Westminster Banks. (39) 
In the shorter term it appears that the National Provincial and 
Westminster's change of heart in favour of joining national machinery 
was also directly related to the impact of the strike action. While 
these banks favoured domestic bargaining they moved into the 
Federation to avoid the possibility of being picked off by the union in 
a stoppage, and because of the Minister of Labour's pressure upon the 
banks collectively to settle the hours issue in conjunction with the 
union. 
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The Midland in contrast remained more firmly against, the national 
forum, in keeping with its policy of strongly supporting its 
association and because of the exceptional hostility to trade unionism 
in banking among its senior executives. Its change of heart "in the 
interests of the bank" apparently related partly to the proposed 
amalgamations of Barclays, Lloyds and Martins, Banks (40) and the 
National Provincial, District, and Westminster Banks, announced early 
in 1968, as these two groups would be more likely to.dominate the 
conduct of the clearing banks' affairs. It was concluded from this 
that its ability to continue to influence pay levels, and any future 
reform of pay structures, from without the Federation would be 
severely diminished by the creation of these groups and that it would 
be more likely to be able to influence negotiations within the 
employers organisation. (41) This was reinforced by pressure from the 
other banks which pointed out that to operate a set of domestic 
negotiations alongside the national forum would create the likelihood 
of continued pay leapfrogging, particularly if the Midland decided to 
pay a premium upon the national rate as the price of isolation. 
Certainly the Midland could not pay less than the national rate, 
particularly in view of the availability of unilateral arbitration 
which would predictably see the national rate as a reference point. In 
addition, to pay less would court the danger of staff discontent which 
NUBE would be bound to exploit, and as a general point it was 
acknowledged that the bank would always be susceptible to further 
strike action by the union to try and force it into national 
negotiations. The price of staying out of the Federation therefore 
seemed unacceptably high. 
It can be argued the that NUBE achieved the critical breakthrough to 
recognition by its strike action. Why therefore did it not try and 
enforce the longstanding demand for sole recognition, continuing 
instead to accept the proposal for joint working with its rivals? 
This seems to be best explained in terms of the optimism of the union 
following the success of its strike action. While not wanting to work 
in conjunction with the associations, the union believed this would 
not be an inpedence to the rapid achievement of its objective of 
majority membership and control of the Banking Staff Council. It 
therefore assumed that, having proved its greater effectiveness, the 
national machinery would ensure the final demise of the internalists. 
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It must also be remembered that, until the decision of the Midland 
association to participate at the last moment, both sides had c virtually equal memberships and NUBE had gained at a much faster rate 
in the previous twelve months. When the union claimed that 
"We are witNa l an ace of being the majority body in British banking ..."' 
its optimism was thus understandable. In due course this proved to be 
a fundamental misjudgement. 
In retrospect, the decision to work within the constraints of the 
procedure which incorporated an arbitration also seemed somewhat 
paradoxical. Although the executive had deliberately moved the unio 
away from its former moderate image and the success of the recent 
campaign had derived from the ability of the union to demonstrate its 
distinctiveness from the associations and its greater effectiveness, 
under the national procedure there would be little or no opportunity to 
repeat this. However the union executive had concluded that only in 
the most exceptional circumstances could it rely on its members to take 
action against their employers; it was, in normal circumstances, as 
dependent upon arbitration as the associations. And again, in the 
context of the post-strike optimism the issue of relative 
effectiveness was assumed to have been proved beyond doubt. In terms 
of attracting members and gaining control of the joint staff side 
however, the relationship between these factors was not as influential 
as the union hoped. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Although a majority of the banks had already expressed their 
willingness to recognise NUBE nationally, an important group of big 
banks remained opposed. This chapter has demonstrated that only 
through NUBE's strike action could this obstacle be resolved. The 
ability of the union to enforce its claim was therefore a crucial 
change from previous attempts to form national machinery, both because 
the banks were themselves persuaded of the need for combination 
against the threat of further disruption, and because this galvanised 
the Government into a more interventionist role. TO mount such strike 
action did require a combination of two issues of importance to staff 
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across all of the banks, and an unprecedented crisis over conlitions of 
esployment which 'the union could exploit. 
By inducing their reluctant staff associations to joinstheltachinery, 
the banks demonstrated at the same time that they had considerable 
power over them. - This derived firstly from the organisational 
boundaries of the associations: as each only organised within a single 
bank, a failure to cooperate in a proposed change in the bargaining 
structure effectively resulted in a loss of the recognition upon which 
it was dependent. It also meant that NUBE, would obtain control at the 
asociations' expense. Furthermore, to demonstrate overt disagreement 
with a bank over the proposed bargaining structure was hardly 
compatible with a notion of identical interests. For these reasons the 
associations were compelled to comply with the banks' ,change of 
policies, and the implications of this point were not lost on NUBE, 
which is why subsequently the union saw employer intervention as 
crucial to resolving the problems it encountered under the continuing 
division of representation. 
Secondly, unity against strike action was henceforth an extremely 
important issue for the banks. They had entered national machinery 
with growing concern at the increasing militancy of the union, (29) and 
this was almost immediately borne out by the threat of strike action by 
NUBE in 1969 if domestic recognition was witheld. Not only did the 
priority of conflict avoidance influence the construction of the 
constitutional framework, but it impinged upon employer bargaining 
policies as well. Subsequently however, greater concern with costs 
began to conflict with this principle placing strain upon the 
negotiated agreements, as will be shown. 
But thirdly, even at the outset of national machinery, the instability 
from divided representation was not resolved by bringing both staff 
bodies together in the joint staff council. This was in effect a 
constitutional artifice which disguised the intensification of 
competition occurring in the 1960s as the pressure from NUBE began to 
pay off. So while it was shown that the associations adopted more 
aggressive bargaining strategies in response, and by establishing a 
greater degree of financial and operational independence from the 
employers became more like trade unions, at the same time their 
distinctiveness was re-emphasised. 
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These developments arguably had important implications for the future 
operation of national bargaining. Having been able to reform their 
role as representative bodies in the post-war.period to come,to terms 
with the new conditions in banking, the prospect of national cMachiriery 
did not represent an insoluble crisis for the domestic ethos of the 
associations even if a minority had consistently opposed it. It was 
recognised to be necessary to work within the new machinery rather than 
oppose it on principle. So, each side of the staff council entered it 
convinced of the rectitude of its own philosophy and thus primarily 
seeking control of the staff council rather than a pooling of interests 
CT a submersion of differences. The consequences of this continuing 
rivalry are considered in the following chapter. 
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1. An interesting difference in the attitudes of the parties is revealed by the union representatives' desire not bo'have the name of the solicitors (Sidney Morse & Cb) printed on the 
constitutions for fear of worrying their members. The employers and the CCBSA took the opposite view that the staff would be 
further impressed by this evidence of professionalism. The 
latter view prevailed. (Minutes of Wbrking Party 1967) 
2. The award, given in October 1965, concurred with the Midland 
settlement and stated that it was within the limits of the 
Government's incomes policy. 
3. Staff Association magazines; Evidence to Donovan (1965) 
4. Natproban 1966/67; "Essay" 1966/67. 
5. The association claimed a consistent membership density of 62% between 1950 and 1965. Natproban Autumn 1965. 
NUBE's density was around 20% in 1967 in National Provincial 
Bank. 
6. Submission to NBPI for Report No 6 12 July 1965. 
7. Essay Spring 1966 and submission to NBPI July 1965. 
8. The Government initially generated its incomes policy proposals 
after consultation with the TUC and major employers' 
associations. 
cf "Joint Statement of Intent on Productivity, Prices and 
Incomes" Dec 1964. 
9. Some associations had changed their constitutions after 1960 to 
register as trade unions, and to try and gain access to the 
National Economic Development Council. 
Others still argued that participation in political life was 
irrelevant. 
cf Natproban Winter 1965; "Essay" Spring 1964. 
10. NBPI Report No 6 (1965) 
11. "Since the Association represented a substantially larger 
proportion of our clerical staff than the National Union (CHE), 
the Bank took no part in the joint working party which was then 
set up, as we had no desire to take a course contrary to the 
wishes of the majority of our staff ..." Chairman's statement to 
the shareholders, 16 Feb 1968. 
12. Meeting of CLCB with the Minister of Labour, 3 August 1967. 
13. NBPI Report No 6 Ctnd 2839 Nov 1965. 
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14. There was a complete standstill period from July 1966 to the end of they year followed by "a period of severe restraint", in which a zero norm for pay rises was fixed. Only rises related to 
productivity and low pay were to be exceptionally permitted, 
throughout 1967. 
cf White Papers Chnd 3073 "Prices & Incomes Standstill" 1966 
Chnd 3150 "Prices & Incomes Standstill: Period of Severe 
Restraint" 1966. Chnd 3235 "Prices & Incomes Policy After 30 June 1967". 
15. Source "British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract 1886-1968" HMSO. 
16. Natproban 1966/67; "Essay" 1966/67 
17. Minister of Labour in a letter to Midland Bank, July 1967. 
18. NBPI Report NO 34 Chnd 3292 (May 1967) & Report No 6. 
19. A survey of staff attitudes revealed these general views in "The Banker", July 1969, pp 669-698. 
20. NBPI Report No 34, para 157. Federation of Bank Employers, minutes of meetings, 1969. 
21. Quoted in NBPI Report NO 34, para 160. 
22. NBPI Report No 34 paras 156-165. 
23. NUBE, ADM General Secretary's Report for 1968. 
24. Membership rose by 16% in 1963. The recognition dispute had been 
boiling up since 1960, and culminated in the successful action 
in 1963. 
25. ADM 1964 
26. Ibid General Secretary's Report 
27. NUBE NEC minutes Feb-Nov 1966 
28 	General Secretary's Report to ADM 1966 
29. "Natproban", Winter 1967 emphasised that NUBE disregarded these 
pleas. 
30. Royal COmmissicn on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, 
chaired by Lord Donovan. Hereafter referred to as The Donovan 
Commission or Donovan Report. London HMSO 1968 (and 3623). 
31. Letter from CLCB to NUBE 20 November 1967. 
32. A press release, quoted in "The Banker", Dec 1967, suggested 
that 2,800 staff were affected, but that the action was a 
nuisance rather than a stoppage. 
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33. FBE documents 1967. 
34. Midland Bank, Directors' statement 17 April 1968. 
35. Meting - CLCB and Minister of Labour 3 August 1967 
36. Meting - CLCB and Minister of Labour 17 January 1968 
37. Bain G S (1967) Donovan COmmission, Research Paper 6. espec. Ch 5. 
38. Flanders A "Collective Bargaining: . Prescription for Change 1967 in Flanders A. (1975) 
39. Interviews with management - 1983. 
40. This tripartite merger was prohibited by the Monopolies 
Commission. Subsequently Barclays and Martins proceeded to 
merge however. 
cf The Monopolies Commission (1968). 
41. Interviews with management 1981/82. 
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To recapitulate, the central theme of this work concerns the 
relationship between the national union, NUBE and the "internalist" 
associations, and the methods of the banks to try and resolve the 
instability which resulted from this. It has been argued that the 
creation of national bargaining with a joint staff side was designed to 
deal with this problem, but we concluded that while constitutionally 
combined, the rivalry between the unions was not dissolved, and 
underneath their cooperation was the objective of controlling the 
staff side. 
This second section considers the two attempts to effect a full-scale 
merger between NUBE and the CBSA in the light of this objective. It 
argues that because of their continuing philosophical and 
organisational differences these merger initiatives were both 
ultimately unachievable. Learning from the failings of the first 
attempt, it is argued that the latter initiative (the Johnston 
Enquiry) came much closer to its goal by confronting the fundamental 
problem of how to reconcile the domestic orientation and internalist 
principles of the associations with the financial sector ambitions and 
more orthodox trade union principles of the national union. In each 
case as well the employers were centrally involved. The mergers can be 
therefore located within our central theme as part of their response to 
the instability of divided unionism. It will be emphasised that the 
merger initiatives were not simply "employer solutions" however. 
This chapter deals with the first round of merger discussions which 
took place between September 1973 and January 1976. Following the 
convention adopted by the parties themselves, these talks will be 
referred to as the ABFU discussions, ABFU being the acronym of the 
proposed merged body, the "Association of Banking and Finance Unions". 
Given the initial commitment of the parties, why did these talks fail 
to produce a satisfactory working solution? Was this because of the 
mode in which they were conducted? Was it related to the national 
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level at which they took place? Was it because of disagreement over .a 
particular item or items? Cr was it rather an impasse created by.the 
emergence of external circumstances which altered the attitudes of the 
participants throughout the process of negotiations? 
The argument will begin by considering the developments which led up to 
the instigation of the talks. Specifically these were related to the 
financial problems facing the union and the threat of competition from 
outside unions. Mbre broadly however they-derived from NUBE's failure 
to achieve control of the staff side and thus to dominate the 
associations, which led it to propose merging as a solution. The 
process of the discussions are then considered, it being argued that 
despite initial progress fundamental differences also soon emerged 
which were never properly overcome. Fundamentally these related to 
the philosophical differences between the two sides as regards the 
nature and purpose of the merged body. Was it to be domestically or 
nationally oriented? Was it to be an "orthodox" trade union or more 
like an amalgam of staff associations? It is concluded that having 
failed to establish agreement on these questions the initiative could 
not succeed; but failure is also more broadly related to the recession 
of external threats from other trade unions which had originally 
brought the two sides together into considering what was essentially a 
defensive alliance. 
BACKGROUND 
The talks must be seen in the context of two factors. Firstly, the 
organisational weaknesses of NUBE relating to its financial problems 
and failure to expand its membership after 1968 sufficiently to 
dominate the joint staff side. Secondly, registration requirements 
under the Industrial Relations Act which affected both the union and 
the associations by exposing them to competition from external unions, 
and prompting the merger talks as a defensive responsive. 
As an organisation NUBE was facing financial crisis by 1970. Latta 
showed for example that it was the union with the lowest level of per  
capita assets in 1960 and 1970. This, he suggested, 
n
... while not entirely satisfacqcy, is probably the best 
measure of union wealth available.""-' 
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In 1960 MBE's per capita , assets were E1.25;' in 1970 these had risen in 
money terms to only £1.53. (2) 
Furthermore, NUBE was one of eleven unions in his sample which - spent 
more than its income in four or more years during that decade. (3) 
In terms of income, NUBE was reliant upon 96% of total income from 
contributions. (4) This was not untypical of expanding white-collar 
unions which as a group had not built up large investments. However 
NUBE's total income was, even within this group, extremely low, 
because it was the union with the lowest contribution per member in 
both 1960 and 1970. (5) Unsurprisingly, it also headed the list of 
unions with the highest percentage of expenditure going on working 
expenses. In 1960 this amounted to 92.5%. By 1970 this had 
deteriorated to 97%. (6) 
NUBE's financial position was critical because its recruitment was 
based almost exclusively on the clearing banks where it was competing 
with organisations which offered the same services for a considerably 
lower charge. Rule changes in 1970 and 1971 enabled it to broaden its 
horizons, but the Executive was extremely worried that the costs of 
recruiting piecemeal in the building societies and insurance 
companies, and often where staff associations were also operating, 
merely extenuated the union's operational problems. They were as a 
result reluctant to pursue large campaigns in these areas. (7) • 
In addition it had failed to gain control of the Banking Staff Council 
through achieving a larger membership than the associations. 
Obtaining this control had been a central assumption of the union's 
decision to work jointly with the associations in the talks leading to 
recognition in 1968. After recognition NUBE's membership rose 
steadily until 1973, but the difference between it and the membership 
of the CBSA remained relatively stable. There was growing impatience 
in the union with the continuing obligation to acquiesce in the 
policies of the CBSA at the bargaining table, and a growing belief that 
under the existing conditions, the ability to overhaul the CBSA was 
impossible. 
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These organisational weaknesses were not alleviated by the Industrial 
Relations Act, as the union had hoped. • 
Both NUBE and the CBSA members registered under the Industrial 
Relations Act, although the registration of each of the associations 
was subject to vigorous opposition by the union., The most important 
factor in favour of registration concerned the ability to obtain 
statutory rights to agency shop arrangements, or sole bargaining  
rights. Only when registered could a union initiate an application to 
obtain recognition as a sole bargaining agent under the Act, (8) or rely 
upon the statutory enforcement powers of the National Industrial 
Relations Court. (9)  The obverse of this situation was that failure to 
register on the part of any of the staff bodies might have led to loss 
of recognition rights. As Weekes et al noted: 
"NUBE was attracted to registration primarily by the recognition 
procedure, which was seen as vital by this union, which operates 
in areas where employers have not generally been willing to 
recognise it, often preferring staff associations, and where the 
traditional means of obtaining recognition - by a show of 
strength in industrial action -is either not desirabli 'lrpr not 
available, or is considered unlikely to be effective." 
The Registrar of Trade Unions was prepared to accept the staff 
associations' applications because they conformed to the criterion of 
independence laid down in the Act (Section 167). 
Fbr the staff associations of Lloyds, Barclays and National 
Westminster this decision was perhaps unsurprising. Their accounts 
showed considerable reserves and they employed staff of their own. Fbr 
example, by 1973 the Barclays Association employed a dozen clerical 
staff in addition to its officials. (11) However the decision to 
register the Midland Bank Staff Association was more contentious, even 
to its fellow CBSA members. (12) This association was apparently 
closely dependent upon the Midland Bank. It had failed to pursue the 
sort of organisational reform which would ensure greater independence. 
It ran no regular magazine or newsletter, was dependent on the bank's 
facilities, and used its premises. Significantly it had also failed to 
generate the growth in membership which would permit the funding of 
greater independence: between 1968 and 1973 its membership remained 
static, around 10,000, while the staff employed by the Midland during 
the corresponding period grew from 30,000 to 40,000. 
-
0 0 
The most dubious aspect of the MBSA's successful application concerned 
its source of funds. From evidence to the Registrar it was_clear that 
the association was in debt to a subsidiary of•Midland Bank, the 
Fbrward Trust °company, to the tune of £20,000 and this sum formed the 
bulk of the association's balance sheet. Even on the narrowest 
interpretation of financial independence it is arguable that the 
Registrar was extremely generous in his judgement. 
Because of NUBE's decision to register under the Act it was in 
contravention of the TUC policy of non-registration as declared in 
September 1971. NUBE was accordingly suspended fran the TUC in 1972 
and expelled by the annual Congress in 1973. This exposed NUBE (and 
the associations) to the new threat of competition from those unions 
which had followed the TUC line and not registered, NUBE no longer 
being protected by the "Bridlington rules". The union was aware that 
several white collar unions, and particularly ASTMS were keen to start 
recruiting in its traditional territory, and rivalry was growing in 
the newer areas such as the building societies and insurance companies 
where NUBE was starting to recruit after registration. Given its 
difficult financial position however it could not afford very large 
campaigns, and therefore pursued other strategies to raise its 
membership including mergers with individual associations. NUBE 
approached the Barclays association in 1970, the MBSA in 1972 and the 
Lloyds and National Westminster bodies in 1973. Success would have 
brought the union much closer to its desired majority position, but in 
each case it would not compromise its essential aim of absorbing the 
associations into its domestic committee structure. The associations 
each found this unacceptable and declined. The union therefore 
concentrated its pressure for support upon the employers. 
From 1971 NUBE was warning the employers of its financial 
problems, (13) but while these were taken very seriously by the 
Federation secretariat, the individual managers who constituted the 
Federation Council were disinclined to try and ameliorate them. The 
request from the union for support via the employers' use of their 
power to effect defensive mergers between the staff bodies was not 
taken up. 
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Out of NUBE's warning the Federation did however begin to consider more 
seriously the threat of incursions by other unions. In particular it 
was believed that if the banks had to deal with powerful unions,(such 
as ASTMS) with memberships spread throughout the financial sector; 
they: 
"... would be very tempted to use the banks as a 'stalking horse' with the Bank settlements as a 1pmff for other negotiations with 
insurance companies and so on.""- 
The likelihood of outside unions gaining a foothold was also thought to 
be raised by the continuing inflation in the economy. It was feared 
that if aggressive bargaining by such unions produced high settlements 
for their members this might be an inducement for bank staff to join 
them, or become more militant as they had done in the 1950's and 
1960's.
(15) Nonetheless the Federation Council members continued to 
resist pressure from their secretariat to take up an interventionist 
policy in order to effect a merger of NUBE and the associations. Their 
reluctance appeared to stem from the satisfactory working of joint 
domestic procedures and a disinclination to believe that an employer 
could effect such a merger. In addition the desire to remain 
impartial, given previous accusations of interference was evident. (16) 
Two events in August and September 1973 were the immediate causes of 
the start of the merger talks. In August NUBE's President and General 
Secretary informed the employers of their intention at the following 
union Executive Committee meeting to recommend withdrawal from certain 
joint negotiating machineries. (17) This was acknowledged to be a 
last-ditch "shock tactic" to galvanise the employers into action, as 
NUBE was now locked into a vicious circle of declining membership and 
growing financial problems, yet its own attempts to start a dialogue 
with the associations had failed. 
While this was sufficient to get the employers to agree that talks 
should start forthwith, the associations of Barclays and National 
Westminster remained disinterested. In the following month 
(September) they changed their views with the announcement by the 
Midland Bank Staff Association that it was to recommend a transfer of 
engagements to ASTMS. 
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The decision by the staff associations to enter the talks was taken the 
same day the MBSA's announcement of its intended merger was made;and 
on the strength of that news .(18)  Not only did the prospect of 
encroachment by ASTMS alarm them, but it was also accepted that NUBE 
might no longer be in a minority within the BSC. But although they 
were henceforth convinced that it was necessary to form one 
representative body, the General Secretaries of Barclays and National 
Westminster emphasised right from this point that a "take-over" by 
NUBE was not acceptable, (19) and that the new body should operate with 
considerable domestic autonomy in bargaining. 
THE ABFU TALKS  
Under the chairmanship of the FLCBE Chairman, and with the Federation 
Secretary attending in an advisory and administrative capacity, 
meetings were held between October 1st 1973 and the beginning of 1976. 
Representing NUBE initially were the General Secretary and Honorary 
President; the staff associations remaining in the CBSA were 
represented by their respective General Secretaries. 
On the face of it, the talks made rapid progress. Agreement on a title 
for the new organisation was quickly reached. (20) This was later 
modified, but it was agreed that the overall organisation was to be an 
association of unions. We would argue that, as they had always 
emphasised their distinctiveness from the orthodox trade union 
movement, the inclusion of the term union in the name of the 
organisation represented a strong symbolic gesture on the part of the 
staff associations. 
From drafts put forward by each side, a composite constitution was 
produced for discussion by February 1974. That this was possible 
arguably indicated the apparently wide area of agreement between the 
parties on the structure of the new organisation. 
It was accepted that a federal arrangement was necessary to encompass 
three levels of organisation. At the top there was a confederate body 
known as the National Council, and of which the constituent unions (or 
members) of the Association would be members. The bottom layer was 
made up of constituent members, which were either unions or sections. 
0 
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Membership of this Council would be open to any union registered under 
the Industrial RelaiOns Act which was solely concerned with banking' 
and finance. . . 
This was designed to be broad enough to encompass NUBE's non-clearing 
bank areas of membership, but not so broad as topermit the entry of 
external unions such as ASTMS. Sections were distinguishable from 
unions mainly by their size: they were small organisations of 
employees from one or more employer which were not necessarily 
registered as unions, but which had common negotiating interests, or 
formed a separate bargaining unit; for example the non-clerical staff 
within the banks. Organisation was thus a mixture of 
industry/employer based, and overlaid with a horizontal/occupational 
linkage. 
A middle layer consisted of negotiating committees. Principally this 
was designed to encompass the existing Banking Staff Council and the 
national negotiating procedures in the clearing banks. It was 
envisaged that other negotiating committees, covering building 
societies, insurance and hire purchase companies, could also be 
established, in some cases around the proposed sections. 
As far as the staff associations were concerned, the prime locus of 
power of the ABFU was to exist at the level of the constituent member. 
Indeed the individual associations would be transformed into.staff 
unions whose constituencies would be the domestic banks. These would 
hold considerable power together on the National Council, because of 
their membership predominance, but most of their activity would be 
concentrated upon the domestic unions, and the English Clearing Banks 
Council. The secretaryships of the unions and of the clearing banks 
negotiating body were therefore crucial positions, although no 
agreement on who was to hold the latter was made at the presentation of 
the composite document. 
One further point about the constiution concerns the function of the 
National Council. Its duties were defined broadly as being to ensure 
that the powers and duties of the Association were discharged. This 
definition left room for considerable interpretation as to its meaning 
in practice. Predictably the union attached a much wider construction 
than the associations of what was thereby implied. NUBE saw the 
organisation as a centralized and genuine industrial - unionwith. co-
ordinated powers and policies; in Which the clearing banks ' were the  
most important part. But the clearers had to be integrated, like the 
other parts, into the whole expressed by the concept of ABFU. The 
associations in contrast were concerned to seek as much control as 
possible devolved to the domestic bodies, and the National Council 
having a limited administrative role. 
From the discussions of the draft constitution in early 1974, the 
fundamental sticking points began to emerge. Initially, the 
associations were concerned at the coverage of matters in national as 
opposed to domestic machinery. They saw the revision of the 
constitution as the means to changing the balance in favour of domestic 
negotiations. This reflected the disagreement on revision of the JNC 
which had been outstanding since 1971. 
At that time it had proved impossible to obtain consensus on revision, 
and the matter had been somewhat unsatisfactorily resolved by the 
renewal of the original constitutions. This, the staff associations 
had regarded as an essentially provisional arrangement. 
The three main points of difference, which were to remain unresolved 
throughout the talks, were also clarified at this point. This seemed 
to be because as the constitutions were discussed, concrete examples 
of the differences between the union and staff associations 
crystallised. These points were: 
1. The contract of service of the officials of the clearing 
unions (initially this problem revolved around the 
employment of the General Secretaries rather than 
officials in general). 
2. Direct membership of ABFU as opposed to membership of the 
constituent unions which would then affiliate in some way 
to the central body. 
3. 	The remittance of subscriptions.(21) 
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Throughout the following meetings. until June, much time , was spent 
talking round 'these problems,. ando the question of the'balanc4 of 
domestic and national negotiations. At the latter point the employers 
indicated that revision of the JNC had to take place separately, and 
that it would be best to retain the existing split in the constitution 
of the existing body, if only to facilitate the agreement on the 
Merger. (22) They did indicate however that they would be prepared to 
modify the national arrangements marginally, by making the minimum 
managerial salary a domestic matter. It seems that this encouraged the 
staff associations to reform via ABFU. (23) 
The representatives essentially regarded the questions of the contract 
of service and the remittance of subscriptions as being the crucial 
ones. (24)  on the payment of subscriptions, the associations were in 
favour of payment being made direct to the domestic bodies, and 
different levels of subscription being permitted to reflect the 
differences in facilities being offered. From there a per capita 
payment would be made to the central body. In contrast NUBE wanted the 
funds to be remitted centrally, and thereafter distributed, their aim 
being to minimise variations in domestic services. 
on the contracts of the executive officers of the clearing bank unions 
there was a parellel dichotomy. The staff associations wanted these to 
be with the individual staff unions: NUBE was in favour of all 
contracts beng made with ABFU itself. 
It is indicative of the spirit which then predominated that a 
compromise was evolved. This effectively traded one point for the 
other, although the wording of the agreements was somewhat tortuous. 
As a result the subscriptions were to be paid to a joint account in the 
name of ABFU and the constituent union, and this joint account was 
operable only on the joint authority of an ABFU and a constituent union 
official. In return NUBE backed down on the question of the contracts 
of service. (25)  
Similarly, a compromise was reached on the question of external 
affiliation. Although NUBE was still outside of the TUC it regarded 
re-affiliation as a necessity at some point in the future. In contrast 
the associations were not keen on this. Another complication related 
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to the Confederation of Employee Organisations (CEO) ct which.the . BBSA 
was a founder member in 1973. This body predominantly represented 
staff associations and white oollar organisations with little sympathy 
for the TUC and its role was mainly as a political pressure group. 
NUBE was, unsurprisingly, not keen to be associated with it. (26)  
Agreement over external affiliations could therefore have been 
problematic, but again a compromise was reached after the BGSA agreed 
to have an affiliation clause written into the domestic constitutions, 
which effectively gave it an option out of the TUC. (27) 
Ostensibly then, the constitution had been agreed upon by April 1974, 
six months after the talks had begun. It was reported in the 
Federation Council that the merger would probably be completed by June 
or July, (28) and all that was required was ratification from the 
executive committees of the staff bodies. At the latest it was thought 
that ABFU would be a concrete reality by January 1974. (29) 
The constitutions were subject to legal drafting and amendments during 
the following three months. At meetings on the 3rd and 14th of June 
these were apparently accepted by the officials of the parties 
involved, and NUBE then mistakenly assumed that the final draft of the 
document could be quickly approved. (30) However between June and 
October no confirmation was forthcoming from the associations. 
Meanwhile, in July an extremely significant meeting between the 
honorary officials of the union and staff associations took place. (31) 
This was intended to examine the practical aspects of the 
constitutional arrangements and discussion was based upon the draft 
ABFU constitution. However it became clear here that there was 
considerable distance between the two sides on the operation of the 
clearing bank unions within ABFU. 
In particular the union's officials believed that: 
1. 	NUBE's General Secretary was acceptable to the other side 
as the General Secretary of the National Council but not 
as the Secretary of the Clearing Bank Council, the 
negotiating committee at the secondary level for the 
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clearing banks. In other words the NUBE leader was to be 
excluded from a principal role in the national machinery. 
This, it was presumed, was to facilitate a revision of the 
JNC towards greater danestic autonomy. 
2. It was believed that the associations were not committed 
to the concept of ABFU as a centralized industry-wide 
body. They were not interested in the ABFU General 
Council, and it was suspected that they were mainly 
concerned with building up autonomy at the constituent 
bank level. In this respect it was also noted that they 
rejected any need for a central level Reserve Fund. 
3. On the question of officials, the NUBE members were 
alarmed by the fact that there were 35 still to be 
"absorbed"; the association officials had indicated no 
interest in doing this. 
4. NUBE feared a subsequent withdrawal of one of the 
constituent unions, as the constitutional ties to the 
central body were not tight enough. This related to the 
likelihood of a disagreement over affiliation to an 
external body such as the TUC, but NUBE felt that any 
withdrawing constituent would be likely to take both 
former association and NUBE members. 
NUBE communicated their views to the Federation, and requested that 
they act to ensure this did not happen. This the Federation declined 
to do, saying it was not their position to impose a ruling on one side 
or another. The Federation also pointed out that the delay stemmed 
mainly from the BGSA. The Barclays staff association defended its 
slowness by insisting that all the implications of the move had to be 
considered by its lay organisation. Events began to be bogged down in 
points of detail while the main object of the exercise was no closer to 
being achieved. 
This was just prior to the October meeting between the fulltime and lay 
officials of each side, when a draft constitution was put on the 
table. (32) Here the union reacted to the July "revelations" by 
-132- 
O 	
0 
hardening its position. It pressed for modifiCation to the draft 
constitution to Safeguard what it regarded as its interests. This 
involved it reneging on the agreement ciVer membership and 
subscriptions; it demanded that both of these, would be directly linked 
to the central body, ABFU, in the first instance. 
The new union position was restated at the following meeting in 
December. The "infamous trinity" (33) of points which agreement could 
not be reached were detailed as follows by NUBE: 
1. Direct membership of ABFU (the central body). 
2. Direct subscriptions payable to ABFU. 
3. Direct employment of all officials by ABFU. 
In a sense, the fresh demands put by NUBE at the December 1974 meeting 
marked the end of any chance that the ABFU talks would be successful. 
The staff associations, surprised by this retrenchment, went back to 
their executive committees, but at the meetings in early 1975 
indicated that they were prepared to stand by the October draft 
constitution. They were not prepared to tolerate the revised union 
position. (34) 
Fundamental questions which had been previously unresolved now 
emerged, such as the prospect of affiliation to the TUC and how to deal 
with the differential in subscription rates between NUBE and the staff 
associations. (35) As these differences began to dominate the 
proceedings, the Chairman from the FUME floated the idea of bringing 
in an outsider to try and "thrash out all the problems", without 
simcess. (36)  Union officials confirmed their intention to take NUBE 
or any new body into the TUC, as their Delegate Conference had 
resolved, even though the price of this would be £33,000 in back-dated 
affiliation fees. 
Resolutions at NUBE's Delegate Conference had also called for the 
withdrawal from the talks if the executive felt no agreement was in 
sight. Withdrawal from joint machinery in the event of the talks 
failing was also proposed. While the talks were still in progress NUBE 
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also placed formal objections to the certification of the associations 
order ,the EMployment Protection Act, disputing their independence.' 
This was supported by attacks upon them in NUBE's magazine. The.staff 
associations responded by arguing that individual bank sections should 
have the right to withdraw from national machinery. 
L 
The talks broke up in January 1976 without the three supposedly 
outstanding questions of direct subscriptions, membership and 
employment of officials even having been considered at the last 
meeting. 
REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF ABFU 
According to those involved the talks failed for several reasons. 
Personality differences; the problems of carrying lay officials and 
local committees; lack of clarity about objectives and changes of 
policy were all pertinent factors. (37) 
Could the talks have succeeded at domestic level? This at first seems 
plausible. Certainly relations between officials at this level were 
better, and the problems of joint working in a practical way had been 
sorted out by previous experience. In addition, the drafting of 
constitutions for the individual banks made more headway. For 
instance, by October 1974 the staff association in Barclays was 
claiming that provisional agreement between it and the. NUBE 
representatives over the domestic constitution was effectively 
complete. (38)  
But, as was subsequently pointed out in the Johnston Report, there were 
fundamental problems with a domestic initiative. Any negotiations 
which were derived from the domestic level were hardly likely to be 
able to ensure reform took place in the other domestic units, nor to 
establish a consensus upon their relationship with the second and 
third tiers of the federal body. As NUBE's principal concern was to 
establish a centralized organisation into which the domestic unions 
could be integrated, it wanted a top-down approach to change and 
resisted any other mode of reform, unless it could achieve individual 
transfers of engagements with any of the staff associations. This 
method however was, as we noted above, unacceptable to the 
associations. 
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With regard to the question of how much importance may be attributed to 
personality differences in the failure-of the talki, the .problem 
arises of distinguishing this factor from questions of principle and 
how much the participants were constrained by organisational roles. 
Certainly the participants themselves put a great deal of weight on 
personality clashes -as an explanation. (39) Yet what might have been 
interpreted as dogmatism or inconsistency could have been due to 
multiple organisational pressures which tended to create complex or 
shifting, negotiating positions throughout the two and a half years of 
the talks. It should be noted however that Dr Johnston saw the failure 
of the talks stemming not so much from concrete differences as 
differences in attitudes, (40) and in general it seems clear that as the 
talks progressed both sides tended to adopt less flexible positions. 
One problem for NUBE was that its officials were dealing with three 
separate officials who came with differing remits. While the LBGSA 
official claimed to have carte blanche, his counterparts emphasised 
that they were much more constrained by their organisations. The BGSA 
representative was particularly concerned with the issue of external 
affiliations and put up more strenuous opposition to the membership 
than the other association officials, a reflection of the Barclays 
staff association's central role in the CEO it would seem. The NWSA 
representative was the most concerned to establish enhanced domestic 
bargaining and the widest possible powers at that level of 
organisation. NUBE were stongly critical of this official in 
ascribing blame for the collapse of the talks, suggesting that his 
position shifted as the talks progressed; however the minutes of the 
meetings suggest no great inconsistency in his priorities throughout 
the talks. Be consistently favoured a clear domestic orientation to 
the new organisation as is shown by the following exchange: 
"Mr Mills (NUBE) added that the overall executive body must have 
the authority to speak for the then most powerful organisation 
as a whole ..." 
"Mr Carthy, (MSA) however, stated that he did not see the 
Central committee as a controlling body, he likened it tape CBI 
whereby it offers advice and guidance to its members.' 
Similarly, the same association official stated, just prior to the 
discussion of the merged constitution, in January 1974, 
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"Broadly, the staff associations see unification through the establishment in each of the banks of a new Organisation into 
which all of the staff associations and NUBE members in that bank 
would be transferred ... The membership of the new organisation would have complete control over its activities through the 
normal democratic process ... The confederation (the top level 
council) would provide legal and research facilities but would have no power of control over its affiliated members. It would 
be financed by af r4pitation fee payable by each of its affiliated organisations."'`' 
and this position was reiterated in October 1975, towards the end of 
the talks. 
It should not be denied that there were differences of attitude on the 
associations' side however. The LBGSA representative was undoubtedly 
the keenest of the CSA officials to effect a merger, and the least 
concerned with points of detail, or of principle. But in general, more 
pragmatic attitudes to amalgamation were adopted by the associations 
than by NUBE. Their priority was to implement, and then sort problems 
out. Given that they entered the talks from a position of relative 
strength it is evident that the associations made significant 
compromises up until mid-1974, and were prepared to go ahead on the 
basis of the October 1974 Constitution, while NUBE wanted further 
reassurances written into it. 
Linked to the question of personalities is the role of the lay 
officials. These people evidently had a considerable impact on the 
outcome of the talks, and NUBE argued that the fulltime association 
officials had failed to "sell" the proposals accurately to their lay 
members. But the idea of a large gap between the CBSA representatives 
and their lay officials was probably overblown. That the 
representatives were well aware of their lay officials' view is in no 
doubt, and that the latter group had expressed strong positions on the 
issues of TUC membership, individual membership of ABFU, contracts of 
service and so on is also clear. (43) To an extent it might be argued 
that the associations' leaders had misjudged how difficult it might be 
to carry their lay officials into a merger through compromise, and that 
the leaders were keener on a merger than their constituents. But these 
leaders had from the start emphasised that the final decision with 
regard to a merger would rest with their lay members. Furthermore the 
associations argued that NUBE shifted its ground at the end of 1974 as 
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a result of pressure from its branchesamdcthere is an element of truth 
in this. The NUBE representatives admitted that its more dogmatic 
position was in part due to the dissatisfaction-of the branches with 
the draft constitution of October 1974. It seems fair 'to argue 
therefore that there was some distance between the fulltime and the lay 
officials on both sides. 
The FLCBE representatives ultimately felt the talks suffered because 
of the entrenched attitudes of the participants. It was noted as early 
as January 1974 that one of the chief problems was the jockeying among 
the officials for the important jobs in the new arrangement, (44) but 
this was obviously related to the question of where the locus of power 
was primarily to be - at domestic or at national level. Although in 
their reporting the employers remained generally neutral, less 
sympathy with the associations was evident in the Federation. For 
example, it was noted that they were "insistent" upon domestic 
autonomy, (45) and subsequently it was suggested that they "remained 
obdurate" on this issue. (46) 
But this interpretation arguably reflects the employers' own concern 
to secure a swift resolution to amalgamate from the staff bodies, and 
to leave the existing national constitutions largely intact. As the 
staff associations were less pressed to secure an early settlement, 
they understandably showed more concern at the implications of the 
first draft constitution. Furthermore they saw the ABFU talks as the 
means to adjust the national-domestic balance more towards their 
philosophy, a move which they believed to be justified by their success 
in gaining members more rapidly than NUBE since 1968 and reflecting the 
greater popularity of their approach. Expressed differently, they saw 
little point in acquiescing in a reform which simply led to their take-
over by what they saw as a new model NUBE, when it was the latter which 
was obviously failing to flourish in the existing conditions. 
What can be made of the role of the Federation members? They acted as 
advisors and facilitators but in a very passive sense, in that there 
was no effort to dictate what the preference of the employers might be, 
or to impose a solution onto the participants. This of course was 
thought necessary to maintain neutrality and impartiality. 
• 
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Their presence was subject to criticism from outsideunions, which was 
subseqUently repudiated by the participants. (47) Certainly there were 
instances when it was necessary to have an employers' representative 
present, as for example over the question of whether reform of the JNC 
could be assumed to be acceptable and therefore included in the ABFU 
constitution. 
It is undeniable however that the employers were interested in and 
supported a merger, and that they felt this would be to their 
advantage. This did not mean that the talks were therefore invalidated 
because it was perfectly plausible to argue that, whatever the banks' 
view, there were advantages to the staff in the merger which the 
representative bodies were under a moral obligation to pursue. It is 
also arguable that a merged body would not necessarily have conformed 
to those advantages which the employers perceived. 
Quite apart from this, there are two observations related to the 
employers' role. While they undoubtedly facilitated change, they 
appeared to be too optimistic, and too keen to bring about the new body 
without examining the real differences between the two parties. This 
was particularly true in the early meetings when agreements were 
almost assumed to be a technical exercise. Often the employers made 
the mistake of assuming that questions such as those relating to 
subscriptions and membership had been resolved, when in fact they had 
not. (48) This reflected, in part, the impatience to get things done 
because of the apparent crisis facing the parties. It also reflected a 
misunderstanding of the role of the officials, and the way that their 
power was circumscribed by their executives, so that they could make 
few commitments without reference back. 
It is arguable that the Federation representatives therefore pushed 
matters along too quickly in the early stage, without appreciating the 
fundamental differences in the attitude between the parties, and that 
this contributed to the mistaken assumption that there was substantial 
congruity over what the nature of ABFU was. 
Secondly, when progress slowed, the employers were unable to direct 
the parties forward. This of course related to their agreed role as 
passive participants, but they were unable to make fresh proposals, to 
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views of one side- to the other. Hence, for example even though they 
met each side separately, little initiative could be taken to try and 
lead either into a compromise by way of conciliation or nediation. 
When the entrenched positions were taken up the Federation felt it 
should do no more than reiterate the previous developments, and 
thereby hope to prompt the parties themselves to move away from a 
stalemate. 
This does not adequately explain why the talks initially made so much 
progress, only to flounder, effectively from March 1974 onwards. 
Rather, changes in the negotiating position of the participants have 
to be located within a dynamic context, and incorporated with factors 
which to an extent were external to the talks. 
If the reasons why the talks were intiated are borne in mind, more 
insight into the weaknesses of the process can be gained. It will be 
remembered that the staff associations were persuaded to enter talks 
because of the imminent threat of ASTMS. Unity against a common 
external problem drew them together with the union and the employers. 
Throughout 1974 this threat receded as ASTMS failed to make membership 
headway or to disrupt the operation of national machinery where it was 
not offered recognition. 
Secondly the staff associations were registered under the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations Act in 1974 and certified under the Employment 
Protection Act 1975, as independent unions. When NUBE openly objected 
to these decisions relations between the sides were considerably 
soured. Indeed this may have been a crucial mistake for the union 
because the Lloyds Staff Association was in 1974 on the point of 
transferring itself to NUBE in an effort to keep the impetus of the 
talks going, but decided not to after the open hostility to 
"internalism" expressed by the union. (49)  
The certification also meant that NUBE could not once again utilise 
statutory criteria to have the associations de-recognised. The CBSA 
members also continued to expand their memberships, and at an 
accelerating rate after 1973 thereby remaining organisationally viable 
and able to resist the approaches for amalgamation or transfer which 
were made to them. (50) 
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Thirdly, NUBE was substantially stronger by the end of 1914, and this 
factor was used by the CBSA representatives to explain why the union 
hardened its position at that point. (51) The upturn in the union's 
fortunes may be attributed to the way in which it used the Iildustrial 
Relaticins Act to its advantage. NUBE made more applications than any 
other union to the NIRC to secure recognition rights. Of a total of 
fifty-four applications by trade unions, NUBE submitted seventeen. 
Perhape the most important, so far as union expansion was concerned, 
registration permitted the union to co-operate with institutions set 
up by the 1971 Act. This would have been considerably more difficult 
as a non-registered union, because of the TUC policy of non-
participation in CIR investigations. (52) 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, (53) NUBE tended to be favoured over 
the internal associations with which it was competing, because the CIR 
assessed bargaining agency on more testing grounds than those used by 
the Registrar to determine independence. 
In particular, the CIR emphasised the need to assess each case 
individually, and to be especially concerned with the question of 
effectiveness when assessing the suitability of bargaining agents. (54) 
It was wary of assuming that conformity to "formal organisation and 
financial criteria" was sufficient evidence of effectiveness as a 
bargaining agent, and was concerned to ascertain whether (possibly 
latent) "outside influence" was nonetheless existent. (55) Independence 
and effectiveness were explored congruently, and the CIR showed 
particular concern as regards the representative capabilities of house 
associations. (56) 
NUBE scored several successes in the Building Societies, where 
collective bargaining was not established. It also reached agency 
shop agreements in some non-clearing banks such as the Yorkshire, Co-
Operative and the TSB, and hire purchase companies. 
The CIR also showed a preference for the union as sole bargaining agent 
in the clearing bank cases which it considered. (57) It overrode the 
claim for recognition of the staff association in each case, despite 
their substantial memberships, showing a stronger concern to create 
streamlined and effective bargaining with an orthodox trade union. 
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agency shop agreement as created in'the Industrial Relations'Act was. 
sdbstantial, because these offered Several , advantages to the 
impecunious NUBE. There was no need for campaigns to recruit members 
and the costs of maintaining members and of collecting sdbscriptions 
were minimised, because the direct debiting system yas introduced with 
each agreement. (58)' This also eased the cash flow of the union by 
ensuring a regular flow, rather than payment on an annual basis. By 
1975 the union had survived its financial crisis and began to augment 
its reserves as well as to start expanding its number of fulltime 
officials and organisation. 
In terms of membership the Act appeared to offer considerable 
assistance. Compered to non-registered unions which registered an 
aggregate growth of 4.7% between 1971 and 1974 NUBE's total membership 
rose from 92,603 to 100,228. An increase of nearly 8%. However during 
this period its clearing bank membership dropped from 71,029 to 60,335 
so that the rise in non-clearing bank membership was in fact much more 
rapid. It increased from 21,574 to 39,893, a rise of 85% and this was 
the area where the majority of NUBE's new recognition agreements were 
made under the Act. 
This growth evidently altered the character of the union. Instead of 
having a constituency which was predominantly located in the clearing 
banks it became more generically a finance industry based 
organisation. This is demonstrated in the weighting of the unions' 
membership: in 1970 78% were clearing bank staff; by 1974 the 
corresponding figure was 60%. 
It is therefore probably no overstatement to suggest that the 1971 Act 
enabled NUBE to survive as an independent union, but it also 
complicated the issues involved in the merger talks. The associations 
had entered the talks because (interalia) it was believed that the 
majority of staff in the banks were in favour of a united body. They 
did not want to see this happen at the expense of the clearing bank 
staff being swamped by a finance sector organisation of workers, 
arguing that conditions of work and the employment relationship in the 
clearers was unique and demanded a special sort of representative 
body. 
In practice this meant that notwithstanding the agreed structural  
autonomy of the English clearing banks group at•the first and second 
levels, the staff associations also wanted to confirm the extensive 
operational independence of the constituent unions and the l'Ehglish 
Clearing Bank Negotiating Council in the new body. They did not want 
to be controlled or linked to the extraneous section, which was 
becoming more important to NUBE, on matters such as finance, strikes, 
political affiliations, or on bargaining strategies, and the more that 
NUBE's extra-clearing bank membership rose,'the more problematic this 
issue became. In effect, there was a process of institutional 
divergence going on throughout the ABFU talks which tended to militate 
against the potential for a merger. 
Finally, perhaps the most important reason for the collapse of 
progress after early 1974 related to the emergence of questions of 
organisational power only at this point. The apparent urgency of the 
situation prompted the commencement and the progress of the talks, but 
it also meant that the fundamental federal problem of how power was to 
be distributed was neglected. In drafting the constitutions both 
sides were principally concerned to get the organisational structure 
right, and given that they were committed to some sort of federated 
arrangement, this did not create too much difficulty. It proved 
relatively easy to define the components of the organisation and to 
delineate the connections between them, but matters became problematic 
when the parties turned to trying to establish the nature of the 
operating relationship between these components. 
This was expressed through the three areas of contradiction. These 
were the concrete dimensions of power within the organisation, because 
they related to financial control; the primary locus of membership and 
therefore where the members were linked to their organisation; and the 
employment principle, which determined which constituency the official 
was primarily serving, and where his responsibilities in decision-
making lay. So although agreement was technically reached on each of 
these three points at one time or another, in practice however this 
process did not engender explicit agreement on the organisational 
philosophy of ABFU. Specifically, the union believed that the written 
rules would safeguard what was to be to them a nationally oriented 
organisation with a continuation of the existing bargaining division. 
0 
Their officials were ( therefore highly surprised by the admission of 
the lay officials'of the association# that ABFU was to be in theft- eyes 
a vehicle of change. But we argued that they had failed to understand 
from the start what the staff associations wanted out of the talks, 
which would seem to imply that the talks were doomed to fail from the 
outset. 
To some extent this was so; as we have shown, the way that the talks 
were handled meant that many crucial points were neglected. The fright 
which both sides had taken at the spectre of ASTMS initially gave them 
the will to concentrate upon points of similarity. When that defensive 
impetus wore off the incompatibility of the respective views as to the 
role and functioning of the new organisation came to the fore. 
Of course, had ASTMS continued to threaten things might have gone 
differently, but, in a sense, the threat from this union was always 
overplayed. The Midland Bank Staff Association was not comparable to 
its counterparts in many ways, and ASTMS really failed to establish 
itself as a viable alternative for the staff of other banks. Again, if 
NUBE's financial position had not improved, it may well have had to 
undertake to merge if only not to collapse. It was however offered 
amalgamations elsewhere with TUC unions which it may have found more 
palatable in the final analysis. (59) 
On the positive side though, it can be said that an organisational 
structure was devised which went a considerable way to satisfying the 
aspirations of both sides. This technical achievement remained 
despite the breakdown of the talks, but it was clear that if a merger 
was to be effected the crucial philosophical differences between the 
two sides still had to be bridged. 
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CONCLUSION 
The talks lasted for nearly two and a half years, from October 1973, 
but were effectively stalled after the October 1974 meeting. We have 
argued that during the period of discussions the cexternal threats of 
ASTMS and NUBE's, financial crisis, which had pushed the sides 
together, receded and that these issues had an important effect upon 
the failure to consolidate on the initial compromises. 
While a degree of personal rivalry and disagreement may have crept into 
the talks, this was unlikely to have been as important as some of the 
participants suspected. Nor, in isolation, were the differences 
between the views of the fulltime and lay officials as crucial as was 
suggested. 
In general it has been argued that these were aspects of the more 
fundamental failure to clarify how each side intended the merged body 
to operate. Agreements on organisational principles were made without 
full exploration of how ABFU was to operate as a compromise between the 
national orientations of one side and the desire on the other for 
greater domestic autonomy. Related to this it has been suggested that 
the early preoccupation with agreeing a federal structure ignored the 
power implications of such a compromise, and that the role of the 
employer-chairman contributed to this, inadvertently. In particular 
the desire to remain impartial, by assuming a deliberately passive 
observer role meant that the chairman was unable to lead the parties 
throught fresh propositions or initiatives. This was a crucial 
weakness when the talks started to get bogged down. In addition, no 
sanctions could be put on the parties to force them into reform, nor 
inducements be offered as a means of encouraging it. As will be shown 
with the Johnston enquiry however, the lessons of this failure were 
largely learnt, and much greater progress to amalagamation was then 
made. 
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INTRCCUCTION 
. 
The Johnston Enquiry represented the second attempt at the national 
level to resolve the division of representation by effecting a merger 
between the staff associations and RUBE. Like the first attempt,.the 
ABFU talks, the employers were actively involved in this initiative, 
but to overcome the shortcomings of ABFU the need for a neutral 
outsider to conduct the discussions was thought necessary. TO this 
end, Dr T L Johnston* was appointed as independent Chairman to enquire 
into the whole question of representation, and report with 
recommendations to the parties concerned. Dr Johnston produced three 
Reports between October 1978 and January 1980, containing the 
recommendations which were meant to form the basis for the merger, but 
they were also supplemented by a sequence of meetings in which the 
detailed problems and objections raised by each side to the Reports 
were discussed. 
In this chapter the intention is not simply to apportion blame for the 
ultimate failure of the talks, but to examine the proposals in terms of 
the objectives of each party (including Dr Johnston). Furthermore, by 
looking at the problems which arose in the process of the Enquiry 
(which lasted nearly two years) and how the Chairman proposed to 
resolved them, the intention is to locate the difficulties which 
finally led to the collapse of the Enquiry in a more dynamic context. 
We argue that Dr Johnston came much closer to effecting a merger than 
the ABFU talks had done because, recognising the shortcomings of the 
previous attempt, he tried to confront the fundamental problem of low 
trust which characterised relations between the unions as a result of 
their longstanding rivalry, and which consistently threatened to 
undermine any possibility of agreement as to the nature and working of 
a merged body. In the development of the discussion we try to 
demonstrate how Johnston tried to overcome this mutual suspicion both 
in the content of his reform proposals and by addressing specific 
operational issues over which there were differences in conjunction 
with the parties themselves, through a series of meetings running 
throughout the Enquiry. FOcussing on the progression of the talks, the 
chapter tries to demonstrate the achievements of this strategy of 
building consensus. 
*At that time head of the Scottish Manpower Services Committee and 
formerly Professor of Economics at Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh. 
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to create a. merger. It is suggested.that as the proposed merged body 
Tut forward by Johnston was a relatively centralised model, this 
appeared to favour NUBE's objectives-, yet the ultimate failure of the 
talks, resulted from a refusal by BIFU MBE had changed its name 
during the Enquiry) to accept the second Report as it stood. It is 
concluded that, despite the centralism of the new model, insufficient 
guarantees on the extra-institutional structure of the new 
organisation could be produced to satisfy various strategically 
important groups within the union. While failure was apparently due to 
an apparently minor technical detail, the profound importance of this 
point to the parties concerned, and the reluctance to take the first 
active steps to implementing change are argued to be evidence of the 
persisting suspicion between the sides, which Johnston had finally 
been unable to overcome. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE  
The chapter is set out as follows: first, the Enquiry is set in the 
context of growing instability of the joint staff side, and the 
decision by NUBE to try and resolve its minority position by applying 
pressure on the associations through outside agencies, as it had done 
prior to obtaining recognition. As in the 1960s following NUBE's 
complaint to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) the response 
of the CSA to the pressure applied by the union was to adopt a more 
competitive bargaining strategy designed to demonstrate their 
effectiveness, and this led to the collapse of the joint staff council, 
over the 1977 pay claim. 
The Johnston Enquiry is therefore located in the context of a crisis of 
instability in the bargaining environment, following the collapse of 
the constitutional framework. 
The second section of the chapter examines the Reports, looking at the 
proposals in detail and the reactions of the parties. Here we try to 
demonstrate Jonhston's success in constructing an acceptable general 
framework for the merger, followed by the way in which he confronted 
more specific problems concerning the locus of organisational power 
before the talks floundered after the second Report. The details of 
this statement are then considered. 
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Chairman, are explored in the final section. The question of'whether 
anything further could have LOen one to overcome the fundamental 
problem of low trust'is addressed, and in particular whether the banks 
which were ascribed an important function in seeing the reform 
implemented, fulfilled their intended role or could have done anything 
more to avert failure. Associated with this, we consider the charge 
made by one party that the Johnston model of reform was managerialist, 
that is to say that it favoured the employers; we conclude that this 
accusation was unfounded. 
BACKGRCUND 'PD THE ENQUIRY 
Before examining the substance of the Johnston Reports, the enquiry 
must be placed into the context of the resurgence of competition 
between the staff bodies arising from the stalemate of the ABFU talks. 
As Dr Johnston emphasised, it was institutional rivalry between the 
union and associations which led to the collapse of the joint national 
machinery: the following section will therefore examine the elements 
of this rivalry which principally derived from the realisation in NUBE 
that strict constitutional parity with the CBSA members was 
insufficient to enable the union to achieve its objective of control of 
the joint staff side by obtaining a majority of members (See Appendix 2 
for Poll vote figures). It therefore turned to external bodies as it 
had done in the past with apparent success in pursuing its case for 
recognition. 
i. References to ACAS  
Firstly, the union attempted to use the statutory changes introduced 
by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (TULRA) and the Employment 
Protection Act (EPA) to outlaw the staff associations. It objected 
unsuccessfully to the registration of the associations under TULRA in 
1974, while the ABFU talks were still continuing. Secondly, it raised 
both a general objection to the CBSA members, and specific objections 
to each association as regards their certificates of independence 
under the EPA, again unsuccessfully. 
Significantly NUBE had returned to the argument it had put to the ILO 
in 1961 that no staff association could be truly independent because it 
could not continue to function without employer recognition. Yet like 
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not prove operational dependence, and he emphasised that his role, as 
Laid down by statute, only required' him to address the question of 
independence as defined by section 30 of TULRA. (2) Under theJerms of 
that definition the CBSA members were able to obtain certification. 
Secondly therefore, the union approached the Advisory, Cbnciliation 
and Arbitration Service (ACAS). It was more confident that it could 
force the banks to end their recognition of the associations through an 
ACAS enqdiry because this body had emerged from the vestiges of the CIR 
which had given more emphasis to bargaining effectiveness as the 
criterion upon which to judge trade union recognition, and had 
declared itself particularly concerned that company or house unions 
prove that they were effective and independent bargaining agents when 
judging their claims. (3) 
Linked with this pressure the union's executive determined to withdraw 
from joint machinery, at both national and institutional levels in 
September 1976, but immediate withdrawal was not made because the 
employers' response to this threat was not to offer separate 
negotiating rights. The FLCBE indicated that national machinery would 
continue to operate under the existing constitutions despite the 
withdrawal of the union. Individually the banks demonstrated less 
dogmatic positions, but none would willingly envisage separate 
procedures. The most positive response was from National Westminster 
Bank, which was more in favour of wider domestic relations and less 
national bargaining. Nonetheless it emphasised that separate 
negotiations would only be envisaged if a third party intervention via 
conciliation and arbitration was removed, (4) and this loss of power 
seriously alarmed the union: absence of arbitration rights was seen as 
tantamount to a loss of all formal recognition rights. (5) In addition 
the union heeded the employers' request to "wait and see" what came of 
the ACAS enquiry. 
When NUBE approached ACAS in 1976 to request an enquiry into the 
procedure and practices of Barclays, Lloyds and National Westminster 
Banks under Section 5 of the EPA, it received a positive but guarded 
reply. ACAS, officials discussed the position with the FLCBE, the banks 
and the staff associations and then confirmed: 
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R oe. it is our view that ACAS could play a helpful role in dealing with the question of divided staff reprr ntation,,in 
Barclays, Lloyds and National Westminster Banks. 
• 
, 
ACAS therefore did not envisage a review at national level of the Whole 
question of representation, but initially interpreted the issue as 
having three discrete areas of contention. Nonetheless it was 
accepted that as there was such a common core running through the 
problem in each bank it would be sensible to defer any investigation 
until all of the applications to the Certification Officer had been 
dealt with. This took until December 1976. 
ACAS met the staff associations and NUBE separately in 1977. It then 
indicated that owing to the differences which still existed between 
the parties there seemed to be little hope of a formal enquiry under 
section 5 of the EPA being successful. NUBE attempted to put further 
pressure on an ACAS initiative by proposing to claim recognition under 
section 11 of the EPA. This came into operation from 1 February 1976 
and was a part of a wider section of the Act dealing with trade union 
recognition. (7) However it was pointed out that in view of NUBE's 
minority membership position, and the certification of the staff 
associations, there could be no guarantee that it would gain sole 
bargaining rights. (8) While NUBE felt frustrated by this decision, it 
was consistent with the Services's adoption of a pragmatic case-by-
case approach to recognition recommendations whereby several main 
criteria were used as yardsticks, including membership and employees' 
wishes for example. (9) 
It was therefore evident to the union that the likelihood of 
successfully using governmental agencies as a means to eradicating the 
division of representation were slim. Indeed there seemed to be no 
other alternative but to pursue the strategy around which it had pinned 
its faith in the 1950's, that of achieving a majority membership, if it 
was to call upon ACAS with any hope in the future, (10) but the 
inability to achieve this had of course been the reason why NUBE had 
turned to the external bodies for support in the first place. It could 
therefore see no means of resolving its failure to achieve control of 
the joint staff side while it remained within it. 
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ii. The 1977 Pay Claim 
t 
Clearly then, NURE's withdrawal from the joint staff councils was to 
be predicted, although it was actually prompted by a decision by the 
CBSA. Having just returned to the TUC after its expulsion over the 
Industrial Relations Act, NUBE was very concerned (to follow its policy 
with regard to the' operation of the Social Contract and cooperation 
with Government economic policies. It could not therefore tolerate 
the claim which the CBSA insisted on putting forward through the BSC, 
for a 10i across-the-board pay rise, as this contravened Phase II of 
the existing incomes policy. The staff associations' superiority in 
the poll vote ensured that this claim was made however, their view 
being that the clearing banks should try and move straight to the next 
Phase (III) of the incomes policy on the grounds that it offered more 
flexibility. NUBE therefore felt it had no alternative but to withdraw 
from the staff council. Its representatives walked out of the BSC 
meeting of 13 October 1977 and declined to attend them subsequently; 
it also withdrew from all meetings of the JNC henceforth, and national 
and domestic machinery effectively went into abeyance at that point. 
In withdrawing NUBE did risk losing all recognition rights however, 
because the employers, both collectively through the Federation and 
individually, reiterated that there could be no possibility of 
granting separate negotiating rights and that the existing arrangement 
would continue to operate without the union. (11) At the national level 
there were mixed views on the desirability of this course of action 
however. In particular Williams & Glyn's and the Midland were unhappy 
with the situation whereby national negotiating was undertaken by a 
bargaining agent (the CBSA) which had no members among their staff. 
This left them with the undesirable necessity of having effectively to 
impose any agreements over the heads of their domestic representative 
bodies, a course which the latter would be likely to try and resist, 
and/Or exploit to their own advantage. (12) In addition the CBSA saw 
this as the appropriate moment to adjust the balance between national 
and domestic negotiations, by widening the area of the latter, so that 
although they were prepared to assume the role of sole bargaining agent 
in the BSC, and made the necessary constitutional revisions, they did 
not envisage national negotiations carrying on entirely as before. (13) 
Again although some of the banks were happy with this proposal, others 
were not so keen to undertake change at this point. 
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problematic. The,Midland indicated its desire to attend national JNC 
meetings with observer status only and not to be bound by any agreement 
that was reached. Williams & Glyn's followed suit. (14) Subsequently 
it was realised that three banks did not make a quorum; it was 
therefore decided to withdraw from the JNC with effect from the ending 
of NUBE's period of notice on 20 March 1978. But as some form of 
national co-ordination was considered desirable, and as a gesture of 
sLpport for the reinstitution of national negotiations it was agreed 
to continue to meet in the Federation Council. 
This represented a significant strengthening of the union's position 
in any prospective talks. It suggested that national negotiations 
without NUBE were not feasible, despite previous statements to the 
contrary by the banks. Indeed, as NUBE had been hoping, the majority 
of the banks moved quickly to institute informal channels with the 
union, thereby acceding in effect to the demand for separate 
arrangements, in order to resolve the threat of instability presented 
by the collapse of procedures. This was, at the time, seen as no more 
than a short term expedient however, separate negotiations being 
disorderly and unpredictable: 	the longer-term solution was 
acknowledged by the Federation Council to be another enquiry into the 
whole question of representation, as NUBE had been pressing for. 
But this point does put the decision to undertake another round of 
merger talks into perspective. The decision, taken even before the JNC 
was officially wound-up, was something of a shock reaction to the 
prospect of instability and open competition between the unions 
without the constraints of procedural order. In the longer-term the 
banks' concern at the prospect of dual negotiations became less 
urgent. As we shall argue below, this was of some significance when it 
came to their reaction to the collapse of the initiative, and a strong 
stance might have made a critical difference. 
THE ENQUIRY - INTRODUCTION 
There is a line of continuity between the 1968 constitutions, the ABFU 
talks and Dr Johnston's enquiry in that they were the concrete 
responses of the employers to the manifestations of instability 
deriving from divided representation. Yet while the first two were 
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0 conducted internally,. Dr Johnston was an external and impartial party, 
brought in to resolve the deepening crisis this division created. 
Although formally he was required to report on the .situation with his 
recommendations it was evident that he was also expected by the parties 
involved to be a catalyst for change, a broker who could generate an 
area of agreement large enough for institutional amalgamation and the 
reconstruction of stable bargaining. As an impartial outsider he was 
thought capable of budging the entrenched positions of the parties, 
which had undermined voluntary change. Additionally he appeared to 
have demonstrated an interest in efficient centralized bargaining 
systens, (15) and in arbitration as a constructive means of dealing 
with change in industrial relations, (16) both of which were regarded 
favourably by the banks. 
The terms of the Johnston Enquiry were established by the FLCBE, which 
also accepted responsibility for payment for his services. 
Dr Johnston's terms of reference were: 
"Th investigate the whole question of staff representation and 
negotiating procedures in the major London clearing banks, and 
to report with recommendations." 
These were evidently as broad as possible, in order that the question 
of the reform of the constitutions could be encompassed within the 
enquiry. 
Dr Johnston's mode of enquiry was to obtain all relevant 
documentation, including the national constitutions, the rules of the 
various parties and details of domestic arrangements. In addition the 
banks and staff bodies submitted written reports covering the 
historical development of the representative machineries, existing 
arrangements, and their recommendations for the future. Discussions 
also took place with the representatives of the parties, with the 
secretariat of the FLCBE and with other parties not immediately 
involved, including representatives of ACAS in an informal manner, 
before the Johnston Report was produced. 
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THE JOHNSON MORT MARK I (OCTOBER 1978)  
Synopsis of Proposals 
t 
The Mark I Report opened with a resume of historical -developments at an 
institutional level leading to the dissolution of national machinery. 
From this the common ground between the parties was set out, with the 
Chairman concluding that there was sufficient consensus to achieve a 
solution of a single staff body. It was affirmed that the staff bodies 
were independent; that all of the parties were concerned to avoid 
coercive action and expressed a preference for arbitration as the 
means of resolving conflict; that all accepted the need for some degree 
of national as well as domestic negotiating; that staff representation 
was a viable and permanent feature of the banks, and that there was 
among the banks' staff, 
"... massive support for 	proposition that one staff body for 
the banks is desirable." 
from which it was argued that there was sufficient consensus to 
overcome the existing division and to create a single merged union. 
Dr Johnston's Enquiry was located at the institutional level in terms 
of its analysis and solutions. Inter-union rivalry was seen as the 
basis of the industrial relations problem in the banks. 
"The basic problem with which this enquiry has had to deal is 
dual unionism and its m ifestations in representatixf and 
negotiating arrangements." °) 
But this had become critical because of the way in which it had 
collapsed regulatory procedures. 
"'What lends urgency to the contemporary situation however is 
that this joint rmiptiating and disputes settlement machinery 
had broken down."' 
The enquiry therefore linked the drawing together of the staff bodies 
with the reconstruction of negotiating rules and procedures. The 
Report continued, 
My recommendations are aimed at restoring this machine to 
working order and if possible improving its efficiency through 
the reorganisation of staff representation on a unified basis -a Clearing Bank Union. “(20) 
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but in generating. efficient machinery there was also seen to.be the 
need for several levels of cperaficn in the merged body via a federated 
organisational arrangement. This would enable a judicious compromise 
between sufficient national/industry level powers to negotiate over 
common areas with the FLCBE, and the need for a degree of domestic 
autonomy. 
In turn this revolved round the creation of rules and procedures which 
would establish the principles of the relationship between the 
different levels. From the problems of ABFU however, Dr Johnston was 
aware of the deficiencies in expecting written rules to conflate 
different attitudes satisfactorily, because they were subject to a 
variety of interpretations. (21) This suggested that it would be 
necessary to supplement any written proposal with discussion between 
the parties to clarify the intention of the constitutional frameworks. 
The Report proceeded by examining various alternative modes of 
approach to the process of merging. The deficiencies, for instance, of 
a purely one-way change so that the merger established a new NUBE-like 
body were pointed out: such a reform would be impolitic and thus 
insufficient to guarantee a total change. (22) In effect, it was 
recognised that a degree of compromise by each side was vital because 
of their existing suspicion and rivalry, and that this would be best 
achieved by a full scale merger, although it was a technically 
difficult solution. Also, in compromising, both sides would have to 
give up some principles in order to meet the other side's demands, and 
in so doing they would be demonstrating their commitment to change, an 
essential prerequisite of any successful reform, as the Report 
emphasised. (23)  
THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE 
There were three layers of membership to be incorporated into any body 
which merged NUBE and the associations (see diagram 6.1). Johnston 
opted to work upwards from the primary/domestic level, to get clear the 
foundations before building other layers on top. (24) Above the 
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primary level was the secondary/national level, and above that the 
tertiary/overall administration of both clearing and non-clearing bank 
areas of interest. Johnston was principally concerned with the first 
two levels, for which he proposed to establish the Clearing Bank Union 
(CBU). This was to be, 
... - single(2DJ responsible, 'industrial' Union for the clearing .  
Being aware of the interpretative problems which had undermined ABFU, 
the Report attempted to define the relationship between the first two 
levels in detail. First, the division of domestically and nationally 
negotiable items were to remain as they had existed since 1968. (26) 
National negotiations were to remain on those "issues of general 
concern" fixed a decade previously. Johnston rejected the minority 
argument for a "substantial reduction" in the national forum, noting 
that the scope of the existing arrangements had not been the cause of 
the collapse, and arguing that "a broad residue was still left for 
domestic arrangement" (27) in terms of the treatment of domestic-level 
issues arising out of national negotiations; domestically negotiable 
items which were not subject to national consideration; and other 
items which were "in the gray area between negotiation and 
consultation." (28) 
It was then necessary to establish a constitution which could reflect 
this federal mix, but the Report deliberately did not include a drafted 
constitutional example, outlining instead the main issues and a way 
round problems which had previously arisen. (29) Firstly, the federal 
concept of spheres of per necessitated clarifying the boundaries 
between each level, and the relationship between them as part of the 
larger body which ultimately encompassed the whole banking and 
financial sector. Secondly, it was necessary to establish sufficient 
power at the second and third levels to ensure the organisational parts 
adhered together, but also to ensure sufficient domestic autonomy to 
bank sector. 
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establish an effective' federal division of powers. This was to be done 
through such mechanisms as positive constitutional rights for the . 	0 first level bodies with regard to negotiating, and - the opportunity to 
hold annual conferendes. 
iLZE ABF PRCBLEMS  
In the light of the failure of ABFU the Report dealt specifically with 
the three areas of contention upon which it had floundered. (30) On 
membership Johnston opted for both CBU and the in-house body. On 
subscriptions the Report was non-oommital, but proposed a lead-in 
period with various options both to harmonise rates between the 
existing bodies and so that the parties could work out which method was 
most appropriate. With regard to the employment of officials the 
Report proposed that all should be officers of the national body (the 
CBU). However it was recognised that for traditional reasons some 
existing staff might want to retain a domestic base and this would have 
to be accepted. 
From constitutional arrangements, Johnston moved to suggest how the 
new body could be made to work in practice. Here the role of the 
employers in encouraging change was deemed to be crucial, because the 
"reward" to entice the staff bodies into change was increased activity 
in a broadened process of regulation, specifically through the 
enlargement of participative structures at the domestic level. 
Dr Johnston was impressed with the Williams & Glyn's mode of operation 
which was exemplified as, 
"at the very least a pa. ) of departure for the other banks and their in-house bodies." 
although he deliberately avoided trying to impose a system upon all of 
the banks with a high level of specificity. Among the proposals 
concerning the actions the employers should take (32) was the 
requirement that they endorse the affiliation of the CBU to the TUC as 
part of a role in "mainstream trade unionism." (33)  No closed shop was 
to be permitted however. 
As Dr Johnston's Enquiry was essentially concerned with the clearing 
banks, the non-clearing bank members of NUKE (the "rump") were a 
C 
secondary concern,, , but obviously they had to be accommodated because 
they represented a "substantial" part of the union. The Report 
expressed the view that they were capable of being assimilated at the ; 
third level without a reduction in organisational strength, and 
without detriment to the need for "enormous autonomy" for the CHU. (34) 
In contrast, there was no room for ASTMS in this configuration because 
it could not amalgamate as a whole or permit the transfer of its 
Midland Bank section. It would also not tolerate a national forum. 
ASTMS was dismissed as "an anomaly" whose presence Dr Johnston 
envisaged would be resolved via the TUC, at some future date. (35) 
AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF MARK I  
It seems that the strategy of Johnston's first Report was to set out 
the problem as he perceived it, consider each of the possible 
alternative solutions and then decide upon the best way forward. At 
the same time, given the weaknesses of ABFU there had to be some 
mechanism to induce the unions into a merger and overcome their 
ideological differences voluntarily. So while constructing a proposed 
organisational skeleton for the new merged body, the details or flesh 
and bones were not drawn in with any degree of finality at this point. 
The proposals of the Report started from the central assumption that 
measures of reform were appropriate because industrial relations had 
fallen into a "slough of despond" through institutional division and 
the collapse of negotiating machinery. Like Lord Cameron fifteen 
years earlier, Johnston saw the restitution of order in the clearing 
banks coming from a fundamental reorganisation of the structure of 
representation. Unlike Cameron however who had seen only the grounds 
for a "community of interest", Johnston felt there was sufficient 
consensus to go beyond this and establish an "identity of interests", 
between the unions as Cameron had termed it, in a single merged body; 
given their longstanding and fundamental rivalry this was clearly an 
ambitious task. 
Johnston also faced the problem of persuading the parties themselves 
that a merger was necessary. 	In particular, while separate 
negotiations were an inefficient method of conducting affairs, they 
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had, 
 
by. the publication of the first Report, led to no serious set-
back 's for either side.-. Indeed, in contrast to the ABFU tall4 where 
bOth staff bodies started off with very strong — reasons for 
entertaining a defensive alliance, there was no,absolutely pressing 
need to amalgamate. Despite NUBE's calls for an ACAS enquiry, there 
were groups within the union as well as in the associations which saw 
separate negotiations as preferable because they avoided the necessity 
of having to compromise organisational principles. 
Recognising this, Johnston proposed to circumvent it in two ways: 
firstly, the strategy of enlarging the potential size of the total area 
of joint regulation, via increasing participation which introduced the 
employers into the process of change. In effect, the package thus 
became a positive-sum equation for each party. Secondly, the Report 
emphasised the popular desire of bank staff to see a merger effected, 
and their discontent with the institutional wranglings between the two 
sides, which placed a strong moral obligation upon each party to enter 
the talks positively. But as it was essentially through these points 
that Johnston hoped to overcome the longstanding competitive 
orientation, they were clearly of great importance. Much depended on 
the union and the associations, and strategically powerful groups 
within them which might resist a compromise being persuaded that the 
two factors were a sufficient trade-off to warrant the compromise of 
principles necessary to effect the merger. This in turn redounded on 
the skills of the Chairman in being able to "sell" his proposals 
effectively, as well as on the banks in agreeing to the proposed 
participative reforms. It was, in short, not simply a matter between 
NUBE and the associations. 
In general, Johnston was aware that the ideological differences 
between the unicn and the associations, were greater than the concrete 
areas of policy disagreement. It was a general theme of his enquiry 
that change required more than a technical exercise in establishing 
the right institutional mix. Indeed the proposed model was 
superficially similar to ABFFJ in its federal division of powers, but 
the significantly new element in Dr Johnston's Report was the emphasis 
upon a political will to change, a meeting of minds. 
"Most fundamental of all, I have concluded that a serious effort 
of imagination will be needed to bridge the gulfs of history. 
There have to be seen to be clear gains and saggices all round 
in any solution which is to command support."‘' 
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So merger involved a thorough compromise, both technically and 
politically. However, on certain points it appeared that the Johnston 
model seemed to be closer to NUBE's c dWaands than the associations. 
Firstly, although it was to be.a "responsible" trade union, it would 
affiliate to the TUC. Secondly, Johnston favoured retaining the' 
existing split of national and domestic negotiations, resisting 
proposals for decentralization of the bargaining structure favoured by 
some of the associations. Both of these proposals also required the 
support of the banks to be endorsed, in Johnston's view, but the 
employers. felt unable to support TUC affiliation, and this was one 
potential sticking point unresolved by the Report. 
Indeed it could be more generally argued that Mark I was a blue-print 
for further discussions. It developed only a general structure for the 
new body but did not deal fully with specific issues. Nor did it lay 
down final decisions but left room for further discussion. Fbr example 
it could be argued that the issues of subscriptions and employment of 
officials still left room for further discussion. Yet this was 
apparently a deliberate decision in order to avoid pre-empting any 
chance of a voluntary agreement, which Johnston insisted was what 
change essentially had to be. Thus, although the Report proposed a 
merger timetable of about 6 months, it put no further sanctions on the 
sides to ensure that this was adhered to. Nor did it call upon the 
employers to enforce change through the application of negative 
sanctions. 
Much was still open to negotiation. In particular there appeared to be 
a need for discussion on the three areas upon which ABFU had collapsed, 
employment of officials, subscriptions, and membership, in order to 
specify the locus of power and the nature of the merged body more 
clearly. In the sequence of meetings that followed the Mark I Report, 
and in the Mark II proposals Johnston attempted to do this in 
conjunction with the staff bodies, rather than impose an operational 
framework without prior consent. 
THE MARK II REPORT (AUGUST' 1979)  
Synopsis  
Following a series of six meetings with the staff associations and 
NUBE/BIFU, Johnston was able to produce this second Report at their 
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request. , It represented a significant advance towards implementing 
the proposed merger, its basis being the acceptance in Principle, by 
both sides, of the broad proposals for the new union's organisational* 
structure outlined in Mark I. Additionally, it was intended to -
confirm the progress made in the ensuing meetings on resolving the 
outstanding details and specific problems to which we referred above 
regarding items such as the collection and allocation of 
subscriptions, and the employment of officials. While based on the 
original Mark I concept, Mark II was designed to translate this into a 
detailed description of the proposed operational framework and thus be 
a springboard for the implementation of reform: however it was 
emphasised that there was still room for further negotiation upon 
specific questions if the parties found it necessary. 
Mark II opened by referring to the process of negotiations following 
the first Report. It was made clear that although progress had been 
made, the longstanding rivalry between the unions had remained a 
considerable difficulty. Johnston was encouraged by the majority 
acceptance of his proposals, the dissenting party being National 
Westminster Staff Association which could not accept one or two points 
discussed below. (37) However he was discouraged by failure to achieve 
the necessary psychological effort to overcome the historic divide 
between the staff bodies: fundamental attitudes seemed not to have 
altered significantly. (38) The parties had been preoccupied with 
tactical point-scoring and had almost completely disregarded the theme 
of participation which had been emphasised as a crucial mechanism of 
change. While it was accepted that their negotiating postures 
represented the preoccupation of both sides with organisational power 
and control, (39) they reflected a divided and negative attitude, which 
was trenchantly denounced. 
"There has been a pervasive and disappointing parochialism, a 
lack of imagination, exemplified in this "(elect of 
participation as an objective and an opportunity."' 
Furthermore, the power struggle had polarised around the extent of 
domestic autonomy (that is, the first level) and the role of the third 
tier, so the functions of the (BU at the second level, which had been 
central to Dr Johnston's first Report, had been neglected. (41) In 
particular, the two larger staff associations were criticised for 
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their "myopic" preoccupation with domestic matters, and disregard for 
the larger opportunities offered by the CBU. Dr Johnston felt that - 	- they had failed to understand the large role for-domestic activity 
offered by the proposed strategy of extended partictpative 
structures. (42) National Westminster Stiff Assodiation was also 
singled out for further criticism of its dilatory response to the 
original Report - it produced no coherent statement until May 1979 -
and for its opposition to the question of TUC affiliation,which derived 
from a membership survey it had conducted. This Johnston condemned as 
narrow in its context and biased, as the association had made no 
attempt to inform its members about TUC services. (43) 
The union was also criticised. Firstly its name change, decided upon 
at the 1979 Delegate Cbnference, was seen as provocative to the staff 
associations as well as to other unions, notably ASTMS, because by 
becoming the Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIER” it was clearly 
and formally declaring its interest in a much wider recruiting area. 
Of course the union had already moved beyond the clearing banks, in 
response to the diversification of banking activities and the 
increasing integration between various parts of the finance sector, 
and this was in a sense only the official confirmation of that 
diversification. However the timing of this name change, and the 
expansionist attitude it appeared to enshrine were hardly conducive to 
the theme of psychological cooperation. 
Motion B at the same conference was also deemed provocative. It stated 
that mergers had to be undertaken within the terms of Rule M of the 
union concerning the creation of sections, and any new body within the 
union had to accept the principles upon which the union had stood firm 
in the ABFU talks, viz direct subscriptions, membership and 
employment. Although BIFU argued that this motion was meant to relate 
to the propsed transfers of the Phoenix Insurance Company's staff 
union and the Bank of England Staff Organisation, their argument 
appeared somewhat disingenuous, given the wider context. (44) 
In the light of what he regarded as the persistently negative attitudes 
of both sides Johnston chose to reiterate that although the federal 
structure represented a compromise, in which the essential difficulty 
related to the balance of "domestic autonomy versus national norms and 
rules." (45) 
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"Yet such a Federal arrangement is - possible, as a positive not a negative concept, and as one that occupies the middle ground tgo between centralism and decentralisation."' 
But in fact Mark II's detailed proposals made explicit the relatively 
centralised nature of the new union, which had been implicitin Mark I, 
and which appeared to favour the national union, BIM, more than the 
associations. }tor example, it was stated that, 
"Fundamentally, however, the need for a Federal solution derives 
not from abstract principles, but from the need to ensure that the clearing banks and their staff retain their distinctive and 
explicit position as a unique grouping ... The Clearing Bank 
Union component of the three-tier body has to be, and has to be 
seen to be largely autonomous. It is now, and for the 
foreseeable future, Big Brother ... This means ... that the in-
house union groupings within individual badfilre part of the 
Clearing Bank Union, not autonomous bodies." 
Of course the Report did not deny the essential autonomy of the 
domestic bodies upon certain matters, but in effect Johnston saw that 
autonomy as being defined from what remained after the area of national 
negotiations had been established; the institutional apex was clearly 
the CBU: 
"The specific matters traditionally reserved for the national 
negotiations would be dealt with through the CBU itself ... The 
balance of negotiating matters and also participation 
arrangemq/W would be automatically allocated to the in-house 
bodies."' ' 
Moreover, the Report emphasised the need to minimise the differences 
between the various domestic units as another basic principle: 
"similar, if not identical, standards of service" were to be expected, 
and to avoid duplication of services, these had to be established at 
the higher tiers, as for instance with research staff. (49) 
In terms of the specific recommendations, strong support for a 
relatively centralized organisation was also evident, both to create 
efficiency and equability between the parts and to ensure 
organisational unity. First, the disinclination to disturb existing  
(1968) negotiating arrangements was reaffirmed, although the prospect 
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of a change at a future date was not ruled out. (50) Second, membership, 
 was to be at all of the levels, and while .this permitted a 
decentralized orientation - members would regard their in-house body 
as the "point of entry" and identify with that level accordingly, (51) 
the location of the in-house body within the larger whole was re-
emphasised. Membership was also to be subject to confirmation by the ( CBU. 52)  
Third, subscriptions were to be tripartite like membership, but 
initial payment was into a central account, from which allocation was 
made to the tiers. This was a more centralized arrangement than that 
put forward by the associations to ABFU, which favoured remittances to 
the domestic level, and control of the distribution of funds to the 
other tiers. Johnston accepted on the question of subscriptions the 
appropriateness of a nmodest element" of domestic autonomy to permit 
them "to do their own thing" (53) but this was to be circumscribed, and 
temporary. It was desirable, 
" ... that these domestic needs should be viewed in a narrow 
context rather than La the broad autonomous way advocated by the 
staff associations. () 
Further, there should be, 
"... gradual reduction in the financial autonomy of the domestic 
bodies ..." 
and 
n
... a commitment to the harmonisation of domestic subscripWns 
(ie parity between banks) within a period of three years.' 
Each of these stipulations appeared to be controls on the 
possibilities of the domestic bodies operating independently of the 
larger bodies, or of creating problematic disparities between 
themselves. 
Fourth, co-ordinating pressures were also evident with regard to the 
employment of officials where the move to standard terms and 
conditions for all employees was recommended. As Johnston argued, 
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"This is essential if ... the integration and devOment of 
staff as a whole union resource, is to be achieved. 
Again this was to be augmented by liMiting the period of re-entry to 
the banks for officials to one year after they had entered the 
employment of the union. 
Indeed on only one point did Johnston not insist upon a trans-
institutional arrangement. This concerned the branch structure where 
he rejected BIFU's demand that a geographical basis should be imposed, 
although even here it was pointed out that such a structure would be 
desirable. (57)  On the other hand, several other matters were also 
dealt with in a manner which emphasised the extra-domestic orientation 
of the new body. First, the proposal of the two large staff 
associations that BIFU's "rump" of non-clearing staff should be  
grouped in one body parallel to the CBU was rejected completely. In 
doing so, Johnston not only pointed to the illogicality of such a move 
in terms of compatibility with differing bargaining structures, but 
also implied that such parochial disinterest in the wider body was 
quite the wrong attitude. 
Second, on the question of certification, Johnston was against this 
being sought by any but the second and third tiers. As discussions 
with the Certification Officer had confirmed, to pursue certification 
any first level body would have to develop a degree of independence and 
autonomy in such matters as finance as well as vis-a-vis the overall 
organisation. ( 57) Johnston explicitly reiterated that this was 
against the central intention of his design, 
... I do not envisage that the domestic bodies would have 
significant financial autonomy after the passage of three years 
at the most. Equally, I have already stressed that the f igrhouse bodies are explicitly part of the Clearing Bank Union.' 
Third, it is evident that the top tier body was to be invested with 
considerable responsibilities, including the broad strategy of 
industrial relations and collective bargaining, representations with 
outside bodies including the Government, and the provision of central 
services. This tier was also indirectly to be involved in negotiations 
via the participation of the General Secretary and it would have to 
approve industrial action which extended beyond one second tier 
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affiliate. (59) It was also suggested that disaffiliation from this 
third tier, 
"could orilyn take place after stringent tests of`nmabership opinion.' 
but it was doubted whether this would be possible at all. 
Furthermore, the constituency of this tier, which was to be the whole 
banking and finance sector, concurred with the broadest aspirations of 
the national union BIFU. This was arguably in direct contrast to the 
staff associations' philosophy as expressed both in the ABFU talks, 
and during this enquiry which was focussed primarily upon the clearing 
banks and envisaged power in any federal body emanating upwards from 
the base. (61) 
The Report concluded with specific proposals for bringing the parties 
to implementation, through the establishment of joint working parties, 
as Johnston had already suggested at a previous meeting. (62)  While a 
degree of detailed work remained to be done, the Report was viewed as a 
sufficient basis in principle for agreement to amalgamate. 
THE REACTION TO MARK II 
We have argued that the second Report went beyond the first in laying 
down specific proposals on the basis of the discussions between the 
parties. Johnston had therefore already got the agreement for much of 
the detail that was set out with a view to clarifying actually how the 
new union would operate, and where organisational power would reside, 
although there was still room for detailed discussions within this 
framework. 
It is evident that the Mark II Report conveyed the frustration of 
Dr Johnston in trying to draw the parties into this compromise, and 
away from preoccupation with power: criticism of the participants was 
occasionally sharp. (63)  One way in which the Report tried to alleviate 
each side's suspicions of the other, and to draw the sides together was 
by the suggestion that arrangements were neutrally practical. 
Operational requirements and optimal allocations of resources were 
seen as the appropriate tests which had to be applied to resolve 
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disputes such as the location of membership records both before and 
after the merger was effected. (64) This was of course sound advice, 
but it was also derived from a desire to de-politicise the 
negotiations, and take the concern with power and control out of court. 
Hence with regard to certification by domestic bodies, Dr Johnston 
explicitly contrasted the "practical" with the "doctrinal". (65) 
 Clearly however, the mutual suspicion engendered by longstanding 
institutional rivalry was still seen to be the fundamental problem, 
despite the progress towards merger made by the representative groups, 
and broad agreement over the proposed structure of the new body. 
It has also been argued that Mark II confirmed Johnston's intention to 
create a relatively centralized organisational structure. *It might 
therefore have been expected that it would be the associations which 
took exception to the proposals. However they each accepted Mark II 
"warts and all" as the basis for a merger, seeing in the participatory 
structures focussed at the domestic level a sufficient enlargement of 
joint regulation to offset their disagreements. Additionally, 
elements of the old internalist style were infused into the domestic 
level arrangements, so that, for example, while each level had the 
right to mount strike action, the balloting procedures at the domestic 
level were much more stringent : and similar to existing staff 
association constitutions. (66) 
This sort of response was exactly what Johnston was looking for 
because, to repeat, Mark II was evidently intended to be a springboard 
to implementation via working parties drawn from both sides. Johnston 
appeared to consider it very important that this should occur 
relatively quickly in order not to lose the momentum engendered by the 
sequence of discussions. This momentum was however unsustainable 
because in the second meeting following the publication of Mark II, 
BIFU announced it could not follow the CBSA's example, as it had 
certain reservations. It was in the light of this delay that the CBSA 
withdrew from the working parties, and the Johnston proposals 
effectively collapsed. 
THE MARK III REPORT (JANUARY 1980)  
It was in the context of this stalemate that Mark III was written. 
Dr Johnston's final Report was a note addressed to all the parties 
included in the original terms of reference. It was in effect a 
postscript, which offered observations on the failure to carry through 
the Mark II proposals at the two meetings involving the BGSA and BIFU 
in October and Nbvember 1979. As Dr Johnston stated: 
"The staff associations have accepted the Mark II Report as a 
package, 'warts and all' and have proposed that the parties 
proceed to implement it through working parties. They have also 
suggested that BIFU should rejoin the joint negotiating 
machinery, as the act of faith suggested in both my Reports. 
BIFU accepted, after some clarification, the specific 
recommendations in the Mark II Report ... 
It indicated also that it was willing to sign heads of agreement 
on these subjects, and enter into working parties on the basis of 
and within the framework of the Johnston Report. It suggested in 
addition that there were matters on which there appeared to 6in 
contradictions, and topics on which the Report was silent."' 
BIFU would not however return to joint working prior to implementing 
the merger nor accept the proposals without further discussion. 
The CBSA members would not accept these reservations, and in 
December 1979 withdrew from the Johnston working party. They. also 
decided to implement the Clearing Bank Union proposal without 
BIFU, (68)  setting up the CBU in 1980, but without the third tier 
covering the rest of the banking and finance sector proposed by 
Johnston. 
The Mark III Report was, in its final remarks, scathing in its 
criticism of BIFU. Dr Johnston argued that, 
"The key 4pue is the acceptance of my Mark II Report as a 
package."' 
as this would demonstrate the "indispensable ingredient for 
success" (70)  namely the will to succeed. BIFU was castigated for its 
prevarication and its failure to convey the will to succeed, or to 
compromise on those parts of the proposals it found unpalatable. The 
initiative remained firmly with BIFU as a result.(71) 
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But it was BIFU's argument that it was not to blame for this collapse: 
it had after all not withdrawn from the talks but merely requested 
further clarification. It was also pointed out by the union's 
representatives that they were not empowered to accept the proposals 
"warts and all": constitutionally such a decision could only be made 
by a Delegate Conference. We shall discuss these arguments in greater 
detail below, but there are two important points to be made here. 
Firstly, the return to joint machinery which Johnston proposed BIFU 
undertook prior to merger as a gesture of good faith was apparently a 
crucial sticking-point. Again BIFU said it could not do this without a 
Delegate Conference decision, but it was evidently loathe to return to 
joint machinery, having ignored the proposal when Johnston had put it 
forward in his first two Reports. This was because under the joint 
staff side NUBE had felt powerless as the minority body and the 
associations had had the advantage of control; in the new arrangement 
it was believed that no such constraint existed, and insofar as the 
associations' bargaining weakness was more clearly demonstrated (being 
unable to rely upon the compulsory arbitration facility) NUBE/BIFU 
believed it was in a considerably more powerful position vis-a-vis the 
merger. Presumably this much was also recognised by the associations, 
which was why they were keen to see BIFU's return to joint working. 
This illustrates the second and more general point that Johnston was 
still dealing with competitive unions. The quick collapse of talks in 
the post-Mark II stalemate, the jostling for best negotiating 
positions, the break-down on the apparent technicality of whether to 
return to joint machinery before or after the initial decision to 
implement were all indicative of the continuing prevalence of low-
trust and antipathy, which had not been bridged entirely. And of 
course throughout the enquiry while Johnston was trying to generate a 
cooperative spirit, this was being contradicted by the day-to-day 
processes of collective bargaining where in the separate arrangements 
each side was actively competing with the other, and thereby 
reinforcing the longstanding sense of division. 
This brings us to the final discussion in which it is intended to 
consider the objectives and roles of the actors involved in the enquiry 
within the dynamic context of the reconstruction of negotiating 
arrangements in the banks. We start first however with an examination 
of the role of the chairman. 
1. DR JOHNSTON 
Firstly, in the light of the collapse of the talks, we have to consider 
whether the way in which Dr Johnston interpreted his role as 
independent chairman was appropriate. It will be argued that he 
adopted a flexible and broad-based approach to the task which was 
increasingly pro-active, and that he cannot be held responsible for 
the failure to merge. 
i. Structural Agency Approach  
In the first Report it appeared that Johnston relied primarily upon 
what Purcell has termed a structural change agency, (72) in that he 
concentrated upon the organisational and institutional changes around 
which reform was to be based. As Purcell has pointed out of this sort 
of approach to reform, 
"Implicitly an assumption is made that there is general 
underlying consensus on what constitutes goc 3l industrial 
relations and the benefits of structural reform." ' 
and it has been suggested that at this stage Johnston did rather assume 
as given the common desire for the sort of changes which would lead to 
a merger. His view was of course based upon the strong argument that 
divided representation was generally unpopular among bank staff, but 
this did not necessarily confirm his point that collapse of 
institutional relationships and competitive unionism was an unhealthy 
development. Tb many activists on both sides quite the opposite 
inference could be made, and it was they who Johnston had to persuade. 
Until the publication of the Mark II Report it might be argued that this 
point was not fully confronted. It has been suggested for example that 
Mark I failed to address what had been shown in ABFU to be the crucial 
sticking points in sufficient detail. At this stage it might be argued 
that Dr Johnston did underestimate the gulf between the staff bodies. 
Displaying what Purcell noted was the typical weakness of the 
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structural change approach, there was not enough in the Report to bring 
about change actively and to counter the existing low-trust 
environment. Whilst Dr Johnston stressed that he could not enforce 
change, and that there must be the right psychological commitment from 
the parties themselves, it was hardly to be expected that a spirit of 
compromise would automaticallly be generated by the Report alone. 
It is perhaps somewhat unsurprising, given this structural emphasis, 
that Dr Johnston displayed considerable frustration with the parties. 
He expressed dismay at their persistently defensive and parochial 
attitudes, and the failure to see the putative value of the 
opportunities before them. (74)  Yet, again the low-trust context must 
be stressed, and the historical nature of the gulf between the parties 
which had been constantly predicated upon rivalry and competition 
rather than cooperation. In this sort of environment it was obviously 
very difficult for the parties to forego any principle without 
misgivings. 
But crucially we would argued that Dr Johnston recognised the 
limitations of his initial approach and increasingly began to employ 
other sorts of change strategies, although continually emphasising 
that reform could not be enforced but had to be voluntary. So although 
even after Mark I Dr Johnston defined his role as being, 
"... to seek ... to identify common ground and persuade the 
parties to take up agreed positions on that common ground, 
within the framework of the Johnston Report. I have seen the 
role of independ chairman as falling some way short of that of 
a conciliator." 
Nevertheless, Dr Johnston emphasised that he was prepared to take on 
any other third party role, including conciliator, mediator and 
arbitrator, if that was agreed by the parties. He also detailed for 
their benefit the advantages of each role, and the way in which each 
operated. (76)  
Moreover the parties held several meetings to discuss the Mark I 
framework. Although again there was constant pressure to acknowledge 
that ultimately the responsibility for change rested with them, the 
chairman took an active role in bringing the two sides together, 
exploring points of detail and the practical application of the 
proposals. • 
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ii. Emphasis Upon the Process of Change  
This role was clearly much closer to what Purcell has termed the 
process agency, (??) in which the active creation of mutual trust and 
appropriate attitude changes are developed through mediation. Clearly 
it complemented the initial approach in a valuable way by emphasising 
the need for active intervention to try and resolve the attitudinal 
obstacles of low trust and competitiveness which had for example 
undermined the ABFU initiative. Dr Johnston's belief that the 
differences between the two representative bodies were minimal by the 
time the Mark II Report was written was not therefore a fanciful 
interpretation. Both sides had after all accepted the points 
suggested as Heads of Agreement in principle, and had explored the 
implications of these in detail. The strategic mode of implementing 
change via the process agency appeared therefore to have resolved the 
major differences of policy and brought the parties round to commiting 
themselves to a merger as a desirable and positive step. 
Finally, what is to be made of the criticism that Dr Johnston 
misunderstood the way in which BIFU operated? It has been argued by 
union officials that he relied too much on a swift positive decision 
from their representatives despite being aware that they could not 
commit BIFU to a return to joint machinery prior to clarifying the 
powers of the second and third tiers, this being a decision for a 
delegate conference. (77)  Yet documentation of formal and informal 
discussions at that time show that Dr Johnston was aware of this 
problem, and more broadly that the BIFU representatives could not make 
binding commitments. X78' In his view the success or failure of the 
Johnston proposals did not simply hinge upon the union making this 
commitment to return to joint machinery immediately, as long as they 
accepted Mark II "warts and all" as the basis for implementing reform. 
In summary it appears that Dr Johnston combined both structural and 
process agencies of change and explored a variety of roles within the 
parameters of his remit, operating as what Purcell, and Carr, have 
termed a "strategic mediator". (79) Moreover it must be concluded that 
Dr Johnston was quite correct to emphasise that while he could try to 
bring the parties together, the decision to implement change finally 
rested with them alone. 
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2. THE STAFF ASSOCIATIONS 
The staff associations' attitudes to the enquiry have to be seen in the 
light of their traditional internalist philosophy and of the 
observations of Dr Johnston upon them. 
Initially it must be stated that there was a degree of division between 
the associations in attitude, if not policy objectives, noted in the 
Reports. Broadly speaking, the two larger associations were more 
antagonistic to the concept of a merger which involved them in an 
extra-domestic macro-financial sector organisation. In particular 
NWSA held a strongly domestic orientation and attitude to the six 
points which were itemised in the Mark II Report. It wanted no 
geographical element in the organisation structure; the prime locus of 
membership at the domestic level; officials to be employed on terms 
fixed domestically; each level to have the right to certificate under 
the EPA, and so on. (80)  But while not as extreme as this, the other 
associations were also to some extent domestically oriented on the 
major questions relating to the locus of organisational power and 
control. 
Moreover each was highly concerned about the question of TUC 
membership and the intention that the new union would move into the 
mainstream of the orthodox trade union movement. (81)  Was BIFU 
therefore right to insist upon the safeguards which appeared to 
undermine the whole enquiry, given these views? Or did the 
associations make a genuine compromise in accepting the Mark II Report 
which BIFU interpreted too cynically? 
The evidence would appear to suggest the latter view is the more 
accurate. In that the Mark II Report was accepted "warts and all" by 
the associations, and that it spelt out highly specifically the 
principles of the amalgamation there appears to be little doubt that 
the associations moved a long way from their opening position. In 
adopting this pragmatic policy, they were imitating their approach to 
the ABFU talks in which we argued that they showed less concern with 
pre-amalgamation constitutional definition, and more willingness to 
devise solutions to problems as they occurred, after the merger was put 
into effect, than NUBE. 
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Moreover, as was argued above, and was recognised by NUBE after the 
Mark I Report, (82)  the Johnston model was a centralized organisation 
in which the CBU retained the powers enshrined in the 1968 agreement 
and lost nothing to the domestic levels. This was despite the desire 
for greater domestic autonomy on the part not only of the majority body 
of the BSC, but of some powerful members of the FLCBE. 
Of course Dr Johnston did offer a substantial trade-off in his plan to 
enlarge domestic activity via increased participation. It was also 
emphasised that, once formed, the new body had the right to make 
internal constitutional changes via its Delegate Conferences so that 
the internalist proponents were not cut off from the avenues of reform 
in the future. (83)  But this did not detract from or contradict with 
the centralized nature of the proposed organisation. So we must 
conclude that the staff associations demonstrated a high degree of 
flexibility and the prerequisite "act of faith" in accepting Mark II 
in its entirety. 
3. NUBE/BIFU 
Dr Johnston was careful not simply to conclude his last Report by 
apportioning blame for the impasse, nevertheless his final remarks 
were critical of BIFU's attitude because it seemed that the union 
increasingly conveyed a lack of good faith, and in his view the way 
forward lay squarely with the union. Was this an accurate commentary 
on the stalemate? 
Firstly we would argue that the increasingly sectoral orientation of 
BIFU considerably influenced its attitude to what Johnston emphasised 
as the positive aspects of a merger. There was a tendency to neglect 
the opportunities for increased activity at the first (domestic) 
level, the union preferring to concentrate upon securing its broad 
organisational ambitions, so that the central emphasis upon the CBU 
and its domestic constituents was in a sense ignored. (84)  Furthermore, 
the increasing heterogeneity of the union was reflected in the 
composition of its executive which was less immediately persuaded of 
the advantages of a merger with the associations, the route to 
expansion seemingly secured without the necessity of compromise with 
internalists. So, as we shall argue below, Johnston perhaps somewhat 
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unexpectedly, had a considerable struggle to persuade the union of the 
value of his proposals. 
Yet BIFU always argued that it did not withdraw from the talks, but 
rather than accept them as a package it wished to establish working 
parties to discuss further the six subjects. It argued that some 
points of the Mark II were "obscure or contradictory". For example, 
whether the third tier's conrol over the "broad strategy" of 
bargaining included a final decision on pay claims in the clearing 
banks, or did this reside with CBU? Cr whether the responsibility of 
the CBU for authorising industrial action of its first tier bodies was 
to be extended to other second tier bodies, and where this left the 
third tier's co-ordination role? Most of these reservations were 
concerned with the operation of the non-clearing bank bodies and how 
they related to the CBU and its domestic bodies, (84) in keeping with 
the sectoral ambitions of the union noted above. 
Yet Johnston had emphasised that precise operational requirements 
could only be worked out by experience, and it is arguable that these 
were precisely the sort of issues which would have to be solved thus. 
Moreover, the working parties, which the associations had agreed to 
enter, provided an opportunity for clarification and detailed 
definition, as long as the principles of Mark II were acknowledged as 
the non-negotiable framework for amalgamation. 
What then explains the decision of the union not to return to joint 
working and resolve these problems in the task forces, as Johnston 
wished? The existence of a division of views within BIFU's executive 
was thought by other participants in the talks to be the explanation 
for the inability of the union's officials to make a binding commitment 
at this point. Their desire to make Mark II a basis for further 
negotiation was seen as a means of "buying some time" so that the 
representatives could establish a consensus policy within the union 
rather than risk that their endorsement of Mark II would not be 
supported by a full Delegate Conference. (86) 
While roughly correct, this explanation does not quite capture the 
complexity of the union's position however. In fact at BIFU's NEC in 
September, Mark II was discussed and the General Secretary expressed 
support, noting that of the six main points, five favoured the union; 
the only one which did not concerned the geographical basis of the 
branch structure, and even that was not ruled out completely. It was 
therefore a very favourable package which the executive endorsed. 
However the Mark II Report was still interpreted only as a basis for 
further discussion with the six points as "heads of agreement". It was 
also accepted that these points would be put to a Delegate Conference 
of the union for ratification before the working parties could be 
entered. Crucially the executive made no proposal to accept the Report 
as a package (which as Dr Johnston had emphasised would not preclude 
detailed discussions). Nor was the proposition to return to joint 
machinery prior to the establishment of the working parties, as 
recommended specifically in Mark I (page 44) and Mark II (page 32) 
discussed at this meeting. 
This can only be explained as a mistake - a misreading - of the Mark II 
proposals, or as a misjudgement of the position of the associations. 
The September meeting took place in the knowledge that the BBSA 
accepted Mark II, but that the other associations had not yet made a 
decision. While it was likely, in view of previous policy, that the 
LBGSA would accept, it was thought more likely that the NWSA, 
traditionally the most domestic oriented body, would prevaricate. 
BIFU's executive also therefore assumed it had a little leeway, and 
that the question of re-entry to joint machinery was not critical 
because further discussions on the six points would be called for. 
Eben so, at the meeting of the parties with Dr Johnston on 4 October 
1979 the union could have acceded his request that the Report was 
signed as a package, because although BIFU said then that this was not 
possible without prior ratification of a Delegate Conference, the 
executive had previously determined that it did have the authority to 
sign the heads of agreement. (87)  That instead they prevaricated at 
this point appears to be best explained by the uncertainty generated 
from a groundswell of oppostion among the union's branches to the 
proposal BIFU had made for a geographical branch structure which 
Johnston had not endorsed. This was the one unfavourable 
organisational detail from BIFU's point of view in the Mark II Report. 
Considerable opposition emerged to the disbanding of Area and Regional 
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Councils which were seen as the guarantee of an effective trade union 
organisation, and the proposal to re-enter joint machinery prior to 
clarification on this point was rejected in several motions to the next 
NEC meeting. 
It would appear then that the upsurge of lay opposition and the 
acceptance "warts and all" of Mark II by all the associations 
surprised the BIFU representatives to the Johnston talks. It became a 
more distinct possibility that were the proposals to go to a Delegate 
Conference, the endorsement of Johnston Mark II by the representatives 
(which included the union's General Secretary) might be overturned. 
Having ostensibly lost sight of the basic principles of the national 
union, such an outcome would put them in an extremely difficult 
position, being tantamount to a vote of no confidence. Amore reserved 
position was therefore adopted, it being acknowleged that the union 
could not proceed on such an important issue while divisions were 
evident. 
Neither however was it desirable that such divisions become public, 
nor that the union was seen to be stalling on what to the broad rank-
and-file might seem like a technicality. The advantage to the 
associations in propaganda of such a split would clearly be enormous. 
Hence BIFU attempted to sustain its existing bargaining position by 
pressing for confirmation of the constitutional position of the second 
and third tier by working parties before it would resume joint 
(88) negotiations, 	and this was the stalemate on which the talks 
floundered. BIFU then attempted to lay the blame for the breakdown at 
the door of the associations by claiming that the pre-condition of re-
entry to joint machinery was imposed by them. (89) This is 
categorically incorrect, because as Johnston emphasised, he had 
proposed this as a gesture of goodwill in both Mark I and Mark II. Of 
course from the union's position it can be understood why its executive 
was so concerned by the propaganda implications of this division. But 
the ostensible failure to accept Mark II as a package on the basis of 
an apparently minor technical detail also belies the point that the 
need for a geographical branch structure was actually of profound 
importance as the ultimate guarantee that the merged body could not at 
some future date become nothing more than a confederation of 
institutional bodies, nor that one of the first level domestic unions 
could disaffiliate from the CBU, taking both the former staff 
association and BIFU members with it. So, this defensive reaction 
among the lay activists in the union to the absence of any 
geographically based branches was in effect an expression of their 
traditional anti-internalist suspicions and of the continuing low 
level of trust regarding the intentions of the associations. It was, 
as such, evidence that Johnston had failed to break the strength of the 
historical divide. 
Nonetheless the union's ultimate refusal to grasp the opportunity to 
merge seems paradoxical when the following factors are borne in mind. 
First, it was NUBE which had pressed the employers (via ABFU) then 
ACAS, and then seceded from the joint machineries in order to resolve 
the question of divided representation. Second, the Johnston model 
envisaged a relatively centralized organisation structure congruent 
with the "national" philosophy of the union. Third, this was 
recognised by the union's executive itself. Fourth, union officials 
were aware that the vast majority of their members desired 
amalgamation, and were unconcerned with detailed niceties. (90) Fifth, 
the staff associations had quite clearly compromised their position in 
accepting the detailed proposals of Mark II, and sixth, the union was 
still the weaker of the staff bodies in terms of members in the 
clearing banks, and had not made any significant inroads into the staff 
associations' majority through the separate arrangements. 
Given the above factors, it is tempting to conclude that BIFU missed 
the opportunity to achieve what would have been a popular merger on 
very favourable terms. With the proposed increase in participation in 
the banks this would probably have led to the creation of an 
organisation with a clearing bank membership of round 200,000 people, 
and together with BIFU's "rump", a total of over one quarter of a 
million finance sector workers. 
4. THE CLEARING BANKS  
Finally, the employers' role, which was of great significance in 
ensuring that the merger was implemented, has to be considered. 
Firstly, the banks' attitudes to the Johnston proposals are examined, 
and despite certain reservations it is argued that his reforms were 
generally accepted. Secondly however, given this support, we consider 
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why they adopted the relatively passive response to the collapse of the 
talks in the post-Mark II stalemate. Thirdly, the question of whether 
the Johnston model was an employers' solution (as one interested party 
charged) has to be addressed. 
To reiterate: the banks had a key role to play in implementing the 
merger by offering an increased scope of joint regulation, 
particularly at the domestic level. This was the prize of reform: an 
extended bargaining role to induce the rivals to forget past 
differences and overlook the immediate questions of institutional 
competitiveness. But clearly this did not require a substantially new 
policy from the employers until the initial agreement to merge had been 
taken by the unions themselves, although their endorsement of the 
proposals was obviously appropriate. What then was the attitude of the 
banks to the Johnston reforms? 
i. The Proposals in Principle  
Despite the apparent contradiction between the more traditionalist 
elements of their managerial methods and ideology and the pluralistic 
nature of the Johnston strategy to extend the area of joint regulation 
with a strong highly representative union, the banks professed support 
for the main thrust of the Johnston Reports. (91)  Indeed, they 
circulated the main points of the proposals to their staff at the time, 
and emphasised their broad support. In effect this was because.they 
accepted the argument that divided representation was the sine qua  non 
of industrial relations instability, and that their primary aim had to 
be the restitution of institutional order, particularly to be able to 
negotiate change in an increasingly complex industry. Second the need 
to resolve this in isolation from other problems was acknowledged to be 
the best strategy of reform even if the Johnston argument for 
continuing the 1968 constitutional framework was not wholly accepted. 
The banks had shown during the ABFU talks, and during the enquiry, they 
had no wish to complicate matters by trying to introduce bargaining 
reform as a second dimension to the problem. 
Third, it may be argued that increasing participative arrangements and 
strengthening the representation presented no conflict with the way 
that they were developing their industrial relations management, as 
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all of the banks were extending lay participation through office 
representatives, seconded representation and other types of 
communication methods. 
Fourth, offsetting the increased power of the proposed CBU was the 
moderation and responsibility of the new body, which Dr Johnston had 
emphasised. It was felt that as long as the assocation viewpoint could 
still be expressed, the moderation of the new body was assured, and the 
only danger stemmed from the possibility that apathy on the part of the 
majority.would permit a minority of activists to dominate issues. ( 92) 
 But given that the participative style was designed to counter this, it 
was not thought to be highly problematic. 
Fifth, the proposition to continue the compulsory arbitration facility 
was accepted despite reservations. As will be discussed below, the 
existing facility was considered by some managers to be a serious 
impediment to bargaining. Nevertheless its value as a peace-keeping 
mechanism was accepted and, given the increased power of the new merged 
body, this was again acknowledged to be a priority. 
ii. Reservations  
Individual banks expressed a variety of reservations about the detail 
of the reform. On one point however there was general disagreement 
with the Johnston proposals. The banks felt unable to encourage TUC 
affiliation from the new body, it being argued that this was a matter 
for the staff themselves to decide, and, given the perceived strong 
opposition to affiliation by some members of staff, one on which the 
employers felt they had to remain neutral. In his second Report 
Dr Johnston reiterated the need for TUC affiliation, despite these 
views, and had managed to convert the associations to this principle, 
thus largely nullifying the employers' qualms. 
Secondly, the centralism of the proposals, in which the second level of 
bargaining (the national forum) retained wide powers, was opposed by 
some banks. In the case of the Midland this related to its atypical 
bargaining agents. It was felt that the question of ASTMS had not been 
satisfactorily resolved, particularly as this union had a majority of 
members in the engineers and data processing staff whose "muscle" made 
(93) dealings with them especially sensitive. 	In fact the Midland had 
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wanted ASTMS to be included in the reconstructed system, but this had 
been rejected by the other banks and by Johnston, who called the 
union's presence in the clearing banks "an anomaly". National 
Westminster's objections to the centralism stemmed more from its 
longstanding domestic orientation, which had been evident in 1968 for 
example when the National Provincial and Westminster had both 
expressed only weak support for national machinery. This company 
level orientation was also encouraged by diversification of trends 
into other areas of finance, which placed a stronger emphasis upon 
corporate policy-making. So, National Westminster had for example 
considered bringing its merchant-banking arm, County Bank, and other 
subsidiaries into a company wide bargaining unit, but this was 
incompatible with the Johnston proposals which defined negotiating 
structures by operational division rather than by ownership. 
Similarly, Barclays had considered integrating the conditions of 
employment between the large home-based international division and the 
domestic bank. It had also considered applying to introduce a 
representative for its international arm into the Federation. In this 
instance however the Barclays' management indicated their willingness 
to defer any integration plans in order not to jeopardise the success 
of the Enquiry. 
On the whole however, the banks agreed to support the reform proposals 
as the best means of obtaining a resumption of national bargaining. 
Secondly, they offered a permanent resolution to the division of 
representation which, given the breakdown of joint working, was now 
likely to make negotiations highly unstable and competitive. The 
division was also thought to be unpopular with staff; as such the 
banks felt that they must be seen to be supporting any real attempts to 
resolve it. 
REACTIONS TO THE POST-MARK II STALEMATE  
A supportive but relatively neutral policy was generally pursued until 
the stalemate in late 1979. Information on developments was 
communicated without comment to bank staff, although it was stated 
that the objective of an end to the division of representation was 
broadly endorsed. 
Differences did however emerge more clearly during the stalemate. To 
reiterate, under the Johnston proposals there was strictly speaking no 
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contingency plan for the banks in the event of a failure to merge. 
Their role was really to become active only when the initial agreement 
between the unions had been achieved in establishing the extended 
scope of joint regulation and participatory channels. When matters 
stalled however a debate between the banks developed on whether they 
should intervene to try and retain the initiative. Domestically, 
Barclays and Williams & Glyn's were the most pro-active: Barclays for 
example considered sending letters from the staff department to line 
managers suggesting staff meetings at which staff would be recommended 
to put pressure on their representative bodies and did in fact send out 
a staff circular to this end. (95) As Johnston had already pointed out 
however, the weakness of this strategy was its domestic basis; thus it 
would be unlikely that BIFU members in Barclays would be able to force 
the union along as a whole unless their action was matched in the other 
banks. 
And in contrast, those banks which had seen less utility in the reform 
were not so committed to an interventionist approach to try and keep 
the reform group. This particularly applied to the Midland where in 
1979 the banks was finally stabilising the rivalry between ASTMS and 
BIFU. Being on the brink of signing a new procedure agreement with 
each union in late 1979, Midland did not wish to disturb matters by 
taking a high-profile stance on the national merger. National 
Westminster was also disinclined to pursue any active intervention 
policy. 
These differences also meant that a Federation level initiative was 
ruled out, although at that point there was little contact nationally 
between the unions and employers. Almost as soon as the post Mark II 
stalemate emerged it is notable that National Westminster proposed to 
the Federation that it, 
... should now let the dust settle and if it meant the end of 
merger discussions then Dr Johnston gRuld be asked to write a 
final postcript to the whole matter"' 
further efforts to establish a merger being pointless, and while a 
minority continued to argue for active employer intervention, the 
postcript was, effectively, written. 
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It would be unjustified to blame the banks for the collapse of the 
Johnston initiative. They did after all support his proposals, and 
agree to implement the bargaining reforms he suggested. It does seem 
more plausible to argue however that the banks took an essentially 
short-term view of industrial relations which did not ensure the 
greatest chance of the Johnston reforms actually working. 
Firstly, Johnston consistently had to work against the background of 
the competitiveness of separate negotiations. He faced the 
contradiction of trying to generate high trust cooperative attitudes 
while at the same time the unions were competing explicitly in domestic 
negotiations. Of course it may be added that the unions also allowed 
short term separatist interests to interfere with their approach to 
reform, and it is understandable that in moving quickly to establish ad 
hoc domestic negotiating channels separately with each union the banks 
were trying to secure stability and a degree of order. Nevertheless 
this did mean that BIFU faced no real penalty for collapsing the joint 
staff side despite the previous threats from the employers, and had no 
pressing need to resume joint working in 1979 when talks collapsed, 
ostensibly on this point. 
Secondly, this was reinforced by the banks' reactions to the disarray 
they faced in 1979 in pay bargaining. Despite being the (self-
confessed) victims of an extended period of leapfrogging  and 
competitiveness between the unions, the banks appeared not to conclude 
that this was concrete proof of the need for national negotiations with 
a simple union. Some argued for instance that there had been 
advantages in the domestic bargaining, particularly relating to the 
flexibility it offered to deal with differentials after the period of 
incomes policy, and Midland, in particular, felt it had contained the 
problem of ASTMS more effectively. Another bank suggested that the key 
to stability lay not so much in the structure of representation as in 
the existing bargaining units: proposals to lump the EDP and computer 
staff with the clericals were considered. (97) 
Thirdly, the concern for stability, predominant among the chief 
executives and general management fo the banks dictated that the banks 
would reconvene national negotiations early in 1980 with both unions 
but on a separate basis. As a response to the problems of domestic 
bargaining experienced in 1979 it was understandable as a short term 
measure, although it did in the view of most managers still represent a 
second-best alternative. It also contravened the previous refusal of 
the banks to be party to such arrangements. But while it disappointed 
the Federation secretariat which was keen to try and keep the momentum 
going, it represented the central concerns of top management for a 
resumption of employer coordination to re-establish stability in 
negotiations, whatever the implications for the efforts to resolve 
dual unionism. 
The decision was in a sense in line with the longstanding view that the 
employers could not impose their wishes upon the unions (despite the 
events of 1968). Nor, given the balance of membership, could a 
withdrawal of rights against one body be considered. It was also 
argued that a decision to merge had to be voluntary otherwise it would 
not be likely to be permanent, hence very soon after the collapse of 
the talks the banks appeared to accept failure as inevitable. 
Nonetheless the resumption of national machinery clearly reduced the 
need of the unions to secure a merger, having informally regained 
virtually all negotiating rights. TO the extent therefore that the 
banks opted to secure short-term stability, it has been argued that 
Johnston did face extra difficulties, despite the formal cooperation 
of the employers. This was because the value to the unions of his 
proposals was reduced as the costs of not pursuing a merger were also 
reduced. Given the inherent competitiveness of the staff bodies this 
opportunity cost factor was, we would argue, a crucial one. 
So, to sum up: Johnston envisaged an important role for the banks in 
offering greater bargaining rights to the new merged body as an 
inducement to reform. Broadly, this much was accepted by the employers 
because of the perceived importance of a merger. when talks stalled 
post-Mark II, the banks declined to pursue a strongly interventionist 
strategy to revive them, and relatively quickly accepted the collapse 
of the initiative. It was suggested that the short-term priorities of 
sustaining stability tended to undermine Johnston's longer-term 
objective; the competitiveness of separate negotiations contradicting 
with the spirit of cooperation necessary for a merger. 
Was the Johnston solution therefore an employers' solution? This was 
the interpretation ASTMS put on the matter, its General Secretary 
complaining that the Report (Mark I) was little more than a re-vamped 
ABFU, the latter having been employer-inspired. (96)  
Certainly it is arguable that a re-ordering of the institutions to 
create stability and efficiency were objectives in which an employer 
would be likely to place some value. Moreover the collapse of joint 
negotiations appeared to be detrimental to the banks in the pay 
bargaining of 1979 when the settlement was upwardly revised several 
times. Nevertheless Johnston was careful to emphasise the popular 
support for the idea of a merger among bank staff, as well as 
employers, and the establishment of an ordered bargaining environment 
is quite clearly an objective which unions in general have pursued, as 
well as employers. 
ASTMS was also particularly critical of the attempt to reinstate 
national negotiations, being in favour of company based bargaining; 
but some of the banks were also beginning to consider extended company 
bargaining as being more advantageous for them. It should also be 
remembered that the creation of a centralized bargaining agent was 
designed as much to ensure organisational strength, which was hardly 
an employer objective, as to engender bargaining efficiency. 
We would conclude that to sustain the ASTMS argument one would firStly 
have to demonstrate that national bargaining was inevitably against 
the interests of the staff and in favour of the banks, and this remains 
unproven; and secondly, that BIFU and the associations were duped by 
Johnston, or unaware of their own best interests. In the next section 
of the thesis we shall try to demonstrate that this clearly was not so. 
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TIIE CalSITTUTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE MACHINERY 
INTRODUCTION 
This is the third section of the thesis, and it seeks to explore, given 
the division of representation, why national machinery was able to 
operate for nearly ten years, by examining the bases of stability and 
agreement between the parties. Secondly, the aim is to look at the 
strains on the national bargaining which derived fundamentally from 
the division between the staff bodies and how they were dealt with. It 
is argued that through the way the constitutions were devised, dual 
unionism proved to be a relatively minor problem for the operation of 
pay bargaining but that the effect of the constitutional controls was 
to restrict the ability to negotiate change on non-union pay issues. 
Moreover because competition between the staff bodies was neutralised 
but not dissolved, it is argued that the rivalry did manifest itself in 
the strategies which the joint staff side developed to broaden the area 
of joint regulation and which were resisted strongly by the banks. In 
effect it is suggested that the question of the characters of the staff 
bodies was of little importance, because their objectives were typical 
of those of trade unions, in trying to further the interests of their 
members by (amongst other things) extending the scope of their 
authority into areas of managerial prerogative. However because of 
the emergence within the banks of greater concerns with labour costs 
and operational flexibility to meet the pressure of rising competition 
for deposits and lending, the staff side's expansionist strategies 
were strongly opposed, and it was this developing conflict betwccn the 
strategic objectives of the two sides which represented the main 
threat to the continued working of the machinery as constituted. 
This chapter analyses the design of the national constitutions which, 
it is argued, were predicated upon an economistic model of bargaining, 
the principal function of joint regulation being limited to a wage 
setting exercise. While this was accepted by the staff side, it is 
suggested that there were considerable rigidities in this structure 
and that problems in the bargaining process stemmed from these. These 
rigidities were located both in the procedure, which incorporated a 
compulsory and unilateral arbitration facility; in the separation of 
bargaining between national and domestic levels; and in the some of 
substantive items for negotiation which was broadened considerably 
from the original list after MBE's strike action and in the removal of 
facilities for consultation at the same time. After delineating 
these, the following chapters then look at how the machinery operated 
in terms of the objectives of the parties in the JNC, to see to what 
extent these rigidities impinged upon the satisfactory working of the 
machinery and the ways in which they were by-passed. 
There were also strong external forces acting upon the JNC during its 
lifetime. In particular the effects of exceptionally high rates of 
inflation upon pay bargaining will be examined, and the influence of 
the Government and its agencies (such as the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes). We have seen already that political pressures for reform 
of the industrial relations structures were highly effective in this 
arena; another profound influence occurred in the constraints upon 
free collective bargaining and the pressure for productivity deals, 
and the effects of these will be considered in detail. 
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METHOD 
The method of examination will be to look at the development and 
outcome of what we have interpreted as the major themes within the JNC. 
The approach will not then be strictly chronological but instead an 
issue based analysis, and the timing of the occurrence or resolution of 
these issues in some instances overlaps historically. Secondly, there 
are issues which are germane to the analysis of two or more themes, and 
are mentioned several times. Where the influence of one event, say for 
example a pay rise, conditioned the outcome of another settlement, for 
example the salary restructuring exercise, we have however tried to 
emphasise the fact. 
The investigation is based primarily upon an examination of the 
minutes of the JNC and the FBE. These minutes are comprehensive, 
containing an account of the way in which discussions developed and 
detailing differing points of view, although they are not verbatim 
accounts. It is reasonable to assume that they present a fair picture 
of the substance of discussions however, and in the case of the JNC 
representatives of the employers, CBSA and NUBE all had to approve the 
minuted records. Tb get round the fact that some informal bargaining 
was not minuted, this source was supplemented by interviews with 
representatives of management and the Federation secretariat, and with 
representatives of both parties to the BSC. However these interviews, 
which were unstructured, were designed principally to clarify themes 
and arguments rather than to gather information. A third source'is the 
minutes of the arbitrations which took place under national machinery. 
These are verbatim and include the submissions of the parties to each 
tribunal, plus the awards of the arbitrators. Finally we have 
supplemented our analysis with an examination of miscellaneous 
documentary evidence from each of the main parties. Private 
discussion papers and working party minutes, used in the development 
and conduct of bargaining, and in particular on the salary 
restructuring exercise offered a valuable source of insight into the 
process of decision making. 
THE CONSTITUTIONS 
The operation of the national machinery was defined by three 
constitutions, covering the rules for the conduct of the employers' 
side, the staff side and the scope and procedure of their negotiations. 
These will be considered in turn. 
(1) The Joint Negotiating Council (JNC)  
This constitution defined the representation on the employers and the 
staff side, set out the procedure under which negotiations took place 
and stated the scope of substantive issues which were to be covered by 
national machinery. It was approved and adopted on 22 May 1968. 
The parties on the staff side to the JNC were the union and staff 
associations each of which nominated representatives from the Banking 
Staff Council. Six staff side members would normally be present in the 
joint council. The employers side were nominated from their 
representative body, the Federation of Bank Employers. Like the staff 
side they would normally have six members present in the joint council. 
As regards substantive issues, it will be remembered that the union had 
managed to conflate the original distinction between negotiable items 
and those items for discussion/consultation only, after the strike 
action of late 1967. • 
The original list of negotiable items agreed by the Wbrking Party was 
derived from those issues upon which some consultation already 
occurred between the banks. These issues were: 
(1) Figures for the aggregate of the basic salary scales. 
(2) Basic retiring salary for the average overscale 
unappointed staff. 
(3) Minimum commencing salary for a full management grade. 
(4) London Allowances. 
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The second group of consultative issues were subsequently incorporated 
into this list of negotiable items as well. These were: 
(1) Safety of Staff 
(2) Working Hours 
(3) Overtime 
(4) Territorial Allowances outside London 
(5) Holidays for Unappointed Staff 
A catch-all clause also permitted any issue within the subject of 
salaries of employers or any group of them to become negotiable and 
arbitral, if so agreed by both sides of the Council. 
The constitution set out the procedure for negotiation, proposing that 
resolutions could be put from either side for decision by the votes of 
staff and employers, each side having one each. In the event of a 
failure to agree being registered on two separate occasions, the 
resolution could be referred to arbitration, by either side. Any 
matter so referred would be decided before a tribunal of three men, of 
whom the staff side and the employers would each nominate one person, 
and the chairman would be appointed by agreement between the two sides. 
In the event of a failure to agree, the President of the Law Society 
would nominate a chairman. The decisions of such tribunals were 
accepted as being binding on both sides of the JNC. The constitution 
of the JNC bound the parties to undertake joint national negotiations 
for a minimum of two years (until 30 June 1970). Thereafter either of 
the nominating bodies could withdraw after a period of notice of six 
months. 
(2) The Banking Staff Council (BSC)  
This constitution was approved and adopted on 20 May 1968. In this 
Council the staff representative bodies, NUBE and the staff 
associations, met to decide upon policy, adopt resolutions and 
nominate representatives to the JNC. 
The Rules of the Council laid down in precise terms the code of 
practise for its operation. This included defining the roles of 
Officers of the Council, (Honorary and otherwise); the rules governing 
the convening of meetings; the transaction of business; voting 
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provisions; the keeping of accounts and financial administration. A 
procedure for winding up the Staff Council was also set out. 
Fran within the two original constituent bodies twenty-four members 
were nominated to the BSC, twelve fran the union and twelve from the 
staff associations. In that sense representation was equally balanced 
at the Council Fran these members the honorary officers were elected, 
and in practice, the chairmanship of the BSC was interchanged on an 
annual basis between the two constituent bodies. The non-honorary 
official, that is the Secretary of the BSC was however appointed from 
outside the staff bodies. The Secretary had the duties of keeping the 
minute book of resolutions and proceedings, as well as maintaining a 
record of the audited memberships of each constituent body, as at each 
year-end. 
The nominations to the staff side of the JNC were taken from among the 
members of the BSC. Normally three representatives of each 
constituent body made up this staff side, again in an attempt to 
maintain a balance between NUBE and the staff associations. 
However this equal balancing had two perceived defects which were 
amended by the poll-vote procedure. First it ran the risk of producing 
a stalemate if there was a difference of opinion between the two 
constituents in the BSC with regard to the framing of claims; or in the 
determination of priorities among issues which were to be put forward 
to the JNC; or in the process of advising the staff side during the 
conduct of negotiations at the JNC. (1) Second it was thought to be 
unfair that equal representation should accrue to a constituent even 
though its membership was unequal. At the outset of course the CBSA, 
representing the staff associations in the clearing banks had greater 
membership. (2) NUBE had however' gained considerably in the events 
leading up to the ratification of the national forum, and was convinced 
that in the long term it could dominate the proceedings, because it had 
always believed that recognition was the major key to increased 
membership. It therefore accepted the poll-vote procedure despite its 
initial minority position. (3) 
The poll-vote was simply a "tie-breaker" to be utilised in the event of 
an equal number of votes for and against a resolution. This was not 
unlikely to occur on major policy proposals if the staff associations 
united against NUBE. Each constituent was deemed to be entitled to the 
number of votes equal to its last audited membership of bank employees 
in the poll vote, but it was the individual staff associations, not the 
CBSA which were the constituents along with NUBE. However it was the 
CBSA which was the nominating body for the associations' 
representatives in the staff side of the JNC. Also the CBSA was the 
forum from which the staff associations' resolutions for negotiation 
would be put forward. 
The BSC also stated the terms on which members could leave or be 
removed, or for new members to join. It is likely that the joining 
option was introduced in order to permit the entry of reconstituted 
staff associations formed from the mergers of the clearing banks in 
early 1968. Membership was effectively determined by the 
corresponding employer's election to the Federation of Bank Employers. 
Moreover the clause restricted membership to those bodies primarily  
concerned with negotiating on behalf of bank employees, thereby 
excluding other white-collar unions with interests in the finance 
sector from claiming representation rights. No withdrawal of any 
member of the BSC was possible before 30 June 1970; thereafter this 
was possible on six months notice, although in such an event a 
disaffiliating body was still subject to any agreement to which it was 
party in the JNC prior to the giving of notice. 
(3) The Federation of Bank Employers (FBE)  
This constitution was adopted on 20 May 1968. The Federation was'the 
employers' organisation which nominated representatives from among its 
members to the JNC. 
In many ways this constitution mirrored that of the BSC. It laid down 
rules for the transaction of business, election of its officials, 
voting provisions for resolutions, financial administration and 
winding up procedure. 
Each of the banks which were members of the Committee of London 
Clearing Bankers was offered a seat at the council of the FBE. All of 
the banks accepted, except for Coutts and CO, which did however follow 
the agreements made at the JNC. In effect then there were ten members 
of the full council, from which six were nominated to form the 
employers' side of the JNC. A Chairman of the council was also elected 
- 
from among the members: in practice this office rotated among the 
banks. 
As with the BSC voting on resolutions was based on a show of hands, but 
the option of a poll was also available. The basis of the poll was on 
the number of employees, (both clerical and non-clerical) employed by 
each bank, as at the 31st December last. 
Under the constitution a secretary of the FBE was also to be appointed, 
although his duties were not precisely defined, being simply those, 
... as the Council may from time to time determine." (4) 
At the outset it was envisaged that this was a fulltime administrative 
role, and no specific mention of a negotiating function was made. The 
broadness of the job description did however permit this, and the banks 
were advised to hire someone with negotiating expertise to work on 
their behalf. (5) 
Membership of the Federation was initially only granted to the London 
clearing banks, but there was no absolute restriction upon non-
clearing banks, or non-CLCB members also joining, subject to the 
approval of the FBE council by at least a 75% majority of votes. The 
criteria for entry were however made more restrictive from 1 January 
1972 when the Federation registered as an employers organisation under 
the Industrial Relations Act (1971). Thereafter entry was restricted 
to members of the Bankers', Clearing House (the London clearing banks) 
and other users of the clearing system (such as the Yorkshire Bank or 
the Co-Operative Bank) were excluded from applying for membership. 
Withdrawal from the FBE could be made on the same conditions as the 
constituents in the BSC faced, after 30 June 1970. 
rat, PARAMETERS OF NATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
In this discussion the intention is to demonstrate that the basic 
reasons for tightly defining the constitutions were to establish a 
strictly delimited bargaining model which was solely concerned with 
wage setting, and at the same time to neutralize the possibilities of 
conflict developing from the rivalry between the staff bodies. While 
this model was acceptable to both of the staff bodies for reasons 
considered below, it is argued that certain rigidities were enshrined 
within the constitution, which were related to the scope of the 
bargaining unit; the collapse of the distinction between negotiable 
and consultative categories of discussion; and the tightly defined 
procedure culminating in the arbitration facility. The discussion 
then attempts to draw out some of the implications of these rigidities 
before the actual operation of the machinery is explored in the 
following chapters to demonstrate their effects and the extent to 
which they were overcome. 
SCOPE OF JOINT REGULATION 
In defining the objectives of the banks with regard to the'scope of 
joint regulation, it is pertinent to note what they wished to exclude 
from this category. This included not only all pay items of lesser 
importance and other non-pay items, but also all personnel areas 
concerned with the control and allocation of work, training and 
development of the workforce and grievances or local work group 
disputes. The premise underlying their policy was to leave untouched 
as far as possible the area of domestic prerogative, so that the 
original scope of bargaining was in fact very restricted, reflecting 
the limits of existing employer coordination. Broadly speaking this 
only included the major components of pay and conditions of employment 
for onscale clerical staff, and during the working party discussiOns, 
the banks had resisted a union attempt to make pensions negotiable, as 
well as opposing the proposal to bring "automation" and "conditions of 
work" into the orbit of consultation because they were not already 
managed in a joint manner and were viewed as matters solely for 
domestic managements' concern. Within the consultative category they 
did allow both minor pay issues, and those non-pay issues over which 
there was either a substantial degree of informal coordination, such 
as holidays or where there was a considerable area of staff interest 
involved, even though they were ultimately non-negotiable. Examples 
of this category included safety of staff and working hours. 
Arguably then, the scope of bargaining was clearly delimited both 
because of the traditionally wide area of prerogative the banks 
enjoyed, and because of the level of negotiation. 	In the new 
arrangements the model of bargaining was essentially economdstic with 
the unions operating as a market agent regulating the terms of 
employment of their members in conjunction with the employers. In 
effect therefore the bargaining process was intended to be a means of 
contracting for the sale of labour, or what Chamberlain called the 
"marketing" function (6) whereby the prices at which labour was 
employed were fixed jointly. On the other hand the party which would 
oversee the application of the terms and conditions would be the 
domestic management. Fbr example, the national JNC was allocated the 
right to negotiate upon overtime payments; however while it was 
intended that it would regulate the premium at which this would be 
paid, and under what conditions, including to which class of workers it 
would apply, it was implicitly not assumed that the JNC would be able 
to stipulate how overtime working would be allocated or distributed 
among the workforce, this power remaining with domestic management. 
Bence the national agreement was not intended to establish what 
Chamberlain termed the managerial function of joint regulation, that 
is the "principle of mutuality" as he called it, which involved a 
sharing of the exercise of authority on all aspects of decisions 
affecting the workforce. (7) 
This was reinforced by the separation of bargaining levels as by this 
division the process of rule-making was distinguished from the 
application of those rules through joint administration. The national 
machinery was in effect what Kahn-Freund called a static rather than a 
dynamic model of bargaining, the characteristic of the dynamic mode 
being that, 
"More important: the body which lays down the conditions is 
often also the body which interprets its own resolutions. Over a 
large area of British industrial relations the rule-making and 
the decision-making processes, the, as it were, 'legislative' and 'judicial' functions are as indistinguijable as they were 
in the Constitution of 'Medieval England.'" 
Flanders (9) has argued however that it is impossible to limit 
bargaining to a purely rule-making process, because this is 
inextricably bound up with the process of administering those rules; 
joint authorship also involves joint responsibility for the observance 
of their contents, and parties develop procedures not only as a means 
of changing existing rules, but also to settle disputes about the 
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interpretation of the present agreements. Yet in the banks it is 
noticeable that the JNC made no provision formally to oversee the 
application of its decisions at domestic level. This was left to the 
institutional managements, arguably for the simple reason that it was 
thought to be unproblematic: the scope of the substantive area of 
national joint regulation was so clearly defined that the JNC would 
simply establish rules which could be unambivalently applied, as for 
example by listing the holiday entitlements of various categories of 
staff based on the criterion of length of service. Furthermore the 
relative simplicity of the age-based pay structure meant that this 
could be easily applied: there was none of the complexity associated 
with bargaining over piecework rates which necessitated joint control 
over the application of agreements. 
But this limited model of national bargaining did largely accord with 
the expressed ambitions of the staff bodies at that time. Although the 
banks were advised by representatives from the Ministry of Labour that 
dual level recognition would be necessary, (10) none of the parties 
actually foresaw the need for this as a means of resolving potential 
questions of the application of agreements. So the problems of 
contract administration were accepted by the staff side to be entirely 
distinct from the process of rule-making. NUBE was therefore quite 
prepared to accept the fact that it would be denied domestic 
recognition, despite its place in the JNC; having previously dismissed 
institutional bargaining as unimportant, and argued that the decisions 
on terms and conditions, over which collective bargaining should be 
established were taken jointly by the banks, it could hardly do 
otherwise. And it must be pointed out that under the new arrangements, 
the proportion of pay fixed nationally was very high; much greater for 
instance than in engineering where local negotiations were 
established. In banking only the merit rises, which were non-
negotiable, were fixed domestically, so NUBE's preference for an 
externalist bargaining was to that extent highly logical. However, 
the response of the associations to this point had been to justify 
their preference for domestic leapfrogging as the best bargaining 
strategy to exploit this situation. 
There was also a sense in which the competition between the two forms 
sharpened up their philosophies to more extreme positions. 	For 
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example, NUBE had at one time argued in favour of an element of domestic 
pay bargaining, but after the associations had achieved domestic 
recognition, the union expressed its preference for the single-tier 
model at the national level (11) in order to emphasise its externalism 
to the banks in contrast to the institutional limitations of the 
associations as the basis of its strategic appeal. Because of its long 
history of non-recognition, its ambitions were therefore directed 
against the internalists as much as the banks. In addition it was 
hampered in undertaking a more extensive role in issues of contract 
administration at local or domestic level, or dealing with individual 
grievances and disputes by its exclusive reliance upon full-time 
officials - lay activity being equated with internalism and the 
possibility of employee domination as we noted in chapter one. Its 
functioning was therefore restricted to a highly centralised 
bargaining role. 
In contrast the staff associations' position being highly 
institutionally oriented, might have been more amenable to extending 
their role into the administration of pay decisions at local level and 
thus taking responsibility for a share in managerial authority through 
bargaining. Certainly they were able to take up grievances or salary 
streaming problems, through their well developed local organisations. 
Ideologically however the strong support of managerial prerogative 
meant that they saw a limited role in penetrating into management 
decision-making, acknowledging the latter's unilateral righti to 
initiate and introduce change as it saw fit. The associations' 
hostility to anything more than a limited wage setting role for 
national machinery was also well-known, and fostered at least in part 
by its conceptual incompatibility with the ideology of internalism. 
It is reasonable to suggest therefore that the longstanding rivalry 
between NUBE and the associations had conditioned their mutual 
interpretation of bargaining principally as a wage setting exercise, 
in a way which was notionally similar to those of the banks. 
THE BARGAINING UNIT 
This brings us to the question of what had determined the scope of the 
bargaining unit, and why had the banks incorporated all of their 
onscale clerical staff, male and female into this, thereby grouping 
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together career and non-career categories? The economistic argument 
usually adduced to explain employer combination was that it was 
advantageous to combine as an oligopsony in order to minimise the 
competition for labour. In this instance however such an argument may 
have appeared superfluous in view of the banks' highly developed 
internal labour markets, for they were only actively competing with 
each other for staff at the point of entry. On the other hand, 
establishing a national scale could have been used as a means to 
reinforce the internal labour market to the extent that staff would see 
no advantage in moving from one bank to another to gain better pay, 
although they might still see a change of employer as a more rapid 
means of promotion. This was already restricted however by the 
informal agreement not to employ each other's staff. Theoretically 
therefore it might be deduced that it was unnecessary to delegate 
control over the whole clerical scale to the national level, and 
disadvantageous insofar as this reduced domestic discretion. But 
against this the banks had to weigh the point that as competitors for 
staff the rates at different points on the scale as well as the entry 
rate could be a significant recruiting factor if they varied 
substantially between the banks. In order to limit this competition it 
made sense therefore to establish a uniform entry rate and similar 
scales. Moreover as the banks were labour intensive organisations 
there could be significant effects on their costs resulting from a 
movement in the entry rate insofar as this set a floor for the whole 
scale; changes in this rate would be likely to rebound on all salary 
levels. This provided a rationale for explicit coordination to ensure 
that shifts in the rest of the scale were kept as low as possible 
despite the fact that competition in the fixing of the age scales was 
reduced by the internal labour markets. 
Several non-economic factors also appear to have influenced the 
question of the bargaining unit. Firstly, it is evident that the banks 
had not simply opted to forego all domestic control over pay, and that 
they did wish to distinguish between career and non-career groups. 
Hence the pay levels of all managerial, appointed and overscale 
clerical staff were to be negotiated domestically and the design of the 
national machinery did even permit some discretion for the individual 
banks on the clerical scale, because only the aggregate of scale was 
fixed in the JNC. While national machinery was to fix the minimum 
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managerial salary and the minimum retirement pay for unappointed 
staff, these were only reluctantly conceded by the banks under 
pressure from the union, and to offset any demands NUBE might have 
asserted for domestic recognition. The decision to exclude the senior 
staff from national bargaining reflected the view that there was no 
point in combining to minimise the competition in the labour market for 
these grades, because even the overscale clerical group, while not 
holding an appointment and therefore not in senior positions in the 
banks' hierarchies, would be unlikely to be able to transfer to 
comparable positions in other organisations, given the career 
prospects and the reward package which included substantial "perks" or 
non-salary items, such as cheap mortgage facilities and non-
contributory pension schemes. They were, in effect, well insulated 
from the influence of the external market. 
In contrast it was thought unfeasible to break down the onscale group 
even though it contained a mixture of career and non-career staff, 
because this group as a whole was regarded as being susceptible to the 
external market, a policy which in part reflected the predominance of 
females within it by the late 1960's. (50% of total staff were female 
by 1968 but less than 1% of managerial posts were held by women) (12)  
and also the high demand for clerical workers in both the public and 
private sector. Additionally, a priority of the banks was to retain 
experienced clerical staff, even if they were not regarded as future 
managerial stock, because of the growth strategies the banks were 
pursuing primarily via the labour intensive branch expansion 
programmes. At that time staff retention was as serious a manpower 
problem for the banks as recruitment. 
Thirdly, it was thought that to split the onscale group up into junior 
and senior categories, and construct national bargaining to the former 
group would simply encourage leapfrogging tactics and disturb the 
differential structure, causing more bargaining difficulties. 
Arguably however, the attitude of the banks to this question did also 
reflect a pessimistic view of their ability to control the influence of 
the external market. This related to a disinclination to regard the 
payment system as an instrument which could be actively utilised in 
manpower development policies, and despite the elaborate career 
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structures, the banks were still concerned with comparability as a pay 
determinant in their bargaining strategies. It is notable as well that 
the age-related pay scale which had been in operation for nearly fifty 
years was still defended as the best available against the criticisms 
of the NBPI. 
It should also be noted that although pay negotiation was removed from 
domestic control, the Federation of Bank Employers was not typical of 
the model of employers' associations, such as the Engineering 
Employers. In the EEF the central negotiating body does not contain a 
representative from each constituent; operational differences between 
the constituents also mean that national wage negotiations in the 
engineering industry can only establish minima. (13) Quite 
deliberately though the banks restricted membership of the Federation 
to CLCB members, and excluded other small retail banks such as the 
Yorkshire Bank, on the grounds that because they were not full members 
of the clearing system their interests and operational systems could 
not be guaranteed to coincide with those in the CLCB. (14) As a result 
of this limitation, wage policy could be developed and negotiated by 
the banks' representatives acting as council members and nominees to 
the JNC, so that their influence was still direct. In fact employer 
policy developed on a consensus (or large majority) basis relatively 
easily, a process which was enhanced after the bank mergers of the late 
1960's reduced the size of the council to five members, plus the 
director. Moreover because of the oligopolistic structure of the 
industry and the homogeneity of the product, their operational 
interests and organisational processes remained highly similar. 
There were also important reasons which were not purely economic as to 
why the banks were prepared to forego domestic control over pay 
negotiations. Firstly, the breadth of the single-tier model was 
effectively the price the banks had to pay for excluding NUBE from 
domestic bargaining. Although the banks were subsequently to reverse 
this decision and offer domestic recognition to the union, it was 
initially their intention to restrict the union to national 
bargaining. Being aware of this, the union pressed very hard for some 
control over appointed and managerial pay, recognising that if its 
representative constituency was restricted to onscale clericals it 
could hardly hope to overhaul the CBSA on the membership based poll- 
vote, with the associations retaining their existing domestic 
recognition rights. So for political as well as ideological reasons 
its aim was to maximise national coverage and minimise domestic 
coverage. 
Secondly, the institutional arbitration facilities already operating 
in most banks conditioned their interpretation of the freedom they 
would have to establish their own pay levels. It was felt that 
previous awards had restricted the opportunity to drift too far from 
industry averages, even with domestic bargaining arrangements, because 
it appeared that arbitrators were impressed by claims based on similar 
pay for similar work arguments. There was therefore seen to be little 
point in not formalising this already implicit linkage between the 
banks. 
For these reasons the majority accepted a single-tier bargaining model 
covering basic not minimum conditions, despite opposition by a 
minority of banks, led by the Westminster, which were not happy with 
the prospect of the loss of domestic managerial control. This might 
have been a much more serious sticking-point had the Midland (which was 
also strongly domestic-oriented) been involved in the discussions. 
However its policy of non-involvement meant that the matter was 
resolved according to the majority's wishes. While the banks were able 
to make merit payments to their onscale staff which supplemented the 
national agreements, these were not negotiable, and clearly the banks 
did not envisage a two-tier bargaining process at this stage. But this 
did present a problem insofar as it offered no means of differentiating 
between career and non-career categories and thus no satisfactory 
opportunity to reward responsibility or initiative as the banks 
increasingly wished to do. The single-tier model was also seen to be 
disadvantageous during periods of official pay control, and 
particularly when productivity schemes offered the opportunity to 
reach pay awards above the prescribed norms. It was therefore one of 
the rigidities of the constitution which generated pressure for reform 
of the bargaining structure and an area where a formal compromise was 
subsequently effected to allow greater domestic flexibility. But it 
will be argued that the price of reform for the banks was the extension 
of joint regulation into their domestic prerogative. Thus it 
represented a substantial modification to the original objective of 
strictly delimiting an economistic bargaining area. 
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NDGOTIATION/CONSULTATION 
A second area of rigidity derived from the substantial broadening of 
the scope of national machinery, achieved when the union enforced the 
dissolution of the distinction between the negotiable and consultative 
categories of representation. This was not however just a quantative 
change, but a qualitative one as well, because the list of the 
substantive items now included areas where there were differences of 
policy between the banks. For example, there was variation on overtime 
arrangements, large town allowances, and the management of safety 
precautions. Such a change in the principle defining the boundaries of 
negotiable items meant that an initial process of aligning conditions 
through bargaining would be necessary, which did create difficulties 
within the context of the tightly defined procedure, as will be shown. 
It also invested the national machinery with greater potential for 
disagreement because the range of items was more heterogeneous, and 
included several which the banks and associations had previously 
regarded as being within the arena of unilateral management. 
Perhaps most significantly, the union managed to establish hours of  
work as a negotiable item, after the discontent on the Saturday morning 
question during 1967. This upset the CCBSA as it had taken a different 
attitude to NUBE on the compromise proposed by the employers in October 
1967, which would have retained Saturday opening in return for extra 
pay. The CCBSA (which became the CBSA in March 1968) had opened 
negotiations with the banks only to see them invalidated by the new 
constitutional arrangements, because the employers yielded to pressure 
from the Minister of Labour to settle the matter in the new 
machinery. (15)  
Secondly, in view of the mishandling of the Saturday closure issue 
prior to 1968, it is perhaps surprising that the facility for 
consultation was omitted. But it will be argued that this change 
substantially increased the rigidity of the negotiating process 
because the effect was to make any resolution brought before the 
council effectively arbitral. As a result it proved difficult to use 
the JNC as a forum for discussion and the exchange of views even on 
sensitive items like the hours of opening. In addition certain 
arbitral items, such as hours of work, holidays, and safety of staff 
- 
touched on areas where the banks regarded their authority to be 
unilateral, but where it was extremely difficult to distinguish 
completely between the areas of bilateral and unilateral control. Fbr 
instance, clearly the hours of work issue overlapped with the hours of 
opening, yet while the former was jointly regulated, the latter was a 
matter for the CLCB, and thus there was theoretically the opportunity 
for a variety of interpretations as regards the proper scope of joint 
regulation. 
This meant that there was theoretically the opportunity for a variety 
of interpretations as to the correct scope of joint regulation. 
However no facility was incorporated into the procedure for an 
arbitrator to adjudicate on the negotiability of an item, it being 
accepted that once the procedure had been activated, an item was 
thenceforth permanently arbitral until both parties in the JNC agreed 
to change its status. The precedent-setting nature of the procedural 
form therefore also made it virtually impossible to introduce items 
into the JNC on a "one-off" manner, in contrast with the engineering 
industry for example, whereas Marsh noted, (13)  informal contacts 
between trade unions and local employers' associations and the 
development of informal works conferences, were designed to facilitate 
the resolution of workplace issues without prejudice to the formal 
statement of managerial functions in the national procedure. In the 
banking JNC, the use of informal discussions as a means of dealing with 
outstanding items without prejudice to the formal constitution was 
very restricted. 
THE PROCEDURE AND ARBITRATION FACILITY 
As Marsh emphasised however, in engineering these conferences were 
effectively voluntary conciliation phases rather than arbitration 
exercises in which a third party imposed a binding settlement, (17) 
whereas in the banking industry the priority of settling issues 
rapidly and finally meant that there was no such provision for 
conciliation. In addition the tightness of the procedure forestalled 
this, because almost simply by virtue of introducing a resolution into 
discussions it was possible to trigger the procedure and thus to define 
a matter as arbitral. Effectively this represented an opportunity for 
the staff side to challenge the designated scope of the constitution 
and thus a potential challenge to the prerogative of the banks, as we 
have noted, for example on the hours of work question. It therefore 
rather contradicted the point of creating a strictly defined area of 
bilateral authority although the banks had intended the opposite 
effect whereby, in establishing a clear limit to the range of arbitral 
items, there would be a distinct division between joint regulation and 
the area of domestic prerogative. 
But it was because of the importance attached to conflict avoidance 
that the banks regarded the inclusion of the arbitration facility as a 
high priority, particularly after the success of NUBE's strike action. 
Indeed, they also wished to introduce a no-strike clause explicitly 
controlling the union's actions before or during any reference to a 
tribunal, but this proved to be impossible. (18) As a second-best 
alternative it was therefore seen to be crucial to constrain the union 
through the joint staff side with the staff associations, even if at 
some future date NUBE was able to obtain control of the BSC through a 
superior membership. The importance of avoiding any pressure for 
separate arrangements either from the union or the associations was 
then a keystone of the banks' policies, (19) divided representation 
being seen as a recipe for unrestricted competition between the staff 
bodies. 
Compulsory arbitration and the joint staff side were also necessary 
arrangements to counter the powerlessness of the associations in'the 
bargaining process. Being unable and unwilling to call upon sanctions 
to back up their claims, without the support of arbitration the 
associations would have quickly been revealed as inferior bargaining 
agents to the union, and thus likely to lose their support. So, to the 
extent that the availability of arbitration took the question of 
strength out of the bargaining equation and equalised the 
effectiveness of both staff bodies, it was relatively disadvantageous 
to the union. Nevertheless NUBE was also in favour of arbitration and 
remained so throughout the operation of the machinery, (20) because of 
its desire to ensure that it obtained absolutely equivalent 
negotiating rights to the associations. The fear of discrimination 
and the known moderation of its members therefore determined the 
union's decision to guarantee its own negotiating rights rather than 
to try and demonstrate the absolute reliance of the associations on 
arbitration. 
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Another potential constitutional rigidity was generated by this 
specific procedural form however, because the inclusion in the 
procedure of the compulsory and unilateral arbitration facility did 
raise the question of whether meaningful bargaining could take place. 
In the discussion below on the use of arbitration in the national 
machinery it will be argued that as the procedure was so tightly 
defined it did tend to inhibit the development of bargaining. 
Particularly during the starting-up period, it was easily possible to 
exhaust the procedure in the process of clarifying issues and 
attempting to standardise past practices as a preliminary step to 
negotiation. Nevertheless this tendency was offset by the adoption of 
informal modes of procedural amplification by both sides, and 
meaningful bargaining did take place over the whole range of arbitral 
items. 
A second sort of risk associated with arbitration was that it placed 
rule-making in the hands of a third party. It will be argued that this 
created problems for the banks particularly when they wished to impose 
changes in the principles determining the payment of certain items, 
such as the Large Town Allowance and overtime because they had 
effectively become fixed or "trapped" by tribunal decisions. 
Moreover, to the extent that the staff side, which was dominated by the 
associations, did not have to depend entirely upon their bargaining 
strength when using arbitration to defend their interests it will be 
argued that this represented a relatively advantageous form of rule-
making for them, because of the tendency of arbitrators to try and 
"split the difference" in their awards. 
In effect therefore, the combination of the increased scope of 
bargaining and the constraints imposed by the arbitration clause, 
served to condition the operation of national machinery in an 
important manner. 
The following chapters will develop the argument that because the 
competition between the staff bodies for control of the staff side 
(through superiority in membership) was not dissolved but only 
neutralized, each was inclined to pursue strategies designed to extend 
the area of joint control in order to demonstrate their greater 
representative effectiveness. Importantly as well, the constitution 
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proved highly conducive to facilitating these strategies because a 
relatively simple but effective means of challenging the designated 
scope of bargaining emerged around the arbitration facility. 
Furthermore, the hazy area between unilateral and bilateral authority 
in some of the newly negotiable items, such as hours of work and 
holidays proved highly conducive to fostering such expansionist 
strategies. So while the rigidities we have outlined above did 
contribute to the effective stabilization of the problem of divided 
representation in the bargaining process, at the same time they did 
generate considerable costs for the banks, and these subsequently 
became sufficiently onerous for them to question the very basis of 
their priorities and commitment to the national machinery as 
constituted. 
To summarize the argument, it was suggested that the banks intended to 
permit a relatively limited area of joint regulation which was 
essentially concerned with rule-making on pay norms common to each 
bank; union involvement in the application and administration of 
these rules was not envisaged however. While the scope of substantive 
issues dealt with at national level was extended into certain non-pay 
issues by the union's action in 1967, there was still a clear 
limitation on the function of joint regulation as a rule-making 
exercise, so that the national bargaining parties had no jurisdiction 
over the interpretation of the rules at domestic level. Secondly, it 
was argued that the scope of bargaining threw up potential problems; 
first because the single-tier model of pay negotiation which covered 
career and non-career staff offered insufficient flexibility and 
discretion for the individual banks to differentiate between these 
groups; second because the broadened range of negotiable items was 
more heterogeneous than the original list, and it presented greater 
opportunity for conflict with other customary rule-making bodies. 
Thirdly, the procedure no longer differentiated between negotiable and 
consultative items, and because of the arbitration clause this tended 
to imply that any item which was discussed was ergo arbitral. In 
addition, the existence of compulsory and unilateral arbitration 
raised the question of whether this was compatible with free 
collective bargaining. 
-21 
It has been argued that the limited national role for trade unicn 
representation was acceptable to the associations and to NUBS at the 
time that the constitutions were formulated. Nonetheless it will be 
proposed that they began to develop more expansionist strategies which 
challenged the role assigned to them in the national machinery, and in 
particular used the procedural format as a means of trying to establish 
a broader range of joint regulation. Not only did this clash with the 
area of unilateral prerogative which the banks traditionally claimed, 
but it coincided with a growing concern with their competitive 
position, which prompted firmer bargaining strategies. However, 
because of the limitations imposed by the procedure, their ability to 
combat the expansion of the staff side was restricted. Hence the 
priority of conflict avoidance, which had been embedded in the 
procedural format of the 1968 constitutions, began to contradict with 
more cost-oriented priorities creating an incipient source of strain 
upon the machinery, even prior to its collapse in 1977. 
In the following chapters the intention is to examine how the 
difficulties stemming from the constitutional rigidities were 
manifested, and to examine to what extent they were dealt with or 
whether they remained a persistent problem. In addition the sources of 
stability in the machinery will be denoted, it being argued that 
bargaining was strengthened by both formal modifications and informal 
practices designed to by-pass the rigidities discussed above. But one 
central source of stability derived from the successful negotiation of 
the clerical salary scales, an item of prime importance to the national 
machinery, and this is discussed in the next chapter where the, 
satisfactory outcome is explained in terms of the external environment 
of high inflation and frequent incomes policies as well as the mutually 
reconcilable objectives of the negotiating parties. 
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24ATIONAL SALARY SCALES  
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the process and outcome of negotiations over the 
national salary scales. Because the fixing of clerical pay was a 
primary function of the JNC it is argued that the success in 
negotiating this matter in a period of rapid inflation and frequent 
wage controls was a major source of stability for the national 
machinery, particularly when the previous problems over pay bargaining 
are borne in mind. 
The intention is to demonstrate how both under incomes controls and in 
free bargaining periods, the process of negotiation was largely 
unaffected by the existence of divided representation. This is 
explained by reference to the similarities in the bargaining 
strategies of the staff bodies deriving from their all-grades 
constituencies, and to the broad compatibility of these strategies 
with the objectives of the employers' Federation, which rendered 
competition over the formulation of claims, or the generation of 
significant conflict over the outcome of negotiation very unlikely. 
(i) INCOMES POLICIhS  
In the first part of the chapter, the salary scales are examined under 
the influence of incomes policies, it being argued that these were not 
strongly disruptive, and proved compatible with some of the policies 
of both sides of the JNC. 
As regards the staff side, this is related to the fact that although 
the weighting of incomes policies was often in favour of the lower paid 
in the junior grades, where NUBE had a much higher proportion of 
members than the staff associations, the responses of the CBSA and NUBE 
to this trend were normally identical. Rather than this becoming an 
issue upon which the institutional competition prompted differentiated 
policies with NUBE showing much greater support for incomes controls 
than its rival, as might have been expected, both bodies were primarily 
intent upon defending the existing internal differential structure. 
- 7 - 
This similarity is explained in terms of the rivalry for members as the 
means to securing control of the. staff council which necessitated both 
sides pursuing policies with the broadest appeal, rather than 
favouring a particular section (such as the junior clericals). It was 
this factor which tended to neutralize the emergence of institutional 
competitiveness, although as the 1977 disagreement which led to the 
collapse of the joint staff side showed, this could be a highly fragile 
consensus. 
On the employers' side it will be argued that the effects of incomes 
policies upon the national salary scales was, within certain 
limitations, reconcilable with the objectives of recruiting and 
retaining adequate numbers of clerical staff. These limitations 
related firstly to the timing of recruitment into the internal labour 
market, which placed a priority upon the correct rate of pay in the 
junior grade, and to the restrictions imposed by the particular 
structure of bargaining adopted by the banking industry. On the other 
hand because of the labour intensiveness of the industry, the attempts 
to control spiralling labour costs were generally welcomed by the 
banks; moreover we suggest that despite a stated commitment to 
maintenance of the internal differentials, they were prepared to 
accept some flattening of the structure caused by official controls as 
a longer term trend. 
In terms then of the problems posed by external constraint overpay 
determination, this section will argue that this was mediated by the 
attitudes of the parties which were in some ways supportive of 
intervention. Some of the restrictive effects did create bargaining 
difficulties over other areas however, and these will be contrasted 
with the pay bargaining process. 
Writers such as Clegg and Flanders have stressed the primacy of 
"voluntarism" in industrial relations, implying that periods when 
voluntary wage negotiations were suspended through intervention by 
incomes control were therefore exceptional. (1)  Yet during the nine 
and a half years of the effective operation of the JNC (May 1968 to 
October 1977) there were three statutory phases of incomes policy. 
These were the Prices and Incomes Policy, which was officially ended in 
(2) January 1970; 	the Conservative Government's three phase "Counter- 
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Inflationary Strategy" 
and the "Attack Upon 
Contract" (5)  in August 
operating from November 1972 to 
Inflation", (4) which succeeded 
1975 and operated for three years, 
July 1974 (3) 
the "Social 
although its 
effects were felt in the banks until mid-1979, because of the timing of 
the pay awards. So in less than half of the years of its operation was 
the national JNC bargaining in a completely "free" environment. 
In the timing of the introduction of these policies, the banks could 
complain with some justification that they were particularly 
unfortunate. It was previously noted that bank staffs were one of the 
first groups to suffer a standstill order under the Labour Government 
in 1965; the JNC also concluded the cost of living awards for 
1 January 1973 on the same day that the pay freeze was announced, 
delaying implementation until 1 April 1973. The Counter Inflationary 
Policy also delayed implementation of restructuring agreements reached 
domestically concerning managerial job evaluation programmes. Again, 
the banks attempted to implement a territorial allowances agreement 
reached in July 1975, but were restricted because of the announcement 
of the "Attack on Inflation" the same day as the claim was submitted to 
the JNC. 
From the standpoint of the parties to the JNC the notion of incomes 
policies being an exception might therefore have seemed something of a 
distortion. Indeed the national machinery was instituted during a 
phase of statutory controls and the JNC quickly learnt that it would 
not be able to by-pass these, whatever merits it believed its case had, 
when the first pay agreement it negotiated was disallowed by the 
NBPI. (6)  Because of this experience, the parties both developed the 
view that free collective bargaining represented a point at which 
adjustment could be made for previous controls and prospective 
restraints as well. 
This was reinforced by the nature of the bargaining arrangements. Both 
sides felt that the centralized level of negotiation and the single  
tier model of pay determination meant that there was little 
opportunity to supplement the agreement, so that they were relatively 
restricted compared to other areas of the private sector where more 
flexible local deals could help circumvent the controls. (7) In 
addition, the national agreements were highly visible and easy to 
"police", which again prompted the view that free bargaining provided 
the adjustment point for the anomalies produced by official control. 
Fran the point of view of the banks it might also have been predicted 
that the distorting effects of incomes policies upon pay structure 
would be of concern because of the importance of their ordered pay 
hierarchy in forming a basis of their career structure. Hence those 
policies which were not based solely on a standard percentage increase 
throughout the grade, or had an upper income cut-off point could 
corrode this structure. Certainly the expressed objective with regard 
to the national salary scales revolved round the broad continuation 
(or restoration) of accepted internal differentials. 
Yet, although the banks consistently supported the government policies 
designed to reduce inflation, including incomes controls, it was the 
timing of statutory policies on wages which was particularly critical 
to them. This stemmed from their concern that the ability to recruit 
and retain staff should not be impeded by external constraints; in 
particular, because the large majority of entrants were school leavers 
who entered in the most junior grade, the salary levels at the entry 
point had to be in line with what were calculated to be market rates in 
the critical period of the summer recruiting season. When the timing 
of the introduction or phasing of official controls constrained 
recruitment, which, it must be remembered, remained at a high level 
throughout the 1970's the banks pressed for latitude, although they 
were never prepared directly to contravene official policy at least 
until a clear precedent had occurred elsewhere, as in 1969. (8)  
In contrast, and arguably because of the strength of their internal 
labour markets, the banks were prepared to accept a compression of the 
rest of the pay structure. Indeed in 1972 they had opposed the 
widening of the differential between grade 1 and grades 2 and 4 which 
was ultimately endorsed by an arbitration tribunal, and were thus 
presumably not too concerned by the re-compression caused through 
official controls in 1973-4. Although the need to retain staff in each 
of the clerical grades did necessitate general adjustments for the 
cost of living changes and comparability, their short term priority 
remained the establishment of the "market rate" at the point of entry. 
It is notable for example that during the "topping up" exercise 
permitted under Phase II in 1973 the employers wished to pay this all 
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into grade 1, while the BSC pressed for equal distribution throughout 
the grades, (9) and from the tables 8.1-8.6 showing the trend of 
clerical pay it is apparent that there was a flattening of the inter-
grade differentials throughout the 1970's particularly if the 1972 
Arbitration is taken as the base-point (see tables 8.5 and 8.6). 
(10) Routh 	has suggested that this is a typical trend of pay structures 
in periods of high inflation, because the trade union response to this 
phenomenon is to increase the frequency of pay claims not based upon a 
standard percentage, partly at least in an effort to compensate for the 
particular problems of the low paid. But the compression cannot in 
this instance be explained in terms of union responses to the 
exceptional inflation of the last decade. Rather it arose from a 
combination of official incomes policies, coupled with a 
disinclination on the part of the employers to re-enlarge the 
structure in periods of free bargaining. Hence between the two periods 
of official policy, from mid-1974 to August 1975, the compressed 
structure was maintained, and common percentage increases throughout 
the grades were awarded, despite the fact that the BSC claims were 
specifically directed towards compensating for "incomes policy 
anomalies". (11) 
It must be remembered that as a labour intensive industry, the 
application of pay awards below the level of inflation did offer the 
banks a significant cost advantage, as long as they did not lose too 
many staff. This factor would have arguably been offset for thein by 
the strength of their internal labour markets, because a substantial 
number of their clerical staff would adopt a longer term perspective to 
their jobs, especially if they felt that their incomes would be 
similarly constrained elsewhere. Particularly therefore when pay 
controls were weighted towards the lower paid in the junior grades it 
could be argued that the effects were not disastrous, in the short term 
at least. Nonetheless it is evident that the banks did not intend to 
allow the differential between the grade 1 and minimum managerial 
point to contract as markedly as it did during the Social Contract 
period from 1976-78, and after the latter date the differential was re-
opened. 
Another effect of incomes policies was the narrowing of the scales 
within each grade, due to the flat rate increases affecting those on 
the lower point while those at the top received a (smaller) percentage 
increase. Again this trend was not reversed in free bargaining 
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periods, but it was offset by the introduction of domestic pay 
bargaining which allowed the national scale to be extended according 
to each bank's discretion. As such the constraints placed upon 
national bargaining were by-passed by this mechanism. 
In summary therefore, the banks policies appeared broadly to be 
reconcilable with the official controls in the short term at least. 
Whilst not unworried by the effects of these controls it was not so 
much in the area of national scales as other pay components that the 
banks were concerned, and in particular over the ability to adjust the 
London allowance, London representing the most competitive recruiting 
area. 
Turning to the staff bodies, it is evident that their objectives with 
regard to the pay structure were broadly similar to those expressed by 
the banks. Particularly after the job evaluation exercise in 1970-71 
conducted by a joint forum, there was no desire to disturb the 
structure. Indeed the only overt conflict over pay during incomes 
policy periods concerned the interpretation of a ruling under Phase 1 
of the "Attack on Inflation," which permitted only pro-rata awards to 
juveniles. Here the BSC managed to obtain some improvement to the 
Federation's proposals after negotiations. 
There were also substantial similarities between the staff bodies with 
regard to incomes policies. These centred around the defence of the 
differentials between bank workers and manual groups, and secondly on 
sustaining the existing internal wage structure against incomes policy 
distortions. Moreover, although NUBE did express support for the low 
paid, who fared better under the flat rate components of incomes 
policies in 1972-73 and the two phases of Labour's policy, it argued 
that, 
"In an industry such as banking and finance flat rate pay 
policies while discriminating against certain employees, 
additionally displocIt career structures and diminish 
differentials 
... and that there had to be due attention paid to existing 
structures which reflected the coincidence of increasing 
responsibility and experience with increasing age. This is 
particularly so in our field where salary differentials should 
be widened as the age structure changes considerably more 
responsibility is borne by senior staff. " 
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As a result the union called for a pay policy which was sensitive to 
the problem of "blockage in wage structures", as well as action on 
taxes and price controls as the primary means of assisting those with 
low pay. Allied to this it was critical of free collective bargaining 
which had militated against responsible behaviour, and too often been 
flouted by those groups which had the most bargaining power. 
"We also believe that the free collective bargaining system of 
itself operates unfairly and furthermore has clearly failed in 
one of its fundamental objectives, which is to secure a more 
equitable distribution of wealth in the country. Indeed one 
major criticism of the free collective bargaining system is that 
it has only been free for those who have the strength to practice freedom."' 
In short, NUBE appeared to have very little sympathy for the sort of 
militant behavour which they thought had led to differentials being 
narrowed in industry, and in effect proposed a permanent system of 
national comparability to replace it. Similarly the staff 
associations traditionally differentiated themselves from the methods 
and style of orthodox unionism. They too displayed more concern with a 
strategy which was defensively derived from the desired manual-white 
collar differentials, and to sustain the banks' wage structure against 
incomes policy distortions. (15)  
Such conservative strategies were arguably a reflection of the nature 
of the competition between the staff bodies. As all-grade unions they 
could plausibly claim that they had to defend the interests of the 
whole range of their members against the effects of incomes policy. 
When Construed in the negative the implications of this point become 
clearer. Orpetition for membership necessitated the avoidance of any 
discrimination against one group of bank staff, say the senior 
clerical or managerial, in favour of another group, such as the junior 
clerical, in case the net effect of this was antipathy by the 
discriminated group and a removal of membership to the rival body. 
Such was this rivalry that one body could be sure that the implications 
of any claim which demonstrated partiality would be denounced by the 
other. (16)  In addition the career orientation of banking meant that 
clerical staff were believed to hold longer term perceptions of their 
own interests and to be normatively committed to a pronounced (17) differential structure. 	While this did not invalidate policies 
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which for instance proposed support for the lower paid or some 
compression of the pay structure, such partiality made them 
potentially high-risk steps in an environment where through high 
inflation and incomes controls all staff were apparently suffering 
strain on their standards of living. (18)  
On this point, it is important to remember that the rival propaganda 
campaigns of the two sides were going on throughout the whole of the 
period of joint working, including the merger talks. In effect the 
competition for membership heightened what Ross (19) described as the 
political dimension of the bargaining process whereby union leaders 
were acutely aware of the penalty of failing to satisfy the wishes of 
any group or coalition of members. But incomes controls also presented 
a further problem for the union as it sought to demonstrate its claim 
that it made all the running in pay negotiations only to see the staff 
associations take the credit, (20) because the staff were probably well 
aware that they were subject to statutory limits regardless of which 
representative body they belonged to. So those grades which did 
benefit more from incomes policies would have seen this as a result of 
the TUC and the Government's policies rather than the union's efforts. 
The importance of this was further enforced by the uneven distribution 
of membership between the union and the associations. Typically NUBE 
had a much greater proportion of junior staff among its members than 
the associations whose strength lay in the more senior clerical and 
appointed grades. As the relative benefactors of the incomes controls 
in 1973 and 1976-77 were the lower paid junior staff NUBE might 
arguably have shown stronger support for the compression of 
differentials. However it actually construed this issue in the 
negative, realising that it could hardly neglect senior staff, who 
were not faring so well, for fear of losing their support, particularly 
as the associations were campaigning on their behalf. Indeed there was 
obviously a strong element of membership competition behind the CBSA's 
decision to try and go straight to Phase III of the Counter Inflation 
policy in 1977 as a means of improving the position of the senior 
grades. Tb this NUBE carefully responded by emphasising its 
commitment to adhering to the statutory policy and the illegality of 
the CBSA's policy as the reason why it did not support this move, 
although it reiterated that it favoured policies to re-establish the 
differential structure. It certainly seems plausible to argue that 
this concern with differentials was at least partly motivated by a 
desire to register sympathy with groups which were preponderently in 
the associations in order to try and recruit them. 
So it seems plausible to argue that the competitiveness between the 
staff bodies was a major factor in their response to incomes policies, 
although until 1977 this did not lead to attempts to break out of 
official constraints by using the arbitration facility, despite the 
view that bank staff were faring relatively badly. Yet because of the 
compulsory nature of the arbitration facility and the fact that there 
was no stipulation for tribunals to be bound by statutory controls this 
did represent an apparently easy route for the staff side to try and 
by-pass official guidelines. Certainly from very early on in the 
lifetime of the machinery an arbitration tribunal indicated that it 
would ignore incomes policy considerations in its award, when the 
overtime ruling of 1969 was given, (21) but it was subsequently 
accepted by both sides that in such cases implementation would take 
place when free bargaining resumed. In effect therefore the respect 
for the integrity of the JNC's procedure and the wish not to compromise 
constitutional authority by challenging external controls did appear 
to be a constraint upon inter-union rivalry. 
This was a fragile consensus however because it could be broken by the 
pressures of competition relatively easily, even when those pressUres 
were not critical. It is notable for example that the CBSA's action in 
1977 did not take place in the context of a serious crisis for the 
associations, as they were leading NUBE comfortably in the poll-vote 
and faced no exceptional pressures either from statutory bodies or the 
employers. Yet apart from the genuine belief that they had a strong 
case to justify their claim, there was little to be gained by this 
action at the time except to embarrass NUBE in front of the TUC, and in 
the event, the banks indicated that on advice from the government and 
their lawyers they would have to abide by official guidelines whatever 
the outcome of the tribunal. (22) 
To conclude this section therefore, it has been argued that there were 
problems with incomes policies, but they related not so much to the 
clerical salary scale as the bargaining over other issues such as 
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London weighting, and the potential clash between the compulsory 
arbitration facility and the exercise of statutory controls. Pay 
policies were almost the norm during the lifetime of the JNC. 
Adherence to official guidelines was followed closely in the banks, 
the centralized nature and the single tier of bargaining being 
conducive to a systematic application. This structure did however 
prompt other sides of the JNC to argue that in comparison with other 
more decentralized arrangements, they were unfairly restricted, and 
exceptionally closely watched by Government departments. 
The policies of both sides of the JNC were designed to defend the 
existing differentials, which were flattened by incomes policies, as 
were the intra-grade scales. Where official controls conflicted with 
recruitment objectives, the banks were particularly concerned to 
maximise their flexibility. But it was argued that, in the short term 
at least, they were able to cope with the way in which official 
policies were weighted in favour of lower paid workers, because the 
strength of their internal labour markets insulated them to some 
extent from problems of comparability with other employers. As for the 
staff side, it has been suggested that institutional competitiveness 
did not impinge upon the problem of incomes policies, both sides of the 
BSC pursuing broadly similar objectives, at least until 1977. 
Additionally, both staff bodies had some reservations about free 
bargaining which meant that they were to a certain extent committed to 
the objectives of incomes policies. As a result the problems seen in 
the banks prior to 1968 did not erupt again. 
(ii) Pay Negotiation in "Free" Collective Bargaining  
It will be argued that bargaining over national rates of pay in periods 
when incomes policy restrictions were not in evidence proved to be 
relatively unproblematic. The reasons for this stability will be 
considered bearing in mind the previous breakdown in consensus over 
both the determinants of pay levels, and the pay structure within the 
clearing banks. Certainly the resurrection of greater consensus 
between the JNC parties was not due to a return to the passivity of the 
1950's on the part of the staff bodies, indeed the institutional 
competition between them was occasionally evident in the formulation 
of rival pay claims. But it will be suggested that the reasons for 
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this relative consensus in pay bargaining (as compared to other 
issues) were linked to: 
(a) a broad commitment by both sides of the JNC to the 
stability of the internal pay structure, which has been 
discussed to some extent in the previous section. 
(b) a context of rapid inflation and frequent periods of 
official pay control which necessitated an element of 
flexibility being built into pay formulation. This, it is 
argued, allowed the principal determinant of the staff 
sides' claims, the cost of living, to coincide roughly 
with the market considerations behind the employers' pay 
policies. 
(c) the division of the national salary scales from other 
components of pay where greater conflict emerged in 
bargaining. 
Following a discussion which seeks to demonstrate the commitment of 
both sides of the JNC to an ordered and stable clerical grading 
structure, the process of pay formulation is examined, to illustrate 
the flexibility which developed in this area, particularly on the 
employers side. Thirdly, the criteria used by both sides in the 
bargaining on national salary scales are considered with a view to 
demonstrating that although these were clearly different, they were 
nonetheless both reconcilable, not the least because each side of the 
JNC excluded certain potentially problematic pay determinants from 
their policies and concentrated on a limited range of factors. It will 
be concluded that these elements of national wage negotiations were 
sufficient to ensure mutually satisfactory results. 
PAY STRUCTURE  
Firstly, an important area of consensus related to the agreement in the 
JNC over the need for a stable and ordered clerical pay structure. It 
must be remembered that a major area of contention in the post-war 
period, which had been instrumental in prompting the banks to 
introduce formal negotiating arrangements, was the attempt to compress 
the differential structure. This flattening occurred both in terms of 
the drop in overscale and appointed staff relative to the onscale 
clerical pay, and also within the clerical scale. But after the 1950's 
this policy was relaxed, and existing arrangements were subject to 
more stability. Moreover the extra effort required from the overscale 
staff, the same group which had suffered the greatest differential 
disturbance was also eased as the banks introduced greater 
mechanisation and computerization. They also adopted methods to 
improve organisational efficiency through clerical work measurement 
programmes and supervisory training, as the NBPI recommended. The 
effort/wage relationship therefore remained free from the sort of 
strains that has been imposed in previous years, mainly because of more 
liberal pay policies on the part of the banks. 
We have already indicated that the banks established a wide coverage 
for national bargaining, extending across the whole of the clerical 
age-pay scale because it was thought that this group was susceptible to 
the external market. It was also thought that to split the onscale 
clericals (which represented the majority of clerical staff) into 
separate bargaining units would also be more likely to create 
leapfrogging settlements or disturb the differential structure, the 
fear being that this might then affect staff retention, which in the 
late 1960's was a serious problem for the banks. (23) There was however 
a recognised need for a payment system which would also be conducive to 
career development while being suitable for the growing numbers of 
non-career staff in the banks. It was mutually accepted that these 
demands called for a national structure which was both sensitive to the 
outside market, yet rewarded career development and particularly the 
shouldering of responsibility and initiative. Because these 
principles were built into the restructuring exercise which 
established a grading differential for clerical staff through a joint 
agreed reform programme, both sides were committed to maintaining the 
new structure in a relatively stable state. 
If we then consider the policies of the staff bodies as expressed at 
the time of the job evaluation exercise it becomes apparent that the 
principles they proposed to determine the pay structure were also 
consistent with those of the employers. Generally it was argued that 
reform would create a system which would more adequately reward 
responsibility and initiative. Indeed it was explicitly suggested 
that a job grading exercise would be of benefit because it would 
enhance the quality of recruited staff and "prevent the serious 
wastage now prevalent in banking employment." (24) It was consistently 
argued that the core element of any pay system in banking should be 
ability, but that this was only of marginal importance in the age-based 
structure. NUBS therefore asserted the need for reform in which 
rewards and promotions would reflect "real ability" creating an 
"ordered" and "rational" structure, a "logical" and "beneficial" 
system, (25) and these arguments were reiterated (less explicitly) by 
the staff associations in explaining the proposals to their 
members. (26) In that they reflected not only the central objectives of 
the employer but also expressed similar normative assumptions about 
the determinants of reward systems it is arguable that they were likely 
to be conducive to a high degree of consensus over pay negotiations in 
the JNC. 
To the extent therefore that the staff side concurred with the banks in 
seeing the need for an ordered and stable set of pay differentials for 
clerical staff, this was one foundation stone underpinnng the 
stability of bargaining over national salary scales. 
THE PROCESS OF PAY FORMULATION 
A series of factors relating to the formulation of pay offers in the 
Federation and to the process of negotiation also tended to minimise 
the potential for conflict. After the initial period of inexperienced 
bargaining, it was intended that a more co-ordinated policy would 
follow with the appointment of a director of the Federation of Bank 
Employers. (27) Nevertheless his ability to generate a strict 
consensus was limited. Firstly, the chairmen and chief executives 
would be centrally involved in drawing up the sort of figures around 
which negotiations could take place, as pay constituted such a major 
cost decision. These officers would also be able to intervene if 
necessary during the process of negotiations, and in so doing alter the 
Federation's brief. Secondly, it was not always possible to establish 
a consensus on bargaining strategy because different members could 
have different priorities, their mandates being formulated 
domestically. 
Because the banks each had an input into the formulation of the pay 
strategy and the decisions over the conduct of the bargaining process, 
rather than delegating all negotiations to a central authority, it was 
often unlikely that an absolute consensus figure would be reached. As 
a result of these factors not only would the Federation usually adopt a 
relatively flexible opening position, but it would be relatively  
difficult for it to establish and hold firm with absolute certainty to 
a final offer. 
But the effects of accelerating inflation and the likelihood of 
incomes restraint also tended to necessitate some latitude for future 
trends. It also reflected uncertainty on the part of the employers as 
to the rates which would be adequate (in their view) to ensure 
projected staff requirements through the recruitment of school-
leavers. These could be difficult to calculate precisely, 
particularly in times of high pay settlements as the employers' 
intended settlement figure would be based on estimates of the likely 
pay settlement of their competitors in the labour market. As a result 
it was not unusual for the banks to reverse or alter pay proposals if 
the "going rate" seemed to differ from their original projections, or 
if recruitment was below expected levels at any point during the summer 
season. Indeed, so as to inject more predictability into this process, 
the Federation of Bank Employers brought forward the traditional 
settlement date from January to 1 July to coincide with the school-
leaving date more closely, with effect from the 1975 settlement. 
Agreement on pay policy was therefore not always unanimous, 
predictions of likely changes in the cost of living being extremely 
difficult to formulate during the unstable periods particularly 
following or prior to a statutory incomes policy. In addition 
recruitment needs could vary between the banks, as for example in 1975 
when the two banks with the greatest proportion of staff in London, 
Barclays and National Westminster, were experiencing different supply 
conditions to the others. Their pay policies accordingly differed as 
well, with these two pressing more strongly for substantial increases 
in the territorial allowances. It is also notable that the banks 
failed to reach a consensus in their pay strategies in the years 1974-
75 and 1978-79 when incomes policies had collapsed to be followed by 
high wage demands, which were finally settled in full. 
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The employers were not only constrained by external circumstances from 
creating fixed pay principles, but also by the particular negotiating 
procedure of the JNC, and the option of recourse to arbitration. In 
particular, it was thought that to acknowledge pay determinants could 
establish precedents which would weigh strongly in the deliberations 
of an arbitrator. As a result the banks were usually prepared to 
settle voluntarily but with what they thought was a generous offer, 
rather than risk being constrained in future by the creation of fixed 
principles such as comparability with an external group, even if in the 
short term they might be no more disadvantageous than any result 
obtained under "free" bargaining. 
Similarly the staff side wished to avoid recourse to arbitration and 
entered the informal bargaining methods developed to supplement the 
procedure. One reason for this was to avoid accusations between the 
representative bodies that another was failing to bargain in good 
faith; there was also the view that the distance between the parties 
in the JNC was normally too small to warrant taking the matter through 
to arbitration. There is also some evidence to suggest that the 
dominance of the CBSA produced slightly lower initial claims, and a 
determination to conclude a settlement rather than protract 
negotiations. In particular, the acrimony over the collapse of the 
ABFU talks at the end of 1974 led to disagreement over the claim, with 
NUBE publicising its preferred figure of 20%, and the CBSA insisting 
that their claim of 17.5% be the one put forward. 
Conversely, in 1977 it was of course the CBSA which attempted to 
circumvent the official controls, and NUBE which preferred to adhere 
to them; however this was an exception. 
It is evident then that the several factors noted above contributed 
substantially to the flexible approaches of both sides of the JNC to 
formulating the rates of change in pay levels. 
BARSAINING 
 
CRITERIA 
Thirdly, the criteria used by each side in the bargaining process have 
to be considered, the intention being to contrast the relative 
consensus which prevailed in the national forum with the situation 
prior to the introduction of national machinery. 
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Robinson argued that the sequence of domestic arbitrations which took 
place in the 1960's prior to the introduction of national machinery, 
were provoked among other things by the rigid adherence of the banks to 
the state of the labour market as the basis of pay determination. (28) 
 In contrast the associations adopted multifactor determinants, 
including comparability and productivity, having moved away from 
purely cost of living based claims. 
But after.1968 it is noticeable that the banks adopted a less rigid 
position, and were able to come to terms with the BSC's claims 
relatively easily. An important indicator of the satisfaction with 
the bargained outcomes was the fact that only one arbitration on salary 
scales occurred, and this was mainly to adjust for anomalies produced 
by the restructuring exercise. Moreover, in the joint staff council, 
both representative bodies opted to focus most strongly upon the cost 
of living once more, a policy which Daniels found to be typical of 
trade unions in his survey undertaken during the period of exceptional 
inflation in the ndd-1970's. (29) Clearly the need to redress the 
effects of inflation upon the standards of living of their members was 
the primary concern of the staff bodies in the national JNC. Although 
their initial claims were usually supported by other factors such as 
profitability, and comparability with other settlements, after the 
first round these were generally relinquished, or referred to as 
supplementary arguments mainly to justify moving beyond a reliance 
upon the historical changes in the Retail Price Index. 
There appeared to be a degree of sympathy shown by the employers, for 
these claims: references in the Federation of Bank Employer's minutes 
to the wish to "do the right thing by their staff" were repeated. (30) 
 But it is debatable whether this reflected an area of normative 
agreement on the legitimate determinants of pay, or whether it derived 
from a more instrumental concern to find justifications for what 
seemed like relatively high settlements even if they were only keeping 
pace with inflation. 
Certainly the prime concern of the Federation Council remained the 
ability to recruit and retain staff, and cost of living arguments were 
of secondary importance. (31) However, because of the effects of 
higher inflation upon the standards of living of all of their staff, by 
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1971 the principle of roughly matching pay awards to changes in the 
cost of living was broadly accepted independently of both ability to 
pay or to recruit. In the next pay round, it was accepted that the RPI 
increase over the previous twelve months was likely to represent the 
minimum acceptable pay rise, although because of the future 
implications of establishing a fixed relationship between the rate of 
inflation and pay, the Federation was opposed to any attempt at a 
formal index-linking exercise. At that time there was also a view that 
allowances for future inflation should not be made, and pay movements 
would effectively remain catching-up exercises. (32) This principle 
did however come under strain from the rapidly accelerating rate of 
inflation in 1974 and 1975, when it was acknowledged that the cost of 
living was a minimum settlement, and that some allowance for both the 
continuing rise in inflation, coupled with prospective statutory 
incomes controls should be made. 
These principles denoted the limits of the employer's position, and as 
they stood were hardly more than an acknowledgement that gross pay 
should (in real terms) not fall too much. Moreover the Federation 
argued in correspondence with the Pay Board that it was in effect only 
following prices: 
"The two 'across the board' settlements were agreed solely in 
recognition of upward movements in the st of living over the 
previous respective twelve months ... 
and in the same letter the employers emphasised that their reasons for 
feeling obliged to match the cost of living were primarily derived from 
labour market conditions: 
"It can be readily appreciated that while we are paying lower 
salaries than our competitors at entry, our recruiting problems 
will continue ... we are also experiencing a high wastage rate (34) 
• • • 
In fact a similar argument had been put to the NBPI in 1965 and was 
dismissed as inflationary and shortsighted; nonetheless the banks 
clearly felt it was crucially important for them to be able to match a 
"going rate" in order simply to fulfill their operational 
requirements. While they did not believe that it was they who were 
leading the inflationary spiral, they clearly felt there was little 
option for them but to follow it or become separated from the market. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of the need for "going rate" settlements 
did provide the crucial link in the bargaining criteria of the two 
sides. Although the relationship between market rates and the cost of 
living was not invariably symmetrical, in practice there appeared to 
be little difference between calculations based on the upward movement 
of the market rate and the changes in the cost of living as used by the 
staff side. Moreover during the periods of high or accelerating 
inflation the need to build in a degree of latitude to the 
negotiations, to account for future changes, enhanced this 
commonality. The employers were thus able to come to terms with the 
staff side's claims even though they approached the table on the basis 
of differing objectives. Under these circumstances, pay bargaining 
could become an integrative rather than a distributive process, in 
which neither side felt that it was losing. (35) 
A further important, and associated, reason why bargaining could 
become integrative related to the way in which other criteria proved to 
be relatively unimportant, or were excluded from the negotiations on 
national salary scales. 
COMPARABILITY 
Taking comparability for example it is arguable that several factors 
could have made this a very important determinant. Firstly, the 
existence in each of the banks of a floor of corporate-wide conditions 
of service was acknowledged by the Federation to be a potential 
bargaining lever. It was however offset by two factors: firstly, 
although the structures of the banks became more elaborate in the 
1970's they evolved differing policies on what conditions were 
corporately denominated. For example in 1973 Midland and National 
Westminster confirmed that their pay scales in subsidiaries were 
autonomous; Barclays stated that (with the exception of BBI) their's 
conformed to the JNC figures, as did Williams and Glyn's; Lloyds 
indicated that their wholly owned companies paid the same but partly 
owned associates were autonomous. Secondly, it was apparent that 
subsidiaries and associated would in general follow the trends 
established in the clearing banks rather that initiating rises. As a 
result the impact of different bargaining units within the corporate 
structures did not causally affect negotiations but in fact worked in 
the other direction. 
The exception to this was perhaps Barclays Bank. Because of the size 
of its international arm in this country, the domestic bank could be 
influenced by negotiated outcomes in BBI, and a close relationship 
between the pay levels in the two divisions was acknowledged to exist. 
Hence while negotiations were managed separately they were clearly 
linked, so that for instance Barclays Bank Ltd felt strongly committed 
to accept the principles of a correlation between movements in the RPI 
and pay levels once this was accepted by the international arm (36) and 
this principle was also subsequently acknowledged by the Federation. 
Similarly, the Scottish clearing banks could have a degree of 
influence upon the pay principles of the London clearers. For example, 
in 1975, the use of the Scottish banks as a comparator by the BSC to 
justify their case for a re-opener clause to the cost of living award 
was accepted as being highly significant by the Federation of London 
Clearing Bank EMployers, for a number of reasons. Firstly, there were 
strong corporate links between the Scottish and London clearers, (37) 
and although the two groups were operationally independent a degree of 
consultation and co-ordination inevitably occurred. Secondly, the 
banks were recruiting similar types of staff, and their markets 
crossed over to a limited extent, through the Scottish banks' presence 
in London and vice-versa. Thirdly, they had similar bargaining 
arrangements, with a national negotiating council, and a common 
bargaining agent in NUBE. The staff associations also had links with 
their Scottish counterparts. But in fact because both employer groups 
used similar "market rate"/cost of living criterion and because the 
area of overlap was relatively slim, the staff side were unable to 
establish any form of "leapfrogging". 
Cbmparisons with external bodies were introduced into the bargaining 
process as well, but their importance again appeared to be mediated by 
the strategic objective of the staff side to maintain the established 
differential structure. In trying to ensure that their clerical rates 
did not drift too far from national averages, the banks referred to a 
variety of comparators including the Civil Service, the Post Office, 
Oil and Insurance companies, and other retail banks. In particular 
they were concerned to ensure that the rates for the junior grades did 
not drift too far from external market influences, so despite their 
internal labour market policies the pay scale was related broadly to 
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labour market factors. However, because their internal structures did 
insulate the banks to a certain extent, this offered them a degree of 
discretion to adjust differentials independently of market 
considerations, particularly with more senior clerical staff. 
Furthermore, technically the use of comparisons was a highly complex, 
and therefore risky matter, because of the variety of non-money 
factors involved, and because it was dificult to compute the exact 
benefit of these. For example, the "perk" of housing loans at a 
discounted rate which was an important non-pay benefit for bank staff 
was not available to all clerical staff, nor necessarily on uniform 
rates throughout the banks. Comparisons which did not fully account 
for future career structure or job content could also prove spurious: 
such differences reduced the utility of any close comparison between, 
say, the task of a cashier in the banks, and a cashier in the Post 
Office, despite the common job title. 
But it has also already been pointed out that the prime concern of the 
staff bodies was to maintain the existing differential structure in a 
stable state. Unless therefore they could use comparability which was 
usually based on one point on the pay structure, or one particular job, 
as a means to lever up the whole scale, introducing external 
comparisons raised the risk of disturbing the structure. As a result 
the staff council would usually augment its claim by references to 
comparability but not regard it as the prime pay factor. 
More broadly however, comparability did not impinge upon the national 
pay scales because of the mutual agreement to treat the various 
elements of the terms and conditions of employment as entirely 
distinct matters. Hence London weighting, holidays and hours of work, 
all of which were linked much more closely to questions of 
comparability were dealt with separately from national salary 
bargaining. This resolved the potential difficulty facing the banks 
that in wishing to enforce national pay rates they faced the fact that 
conditions within the national labour market were not uniform. Most 
notably, the demand for staff in London was so high that the banks had 
to add a premium comparable to that paid by other employers to meet 
their requirements. If the staff side had been able to compound this 
into the basic salary of all staff, clearly comparability would have 
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become a much more important issue; but because they chose to observe 
the constitutional distinctions in the components of pay, a discrete 
set of determinants could be utilised for each case. Thus national 
rates represented a sort of basic salary throughout the industry, on 
top of which certain special conditions could be added. 
PROFITABILITY OF THE BANKS  
While reference was made to factors such as the ability to pay and the 
profitability of the banks by the staff bodies in their magazines, 
these were rarely the primary plank of their cases in the JNC. When 
such references were made they were strongly resisted by the 
Federation on several grounds. 
Firstly, it was pointed out that profitability and pay had not been 
linked historically. Subsequently, the introduction of domestic 
profit sharing schemes also enable the banks to argue that this factor 
was taken into account elsewhere, and hence it had to be be excluded 
from national bargaining. 
Secondly, the Federation argued that profitability could not be 
accurately incorporated into national rates because of the significant 
variations in profit levels over time, and between the member banks. 
Thirdly, it was stated that in real terms the profitability of the 
banks was not high (a factor which was accepted with more equanimity by 
the staff side than their public rhetoric suggested) and that as rates 
of return were subject to external influences, and particularly 
government interest rate policies, it could hardly be prudent to base 
pay determination upon this. Conversely however, the banks did not 
ever refer to reduced profitability as a justification for inability 
to pay, even during periods of high wage rises. 
It is evident then that bargaining criteria which might have produced 
rises in real pay levels were not strongly deployed by the staff side, 
and when used, were strongly resisted by the banks. It was mutually 
accepted that profitability was a difficult criterion to use at the 
national level of bargaining, but more significantly both sides 
appeared to value the stability and predictability of pay 
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determination which was centrally related to the cost of living rather 
than the ability to pay. 
CONCLUSION 
Compared to the period prior to national machinery, it has been argued 
that pay negotiation proved to be a relatively unproblematic exercise. 
The explanation for this has been based firstly upon the bargaining 
strategies generated within a context of high inflation and frequent 
pay controls in which the banks were operating, and secondly, the 
particular structure of union representation. 
A convergence of views in the JNC on the need to relate salary rises 
closely to changes in the cost of living arguably derived from the 
first factor. Indeed the increasing rate of inflation enhanced this 
consensus as both sides agreed to build more latitude into agreements 
in order to take account of future inflation and to compensate for 
anomalies caused by past and prospective incomes controls. Other pay 
determinants such as comparability became less important not only 
because of the high inflation, but also because of the agreement to 
deal with other pay components, such as territorial allowances, on a 
separate basis. 
As regards the second factor, the bargaining strategies of the staff 
bodies were seen to be conditioned by the representative structure in 
which they were operating (the joint staff council). So despite their 
differing membership profiles and ideological incompatibility both 
NUBE and the CBSA were similarly concerned to sustain existing 
differential structure, and it was argued that this common policy 
derived from their competition to maximise membership throughout all 
of the grades in order to obtain or retain control of the Banking Staff 
Council. As a result of the similarities in their policies however, 
the effects of inter-union rivalry were largely neutralized, 
contributing to the relative ease with which changes in pay were 
achieved, an indication of this being the infrequent use of 
arbitration, or even of formal "failures to agree" in the procedure. 
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SALARY SCALES 
New Job Evaluation system Introduced 1 April 1971 with salaries 
backdated to 1 	January 
CG1 
Minimum 
£ 
1971. 
CG1 
Age 21 
£ 
CG2 
Age 21 
£ 
CG3 
Minimum 
£ 
CG4 
Minimum 
£ 
Minimum 
Managerial 
£ 
1 	January 	1971 485 750 - 1000 1250 2770 
1 	January 	1972 522 804 - 1074 1341 2967 
1 	October 	1972 522 804 1020 1228 1494 2967 
1 	January 	1973 	.. 561 861 1092 1317 1599 3098 
1 	January 	1974 693 993 1224 1449 1731 3408 
1 	August 	1974 
(including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
876 1242 1554 1857 2220 4221 
1 	July 	1975 1073 1521 1904 2275 2720 5171 
1 	July 	1976 1338 1833 2216 2587 3032 5483 
1 	July 	1977 1449 1963 2346 2717 3184 5691 
1 	July 	1978 1683* 2122 2534 2962 3471 6374 
1 	July 	1979 1978' 2494 2978 3510 4114 7617 
1 	April 	1980 2335' 2943 3532 4185 4953 9348 
1 	April 	1981 2569' 3238 3886 4604 5449 10283 
1 	April 	1982 2788' 3514 4217 4996 5913 11158 
" 	(age under 	18 - 	previously 	under 17) 
" 	Paid 	from 	1 	April 	1973. 
TABLE 8 . 1 
-246- 
LONDON CLEARING BANKS 
GRADE MAXIMUM SALARY SCALES 
New Job Evaluation system introduced 1 April 1971 with salaries 
backdated to 1 January 1971. 
CG1 
4.. 
Standard 
CG2 
i 
Maxima 	(also known as 
CG3 
£ 
Min/Max) 
CG4 
£ 
1 	January 	1971 750 1000 1250 1700 
1 	January 	1972 804 1074 1341 1821 
1 	October 	1972 804 1406 1650 1950 
1 	January 	1973 864 1506 1767 2088 
1 	January 	1974 996 1638 1914 2256 
1 	August 	1974 
(including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
1242 1941 2382 2796 
1 	July 	1975 1521 2378 2918 3425 
1 	July 	1976 1833 2690 3230 3737 
1 	July 	1977 1937 2825 3392. 3924 
1 	July 	1978 2122 3051 3698 4279 
1 	July 	1979 2494 3585 4383 5071 
1 	April 	1980 2943 4429 5460 6105 
1 	April 	1981 3238 4872 6006 6936 
1 	April 	1982 3514 5287 6517 7526 
TABLE 8 . 2 
-247- 
LONDON CLEAkIt4G bANNS 
SALARIES RELATIVE TO 1 JANUARY 1971 
New Job Evaluation system introduced 1 April 1971 with salaries 
backdated to 1 January 1971. 
CG1 
Minimum 
CG1 
Age 
CG2 
21 	Age 21 
CG3 
Minimum 
CG4 
Minimum 
Minimu 
Manager 
1 	January 	1971 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 
1 	January 	1972 108 107 N/A 107 107 107 
1 	October 	1972 108 107 - 123 120 107 
1 	January 	1973 116 115 - 132 128 112 
1 	January 	1974 143 132 - 145 138 123 
1 	August 	1974 
(including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
181 166 - 186 178 152 
1 	July 	1975 221 203 - 228 218 187 
1 	July 	1076 276 244 - 259 243 198 
1 	July 	1977 299 262 - 272 255 205 
1 	July 	1978 347 283 - 296 278 230 
1 	July 	1979 408 332 - 351 329 275 
1 	April 	1980 481 392 - 419 396 337 
1 	April 	1981 530 432 - 461 436 371 
1 	April 	1982 575 469 - 500 473 403 
(age under 18 - previously under 17) 
N/A (salary scale not available for accurate comparision). 
TABLE 8 . 3 
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SALARIES RELATIVE TO 1 JANUARY 1971 
New Job Evaluation system introduced 1 April 1971 with salaries 
backdated to 	1 
CG1 
January 	1971. 
Standard 
CG2 
Maxima 	(also known as 
CG3 
Min/Max) 
CG4 
1 	January 	1971 100 100 100 100 
1 	January 	1972 107 107 107 107 
1 	October 	1972 107 140 132 115 
1 	January 	1973 115 150 141 123 
1 	January 	1974 133 164 153 133 
1 	August 	1974 
(including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
166 . 	194 191 164 
1 	July 	1975 230 238 233 201 
1 	July 	1976 244 269 258 220 
1 	July 	1977 258 283 271 231 
1 	July 	1978 283 305 296 252 
1 	July 	1979 333 359 351 298 
1 	April 	1980 392 443 437 359 
1 	April 	1981 432 487 480 408 
1 	April 	1982 469 529 521 443 
TABLE 8 .4 
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LONDON CLEARING BANKS 
SALARIES RELATIVE TO 1 OCTOBER 1972 
An arbitration adjusted salaries In the London Clearing Banks from 
1st October 1972. 
CG1 
Minimum 
CG1 
Age 21 
CG2 
Age 21 
CG3 
Minimum 
CG4 
Minimum 
Minimum 
Manageria 
1 	October 	1972 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 	January 	1973 107 107 107 107 107 104 
1 	January 	1974 133 124 120 118 116 115 
1 	August 	1974 168 154 152 151 149 142 
(Including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
1 	July 	1975 206 189 187 185 182 174 
1 	July 	1976 256 228 217 211 203 185 
1 	July 	1977 278 244 230 221 213 192 
1 	July 	1978 322 264 248 241 232 215 
1 	July 	1979 379 310 292 286 275 257 
1 	April 	1980 447 366 346 341 332 315 
1 	April 	1981 492 403 381 375 365 347 
1 	April 	1982 534 437 413 407 396 376 
TABLE 8 . 5 
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LONDON CLEARING BANKS 
SALARIES RELATIVE TO 1 OCTOBER 1972 
An arbitration adjusted salaries In the London Clearing Banks from 
1st October 1972. 
CG1 
Standard 
CG2 
Maxima 	(also known as 
CG3 
Mln/Max) 
CG4 
1 	October 	1972 100 100 100 100 
1 	January 	1973 107 107 107 107 
1 	January 	1974 124 117 116 116 
1 	August 	1974 
(including 
threshold 
consolidation) 
154 138 144 143 
1 	July 	1975 189 169 177 176 
1 	July 	1976 228 191 196 192 
1 	July 	1977 241 201 206 201 
1 	July 	1978 264 217 224 219 
1 	July 	1979 310 255 266 260 
1 	April 	1980 366 315 331 313 
1 	April 	1981 403 347 364 356 
1 	April 	1982 437 376 395 386 
TABLE 8 . 6 
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PaIDOCTIVITY BARGAINING N WARY REFORM 
Its7rRODUCTION 
While the outcome of pay bargaining was broadly satisfactory to the 
parties concerned, the structure of pay negotiation did prove 
problematic. It is the reform of this structure which is considered in 
this chapter, and specifically the relationship of this reform to the 
competition between the unions for power. 
The reason for examining this restructuring exercise is that, as was 
argued in chapter 7, one of the reasons for establishing a single level 
of pay determination in the national JNC in 1968 was to minimise the 
effects of the competition between the staff associations and NUBE. By 
restricting pay bargaining to the national machinery, domestic 
management was insulated from the effects of this rivalry, and in fact 
NUBE did not obtain institutional (ie domestic) bargaining rights 
under the national constitutions. As such the structure of bargaining 
was one component of the employer response to the special form of 
inter-union rivalry which forms the central theme of this thesis. 
But insofar as it contradicted with the aims of management 
domestically to use pay as an instrument of manpower development, it is 
argued that the original strategy of establishing a single tier of pay 
bargaining proved to be problematic. This was intensified by external 
pressure for productivity bargaining at the domestic level. This 
chapter considers these developments which led to the restructuring 
exercise, and, in examining the outcome - a two-tier bargaining 
process - it looks at how this change was reconciled with the original 
objectives of the banks, when establishing a single-tier bargaining 
model, of minimising wage coopetition and controlling the instability 
of divided representation. 
Although specifically concerned with the way in which the problem of 
inter-union coopetition was managed, nonetheless it is emphasised that 
in reinforcing the salary structure the principal objective of the 
banks was to acquire greater domestic control over salaries. It is 
argued that by jointly negotiating and implementing the reform, the 
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banks did depart from their original strategy of limiting bargaining 
to the principal terms and conditions of employment. In particular the 
new federated negotiating structure represented an amplification of 
NUBE's recognition rights. Crucially however, it did not offer the 
union a means to obtaining control of the staff side, as NUBE hoped it 
would, and it is concluded that the underlying instability of the 
inter-union rivalry was only intensified by the extension of the joint 
working arrangements to the domestic level. 
The chapter is set out in two parts. In the first, the influence of 
incomes policy constraint and particularly pressure to pursue 
productivity bargaining are considered. The difficulties this created 
for the single level of bargaining at the national level are explored, 
it being argued that a pay-productivity linkage was more appropriately 
applied at the company level. 
In the second part of the chapter the restructuring exercise, 
stimulated by Government pay restraint, is considered. The objectives 
of the parties are examined, it being demonstrated that in particular 
there were difficulties arising from the differing intentions of the 
unions as regards the degree of centralisation of bargaining which 
threatened to destabilise negotiations and undermine the reform 
initiative. The process of reform is then considered to see how this 
difficulty was resolved. Finally, the outcome of the restructuring is 
examined and the impact of the changes on the inter-union competition 
are assessed. 
INCOME POLICY AND NATIONAL PAY NEGOTIATIONS  
In this section the objective is to demonstrate how the linkage between 
pay and productivity established by the Government and applied by the 
National Board for Prices and incomes (NBPI) created problems for the 
banking industry and subsequently both complicated and stimulated the 
reform of the clerical salary structure. 
It is argued that because the productivity criteria was properly 
applied at the domestic level it created fundamental problems for the 
banks. Firstly, it contradicted with the national pay coordination, 
seen as necessary to minimise wage competition. Secondly, 
productivity proved to be a difficult concept to apply in the banking 
industry. As a result productivity based changes to pay were 
considered insufficient to match the market rates for staff. In a 
period of high demand this resulted in serious recruiting problems for 
the banks, but due to the close scrutiny of the industry by the 
Government the attempts to bypass the policy were unsuccessful. The 
industry was therefore relatively restricted in its pay settlements. 
It was in this context that the new national machinery was quickly 
placed under strain by pressures for a return to domestic 
negotiations. But a loosening of pay controls and a compromise 
proposal from the NBPI offered the opportunity of reconciling the 
national institutional pay structure with the productivity criterion, 
thereby stimulating the decision to undertake a national salary 
restructuring exercise. This is then considered in the second part of 
the chapter. 
We start by asking why the banks felt unable to accept the premise of 
the Government's pay policy, which increasingly sought to relate 
changes in pay to changes in the level of productivity. 
i. Pay and Productivity: the Banks' View 
The fundamental problem, in the banks' view, of the linkage of pay and 
productivity was that it coincided with a period of high demand for 
labour, which necessitated an adherence to what were seen to be market 
rates for clerical staff as the central determinant of pay change. 
This demand resulted from the corporate growth which each bank was 
pursuing through branch expansion and led to a 22% rise in the total 
numbers employed from 144,775 to 176,875 between 1965 and 1970. (1) 
Apart from the need to recruit new staff, this expansion required a 
high retention of experienced clerical staff, particularly from among 
the female staff who had provided much of the increase in the banks' 
labour force. As the NBPI acknowledged however, this group was not 
expected to pursue a career in management and its pay was therefore 
much more susceptible to 'market rates'. (2) In the tight external 
market then prevailing for clerical staff it was therefore of prime 
importance to the banks to keep clerical salary levels adjusted to 
those of their competitors, and in this context, any sort of pay- 
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productivity linkage was of secondary importance; indeed we noted 
earlier that the banks had already strongly resisted the efforts of the 
staff associations to establish such a relationship from 1960 onwards. 
Yet as several writers have pointed out, through the Labour 
Government's Prices and Incomes Policy (3) and the work of the National 
Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI, and more commonly referred to as 
the Prices and Incomes Board) (4)  productivity became by 1970 the prime 
and almost exclusive determinant of pay. There was therefore the basis 
for a clear clash of policies between the banks, and the Government. 
Tb counter the efforts of the NBPI to make them develop pay structures 
based on changes in their individual levels of productivity, instead 
of comparability with market rates, the banks developed several 
arguments. Firstly, it was pointed out that owing to the lack of a 
tangible product it was extremely difficult to measure output. Indeed 
the definition of productivity offered by the Midland Bank which was 
the subject of the NBPI's first investigation in 1965 related not 
strictly to output, but to, 
"the development of appropriate seces, coupled with the 
receipt of appropriate remuneration."' i 
which not only raised the question of how to measure changes in 
productivity with regard to newer services such as trustee and 
executor work, income tax advice and some of the foreign trade and 
travel facilities, but also the general question of whether the 
changed level of activity was evenly dispersed throughout the various 
grades. 
Secondly, it was by no means certain that the banks accepted the need 
for productivity gains from their staff, through increased effort or 
by shouldering new responsibilities, because they argued that 
technological innovations, and in particular the automation of the 
clearing systems and computerisation of their accounting procedures 
would ensure increased efficiency. The sort of reforms proposed by the 
NBPI in its second Report (No 34) on the banks, which included better 
training for junior clerical staff and supervisors, and the 
introduction of more rigorous techniques for analysing work 
processes in the O&M Departments were therefore not seen to be of 
great importance. They were sceptical about the 12% savings in staff 
which the NBPI suggested could be achieved from strh changes, 
especially as no details on quite how this was to be done were given. (6)  
Related to this, the banks argued that it would be impossible to 
disaggregate any calculation of the effects of technical change upon 
productivity from the effects of increased effort. Coupled with the 
changing nature of the services which they offered, this made 
longitudinal comparisons difficult. This point was accepted by the 
Prices and Incomes Board which, while still trying to quantify change 
by the use of numerous selected indicators, accepted that its 
calculations were not faultless. () Moreover, the banks argued that 
they did not suffer from the sort of labour problems experienced by 
other sectors of industry, such as resistance to technological change 
and restrictive working practices, which were usually seen as the 
cause of low productivity, (8) although in view of the inability to 
measure productivity accurately they could hardly be certain. So, 
both because of measurement difficulties and because productivity was 
thought by management to be rising sufficiently quickly, any 
calculation of pay changes based upon productivity alone was 
considered inappropriate, while the high turnover of staff and the 
inability to recruit and retain a sufficient number of high calibre 
staff to fulfil their future managerial needs were argued to justify 
pay rises above the national norm, which was fixed at around 31% by the 
Prices and Incomes Policy in 1965. 
ii. The Response of the NBPI  
However, the Prices and Incomes Board persistently rejected these 
arguments and pressed for a move away from market rate determination. 
Without concomitant increases in productivity, it argued that pay 
rises were inflationary and, insofar as they led to other employers 
bidding-up for labour in response, ultimately self-defeating. It was 
made clear in 1965 that the banks could expect close scrutiny of their 
settlements "as bank staff form an important group of salaried 
workers" (9) and their agreements could affect the national interest 
(as determined by the objectives of the Prices and Incomes Policy). 
The banks were therefore bound to have to justify their agreements in 
terms of the official productivity criteria and, predictably, they 
were unsuccessful in persuading the NBPI that they should be exempted 
from official policy. The banks were in fact subject to a statutory 
pay freeze for 20 months between 1965-67 as a result, and their pay 
rises were restricted to the national "norm" for nearly four years 
until the middle of 1969. 
Not only was there disagreement over the question of pay 
determination, but the main proposal of the Board to raise efficiency 
in its first two Reports (Nos 6 and 34) was also rejected by the banks. 
This proposal, for a dual-level salary scale, was in keeping with the 
Board's main strategy for raising the efficiency of white collar 
workers through changing the pay structure, as McKersie and Hunter 
have shown. (10) The intention was to establish two separate 
recruitment categories: career and non-career, which, it was thought, 
would enable the banks to meet the need for a growing number of 
clerical workers engaged in routine accounting work, while at the same 
time the management of the future could be trained separately. Indeed 
the Board argued that this arrangement would simply formalise the 
existing division the banks operated, based broadly upon sex, but it 
would save costs as well because the annual increment to pay need not 
be applied to all staff, and salary levels could be tied more closely 
to productivity. (11)  
Now while the management in some banks had acknowledged that the 
existing system was anachronistic, the NBPI's proposal was still 
thought unacceptable. Firstly because it ofered no immediate means to 
circumvent the incomes policy norm and therefore did not resolve the 
pressing short term question of recruiting and retaining staff. More 
fundamentally the reform proposed, or implied, that change should be 
made domestically in order to break away from market or national rates, 
and to tailor the pay structure to each bank's individual needs. Yet 
this revealed the central difficulty of the proposal from the 
viewpoint of the banks: change would simply create a differentiation 
between them in pay levels and increase the competition for labour 
which, by national coordination, they were trying to minimise. 
Thirdly, they were not convinced that the generalist training given to 
all recruits should be abandoned through tiering at the point of entry. 
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iii. Effects on National Machinery 
But insofar as such reform threatened to put in jeopardy the national 
machinery, it also increased the chances of disruption from MBE. The 
banks were therefore caught between pressures to decentralize pay 
bargaining and pressures to sustain the new arrangements, which were 
intensified after the NBPI disallowed the JNC's first agreement in 
1968 and a 31% rise was imposed for the second time in three years. A 
proposal to return to domestic bargaining began to circulate among 
some staff associations which recognised, in the restrictiveness of 
national negotiations, an opportunity to vindicate their domestic 
preferences. With the prospect of another two years of statutory 
control upon their pay levels this also began to appear more attractive 
to some managers, despite the threat to national coordination that was 
implied. Although not all parties supported this move, it was 
generally acknowledged that while the pay-productivity linkage 
continued, the single tier model of pay negotiation fixing actual (as 
opposed to minimum) rates for clerical staff incorporated several 
disadvantages. Firstly, this offered no opportunity for "wage drift" 
through local negotiations, while where multi-level bargaining 
occurred the chances of 'exceptional' increases were raised. (12) The 
arrangements in the national JNC were said to offer only 'one bite at 
the cherry' which was highly visible and easily "policed". (13)  
Secondly, the bank staff appeared to be penalised for, their 
moderation. Because no known restrictive practices were maintained by 
the staff, the accelerating trend of automation and computerisation 
took place with the cooperation (and indeed without extended 
consultation) with the staff bodies. In their Report No 106 it was 
noted that both sides of the JNC had referred to this factor, but the 
Board failed to see this as a justification for the general case for 
exceptional treatment. So in effect, the absence of a need for 
productivity bargaining linking "increases in pay" to "specific 
changes in working methods ,(14) was detrimental to the banks' case 
because the Board implicitly argued that such cooperation should be 
the norm (whether it was or not) and hence it could not accept the 
principle of rewarding it. 
- 
Thirdly, although it was possible to negotiate pay based on measures of 
productivity nationally, this did restrict the banks to an industry 
average, and as the staff associations pointed out, this would 
penalise staff in the more efficient and profitable banks. (15)  Thus 
company level negotiations were, in their view, clearly superior. 
Pressure for reform in order to resolve the problem of continuing pay 
restraint therefore quickly threatened the viability of the newly 
constituted national machinery and might well have led to its demise 
before it was properly established given its apparent disadvantages. 
It was relieved however firstly by the loosening of pay restrictions in 
the latter part of 1969, with the result that, against the wishes of 
the NBPI and the Government, the banks were able to pay the full amount 
of their pay agreement and backdate it to July 1968. Secondly, they 
were able to reconcile the objective of national coordination with 
demands for improved productivity because the NBPI shifted from its 
previous dual level salary structure proposal to the suggestion of an 
industry-wide salary restructuring as the means to enhance 
performance. (16) No specific linkage of future pay rises to changes in 
doemstic productivity were mentioned nor were criteria to measure the 
outcome of reform in terms of output or efficiency, it being assumed 
that this would inevitably bring about the desired change. Moreover, 
unlike the earlier proposals this one indicated that "exceptional" pay 
rises would be permitted when it was implemented, which offered the 
impetus to undertake reform via the national machinery, heading off 
criticism from those members of the JNC which were keener to undertake 
domestic reform. 
It was, then, a shift in the mode of reform proposed by the NBPI to a 
more flexible plan located at the national level which reconciled the 
pay-productivity linkage with the need for national coordination. 
Prior to that, this had threatened to undermine the national machinery 
almost as soon as it had started to operate. The outcome of reform was 
however a significant change in the structure of pay bargaining and the 
scope of joint regulation, as the next section will demonstrate. 
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SALAR( RESTRUCI'URING 
TO recapitulate: the argument in this chapter is that the original 
model of pay bargaining, located exclusively at the national level and 
designed to insulate domestic management from the effects of the 
inter-union rivalry subsequently proved over-restrictive for the 
banks, in part because of the Government's emphasis upon pay and 
productivity focussed upon the company as the appropriate level of 
negotiation. 
The resultant shift to a two-tier bargaining process extending joint 
regulation on pay into the domestic banks was therefore a significant 
modification to the original model. How, in undertaking this reform, 
the banks managed to resolve the differences between the unions over 
the appropriate federal split between national and domestic 
negotiations is one objective of this part of the chapter. Secondly, 
it demonstrates how the banks, while extending the scope of joint 
regulation into "managerial" issues were nonetheless able to sustain 
the insulation of the bargaining process from instability due to 
competitive unionism. It is concluded therefore that the 
restructuring exercise represented an extension of union power, 
particularly for NUBE whose rights had been restricted to the national 
forum. It did not however offer a means to achieving control of the 
staff side, as the union hoped, and therefore did not dissolve the 
fundamental rivalry between the two staff bodies. 
The section is split into three parts. The first deals with the 
objectives of the parties in the reform, which took place through an 
industry-wide job evaluation programme. It is suggested that there 
were two fundamental and related problems. 
Firstly, the constitutional difficulty for the banks associated with 
instituting change with the consent of the staff side while protecting 
their managerial prerogative and the dangers of being taken to 
arbitration. Secondly, this was exacerbated by the difference in the 
objectives of the staff bodies as regards the desired scope of the 
national bargaining unit which seriously threatened to disrupt reform. 
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In studying the process of reform in the second section the intention 
is to demonstrate how these problems were overcome by an unprecedented 
suspension of the established procedure. 
The third section then considers the outcome of change in terms of the 
rivalry between the staff side. It demonstrates how the function of 
the unions was significantly extended beyond that designated in the 
1968 constitutions into areas previously controlled unilaterally by 
management. Yet this did not offer a means of dissolving fundamental 
differences between the unions, and the tensions underlying the 
superficial stability of joint working therefore persisted. 
THE BANKS' OBJECTIVES AND THE NBPI PROPOSALS 
Looking first at the employers' objectives in fixing clerical pay, it 
can be argued that while they were consistently concerned to recruit 
and retain adequate numbers of clerical workers for current manning 
needs and future management development there was also a discernible 
development in their views on the appropriate process of pay 
formulation, and structure of salaries. During the 1960's it had 
become apparent that the age-based progression was inappropriate, 
being too rigid to cope with the high demand for labour in the tight 
market conditions, and unsuitable in view of the organisational 
changes stemming from computerisation. It was also expensive because 
shifts in one part of the scale to accommodate the external market 
necessitated concomitant movements in the rest of the scale. By 
introducing merit schemes and a degree of streaming the banks modified 
the system marginally, but remained committed to the existing 
structure principally because it was a means of sustaining 
coordination. The decision to do no more than tinker with this system 
was also influenced by the disinclination to be drawn into the reforms 
proposed initially by the NBPI, and because the banks were 
consistently trying to fight the strictures of incomes policy and 
staying aligned with market rates, rather than develop domestically 
based two-tier structures. 
A further point which influenced the decision to sustain the national 
coordination of pay was the competitiveness of the staff bodies. As 
was argued above, a major reason for introducing national machinery 
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had been to minimise the effects of this rivalry, which had already 
engendered more aggressive bargaining strategies among the 
associations from 1960 onwards. Domestic negotiations could only 
encourage greater competitiveness; hence the single tier of pay 
negotiation established by the 1968 constitutions governing national 
machinery. 
However this quickly proved too restrictive for the banks, which by 
1969 were looking more favourably at a two-tier bargaining process. 
Not only was this to avoid the productivity bargaining difficulties 
considered above, but also to allow a clearer streaming of staff. (16) 
The intention was to develop a pay structure which was more sensitive 
to the market rate by relating pay to the task performed rather than 
age, whilst allowing career staff who showed responsibility and 
intiative to be rewarded through promotion to higher grades with more 
pay. The structure would therefore permit a more systematic 
development of management potential than the existing merit awards, 
but still sustain national coordination at least on recruitment rates 
through the use of an industry-wide job evaluation programme. While 
not abandoning the common basis to their pay structure, the banks were 
nonetheless intent upon establishing greater domestic discretion (and 
thus, potentially, variety) to use pay as a component of manpower 
development policies. 
An industry-wide programme of reform also squared with the propbsals 
of the NBPI in its third report on the banks (No 106) published in 
1969. This was an unusual step for the Board to take, not usually 
being in favour of centrally developed reforms, and preferring to 
limit national agreements to a "framework" making role of encouraging 
and establishing the guidelines for change, while the main thrust of 
change was based at coupany or establishment level, as Liddle and 
McCarthy noted. (17) However the special conditions in banking - its 
high degree of concentration and homogeneity in organisation - were 
seen to merit the exception. (18) Furthermore, the Board was keen to 
overcome the previous resistance to any reform by encouraging change 
through the new national institutions, and by offering the incentive 
of an above-norm pay increase. 
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Given the four years of pay restriction in which the banks had 
reluctantly acquiesced this proposal was highly attractive. And in 
wishing to create a clearer distinction between career and non-career 
staff, and to reward responsibility more systematically there were 
clearly affinities with the NBPI's earlier proposals. However the 
revised ideas of the Board contained crucial changes: firstly, they 
allowed the banks to retain a core industry-wide pay structure to 
minimise the competition for labour. Secondly, the generalist 
training system could be retained, and no formal distinction between 
career and non-career staff had to be developed at the point of entry. 
Hence thirdly, the banks did not have to establish a formal division of 
labour based upon sex which was implied in the NBPI's earlier 
proposals. 
While offering the advantage of an "above ceiling" pay increase and 
being sufficiently close to the banks own objectives, the Board's 
proposals for a national negotiated reform did present certain 
constitutional problems. Most importantly from the perspective of 
managing the reform, it was pointed out in the Federation that job 
evaulation was not a nationally negotiable issue but a matter for 
domestic prerogative. (19)  Were it to be considered by the national 
JNC, there was the risk that the matter would be deemed arbitral and 
therefore possibly removed from the control of the banks to an external 
body. On the other hand, as an issue of concern to all staff it was 
seen to be inappropriate to impose reform unilaterally at either 
level. So, having decided under the influence of the Board to 
undertake reform nationally, the banks then had to place certain 
provisos over the extent of the negotiability of restructuring, and in 
effect to have the procedure suspended. Arguing that as a matter of 
operational management it would be inappropriate to determine the 
design of the evaluation programme jointly, and that in return for 
agreement from the staff side that discussions would be free from 
procedural constraints, the banks agreed to continue to negotiate on 
pay separately and to make an interim award. (20)  Fortuitously, by this 
point the incomes policy had effectively collapsed. 
Tb sum up the objectives of the banks, they were concerned to establish 
greater domestic discretion over the pay structure, while retaining a 
core of national coordination. The question of inter-union 
competition, while significant in terms of the negotiation of change 
was incidental to this main objective. However there was a risk of 
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disruption due to the differences in the objectives of the staff 
bodies, and this was highlighted by the timing of the proposed 
restructuring. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STAFF BODIES 
Secondly, therefore the differences in the objectives of the staff 
bodies had to be resolved. These were highlighted by the fact that the 
formal revision of the national constitutions was due in 1970 and the 
new salary system was seen as an opportunity to change the scope of the 
national bargaining unit by the CBSA. Having been (in the view of the 
associations) coerced into the existing arrangements by NUBE's strike 
action the associations saw their continuing membership superiority as 
evidence that a majority of staff supported greater domestic 
bargaining, and while the motion from the BSC proposing salary reform 
was made "in view of the NBPI's recommendations" (21)  it was a 
considerable dilution of the Board's ideas. Framed from the 
standpoint of the staff associations which dominated the national 
joint staff council, it proposed that the main locus of any decision 
making on this matter should be the individual banks. Hence the JNC 
resolution simply called for a shortening of the existing age scale to 
25 years (from 31) and all other salaries becoming domestically 
negotiable. The dominance of the CBSA was further illustrated by 
resistance to a Federation proposal that the whole issue of reform be 
thrown open to discussion on the grounds that restructuring was 
without the national constitution, being distinct from the matter of 
pay levels. 
NUBE however made it clear that it would oppose a domestic based reform 
or changes to the existing scope of national bargaining. Having long 
argued that pay was determined collectively by the banks, it saw 
domestic pay bargaining as spurious and simply an excuse for 
"internalism" to re-emerge as a block to real representation. It had 
also not achieved full domestic recognition in all of the banks and 
therefore stood to lose a degree of control over the determination of 
pay which would also redound detrimentally on its appeal to potential 
members. In contrast the associations still retained their pre-1968 
domestic rights. This inter-union conflict threatened to disrupt the 
negotiation of change and to collapse the procedural framework if it 
was not resolved by July 1970. 
Again however, by the offer of pay awards independent of the 
restructuring exercise, the banks managed to persuade the staff side 
that the constitutional question be dealt with separately from the job 
evaluation programme. Significantly, it was also agreed that the 
design of the job evaluation would be developed by the Federation and 
then put to the BSC for ratification, so that the whole argument about 
the scope of bargaining was initially at least to be dealt with by the 
banks alone, and prior to the revision of the constitution. As will be 
demonstrated however, in practice the two issues were intertwined. 
Tb summarize: the objectives of the parties vis-a-vis restructuring 
have been considered. It was shown that the impetus of the NBPI 
strongly influenced the timing of the banks' decision to introduce a 
restructuring exercise, and to undertake it through "negotiations" in 
the JNC. Tb protect managerial prerogative and remove the possibility 
of an arbitration, the procedure was suspended under the initiative of 
the banks. Secondly, to overcome the inter-union differences which 
threatened to disrupt the reform, the banks managed to obtain 
agreement that they could determine the design of the job evaluation 
exercise, limiting the role of the staff side in the process of reform. 
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE  
Having agreed to an unprecedented suspension of the formal procedure 
to negotiate restructuring, this section examines how the parties came 
to terms with negotiation without arbitration. It illustrates the 
limitations on the degree of joint determination arguing that,despite 
their competitiveness, both staff bodies mutually agreed to adopt a 
full negotiating role only over the questions of new salary figures in 
the final stages of the reform. It also examines the banks' reasons 
for shifting from a decentralized to a more centralized job evaluation 
scheme, explaining this in terms of a desire to ensure the continuation 
of stability in the bargaining process. 
In the Federation's Working Party formed to develop the design of the 
national job evaluation scheme (see diagram 9.1, stage 4) there were 
considerable disagreements between the banks as to the intended scope 
of national bargaining, reflecting the differences in domestic 
orientation between them. National Westminster was the most strongly 
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in favour of decentralizing the bargaining structure, and proposed 
that the junior grades, one and two, be negotiated nationally, and the 
more senior grades domestically. It also envisaged only the minimum 
points of each grade being fixed nationally, grade progression and 
maxima being domestic items. (22)  Barclays in contrast was the most 
committed to a centralized structure with the other two large banks 
somewhere between them. The other small banks, which were in the 
process of amalgamating into Williams and Glyn's were not so 
influential, but preferred a centralized scheme in order to restrict 
the possibilities of domestic competition. There was a broad 
agreement to keep the appointed and managerial staff out of national 
machinery however, because of the greater variety of responsibilities 
they carried. Moreover specialist staff in areas such as computer and 
data processing were thought to have such market power that they 
necessitated domestic pay negotiation to provide sufficient 
flexibility for managements. 
i. The July Proposals 
Technically, the central question confronting the banks in the 
proposed national framework for reform was whether despite the high 
degree of organisational similarity between them, the centrifugal 
tendencies inherent in differing operational priorities could be 
rendered compatible with the centripetal demands of a national job 
evaluation programme. The solution involved other factors besides 
these technical ones however. 
In fact several options were technically possible, as the contrast 
between the July and September 1970 proposals showed. In July 1970 the 
first proposals of the Federation were put to the JNC (Stage 5). These 
included the principle of a restructuring programme through job 
evaluation; adoption of a Points Rating system as the method, the use 
of four or five grades with an age scale incorporated into the most 
junior grade (1); the determination of minimum and the maximum salary 
for a satisfactory performer in each grade; and the proposal to 
establish two or three "bench-mark" jobs to each grade. All of these 
ideas were generated unilaterally. Joint decision making was to 
confirm the factors to be used in the four nationally determined 
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grades, the allocation of points to each of these factors and the 
grading of the "bench-mark" jobs, but again on the basis of proposals 
and information put forward by the Federation Working Party. 
Negotiation would however fix the minimum and minimunVkaximum 
salary (23) of each grade. 
Considerable discretion was to be left to domestic decisions however. 
Each bank would evaluate and agree the grading of all jobs beside the 
"bench-marks" domestically; no bank was bound by the Points Rating 
scheme, although any domestic disagreements would be settled by 
reference to the national scheme; more than four or five grades could 
be established domestically; and both the progression through the 
grades as well as a domestic maximum which was in excess of the 
national figure could be established for each grade, and in order to 
reward above-satisfactory performance. It was therefore a relatively 
decentralized scheme which was envisaged by the banks at this time. 
ii. The September Proposal  
Following an initiative by Barclays Bank however, subsequent 
discussion in the Federation Council led to a more centralized scheme 
being put to the JNC in September 1970 (Stages 7 and 8). The crucial  
difference was that the points-rating scheme established at national 
level was to be used in the domestic schemes as well, thus ensuring a 
close coordination of pay structures from the centre. As a trade-off 
to those banks which were concerned to preserve domestic autonomy, 
only four grades were to be fixed nationally, and additional domestic 
grades could be established if any bank so desired. Also there was to 
be only one bench-mark job per grade: to create more than that number 
had proved difficult due to the lack of jobs with identical or closely 
similar task contents between the banks. Indeed it proved difficult to 
establish a single bench-mark job for grade four at this stage. 
It was largely the Barclays model of reform which was finally put 
forward. Although there were several important lines of continuity 
between the two proposals, and considerable effort was made to ensure 
substantially domestic autonomy, there was a fundamental change 
between July and September. As NUBE argued, the July proposals had 
laid down only very loose guidelines for institutional 
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arrangements, (24) and it is significant that whilst the associations 
had supported those strongly, they had been distinctly less happy 
about the September arrangements which were more centralized. (25) 
iii. The Shift in Strategic Objectives  
This change of plan during the summer of 1970 was apparently based not 
so much on technical considerations but evolved from a debate upon the 
most desirable scope for national bargaining in terms of the strategic 
objectives of the employers. Design questions were ultimately 
determined by the preferred distribution of power in the federal 
relationship, and the locus of pay decisions, which in turn was 
conditioned by the question of inter-union competition. 
Those banks which preferred a high degree domestic prerogative in wage 
fixing favoured the maximum autonomy in the selection and 
implementation of the job evaluation programme at the institutional 
level. The primary objective here was to retain the greatest 
discretion with regard to the development of a cadre of career staff, 
by separating the determination of senior clerical rates from those of 
the junior ranks, and attaching them instead to the 
managerial/appointed staff bargaining unit. Associated with this 
objective was the need to all domestic management to reward 
responsibility or initiative by not having a national grade maximum 
point and by permitting overlaps between the grades. 
The strategic alternative to this was based upon the priority of 
minimising the threat of leapfrogging by reducing the area of domestic 
pay bargaining. More indirectly this derived from a greater concern to 
counter the possibility of industrial action or disruption to business 
activity than the other mode incorporated, because the logic of this 
strategy involved avoiding a single bank being "picked-off" in 
isolation. As such it represented a continuation of the thinking which 
had predominated among management since the inception of national 
machinery and in consequence of NUBE's successful strike action. 
Adoption of this mode required the maximum national control over pay 
and the widest degree of conformity on grades and pay parameters (ie 
the minima and minima/maxima) within each of these grades. 
r 
iv. The Influence of Inter -Union Competition  
TO an extent the proposal actually agreed in the JNC was a compromise 
between the strategic alternatives, but the banks' final decision to 
shift to a more centralized model of negotiation was influenced very 
strongly by the threat of a crisis deriving from the differences 
between the staff bodies over the constitutional revision. Were the 
most pro-domestic associations, the Midland and the National 
Westminster, to secede in protest at the way in which their initial 
proposals for a domestic job evaluation exercise and a shift to 
instutitional bargaining were ignored, it was assumed that NUBE would 
obtain control of the national BSC. From this the Federation concluded 
that a more centralized national restructuring exercise than the July 
model first put to the JNC would be valuable, both to avoid any risk of 
the associations causing a fragmentation of the national machinery, 
and to reinforce the mutual protection which employer cooperation 
offered in the event of the more aggressive NUBE (as it was assumed) 
taking control. (26)  So the actual outcome of the question of balance 
between domestic discretion and national coordination was strongly 
conditioned by the coincidence of constitutional reform with 
restructuring, and what the banks predicted the outcome of the inter-
union rivalry would be. 
Yet while the objectives of the staff side were clearly differentiated 
over the future scope of national bargaining, the staff bodies were 
effectively excluded from determining the outcome of this point, 
because both sides were prepared to accept a limited role in the 
decision making over the design of the job evaluation exercise. In 
looking at the process of formulating the restructuring programme at 
the national level we emphasised that the BSC voluntarily adopted a 
ratifying role, akin to a consultative function, because it was 
accepted that the operational requirements of the banks, which were 
not amenable to negotiation, were meant to be the criteria on which 
design decisions were based. But it was from the decisions on the 
design of the evaluation programme, which we have suggested were 
influenced by the question of inter-union rivalry as well as 
operational matters, that the scope of the national bargaining was 
defined. 
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v. The Return to Full Negotiation 
Until the September proposals were agreed, joint decision making had 
effectively involved the ratification of the proposals emanating from 
the employers' Wbrking Party. The procedure was voluntarily 
suspended. However a discrete negotiating phase then commenced on the 
salary figures to be attached to each grade. The BSC immediately made 
it clear that the recourse to arbitration was now possible and the 
procedure was again operating. Indeed, it rejected a proposal from the 
Federation for dual level bargaining on maxima figures for fear of 
fudging the arbitrality of the issue. Agreement was actually reached 
voluntarily in January 1971 after several rounds of negotiation and 
informal suspensions of the procedure. Nevertheless, it was made 
clear that the formal period of suspension was finished. 
To conclude this section, two points must be noted. Firstly, the 
institutional competitiveness of the unions had threatened to disrupt 
the process of restructuring over the specific issue of the scope of 
the national bargaining unit. Additionally, it had critically 
influenced the banks thinking on the actual design of a job evaluation 
scheme and prompted the more centralized model being instituted in 
order to secure the priority of peace and employer solidarity, at the 
expense of domestic discretion over pay. Secondly however, the 
agreement of both staff bodies to limit their bargaining role 
voluntarily had been crucial. It had enabled the procedure to be 
suspended, and the employers to establish the parameters of the 
restructuring programme and to formulate the actual planning and 
design stages unilaterally. Despite their institutional 
competitiveness, both unions had respected the prerogative of 
management with respect to operational decisions and both had accepted 
a ratifying, quasi-consultative role over non-pay issues. On the pay 
questions of the restructuring they had immediately reasserted their 
negotiating role. In effect the mutual acceptance that negotiation 
was properly limited to terms and conditions of employment, as was 
implied in the 1968 constitutions, mediated the competition for 
dominance between them. 
Because of this factor, the banks were able to determine the 
constitutional reform question unilaterally as well. 	The job 
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evaluation proposals fixed the national bargaining unit as covering 
all clerical grades and continued to include the minimum managerial 
point. 
Although the CBSA was distinctly unhappy with the outcome (and no 
formal redrawing of the constitutions took place) they were typically 
flexible in opting to cooperate in the new arrangements, and to retain 
control of the BSC. Yet NUBE faced the paradox that while the more 
centralized structure which it favoured was finally instituted, this 
did not bring it closer to control of the national staff council. 
Indeed, if a narrower national scope had been established at this 
juncture it is arguable that it would have forsaken joint negotiations 
before 1977, given that the continuing minority position was causing 
dissatisfaction even by 1971. But an important reason behind the 
decision to continue with the existing arrangements must have been the 
extension of its rights at the domestic level, to which the discussion 
now turns, because through this breakthrough NUBE saw the means of 
coming to terms with the associations in an area where the latter had 
always claimed their superiority lay as representative bodies. 
DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF JOB EVALUATION AND RECOGNITION OF NUBE 
Although NUBE had not gained domestic recognition from the national 
constitutions, it had initially regarded this as of minor importance, 
given their exclusive preference for industry wide regulation. And 
under the national arrangements there was no necessity to create a 
linkage between the two levels in order to facilitate the usual 
supplementation of national rates, these being standard not minima. 
However, domestic recognition followed in 1969 and 1970 in the four 
major clearing banks. Joint staff sides were formed to mirror the 
national arrangements, except in the Midland Bank where staff 
association hostility necessitated separate but identical bargaining 
arrangements. Arguably this was a significant development for the 
union having confronted fifty years of domestic resistance to 
recognition, because constitutionally at least the union was for the 
first time on equal terms with the staff associations. It had broken 
through the barrier of the CLCB doctrine (as propounded by 
Sir Oliver Franks) which had confirmed the banks' desire to avoid 
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multiple recognition arrangements and their insistence that the union 
should be restricted to what were termed representational rights given 
the established domestic relationships enjoyed between the staff 
associations and domestic managements. The change of policy therefore 
conferred an unprecedented legitimacy upon NUBE which the union 
believed was a crucial development in terms of achieving the 
membership growth necessary to obtain control of the staff side. 
Henceforth it was believed that the competition for members would be on 
equal grounds given that if offered an equivalent range of services to 
that of its rivals, and was no longer tarred with a reputation of 
employer hostility. 
For the banks these domestic arrangements also represented a 
significant departure from their previous strategy, when constructing 
national machinery. Then they had attempted to keep a clear line 
between the joint determination of pay and conditions of employment 
and the retention of unilateral control over non-pay areas such as 
manpower development and work allocation. 
When dealing with the job evaluation exercise at domestic level this 
distinction was sustained inasmuch as the individual variations in 
domestic grading systems were a product of unilateral management 
planning. However in opting to administer the grading systems in 
cooperation with the staff bodies the traditional boundary of joint 
regulation was broken down, as this exercise required decisions about 
the placing of staff into a new organisational hierarchy and 
allocating a value to each clerical job from which grading and salary 
levels could be derived. Furthermore, the application of the scheme 
was typically conducted through several phases, all of which were 
managed by jointly convened institutions. Joint Grading Committees 
applied the factors and points of the national agreement to jobs in the 
banks. Re-evaluation and Review Panels examined immediate problems 
and longer term changes arise from modifications to job content or the 
development of new jobs, and Joint Appeals Committees dealt with 
grievances and other problems. 
So, in endorsing the scheme and becoming involved in jointly 
administering the objectives, the union was drawn into what Flanders 
saw as the managerial function of unions, (27) the hall-mark of a mature 
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bargaining relationship. This was more than a temporary development 
as well, because grievances and appeals were constantly being thrown 
up. Subsequent technological and product developments have brought 
about new tasks and alterations in the division of labour 
necessitating reviews of the grading structure by joint committees, 
and the decision of the banks to start job evaluation programmes at 
domestic level for managers and appointed grades soon after the 
completion of the clerical scheme, have also necessitated joint 
administration. Additionally at the direction of the 1972 arbitration 
tribunal, the national JNC established a Joint Wbrking Party to review 
the working of the whole scheme. This required an extension of the 
staff side role from that intended by the constitution and a novel 
institutional development designed formally to widen the scope of 
joint decision making. 
The "penetration into management „(28)  involved in this joint 
administration of decision making marked a substantial change from the 
position of the union only two years earlier when domestic recognition 
had been denied. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the same 
sort of controls Ton the union were applied domestically as existed in 
the national arena, it being constrained by compulsory arbitration and 
the joint staff side which the associations dominated. Except in the 
Midland where the weak association soon collapsed, institutional 
negotiations presented to NUBE the same problem of being unable to 
break out of the joint staff side and demonstrate its purportedly 
greater effectiveness as it was experiencing nationally. 
Organisationally as well, its response to domestic recognition was 
somewhat equivocal, it being reluctant to discard its old national 
level emphasis. For instance, as the CIR pointed out in its survey of 
Williams & Glyn's, (29) the union was ill-equipped to deal with its 
representative role at the local level. Its policy of relying upon 
fulltime officals (lay officials being traditionally associated with 
internalism) meant that it was unable to cope with individual 
grievances as well as the associations, whose local organisation was 
generally superior. This problem only began to be resolved in the late 
1970's in the Big Four banks with the introduction of seconded 
officials and office representatives. Secondly, the geographical 
branch structure of the union also contradicted with the development 
of a strong institutional organisation structure. While NUBE did 
begin to develop institutional branches, it was loathe to extend these 
within the clerical branches of the individual banks. (30) It did not 
therefore commit itself wholeheartedly to a sophisticated domestic 
structure, in part at least for fear of moving boo close to the 
position of its rivals, and this probably limited its ability to take 
full advantage of domestic recognition in terms of membership gains. 
So whilst domestic recognition was a compromise for the banks insofar 
as it represented an extension of joint regulation into managerial 
prerogative, crucially, the instability of divided representation was 
neutralized as effectively as at the national level. This did not 
therefore mark a new route to dominance for the union. 
CONCLUSIONS  
In this discussion we have considered the impact of the process and 
consequences of the salary restructuring exercise upon pay bargaining 
arrangements constructed in 1968 and in terms of the division of 
representation. 
The analysis first demonstrated the influence of the NBPI upon the 
process of salary reform, showing how the pay productivity linkage 
emphasised by that body created difficulties for the industry-wide pay 
structure. Additionally, the problems of quantifying intangible 
productivity appeared to work against the banking industry. By the 
time the national JNC began to operate, the industry had been subject 
to several years of pay restraint, and this placed a strain on the 
viability of national bargaining because it offered no opportunity for 
wage drift. 
The NBPI's proposals for pay reform were examined, and it was argued 
that it was only with a shift to a more flexible approach, based on a 
national job evaluation programme and with the opportunity for an 
above "norm" increase that the banks were able to reconcile this with 
their own objectives. These were to retain a degree of national 
coordination over pay in order to minimise the competition to recruit 
and retain staff by paying market rates (which were not necessarily 
related to productivity measures) while developing greater domestic 
discretion than was possible under the simple tier model in order to 
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reward and encourage future managerial staff. Responsibility and 
initiative were therefore to be allocated a premium, although specific 
measures of productivity were not directly related to pay. This 
required the shift to a two-tier pay structure. 
The important point here demonstrated is that the banks' objectives 
were not solely or even principally concerned with the structure of 
representation. But this was a factor which impinged upon the mode of 
reform, particularly because the restructuring coincided with a 
revision of the constitutions over which there was a definite split 
between the staff bodies which threatened to disrupt the JNC. Because 
of the willingness of the staff bodies voluntarily to limit their role 
in the process of reform to a consultative one, the banks effectively 
determined the outcome of this disagreement by opting for a 
centralized restructuring programme. While unhappy with this, the 
associations did not leave the national machinery and were prepared to 
work with the new model, in keeping with their strongly pragmatic 
approach. NUBE was therefore unable to take advantage of the 
associations' objections. 
In the process of applying the restructuring programme it was argued 
that there was a notable extension of the area of joint regulation into 
governmental and managerial functions, what Flanders called a 
"penetration into management". This was not simply a temporary change 
either, but had permanent institutional repercussions. In effect this 
represented a substantial compromise by the banks to their original 
plan to restrict bilateral authority to the major terms and conditions 
of employment. It was in particular a notable advance for the union in 
its depth of recognition, although its response to a domestic role was 
initially somewhat ambivalent. Nevertheless through the erection of 
similar constitutional safeguards domestically as well as nationally, 
the banks again managed to neutralize the effects of competition 
between the staff bodies, and in that sense this extension of 
recognition did not represent the means by which NUBE obtained control 
of the staff side, but rather a further frustration of its goal. 
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THE EFIFECI'S OF' THE ARBITRATION FACILITY UPON THE 
CFSRATICN OF NATIONAL BAN2AINDU  
DuRcxxicnow 
A central element of the employers' response to the instability of 
institutional competition between NUBE and the staff associations, the 
key concern of this work, was the incorporation of the unilateral and 
compulsory arbitration facility into the national procedure. This 
chapter examines how this facility influenced the process and outcome 
of negotiations; it considers how it affected the rivalry for control 
of the staff side; and it considers what the achievements and costs of 
this were to the banks. 
To do this, the chapter is broadly divided into three sections. In the 
first section the background to the establishment of the national 
procedure is reconsidered, to explain why arbitration was first 
introduced into domestic negotiations. It is argued that it was not 
the intention of the parties to develop a substitute for collective 
bargaining as arbitration is usually construed, but given the special 
character of the associations and their cooperative relationship with 
the banks, arbitration was designed to ensure meaningful negotiation 
could take place without conflict resulting in the event of 
disagreement. This sort of reasoning also became the framework of the 
national machinery, NUBE preferring arbitration in the belief that its 
moderate membership would only countenance the use of industrial 
action very exceptionally. 
Yet in examining the procedure which was adopted in 1968 it is 
concluded that negotiation was likely to be restricted, and that the 
competition between the unions made it likely they would attempt to 
exploit arbitration to demonstrate their effectiveness. So while 
operating as a guarantee of peaceful outcome to negotiation, as the 
banks principally intended arbitration to do, it created the risk that 
bargaining might simply be manipulated and would not develop properly. 
In looking at the pattern of arbitration over the lifetime of the 
national machinery this appears to have been the case initially. Fbr 
several reasons which are considered below this did not continue 
however and arbitration became essentially a "last resort" mechanism. 
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The second section of the chapter then focusses upon the process of 
arbitration. In demonstrating how this was linked to the process of 
bargaining in the JNC which preceded it, the intention is to 
demonstrate why third party rule-making was not considered inherently 
problematic by the bargaining bodies. It also explains the tendency 
for arbitrated decisions to try and generate a compromise outcome 
which "split the difference" between the two sides wherever possible, 
as a means of satisfactory conflict resolution. 
The implications of this sort of outcome are then considered. In 
particular it is argued that arbitrated decisions could set precedents 
which extended beyond the specific issue in question. This 
restrictive effect on future negotiations began to be increasingly 
burdensome to the banks, and it is this as well as the growing concern 
with the cost implications of delegating control to third parties 
which prompted them subsequently to move away from unilateral 
arbitration. 
It is concluded that this facility did have a significant impact upon 
the outcome of the inter-union competition, principally by equalising 
the bargaining power of the associations and the union. Thus, NUBE's 
strategy of achieving control through demonstrating its claimed 
superior effectiveness was thereby neutralized. 
REASONS FOR INTRODUCING ARBITRATION 
It was shown in chapter two that arbitration, when originally 
introduced domestically in the 1950's, was designed to ensure that 
bargaining between the banks and their associations could be conducted 
in a meaningful manner. The domestic agreements were intended to avoid 
the threat of external direction by the Industrial Disputes Tribunals 
(IDT) set up by the Government's Order 1376, and mirrored the official 
reliance upon arbitration to settle disputes in the event of a failure 
through negotiations. At the same time this move sealed off NUBE's 
hopes of using statutory machinery to obtain recognition and secondly 
it created a means of reconciling the disinclination of the 
associations to use sanctions with the appearance of meaningful 
negotiation. In the event of a failure to agree, either side could 
appeal to a third party for adjudication. Such a scheme thus 
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underpinned the continuing notion of an identity of interests between 
staff and employers while ostensibly guaranteeing that negotiations 
took place in a "fair" and orderly manner. Arbitration was therefore 
intended to enhance rather than present an alternative to collective 
bargaining. 
In establishing national machinery the banks were prepared to continue 
this system despite the fact that "leapfrogging" had occurred in the 
early 1960's via a sequence of arbitrations in which the arguments over 
pay determination put forward by the employers had been rejected and 
higher settlements had resulted. Because arbitration continued to 
guarantee their effectiveness and to obviate the need to employ 
orthodox union sanctions, the associations were also in favour. This 
meant that they could retain their claim to be distinctive from trade 
unions and "negotiate" (as opposed to bargain) (1)  in a manner 
consistent with their internalist principles by emphasising the need 
for compromise rather than the threat of conflict. But despite the 
fact that unilateral arbitration therefore underpinned the continuing 
viability of the associations, NUBE was also keen to establish it 
nationally. This was in one sense a residue of the long period of 
employer hostility: it saw arbitration as the guarantee that its 
recognition would be equal to that of its rivals. It also resolved the 
union's perceived problem that it could not consistently rely upon its 
membership to respond to a call for industrial action to back its 
claims, given the moderate disposition of the majority, and their 
apparent preference for arbitration. (2)  
The banks were willing to extend arbitration rights to the national 
level principally because they saw this as a means of guaranteeing 
stability in the bargaining process. It would also be a means of 
ensuring that the inter-union competition did not result in NUBE 
demonstrating its effectiveness through an escalation of demands 
backed by action, and would therefore act as a peace-keeping 
mechanism, even if this meant that third party adjudication reduced 
the employers' discretion over bargaining outcomes. 
So in intention at least, the system was not designed to preclude 
bargaining but to ensure that it did operate, albeit within certain 
constraints. This was still a contrast to the usual interpretation of 
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arbitration as an alternative to bargaining which was posited by the 
Webbs and others. (3) Indeed, to the Webbs compulsory arbitration was 
tantamount to legal enactment and thus not only a different method of 
regulation to collective bargaining, but also incompatible with the 
conflicts of interest between workers and employer inherent in 
existing modes of production. (4) McCarthy and Ellis (5) also pointed 
out that in the voluntarist tradition there is an assumption that the 
opportunity to recourse to arbitration will undermine the quality of 
bargaining, there being no obligation to reach a negotiated 
settlement. 	But this directly contradicted the views of the 
associations and NUBE. 	They saw it as a factor which ensured 
"realistic" negotiations given their perceived handicap of a moderate 
membership, rather than impeding them. 
In theory however NUBE did retain certain advantages compared to the 
associations and for example to the union in another moderate industry 
- footwear manufacture - where arbitration also operated. In footwear 
manufacture the union was seen by Goodman et al (6) to be reliant upon 
arbitration as a means of guaranteeing a national minimum wage for its 
members, and therefore as the means of ensuring a degree of bargaining 
power. But that industry was characterised by intense product market 
competition, which could generate pressure to cut wages locally in 
order to obtain a sectional advantage. That sort of pressure did not 
confrom the banking unions however, the product market competition 
being limited and the employers operating effectively as a cartel. 
Furthermore, as nationally spread organisations they were opposed to 
local variations in basic pay and in much of the post-war period their 
expansion ensured a high demand for clerical labour. These variations 
in the product and labour market conditions established a crucial 
difference in the position of the unions. Whereas the quid pro quo for 
national recognition in the footwear industry was a no-strike 
agreement by the union, NUBE did not have to accept such a limitation 
to enforce a national rate. Indeed having been able to achieve 
recognition by a display of strength NUBE insisted on sustaining its 
right to strike as a means of demonstrating its distinctiveness from 
internalism. Moreover because of their reliance upon the industry as 
its sole organising base and because of its dependence upon 
arbitration for the minimal bargaining power, the boot and shoe union 
was effectively in a similar position to the associations. NUBE in 
contrast was not wholly tied to the London clearers. Nevertheless in 
practice it opted to forego the non-reliance upon arbitration and thus 
effectively redeemed its ability to apply sanctions. Seeing itself, 
like the footwear union, as dependent upon arbitration for power in all 
but the most exceptional circumstances, it elected to operate like the 
staff associations, and as will be argued below this was to have a 
significant impact upon the outcome of the inter-union competition. 
THE NATIONAL PROCEDURE 
Having argued that in intention at least, the unilateral and 
compulsory arbitration facility was not meant to preclude negotiation, 
we now consider whether this was possible in practice. Or did the 
recourse to arbitration impede bargaining, and if so was this due in 
any way to the inter-union rivalry? TO answer this the procedural 
arrangements are examined, and then the actual use of arbitration in 
the national machinery is considered. 
It may be argued that in several ways the procedural arrangements were 
not designed to encourage the full development of negotiations, there 
being certain important constraints. Firstly for instance, the 
procedure was tightly defined; it permitted two failures to agree to be 
registered on any resolution prior to the matter being referred to 
arbitration upon request from either side, but because these stages 
were intended to coincide with consecutive meetings of the ,INC, (7) it 
made the procedure very rigid. So, while ensuring a relatively rapid 
processing of items, it offered little opportunity for negotiation to 
develop fully and for the issues, particularly in a complex matter such 
as salary restructuring, to be examined fully. Arbitration was 
designed not as a final resort to be used when bargaining had clearly 
failed, but as a means of resolving issues before they reached that 
stage, and discussion had been exhausted in the view of all of the 
parties. 
Secondly, the absence of a category of consultative items also tended 
to restrict the range of discussions very tightly. The removal of this 
category, after NUBE's strike action, meant that in practice any issue 
introduced for discussion was de facto arbitral and that this status, 
once affirmed, was permanent as the hours of work/hours of business 
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arbitration confirmed in 1969 (see table 10.1 at end of the chapter). 
Unless the banks restricted discussions to constitutional boundaries 
this represented a relatively easy way for the staff side to extend the 
area of joint regulation. But it presented problems in handling the 
discussion of items such as Bank Holidays and salary restructuring 
which, while in the narrowest sense management issues, could plausibly 
be seen as bordering upon negotiability. Like the hours issue, they 
were items upon which the banks wished to consult, while retaining 
their prerogative, but this proved extremely difficult. 
Thirdly, recourse to arbitration potentially offered a relatively easy 
method of demonstrating achievement for the staff side, and hence 
effectiveness. If gains could be made simply by putting a strong case 
to a tribunal, the lack of bargaining power was unimportant, and 
because of the inter-union rivalry, the need to demonstrate 
effectiveness was in this instance crucial. Hypothetically at least, 
this heightened the probability that there would be an inclination to 
exploit the procedures and avoid compromise which McCarthy noted as a 
central problem of any system of legally binding arbitration. (8)  In 
other words, any modification of a bargaining position would be 
resisted because it would be seen as a sign of weakness by the 
arbitrator, and in this instance be likely to be criticised by the 
rival union as well with the risk of adverse effects upon membership. 
So there seemed to be every likelihood that bargaining would be 
inhibited significantly by the tight procedure and by the inter-union 
competition, with arbitration used as a substitute. 
RECOURSE TO ARBITRATION 1968-1977  
It was however, used relatively infrequently by the JNC. During its 
operation, recourse to a tribunal was made only nine times (see 
table 10.1) while in that period the JNC usually met on a monthly basis 
to discuss resolutions. Neither was the use of arbitration evenly 
spread over the lifetime of the JNC. Three issues were resolved in 
this way in the first eighteen months of its operation, while from 1973 
to 1977 only four tribunals took place; moreover of the latter group, 
two were concerned with holidays, and the second effectively cleared 
up unresolved problems left over from the first. 
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This infrequent use of arbitration would suggest therefore that 
arbitration did not become a substitute for bargaining. Certainly 
Johnston saw it as an indicator of the viability of national 
machinery, (9)  implying that there was a mutual desire not simply to 
delegate decision making to tribunals, but to try and achieve 
voluntary settlements wherever possible. 
As a factor explaining the distribution of the arbitrations, the 
competitiveness of the staff bodies was apparently of some relevance. 
Certainly the Federation saw inter-union rivalry as a significant 
factor, the argument being that if one side could claim success at a 
tribunal the other would have to respond. (10)  Moreover at that stage 
(1968-1970) the membership battle was very evenly divided, NUBE having 
capitalised upon its 1967 success and come relatively close to 
overhauling the CBSA. The need for both sides to demonstrate their 
effectiveness was therefore relatively acute at that time. This may 
for example explain the recourse to arbitration over territorial 
allowances in 1969, this claim being principally conducted by the CBSA 
after NUBE had publicised its own success in conducting the previous 
case regarding overtime pay. (11)  But the outcome of the territorial 
allowances tribunal may have instilled much greater caution in the use 
of arbitration as a political tactic, because the total failure of the 
staff side to carry its case with the arbitrators resulted in an 
unusually clear winner-loser outcome, with the award being identical 
to the employers' final offer. This demonstrated that arbitration 
could reveal weaknesses as well as enhancing effectiveness, and 
predictably NUBE condemned the failure as a reflection of the CBSA's 
lack of research facilities and expertise. (12) This sort of risk did 
offset the temptation to use arbitration as a relatively easy means of 
scoring a negotiating success, and thus as an instrument of inter-
union competition. 
Indeed the competitive pressures could militate against using 
arbitration, as both sides were keen to demonstrate that they did not 
rely upon it. This related to the Webbs' argument that recourse to 
third parties was an indication of immaturity or an inability to 
bargain properly, it being implied by the staff bodies that an immature 
(or inexperienced) union would not be able to recognise when the best 
deal possible had been offered, and thus to judge when to compromise. 
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The desire to avoid any such charges of immaturity, to which NUBE was 
particularly exposed given its previous non-recognition, perhaps led 
the staff bodies to resist pursuing every issue as far as they could. 
Additionally, the recourse to arbitration could expose a party to the 
charge that it was simply exploiting the constitution for sectarian 
ends rather than the best interests of bank staff as a whole. (13)  As 
with pay bargaining where strategies were conditioned negatively by 
the desire to avoid accusations of partiality because this could have a 
net detrimental effect on membership, so here as well the pressure of 
competition for members meant that both sides wanted to avoid charges 
of partiality. Responsibility and the general interest of their 
constituents therefore dictated that the bargaining procedure was not 
consistently exploited, nor arbitration used as an instrument of 
competition. Justifications for pursuing claims to arbitration 
usually emphasised the justice of the cause, moderation of the claim 
and willingness to compromise. (14) 
Quite apart from inter-union competition however, there were other 
exceptional "starting-up" problems which contribute to an explanation 
for the initial frequency of arbitrations. Within the context of the 
rigid negotiating procedures these added to the difficulty of 
achieving a negotiated settlement at first. Fbr instance, the build-
up of pressure on the issue of Saturday closure prior to the 
introduction of national machinery meant that although in the view of 
the CLCB this was a matter for management unilaterally to determine, 
the strength of feeling of staff, and the wishes of the Minister of 
Labour (15) ensured that it would be discussed in the JNC. Predictably 
as well the BSC adopted a hardline position, NUBE having already struck 
successfully over this issue to gain recognition. There was therefore 
a complete impasse in the JNC, in which the Federation ended up trying 
to mediate between the CLCB and the staff side, without success. It 
seems that the staff side were also keen to see the matter go to 
arbitration (although it was referred by the Federation) in order to 
establish that as a question of hours of work, bank opening times would 
be confirmed as negotiable henceforth. This was not so much evidence 
of immaturity however as an indicator of the complexity and 
longstanding importance of this matter to both sides. 
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Secondly, the JNC faced the problem of standardising management custom 
and practice on those issues which had previously been non-negotiable. 
Much of the bargaining over territorial allowances in 1969 for example 
was spent trying to define the boundaries of London and which towns 
were to be included in the Large Town Allowance, there being no pre-
existing consensus between the employers. 
Here the strict procedural format meant that negotiations were 
exhausted before irrevocable disagreement had crystallised. The 
initial run of arbitrations appeared to relate to the inability of each 
side to develop its case properly when such issues were being discussed 
for the first time. It is notable for instance that difficulties also 
emerged during the first round of bargaining on the Channel Islands 
allowances, this issue having emerged for the first time in 1974, 
principally because of the effects of incomes policy and high 
inflation levels upon the exceptional cost of living factors in that 
area. Again, negotiation was complicated by the absence of 
established criteria upon which to calculate an appropriate 
supplement, and despite extended negotiation, these factors proved to 
be irreconcilable within the constraints of the procedure. Hence the 
1975 arbitration. 
The foreshortened negotiation on these issues also demonstrated the 
point that arbitration was not necessarily required when it was 
invoked. Its function under the constitution was not however as a 
facility to be used in the last resort, but as an insurance that issues 
would be rapidly processed to a resolution, by negotiation or 
otherwise. This was presumably to avoid any risk of an issue 
escalating through non-settlement. It appears, however, that neither 
side of the JNC found this arrangement satisfactory. Thus by 
introducing certain procedural modifications they both tried to escape 
from its constraints to use arbitration, only when in the view of one 
of the parties bargaining had failed to produce a satisfactory 
solution. 
THE PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS  
Yet although a variety of modifications were developed, these were all 
on an ad hoc basis, principally it would appear because the staff 
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bodies recognised the ability to have recourse to arbitration was the 
ultimate guarantee of their effectiveness. The limitations on reform 
therefore related to the character and the competitiveness of the 
unions; but within this proviso, they were prepared to adopt the 
following alterations: 
(i) an extended phase of discussions prior to the commencement of a 
formal negotiating phase, particularly over pay issues. (16) 
(ii) the suspension of the negotiating phase and an interjection of a 
discussion phase without prejudice to the existing negotiations, 
ie if a failure to agree had been registered this would not be 
disallowed by the recourse to discussions. Discussions would be 
minuted and could be outside the framework of the original 
claim. (17) 
(iii)the development of side meetings between the leading negotiators 
on both sides, normally non-minuted and without prejudice to 
procedure at which proposals could be fronted without fear of 
having to register formal disagreement. These could take place 
at meetings of the JNC or outside them. (18)  
(iv) a joint working party. This was established for job evaluation 
alone. 	It was not minuted in the JNC and reported with 
recommendations to the JNC, but operated without the limitations 
of national procedure. 
Each of these procedural changes amplified the flexibility of 
negotiation and was therefore designed to avoid the strict logic of the 
procedure which ended in arbitration. However, the staff side 
insisted in preserving the ultimate arbitrality of any item. It 
resisted calls for a conciliation stage for instance, seeing this as a 
possible substitute. (19)  Additionally, it resisted the switching of 
issues between levels of negotiation (domestic and national) even if 
this meant foregoing the flexibility this appeared to offer. The hours 
of work issue, health and safety matters, and salary restructuring 
were all examples of matters that were restricted thus in order not to 
confuse their arbitral status. 
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So because both staff saw arbitration as the ultimate guarantee of 
their effectiveness this limited the degree of reform (intended to 
free bargaining from the constraints of the procedural logic) which 
they were prepared to countenance. 
THE PROCESS OF ARBITRATION 
If the process of arbitration is examined it is also evident that it 
was closely related, and to an extend dependent upon, the bargaining 
which preceded it. This again suggested that the two forms of rule-
making were not wholly distinct, despite the formal difference in the 
authorship of the rules, and that the successful prosecution of a 
tribunal depended upon a previous phase of bargaining in good faith. 
Furthermore, because of the key role played by the wingmen or sidesmen 
in the tribunal, the arbitration depended like collective bargaining 
upon what may be called an adversarial style of development. It was 
this conjunction between arbitration and the bargaining process which 
plausibly explains why the third party nature of rule-making was not 
considered inherently problematic, despite the formal absence of 
control over the outcome. 
This may be illustrated by dividing the arbitration process into 
several phases. The first involved a relatively formalised exposition 
by each side of their case; this was followed by critiques of the other 
side's submissions. Thirdly, the sidemen nominated by the respective 
parties would cross-examine both sides before winding-up with their 
final submissions, as if in a court of law. 
The role of the chief arbitrator would therefore be roughly analogous 
to that of a judge in terms of his mainly passive participation in the 
process of developing the cases and hearing the evidence. The final 
part of this would typically be an evaluation involving all the members 
of the tribunal in an attempt to reach a unanimous award, but given the 
representative role that these sidemen had played in putting forward 
their side's cases this was not always possible. 
Insofar as the adversarial trade, typical of collective bargaining, 
whereby each side submits its own case, criticises the other's and then 
moves toward a compromising phase, was continued in an arbitration it 
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could be described as an extension of, or an extrapolation of the 
previous negotiations. Central to this continuity was the role of the 
sidemen, working closely with their respective parties and taking up 
an advocate's function on their behalf. Indeed a form of bargaining 
would continue into the final evaluation by the tribunal with each 
sidemen being given a negotiating brief which established priorities 
and minimal acceptance points as well as possible areas of trade-off. 
This involved refining and exploring the detail of the cases but within 
the parameters already defined by the briefs used in the bargaining 
process. 
So, in contrast with the model which has been put forward by Kahn-
Fteund, (20) Flanders (21) and the Webbs, in our analysis arbitration 
and bargaining were not dichotomised. But their distinction derives 
from a focus upon the formal authorship of the outcome: in bargaining 
the authors are the parties to the agreement; in arbitration it is the 
arbitrator who makes the decision. In contrast, the focus here was 
upon the process of rule-making in the analysis above, and this had the 
effect of mediating the ostensible dichotomy, the parties having 
considerable opportunity to influence decision-making despite not 
being responsible for the outcome. 
Indeed, the tribunal depended to a degree upon a proper prior 
negotiating phase, as the first and second phases of arbitration were a 
recapitulation of the arguments used in bargaining. This was of value 
in establishing the extent of the differences between the parties and 
any common ground, and awareness of this tended to offset any 
inclination to rush through the procedure. The argument that the 
availability of arbitration devalued the bargaining process, put 
forward by McCarthy and others did not therefore, appear to occur, 
although the Federation did make this accusation to the staff council. 
On the basis of the minutes of negotiation no overt abuse of the 
procedures was generally evident however. 
Indeed, the minutes of the Negotiation Council would normally be 
submitted to the tribunal in order to clarify or support arguments, and 
were intended to be taken into account, rather than simply be seen as a 
preliminary. It was likely as well that the arbitrators would be 
notified of any short-circuiting of the procedure and asked to weigh 
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that against the guilty party, as for example in 1977 with the pay 
claim which split the BSC. Here a central argument of the Federation 
was that the BSC had rushed through procedure without "good faith 
bargaining", and the tribunal was asked to bear this in mind when 
making its award. (22) 
Additionally arbitration tribunals would often encourage bargaining, 
or alternative means of conflict resolution in the terms of their 
awards. For example the first award, on the "hours" issue stipulated 
that a survey of staff attitudes be taken on the question of evening 
opening with a view to the position being reviewed by the JNC in a 
year's time. Similarly, the 1972 arbitration on the salary structure 
explicitly recommended that a joint committee be set up to review the 
working of job evaluation as a means to resolving further disputes 
without the necessity of recourse to third parties. 
This went further that the first recommendation by placing the onus for 
investigation and decision making on a jointly convened body, 
extending the staff side's role into what Flanders saw as the 
managerial dimension of joint regulation. (23)  Another example of 
extended bargaining came out of the award on holidays in 1975. The 
tribunal, in making its award, stipulated that progress be made 
towards introducing a four weeks minimum holiday in the next round of 
negotiations in effect offering the JNC another chance to come to a 
decision in free bargaining. 
But despite being closely inter-related with bargaining, arbitration 
was not a pure replication of it. It was more formalised and 
legalistically stylised; it also lacked the flexibility of bargaining 
to introduce other issues or to establish an agenda "trade-off" on a 
quid pro quo basis, a point noted by Hawkins (24) when referring to the 
"autonomy" that bargaining offers to trade unionists and employers as 
being its principal advantage over arbitration. Furthermore, it 
cannot be suggested that the parties were impervious to the 
possibility of an arbitrated outcome when in negotiations in the JNC. 
Like Dufty's case study in Australia, in the clearing banks JNC it was 
evident that: 
” ... 	the availability of compulsory arbitration as a last 
resort does seem to have a significant influence. The actions of 
nr) 
both parties in the negotiating process were affected by their 
assumption of what wog )  should the issue go to 
compulsory arbitration."' ' 
Quite how much this affected the bargaining process is impossible to 
estimate however, and like Dufty we would conclude that this did not, 
"prevent meaningful bargaining taking illme with results seen as 
broadly satisfactory by both parties." 
It might be also argued that the satisfactory outcome of bargaining was 
at least in part related to the very predictability of the alternative, 
ie arbitration. In other words knowing what could otherwise be 
achieved gave each side a yardstick by which to measure voluntarily 
bargained results. And we would argue that the manner in which 
tribunals were conducted meant that the results were predictable, the 
' whole process being designed to establish a consensus of satisfaction 
by roughly splitting the difference between final claim and offer or by 
sharing out gains and losses if there were several points to 
settle. (27) Until 1977, only one arbitration (the 1969 territorial 
allowances) was a clear victory for one side, although because 
disputes could sometimes incorporate a clash of principles which were 
not easily reconciled, as for example the proper determinants of the 
length of annual leave, compromise was not always possible. 
Nevertheless, despite the compulsory status of the awards, it may be 
argued that the process of arbitrating contributed towards the sort of 
outcome in which the satisfaction of both sides was an important 
factor. The implication of this is considered in the next section. 
To summarise, this far it has been argued that the availability of 
compulsory arbitration was not intended to stifle bargaining. 
Nevertheless the tightly defined procedural arrangements and the 
opportunity that arbitration offered to demonstrate bargaining 
effectiveness in the context of the strong inter-union competition 
might have pre-empted the development of bargaining. That this did not 
occur so much, after initial difficulties, was because of certain ad 
hoc procedural modifications, and because the processes of bargaining 
and arbitration were by no means discrete, but closely intertwined. 
Indeed arbitration depended to a certain extent on a prior stage of 
bargaining to develop the arguments. The risk involved in the 
conjunction of compulsory arbitration and bargaining, namely that they 
would prove incompatible, was offset by the intention of all parties to 
operate with arbitration only as a last resort. 
Given this, it remains to be examined to what extent the Federation and 
the unions found their bargaining objectives either facilitated or 
obstructed by the compulsory arbitration facility. This is the issue 
which will be addressed in the remainder of this chapter. 
ARBITRATION AND THE "TRAPPING" OF NEGOTIABILITY 
To do this, the analysis has to be moved from the process of 
arbitrating to the outcome of the tribunals because it was the impact 
which these could have upon the future negotiability of an item which 
affected both the outcome of the competition between the unions, and 
the attitude of the banks to national negotiations as constituted. 
The tendency for decisions to impinge upon future negotiations is a 
characteristic which may be termed "trapping". It arose because the 
nature of arbitral decisions involved not simply the interpretation of 
existing agreements, that is conflicts of right, but also conflicts of 
interest, that is decisions about conditions to be agreed for the 
future. (28) As a result the question arose as to how long into the 
future an arbitration fixed a decision for. At its most emphatic it 
could be assumed that an award was applicable until specifically 
altered by voluntary agreement or by a further arbitration. Some 
decisions, like the hours issue and the overtime ruling were evidently 
of this nature because they were so precise, and this would forestall 
all future bargaining upon them if the staff side resisted by reference 
to the protection of the existing precedent. This might have broken 
down bargaining seriously if arbitration had consistently denied 
further discussion. However the Federation were of the opinion that 
not all precedents were so permanent, as the minutes reveal of one 
council members' view. 
"He doubted whether an Arbitration Award was hnmutable for all time and felt it9) ruling must, de facto, lapse by changed circumstances ... 
Another member felt that no decision was immutable simply because it 
(30) was always oonstitutionally subject to negotiation in the future. 
In practice however their views were over-optimistic. No decision 
simply lapsed to be superceded without some reference to precedent, 
and no arbitration placed any specific guidelines to clarify the 
conditions under which it became irrelevant. Nor was any time limit 
placed upon the operability of an award by the tribunal. 
In fact the converse of the Federation's arguments could occur in as 
much as rulings fixed principles until the case for change was proven. 
To defend an existing award was therefore much easier than to procure a 
change, the onus being on the agent favouring change to justify it in 
the light of new conditions, both to the other party in negotiations 
and to the tribunal. 
Apart for this inherently conservative dimension there were other ways 
in which arbitration could effectively "trap" an issue so that the 
negotiation of change was restricted. First, we have seen from the 
hours of work issue how this confirmed its arbitrality because it had 
been referred to a tribunal. Hereafter attempts by the Federation to 
modify the 1969 award were resisted by the staff side and it was 
accepted that this issue could not be subsequently withdrawn from 
arbitrality or dealt with differently. It remained therefore under 
the "protection" of the arbitrator. 
Second, by confirming an item's arbitral status the level at which it 
was to be negotiated was fixed. Hence domestic initiatives to alter 
the late opening programme, or to commence negotiations at that level 
were persistently quashed by the BSC in reiterating the principle that 
it was only negotiable nationally. Arbitration therefore necessitated 
a clear dividing line between the two levels of negotiation and 
minimised the interchangeability between them. This could have made 
items such as health and safety extremely difficult to deal with if any 
matter on this subject had gone to arbitration, because although it was 
within the auspices of the national JNC, different domestic systems as 
well as statutory responsibilities of individual employers (31) meant 
in practice that discussion was limited to consultation nationally. 
Fortunately no issue under this heading was subject to disagreement in 
negotiations. 
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Third, an award could establish the principles which were to govern 
future negotiation, and although this would not necessarily prohibit 
change, it could have the effect of determining the parameters of 
bargaining. When this resulted from the practice of tribunals of 
recapitulating the main arguments and offering a brief explanation for 
the award, the principles so created were not highly explicit. For 
instance, the 1969 Territorial Allowances award went no further than 
acknowledging that London and Large Town Supplements could be taken as 
a single category of pay, but established no correlation between them. 
As a result the parameters of future bargaining were hardly 
constrained, and the employers were prepared to risk arbitration in 
order to secure the abolition of the Large Town Allowance in 1972. But 
the danger with this strategy was the possibility of creating a 
stronger or more explicit principle about which it would then be more 
difficult to negotiate. Thus in this instance the tribunal not only 
retained the allowance, but correlated its size with the London 
Allowance, thereby creating a more restrictive formula which limited 
the parameters of future negotiation. So, the more explicit an 
arbitrated principle was, the more fixed and non-negotiable an item 
became. Adjustments to the Large Town Allowance were thereafter a 
mathematical exercise and attempts to abolish it acknowledged to be 
impossible. 
While this did not prevent the parties from trying to use arbitration 
as a means of change, or to rescind previous discussions, it made such 
a strategy highly risky. On the one hand, the very lack of detailed 
reasoning behind arbitrated decisions meant that there was uncertainty 
as to whether a case for change would fulfill the necessary criteria to 
satisfy the tribunal, and we have seen that the price of losing a 
second time could lead to the creation of a permanent rule. On the 
other hand, if reasoning was advanced in any detail this too could 
establish a precedent for bargaining. Fbr example the job evaluation 
tribunal confirmed in 1972 that comparability was to be a central 
factor for the whole of the grading structure, while at the same time 
deliberately making no allowance for the changing level of the cost of 
living. This crystallised the separation of cost of living, pay 
resolutions from other resolutions about national pay levels, and 
secondly specified that external comparability was to be a central 
component of all future negotiations about the internal differential 
structure, neither of which had been formally confirmed before. 
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More broadly, bargaining could be influenced by normative guidelines 
on what determinants should, in the view of an arbitration panel, be 
germane to a particular issue. Without defining a specific formula for 
future negotiations these tended to emerge from the comments which 
accompanied an award, and were often aimed at facilitating future 
bargaining by pointing out the sort of factors which the parties might 
focus upon in their deliberations. Perhaps the best example of this 
was the two holiday tribunals of 1975 and 1976 in which the arbitrator 
made reference to comparability and European practices as factors 
which should be of great importance in future negotiations. 
Alternatively, determinants could be defined by those that were 
omitted, or stated not to be relevant to the issue. 
So, the effect of the "trapping" of negotiations was to reduce the 
ability of the parties to institute change. In that sense it affirmed 
Kahn-Freund's (32)  point that arbitration undermines the dynamic open-
endedness of voluntary negotiations in which change may be initiated 
by the simple act of forwarding a resolution to the JNC. It was this 
reduction in their autonomy which was the banks' major objection to the 
procedure. In their view it acted as a brake on reform of several 
substantial issues such as hours of work, territorial allowances and 
overtime, which in free collective bargaining would not have remained 
"trapped". 
Secondly, but associated with the previous point, the employers 
believed there was a cost penalty associated with arbitration which 
derived from the basis of decision-making in the tribunal. Despite 
being compulsory, the whole emphasis in the mode of conducting the 
tribunals was directed to achieving an award which was acceptable to 
both sides; hence the tendency to "split the difference" rather than 
award firmly for one side was predictable. One argument put forward 
occasionally by the banks was that the staff side tried to exploit this 
by submitting "unrealistically" high claims, so that even with some 
subsequent shift in negotiations the arbitrator was still left with a 
high final claim as one of his points of reference. The response of 
the Federation was to withdraw all formal offers so that the tribunal 
had no way of splitting the difference, as in the holiday arbitration 
in 1976. 
Another objection which is more typical of employer arguments against 
arbitration was also raised. In the mid-1970's it became more apparent 
that the banks found the prospect of delegating decision-making to 
third parties with no specialised knowledge or sympathy with their 
operational problems a liability. (33)  This reflected their view that 
the cost penalty of arbitration was significant, for instance, they 
argued that the holiday claim which went to arbitration in 1976 would 
add over 2% to labour costs if met. Inability to pay was the central 
plank of their absolute refusal to meet any claim in this instance. 
On the other hand, the priority of peace which had been a central 
objective of the employers (and unions) in the design of the 
constitutions had been achieved and arbitration could be assumed to 
have contributed to this, as was intended. Neither at national or 
domestic level did this failure to agree result in the use of 
sanctions, although NUBE was not restricted by a no-strike clause. 
Specifically, the employers felt that arbitration had helped to 
contain the enormous bargaining power of the computer personnel and 
clearing system staff as the national machinery was operating. Whilst 
there were costs associated with this constraint, they had to be offset 
against the potential costs of conflict which would have been 
associated with free bargaining, so the general assumption as 
expressed by Hawkins for instance, of a normative commitment to 
"voluntarism" on the basis that 
"Alternative systems of rule-making such as compulsory 
arbitration have been consistently rejected by trade unionists 
and employers primarily because collective bargaini ftR i permits 
both sides to retain the maximum degree of autonomy.' 
has to be qualified by the point that sometimes either or both parties 
may have priorities which conflict with the maintenance of maximum 
autonomy. The preferred system of rule-making is to that extent 
dependent upon the objectives of the parties in negotiation. In this 
instance, neither staff body had wished to rely upon its own bargaining 
power, and the banks had been concerned to avoid industrial action, or 
the instability deriving from inter-union rivalry from impinging upon 
the bargaining process. Additionally they had wished to restrict free 
bargaining to avoid any escalation of claims because of union 
competition; arbitration was therefore designed to stabilise outcomes 
and to bring an issue to a definite finish whatever the associated 
costs. 
The perceived disadvantages of compulsory arbitration expressed 
latterly by the banks must therefore be explained by a shift in their 
bargaining objectives. Awards given prior to national bargaining in 
the early 1960's had already demonstrated the disadvantages of third 
party adjudication but the advantages of a guarantee of conflict 
avoidance in the context of growing union militancy in the 1960's and 
the emergence of strategically powerful bargaining groups in the 
1970's seemed to offset such disadvantages. However, growing concern 
with costs and their competitive position in the product market were 
behind the emergent view that, despite the risks free bargaining was 
necessary to reassert control. 
This shift was not completed until after the collapse of the joint 
staff side. Indeed the instability created by this provoked a 
resurgence of commitment to stability in the bargaining process. None 
of the banks opposed the proposal to retain compulsory arbitration 
made in the Johnston Report in 1978 when procedures had collapsed and 
the prospect of overt competition between the unions had arisen. 
Discussion documents circulated in late 1979 still argued that 
compulsory arbitration was necessary nationally as a means of conflict 
avoidance either if the merger then proposed was effected or if it 
failed. (36) However, a minority of the banks had begun to express a 
preference for voluntary arbitration, and particularly the Midland, 
which in December 1979 signed a domestic agreement with BIFU and ASTMS 
incorporating such an arrangement. Obviously that bank faced 
exceptional difficulties in dealing with a strong trade union, ASTMS, 
which was not recognised nationally, and in the view of its managers, 
the prospect of being tied to a compulsory facility nationally only 
served to limit the options available. In questioning the 
desirability of compulsory arbitration the Midland was not alone 
however, and the outcome of this debate is considered in detail in the 
next chapter, in relation to the whole question of reconstructing 
national negotiations in the light of the failure to achieve a union 
merger. 
ME IMPACT OF ARBITRATION ON THE INTER--UNION COMPETITION 
Before that, the implications of the availability of unilateral 
arbitration on the outcome of the competition between NUBE and the CBSA 
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have to be considered, because arguably this did have significant 
bearing on the matter. Tb recapitulate: the central objective of each 
staff body was to obtain or maintain control of the staff council in 
order to impose their policies upon it, rather than being subject to 
the dominance of their rival. Arbitration was potentially a valuable 
instrument for this, but it was shown that the very competitiveness of 
the unions offset inclinations to exploit the facility after initial 
attempts to do so, because it could expose a union to the charge or 
irresponsibility and sectarianism in bargaining. 
Insofar as arbitration awards were not apparently based on assessments 
of the parties' power in bargaining they did assist the union side. 
Lockwood (38) called this sort of arbitrated decision a political one 
and contrasted it with judicial decisions in which the case was judged 
on its own merits regardless of what might have been the bargained 
outcome. In the banks it appeared that no tribunal dissociated 
bargaining and arbitration to judge a case in an isolated, 
dispassionate manner, the two processess being inter-related. Neither 
however were decisions based solely upon bargaining power: rather 
there was every effort to reach an equitable compromise, often by 
"splitting the difference", a result which was neither necessarily 
political nor judicial. 
Given the weakness of the unions, stemming from their inability to 
deploy great bargaining power (or the disinclination to try) this sort 
of outcome favoured them. Furthermore, this did not related simply to 
the outcome of those issues which went to arbitration, but more 
generally to all bargaining because of the possibility that it might be 
so resolved. The threat of arbitration intruded into negotiations: if 
it was adjudged that an outcome more favourable that that on offer 
could be reached, recourse to arbitration by activating the procedure 
could be used tactically as a sanction. And this was successful 
insofar as the banks declared themselves prepared to settle 
"generously" (in their view) but voluntarily rather than risk an 
arbitration on several occasions. (39)  
But it was to be predicted that compulsory arbitration would 
supplement the power of the staff side in this way. This had been one 
of its functions when originally introduced into domestic 
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negotiations. As then, in national machinery it was designed to ensure 
meaningful negotiation despite the non-coercive methods of the 
associations, and secondly to ensure NUBE had no reason to invoke 
sanctions. Its function was therefore to equalize the effectiveness 
of the staff bodies by ruling out the usual indices of power from the 
bargaining process. 
Yet insofar as the relative bargaining powers of each union were 
rendered irrelevant, this crucially affected the central issue of 
competition for control of the staff side. It meant that the choice to 
bank staff of which representative body to join did not have to hinge 
upon measures of effectiveness. But, given the equal recognition 
rights, and the relative cost disadvantages of membership, NUBE's main 
platform for recruitment resided on the very issue of bargaining 
effectiveness. So precisely by agreeing to use compulsory arbitration 
instead of voluntary negotiation, NUBE apparently undermined what it 
saw as the key to its strategy to attract more members. It would 
appear then that there was a contradiction in the union's position: 
its fear of alienating its "moderate" and "respectable" membership who 
had only once shown a willingness to countenance the use of sanctions 
against their employer led it to try and demonstrate that its 
moderation was equal to that of the associations, while at the same 
time it was claiming to be a superior bargaining agent precisely 
because it was not like an association and did not rely on arbitration 
alone. The contradiction remained unresolved, exposing the union to 
the criticism that it was neither one thing or another particularly, 
for example, in the context of its registration under the Industrial 
Relations Act in 1971. Indeed we would conclude that NUBE's policy on 
compulsory arbitration demonstrated the central difficulty which 
consistently faced it of distinguishing its character from that of its 
internalist rivals in order to be seen as a real alternative, whilst at 
the same time remaining sufficiently moderate to avoid alienating its 
membership, both actual and potential. 
CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has examined the effects of the incorporation of an 
arbitration facility into the national procedure upon the division of 
representation. Recognising that it was an element of the employers' 
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strategy to neutralize any instability ensuring from this division, we 
explored whether this objective was achieved, and what the grounds for 
the banks' subsequent dissatisfaction with this arrangement were. 
It was argued that arbitration was originally not designed to preclude 
bargaining but to guarantee that it took place fairly, given the 
cooperative ethos of the internalists. NUBE accepted this premise as 
well when agreeing to its inclusion into the national procedure. But 
the temptation to use arbitration as an instrument of the inter-union 
rivalry initially threatened to stifle negotiations. Paradoxically 
however, the very competitiveness of the unions also offset this 
effect subsequently by emphasising the need for bargaining maturity 
rather than a reliance upon arbitration. Ad hoc procedural 
modifications were therefore agreed by the unions, although as the 
ultimate guarantee of their power, they would not consider formal 
restrictions upon arbitration. 
Considerable evidence of continuity between the process of arbitration 
and the forerunning negotiation was noted, and the notion that they 
could be construed as separate modes of rule-making was called into 
doubt. This suggested that the satisfaction of the parties with 
arbitration as a form of decision making was related to the input that 
they could have. Secondly, despite its compulsory status, the thrust 
of the tribunals was towards effecting a consensus outcome, acceptable 
to both sides by splitting the difference in most cases. The outcome 
to that extent was reasonably predictable. 
Although bargaining was not reduced to a meaningless exercise, and 
continued to function alongside the existence of arbitration, there 
were ways in which it was impeded. We looked at the various ways and 
the various degrees to which an issue could become "trapped" , 
suggesting that because of this tendency, arbitration did lead to 
outcomes which differed from those which would have resulted from free 
negotiation. In general, the tendency of tribunals to refer to 
existing arrangements and established precedents in decision making 
appeared to be more conducive to the staff side, and in the view of the 
Federation arbitration presented an extra obstacle to the negotiation 
of change. The employers also believed that the inclination to split 
the difference could result in awards less favourable than they would 
have achieved in free bargaining. 
These effects became increasingly problematic to the banks throughout 
the operation of the national machinery. While arbitration did ensure 
the peaceful resolution of negotiations and, with modifications did 
not inhibit meaningful negotiations, the price of this stability in 
the bargaining process became excessive for the banks. This change in 
attitude reflected a more fundamental shift in managerial priorities 
towards cost controls and greater competitiveness, and it was this 
which explained the removal of compulsory arbitration facilities 
subsequently. 
During the operation of the joint staff side however, this procedural 
format was argued to have had a significant effect on the outcome of 
the inter-union competition. By equalizing the power of the staff 
bodies in the process of negotiation and obviating the need to deploy 
bargaining sanctions it neutralized NUBE's strategy to obtain 
supremacy by the demonstration of its purportedly greater 
effectiveness. 
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TABLE 10.1 
ARBITRATIONS IN THE NATIONAL CIEMICAL JIB 1968-1977 
1. Banking Hours - 1 May 1969 
2. Overtime Claim related to changes in Banking Hours -
19 September 1969. 
3. Territorial Allowances - 19 November 1969. 
4. Large Town Allowance - 23 June 1972. 
5. Job Evaluation Restructuring/Pay Claim -5 September 1972. 
6. Holiday Entitlement - 17 January 1975. 
7. Channel Islands Allowance - 30 June 1975. 
8. Holiday Entitlement - 15 July 1976. 
9. Pay Claim - October 1977. 
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CORPORATE EEVELOPMENIS AND TIM  
RECCNSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL MhalINERY 
INTRODUCTION 
Having considered the operation of national machinery under joint 
working we now try to draw some conclusions from the changes since its 
demise in 1978, instituted by management in the light of their 
experience with the joint staff side and with the prospect of working 
with separate bargaining arrangements. We also consider the debate 
among the banks over the utility of national and domestic wage 
negotiations in the light of the problems prior to 1978 and 
particularly the difficulties associated with compulsory arbitration. 
A further objective of the chapter is to broaden the basis of the main 
argument regarding the response of the banks to inter-union 
competition. It attempts to locate the policies of the banks within 
the context of their corporate objectives, by considering more fully 
how these developed throughout the 1970's to the present. This is seen 
as necessary if a proper perspective is to be offered on the question 
of divided representation and the way that it has been managed by the 
banks. After all, the management of this issue should not be construed 
as an end in itself: rather, controlling the instability of inter-
union competition was essentially a facilitative (1) exercise, being 
part of a strategy to achieve certain objectives of labour management 
,which were in turn more broadly determined by the business aims of the 
banks, or their market strategies. In other words, the management of 
industrial relations cannot be assumed to be an autonomous function, 
but is, as other writers have emphasised, subject to corporate 
objectives. (2)  And while there may be differences between each bank in 
policy or priorities, national institutions obviously presuppose an 
area of common policy and interests, based upon similar corporate 
objectives. 
Within this framework the chapter tries to explain why, given the 
apparent changes in corporate strategies and the greater 
diversification between the banks, the only change to national 
bargaining that has been instituted concerned the procedure, with the 
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ending of unilateral compulsory arbitration. This is done by arguing 
that despite the new business strategies, these have not altered the 
basic oligopolistic structure of banking, and secondly that the debate 
on the utility of national bargaining must be seen within the context 
of the collapse of joint working, in which it took place. In doing 
this it is argued that the decisions regarding the scope and procedure 
of national machinery were importantly affected by the outcome of 
concrete issues negotiated both at that time and since the resumption 
of national bargaining. We conclude that the decisions were made on 
the basis of practical experience rather than doctrinaire principles, 
and that experience appeared to favour continuity rather than change. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The chapter is set out as follows. First the reasons for and the 
timing of the emergence of a more profit conscious management in the 
1970's are examined. In terms of industrial relations policies 
however, it is argued that the effects of this development were limited 
significantly. The analysis then considers the much more positive 
attempts to deal with the stagnation in market share developed by the 
clearers recently and the trends to greater diversification, assisted 
by the current wave of automation. It examines the industrial 
relations impact of these corporate developments, asking why it was 
that the banks chose to resume national machinery with the same scope 
as in 1968. This is answered by reference to the domestic experience 
of wage bargaining and other issues affecting managerial prerogative. 
It finally considers the key question of arbitration asking why, given 
the dissatisfaction of the 1970's, the banks deliberated extensively 
before opting to abandon a compulsory facility only in 1981. Again it 
is suggested that this was due to practical experience rather than 
doctrinaire reasons. It is concluded that only in the last two or 
three years have the banks determined that compulsory third party 
intervention is intolerable. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFIT-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE 1970's  
In this first part of the chapter we take up the argument noted when 
looking at the banks' objections to compulsory and unilateral 
arbitration, that it conflicted with the growing concern with cost 
controls among management in the 1970's. This is related to the wider 
development of what is called a "profit-conscious" management 
strategy, and the'ccnditions for the emergence of this strategy are 
noted. Nevertheless it is argued that the degree of competition 
between the banks remained limited, and, continuing to function as an 
oligopoly with high labour costs, the value of national wage 
bargaining to minimise the competition for labour was still relevant. 
Commercially the banks confronted the problem which had been with them 
throughout the Jpost-war period of a declining or stagnant market 
position. That this_did not generate more than a partial attack on the 
problem of labour - costs was ostensibly due to the continuing 
prosperity of the industry, despite the lack of growth, and to the view 
taken by the banks that the barriers to competition were at the heart 
of this trend. 
Management policies:were thus informed by the paradox of low growth or 
stagnation accotpanied by profitability. The evidence of this 
stagnation is shown -in table 11.1, where in particular the clearing 
banks were unable'to match the performance of the building societies 
which, between 1965 and 1980, doubled their market share of deposits of 
the personal sector, while the banks' position remained virtually 
unchanged. The national savings institutions suffered a halving of 
their market share in the same period. And between 1968 and 1979 the 
clearers' share of the total interest bearing deposits market was 
reduced from 22%-to 18% while their principal rival in the sterling 
market, the building societies, maintained their market share at 
40%. (3) 
In lending thy-=environment was also highly competitive both in 
corporate finance,' and the private sector, although the banks were 
much more active in the 1970's than twenty years previously. By 1972 
the ratio of advances to net sterling deposits was in excess of 70%, 
compared to the trough of the 1950's when the ratio was less than 40%. 
However throughout the 1970's the banks' share of private sector 
sterling advances still remained static at around 30%, well below that 
of the building societies, whose share remained around 50%. (4) 
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Nevertheless this market stagnation was apparently offset by the 
continuing profitability of the banks. It has been shown for example 
that in terms of pay determination, the banks were prepared to adopt a 
flexible response to fluctuations in their total profitability, as 
well as variations between the individual clearers, only arguing 
inability to pay very rarely. Significantly it was not until the end 
of the last decade that concern about the stagnation in real profit 
levels became an important negotiating factor, probably because of the 
continuing "endowment" effect of high interest rate policies, and the 
growing contribution made by the international divisions. On interest 
rates for example, Frazer and Vittas note that, 
"The arithmetic average of bank base rates in 1971-78 w I almost 
50% higher than the corresponding average for 1963-70" 
and between 1969 and 1977, the consolidated pre-tax profits of the Big 
Four clearers more than quadrupled. (See table 11.2) 
In addition because of the corporate diversification policies which 
each bank pursued, the domestic division became in the 1970's just one 
(albeit a major one) of the several operating divisions which each made 
substantial contributions to total profits. So whilst there is no 
evidence of cross-subsidisation of divisions, it seems plausible that 
the existence of multiple profit centres did insulate management from 
being too concerned about spiralling costs. (6)  Furthermore the simple 
point that in absolute terms each bank's profit figure seemed very 
large, (for example, in 1978 National Westminster pre-tax profit 
amounted to £189.5 million) made ,it very difficult to argue inability 
to pay at the bargaining table, a factor which was further enhanced by 
their typically counter-cyclical trend (profits rising during a 
recession) as Morse has pointed out. (7) 
Morse (8) has argued however that a more profit-conscious style of 
management, concerned to maximise returns by new market strategies and 
cost controls did develop among managers in the 1970's for several 
reasons. The impact of high inflation during the 1970's was probably 
the single most important factor which induced greater profit and cost 
consciousness. Whilst remaining consistently profitable, like the 
rest of the private sector the banks were concerned by the way that 
high inflation rates eroded the real value of their profit levels. 
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Furthermore as labour intensive organisations (labour constituted 
approximately 67% of total operating costs) this was particularly 
problematic because the inevitable response of their staff to 
inflation was to demand cost of living rises. At the same time much of 
the banks typical asset portfolios were not insulated from inflation, 
and were thus losing value. (9) 
Secondly, Morse (10) has argued that pressures from Government agencies 
such as the NPBI, the Treasury and Bank of England for greater 
competition between the clearing banks was an important influence upon 
corporate objectives. But while a greater variety in the range of 
accounts and facilities offered by the banks did emerge, they remained 
in many ways, a cartelised sector with clear limitations upon the areas 
of competition. 
For instance, the wider range of services which developed were broadly 
duplicated by each of the clearers. The banks all continued to 
organise their domestic diversions on a similar basis, making each 
branch a microcosm of the whole bank, as the CLCB pointed out. That is 
to say each full branch offered a complete range of services regardless 
of market demand, and thus every branch in each bank was a replication 
of the others. 
Indeed it was consistently assumed that wide variations in pricing 
policies were not possible, given the close relationship of lending 
and deposit rates to the Bank Rate (latest Minimum Lending Rate). The 
efforts of the NBPI and the Bank of England to stimulate greater 
variation were therefore restricted. Furthermore as the banks' 
services were mutually inter-dependent upon the clearing system for 
the most part, there was little opportunity to compete by product 
innovation. Where a new market could be developed, as for example in 
credit cards, this was quickly covered by the other banks either 
individually or collectively, as in the case of the Joint Credit 
Company started by Midland, Lloyds and National Westminster Banks in 
response to Barclays' Barclaycard. 
The banks therefore remained a cartel competing only in restricted 
ways, as for instance by branch coverage. And after the mergers of the 
late 1960's the limits to growth through this form of competition were 
considered to have been reached, the branch systems being complete. 
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What then were the implications for national bargaining of these 
commercial conditions? First, the oligopolistic structure of the 
industry and organisational homogeneity of the banks was conducive to 
a broad national bargaining unit. Hence we noted that the banks were 
able to conduct a national job evaluation exercise imposing a common 
structure throughout. Secondly, branch coverage remained a central 
form of competition, and this meant that the banks remained labour 
intensive organisations. Table 11.3 shows that despite the branch 
rationalisation programmes there was a consistent rise in total 
numbers employed in their domestic divisions, and an annual 
recruitment target of pp to 10,000 new staff faced the clearers in most 
years of the 1970's. (11)  In addition there was an exceptional demand 
for staff in certain key areas, notably Central London which 
underlined the need for a bullish response to changes in labour market 
rates, despite the ending of full employment in the economy as a whole. 
Given this expansion throughout the industry, each bank's labour 
market policy remained similar and conditioned by the labour intensive 
methods of operating. With relatively stable market shares, and 
similar interest rate margins, profitability could be strongly 
influenced by wage costs which constituted around 50% (12) of net 
operating income. So, even with the official encouragement to compete 
more distinctly between themselves in the product market the 
desirability of minimising wage competition continued, it being 
assumed that differences in the wage bill of any one bank could not be 
compensated for by product market growth. 
Thirdly, on several issues it appears that in the 1970's the banks did 
shift from an initially unrestrictive approach to show a greater 
concern with the cost implications of negotiated changes. Such items 
included the overtime payments, Large Town Allowances and holidays for 
instance. 
Taking the Large Town Allowance as an example, it is notable that the 
Federation offered no financial justification for payment of this 
supplement in evidence to the 1969 arbitration tribunal, its case for 
continuing to pay the allowance resting on customary practice in 
several banks which it wished to standardise. But by the mid-1970's 
the opposition to the allowance had hardened, particularly after the 
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1972 arbitration award linked the calculation of the amount of this 
allowance to the London Supplement, which the banks were keen to 
retain: By 1974 a bargaining priority of the Federation was to try and 
disengage the two supplements, the Large Town Allowance being, in its 
view, a cost element of considerable size which was paid to 15% of 
their staff for no justifiable reason. (13)  In the same period the 
employers also stepped up their attempts to revise the overtime 
agreement, established by the 1969 arbitration tribunal, on the 
grounds that it was too costly. 
During the holidays arbitration in 1975, the reasons for the 
employers' rising concern with the cost implications of settlements 
were made explicit. While accepting the legitimacy of the staff side's 
case for preserving a differential structure, their objections were 
based upon the inappropriateness of the traditional structure in the 
context of high inflation. (14) Instead, the new conditions 
necessitated a break with traditional assumptions and much closer 
reference to comparability with other organisations and the market 
position. In effect, high inflation placed considerable strain upon 
the reward system which was based upon a differential structure for 
non-pay as well as pay items. This meant that it was not only the 
strict wage elements of remuneration which were rising rapidly, but 
the aggregate costs of labour. 
But, fourthly, it can be concluded that the attack on costs remained 
partial, insofar as it was only the more minor items which the banks 
tried to control, such as the Large Town Allowance. In contrast it was 
assumed that they were obliged to follow what were seen as the market 
rates for national salary scales (at least for the junior grades) and 
on the London supplement. The more major items therefore remained 
beyond control. 
There appeared then to be limits to the degree of concern which was 
attached to cost controls, despite the trend to greater profit 
consciousness. Several managers argued that in hindsight relatively 
"unrigorous" (as one put it) (15)  attitudes prevailed, mainly because 
of the prosperity of the industry. Indeed it was suggested by a number 
of senior managers that the most fundamental change now occurring was 
attitudinal: managers throughout the banks were all becoming profit 
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oriented in their decisions whereas previously this had not been so, a 
point which is returned to below. But in terms of labour costs, the 
point was made that this relatively unrigorous approach had also 
prevailed. 
Mere broadly it appeared that labour questions were not considered 
central to the fundamental problem confronting the banks, which was 
lack of growth. Instead this was seen to be a function primarily of 
imperfect competition particularly in relation to the building 
societies. So, a market free from lending restrictions was seen as a 
key to growth, and this could only be properly secured by Government 
. policies. (16)  Taking the hours of work/opening issue for example, on 
one level the restrictions on hours of opening were persistently 
argued by the management as a restraint to market growth. A paper from 
the Chief Executive Officers' Committee arguing the need to compete 
through more flexible opening times was circulated in the JNC in 
1972. (17)  But the absolute rejection by the Staff Council of any 
proposals for changes led managers to conclude that the matter was 
therefore closed, and no further attempts to re-negotiate the issue 
were made. Pressure from the staff side on reductions in late-night 
opening in branches was also effective, and the numbers offering this 
service did come down. Thus although there appears to be no overriding 
operational reason to dictate this, common opening times have 
prevailed in the clearers, and it was not until the 1980's that the 
possibility of moving out of step on hours of work was taken up. It 
would appear that the failure to pursue greater variation in hours (as 
was first recommended back in the 1960's by the Bank of England and the 
NBPI to make the banks more competitive) relates to the view that 
interest rate competition is the prime obstacle to growth. 
To sum up: commercially the banks faced the paradoxical situation of 
stagnation and decline in their market position, while remaining 
relatively profitable. 	Although there was an emergent profit 
consciousness, the degree of competition between the banks remained 
limited. In terms of industrial relations, these conditions continued 
to dictate the value of national bargaining to minimise wage 
competition and meant that although there was an attempt to gain 
greater control over labour costs, this was limited to more minor 
issues. 
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RECENI"I'RENDS TNARDS GREATER CCMPETITIVENESS  
But as the resumption of Saturday opening by Barclays in 1982 
indicated, a more forceful approach has recently developed. This has 
been shown in a greater determination to compete actively with other 
financial institutions, and also in a determination to control the 
increase in operating costs, and particularly those attributable to 
labour. 
This trend may have been inspired in part by the efforts of other 
institutions to enter market territories traditionally occupied by the 
clearers, in offering current account facilities and automated cash 
points for instance. For their part, the greater competitiveness of 
the clearers may be seen in the more positive attempts to resolve their 
stagnant market share through such strategies as the moves into 
lending for house purchases, by which they have attempted to gain 
customers in an area traditionally dominated by the building 
societies. Secondly, the banks have extended their credit card 
operations, and transactions by this method increased by an average of 
32% per annum between 1971 and 1981. Thirdly, to try and move in to 
the "unbanked" sector, banks have started to consider current accounts 
paying interest. In this country there are still about 40% of adults 
without a bank current (18) account, so considerable room for growth 
still exists, although here the clearers face tough competition not 
only from the building societies but from the other retail banks, such 
as the Cooperative, and some of the American banks which have linked 
with building societies to offset their lack of a branch system. 
Fourth, attempts to meet the needs of small businesses have been 
developed by the clearers, partly in response to some sharp criticism. 
Associated with these changes has been the emergence of a segmented 
market strategy replacing the traditional generalist approach. Now, 
in distinguishing between the needs of large corporate customers, 
small businesses, and the majority of private individual accounts the 
banks have shifted towards a specialization more in the style of the 
merchant and foreign banks. 
The competitiveness in the retail market has been increased by the 
innovations in automated techniques of payment and cashing facilities. 
Th the extent that the clearers have responded to the growth of 
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electronic banking in diverse ways, this has reduced the importance of 
the clearing system between them, and the degree of homogeneity in 
their organisational structures located round the branch system. 
As one banker succinctly put it recently: 
"The full-service branch is past its prime." (19) 
and forecasts that 90% of all routine personal cash withdrawals will be 
through automatic teller machines within the medium term are now being 
made. Experiments with "satellite" branch systems have been made by 
all of the major clearers. But despite this growing heterogeneity the 
banks remain relatively similar. They still retail their services 
through extensive branch structures and offer a broadly similar 
package of facilities. The ability to compete on price is still 
technically restricted, and essentially they remain an oligopoly, 
which is functionally inter-dependent because of the clearing system. 
However, a more utilitarian style of management, committed to profit 
maximisation through growth and strict cost controls is argued now to 
be more prevalent. (20)  And a key component of this profit maximising 
strategy is the need to contain all elements of the labour cost 
structure, in a manner which was previously not nearly so pronounced or 
thorough. Evidence of this shift towards a more "purposive 
rationality" was expressed by one senior executive who, when 
criticising the former complacency towards costs arising management, 
stated that; 
"Management must steel itself to get the fat of the palmier days 
out of its organisation. The whole industry has been too relaxed 
about cts and it will not be easy to change - but change we 
must. 
For instance, it is now also argued that the clearers have to compare 
their cost structures internationally. In particular on this 
assumption the British banks' productivity levels fall well below 
those of their foreign counterparts and must be raised to compete 
effectively, principally through further automation. Associated with 
this is the view that in real terms the profitability of the banks is 
too low, a problem which in managements' minds has been compounded by 
the precedent set in 1981 of the Government levy of "windfall" profits 
tax. The banks greatly fear further levies of this nature, not least 
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because profitability is unpredictable, being largely determined by 
interest rate policies over which the banks claim little or no 
influence. In addition the previous rates of profit gained from 
current account balances (which were non-interest bearing) and the 
money transmission services where most of the clerical staff are 
employed have fallen "substantially ”(22) after a peak in the mid-
1960's when the NBPI was investigating the efficiency of the clearers. 
It is for this reason that the strictest control over labour costs is 
deemed necessary both because this continues to be the principle item 
on the cost accounts and because the other cost factors are largely 
fixed. 
THE RESUMPTION OF NATIONAL BARGAINING 
What then have been the effects of these developments in corporate 
strategy on the management of bargaining in the national machinery? 
Constitutionally at least, there is considerable similarity with the 
pre-1978 arrangements, the scope of bargaining remaining the same. In 
the procedure, the compulsory arbitration facility was removed and 
replaced by the opportunity for voluntary third party reconciliation 
and arbitration with the agreement of all parties, when the new 
constitution was finally agreed in December 1982. But this apparent 
continuity disguises the debate which was conducted by the banks on the 
utility of national arrangements, and the alternatives including 
domestic bargaining, as well as the very real shift in the bargaining 
strategies of the clearers. 
We argue in the following sections that the actual outcome of the 
debate were determined largely by experience, there being no clear-cut 
or overriding principle to determine bargaining arrangements 
predominant amongst the clearers. Hence the return to national 
bargaining was decided principally by the outcome of pay negotiations 
in the period of domestic bargaining, and the merits of national machinery 
were also seen in terms of the protection it offered to managerial 
prerogative in the face of pressure from the competing unions. 
Furthermore, it is argued that despite the avowed profit consciousness 
of the clearers, only in 1981 did new imperatives to control labour 
costs become explicit. One crucial result of this new policy, which 
was directly related to a range of commercial considerations as we 
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shall see, was the decision to revoke all conpulsory arbitration 
facilities. But prior to 1981 there was considerable debate over the 
value of this, despite the apparent disadvantages noted in the 1970's. 
It is concluded that only in the last three years have corporate 
objectives so tightly determined managements' bargaining policies at 
the national level. 
(i) Pay Negotiations  
Considering the wage bargaining arrangements first, there appeared to 
be several pertinent reasons for moving to domestic arrangements. In 
particular the non-existence of the staff associations in the Midland 
and Williams & Glyn's meant that any national agreement struck with 
them would have to be imposed over the heads of BIFU (and ASTMS in the 
Midland) members. Not surprisingly Midland management found this 
prospect worrying, and still do. On the other hand, there were 
managers in those banks with staff associations who were inclined to 
think that if they could reach agreement with their associations 
without the threat of industrial action, then the minority membership 
position of BIFU would make it difficult for the union to reject 
this. (23) Why then should they be tied up with problems in other banks 
where BIFU was stronger? 
These arguments were rendered somewhat hypothetical in the light of 
events between 1978 and 1980 however, when separate negotiations 
worked against the banks. Fearing industrial action, no bank would 
settle at a lower rate than the others in the wage round. Furthermore, 
it was evident that no bank wanted to move away from the national rate 
and try to establish its own pay scale: hence in 1978 when a 
productivity element was deemed payable under the incomes policy then 
operating it is notable that the banks contrived to apply this 
uniformly in order not to establish different rates, even though the 
national negotiations had collapsed. The commitment to a national 
rate in order to take wages out of competition was still considered 
important, especially as the banks were all still expanding their 
employment as well as replacing wastage. 
The 1980 pay round was something of a watershed however. In the wake 
of this a much firmer employer line emerged, apparently after BIFU's 
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strike action in its Technical and Services Section in the National 
Westminster threatened to reopen the leapfrogging on the clerical pay 
deal which had been concluded. Raving concluded two settlements which 
were higher than the annual RPI, the banks determined to try and reach 
a settlement below this in the next pay round. This was influenced by 
several commercial factors, (24) such as increasing competition from 
overseas banks; the increasing provisions for bad debts as company 
liquidations rose; the fall in interest rates which reduced the 
"endowment effect" on profits; and the rising levels of expenditure on 
new technology. The period 1980-81 also coincided with a rapid rise in 
unemployment, a reduction in the size of pay settlements, and some 
criticism of the banks for their high settlements by industry and the 
Government. Crucially as well greater variation in the profitability 
of the clearers was evident. 
Indeed to a minority of managers, these conditions suggested that 
domestic bargaining with great firmness might prove more advantageous 
than national negotiations. Firstly, because the industry-wide rate 
could be dispensed with in the light of the new labour market 
conditions of over-supply, and secondly, because profitability, or the 
inability to pay argument could be more forcefully applied in domestic 
negotiations. The national rate might therefore not be the minimum 
settlement. 
In practice, four reasons appear to have vitiated what in theory are 
sound arguments for domestic bargaining. First domestic bargaining 
will always have to deal with union demands for comparability with 
other banks. Given the longstanding parity in the industry this 
suggests that no bank will be able to move far from the others, and 
will always expose itself to a greater risk of action by unions in 
pursuance of this standard rate. Second, any sub-average domestic 
settlement may have hidden costs; most managers argued that the 
importance of what were perceived to be fair settlements, even if 
marginally above the hypothetical minimum paid off in terms of longer- 
term loyalty and commitment. (25)  This was emphasised still highly as 
important in the career based banking employment, particularly in view 
of the cooperation needed for future organisational changes. Third, 
(and related to that point) the size of national agreements has since 
1981 been significantly lower than previous years, so that the premium 
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of national bargaining is accepted to be only one or two percentage 
points at most. (26)  Over the longer term such a variation was in the 
view of most managers seen to be insignificant. Fourth, there is an 
element of domestic bargaining in the two tier bargaining process 
which gives each bank considerable discretion, particularly in view of 
the lower national settlements. While in the period of settlements 
around, say, 15%, the domestic element of say 4 or 5% was 
insignificant, this has now altered: for instance, in 1983 in some 
clearers the domestic component of pay increases were in percentage 
terms as big as the national rise, 5%. So, as management wanted the 
proportion of pay related to individual performance this increased 
significantly. As a result the arguments against continuing to 
operate an employers' Federation for wage bargaining have receded. 
ii. Protection of Management Prerogative  
The second argument for retaining national bargaining and employer 
cooperation related to the protection this offered against attempts to 
extend joint negotiations to include certain issues deemed to be 
within managements' prerogative. Again, following the collapse of the 
joint staff side, the value of acting in combination was reaffirmed to 
the banks when rather than being able to argue that certain issues were 
only negotiable nationally, or were non-negotiable, the banks found 
themselves isolated by division just as separate arrangements made 
bargaining increasingly unstable. This may be illustrated by 
reference to the question of Christmas leave. 
During the period of joint national negotiations this issue was 
pursued with increasing vigour by the staff side, although as a matter 
of hours of opening rather than of holidays it was regarded by the 
banks as non-negotiable, and this viewpoint was defended very 
effectively in the national forum. For example, the BSC submitted a 
claim for a five day closure over Christmas in 1974, which was rejected 
as unconstitutional by the Federation, but similar resolutions were 
subsequently submitted annually between 1975 and 1977. Furthermore, 
in 1977 the BSC escalated its claims by requesting closure on the last 
working day before Christmas, Friday 23 December, even though not 
being Christmas Eve this was unprecedented. 
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Significantly, in the context of the break-up of the joint staff side, 
the CLCB acceded to this request, and while achieving a retrenchment 
the following year (1978), the banks again conceded the last working 
day in 1979, in a package which gave all staff an extra one and a half 
days leave. This decision was taken in the aftermath of the extended 
"leapfrogging" over pay that summer and demonstrated the weakness of 
the banks in the absence of a national forum. The return to formal 
national negotiations in 1980 led to the resumption of a much firmer 
employer line and a return to the pre-1977 position, in an agreement 
with the CBU (the three staff associations constituting the CBSA) 
which was applied over the heads of the BIFU officials who had rejected 
it. This was the first agreement for two years to expose the weakness 
of the divided unions, and it reaffirmed the utility to the employers 
of national machinery. 
On other issues as well the value of joint action by the employers has 
been demonstrated. In the 1981 pay negotiations for example, BIFU took 
action in the computer and clearing centres in the various banks to try 
and reopen negotiations after a deal had been reached between the 
Federation and the CBU. Because of its extra strength in the Midland, 
and with the support of ASTMS members, that bank was particularly 
affected, but it received support from the other clearers which at the 
time enabled it to stand firm against the union pressure. (27) 
 Secondly, the broader question of new technology has been considered 
at the Federation level. The banks have coordinated their response to 
BIFU's requests for negotiations on this and have also considered 
undertaking discussions nationally on this matter in order to relieve 
domestic pressure. This offers the advantage of dealing only in 
general principles, while specific operational questions which are not 
common throughout the banks are deemed beyond the remit of the for un. 
iii. Procedure: The Debate over Arbitration  
A third question concerned the procedure to be used given the separate 
bargaining arrangements. As we showed above, there had been criticism 
of the "trapping" effects which unilateral arbitration had had in the 
period of joint working. It might therefore have been expected that in 
the climate of greater competitiveness the banks would have been 
determined to avoid any recourse to third parties. This was not 
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initially the case however, the change in the policy of the banks only 
coming in 1981 and coinciding with the decision to adopt a much firmer 
wage bargaining line. 
Why then, given the disquiet over the effects of unilateral 
arbitration were the banks prepared to consider this? Again the answer 
was related to the experiences of 1978-1980. In this period the costs 
of free domestic bargaining, had suggested that arbitration might at 
least resolve the overt competitiveness of separate negotiations, as 
discussions in the Federation Council repeatedly concluded. (28)  Even 
though the Federation Director made the point that the expense of 
arbitration related to the ability of the unions to negotiate without 
having to consider deploying sanctions, it had at least secured peace 
which, in the context of separate negotiations, was of great 
value. (29)  Allied to this point it was argued that under arbitration 
the banks had very rarely lost a case completely, so that the system 
did have some advantages. (30)  
Thirdly, the banks were broadly agreed on the need to be in line on 
national and domestic agreements, and domestically there were good 
reasons for re-establishing arbitration rights. Specifically, 
technical change and capital intensification have increased the 
potential for disruption at the centre of the clearing banks' systems. 
The ability of key groups of staff in computer centres and cash centres 
such as engineers and data-processing staff to take action in one bank 
which affected the others suggested to some managers that arbitration 
was more necessary than ever as a guarantee of peace. (31)  The strike 
by messengers in National Westminster in 1980 demonstrated this point, 
as did the action by computer staff the following year. It also raised 
the question of whether the national bargaining unit was appropriate; 
should it, for example, be narrowed to include only junior clericals, 
or should the clericals be grouped with the Technical staff as a means 
of trying to moderate their power? There was no guarantee however, 
that by simply redrawing the bargaining units these strategic groups 
could be better contained. (32)  
Fourth, it was argued that the longstanding use of unilateral 
arbitration was popular with staff. Were management now to argue that 
it was no longer desirable it was thought that this would be seen as 
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tantamount to an invitation to the unions (and particularly the CBU 
which had always relied upon this) to become more militant, and would 
therefore contribute to a deterioration in staff relations. (33)  In 
fact it was recognised that without a unilateral facility the staff 
unions would be "rendered impotent". (34)  There were therefore 
substantial arguments in favour of a return to unilateral arbitration. 
Indeed, as the Director of the Federation argued, the reasons for not 
doing so in 1980 were purely technical. No means of reconciling BIFU's 
refusal to cooperate in any way with the need for arbitration binding 
on all parties could be found. (35)  In the meanwhile, Federation policy 
began to move away from unilateral arbitration as the competition 
between the unions led BIFU and the CBU both to try and influence 
national pay negotiations through domestic pay references, and with 
some success. In 1980 the Lloyds managers' arbitration re-establising 
differentials with clerical staff at the 1975 (pre-incomes policy 
level) in the middle of the national negotiations affected them 
significantly. (36)  The following year BIFU, having had the national 
agreement imposed upon it, attempted to reopen matters by a Williams & 
Glyn's arbitration, and by references in BRCS and the Joint Credit Card 
Company. (37) It was in response to this action that the Chief 
Executive Officers determined in August 1981 to end all domestic 
unilateral arbitration. (38) This cleared the way for the national 
agreement to incorporate voluntary arbitration, plus conciliation, but 
with no unilateral facilities. 
•It must be reiterated however, that this decision was not simply taken 
on account of the perceived "abuse" of the procedure by the unions as a 
result of their competitiveness. It coincided with the development at 
that time of the systematic attempts to reduce the costs of labour and 
generate productivity which have already been noted. The increased 
risks of purely voluntary settlements were thought to be worth bearing 
if only to regain the ability to bargain over every issue again, thus 
freeing those matters that, as things had stood, were "trapped" by 
arbitration. Furthermore, as one manager put it, 
"a will to try and win evecyquestion, which had been lacking for 
several years previously"' 
became evident. 
Now this reassertion of control was in a sense fortuitously timed. It 
was arguably assisted by the changes in the economy as a whole with pay 
settlements decreasing in size, and unemployment rising rapidly in 
1980-81. It also parallelled the decision of the Government to 
reconsider the whole basis of civil service pay and subsequently to 
move away from arbitration in order to place a stronger influence on 
the market rates, following the Megaw Report. (40)  Nevertheless the 
decision to reassert control was not simply a function of changes in 
macro-economic policy, and was related to the stronger competitive 
priorities then emerging, and which have closely determined the 
Federation policies since 1981. 
In the banks the control over the bargaining process permitted several 
new policies; first, it led to the freeing of those items previously 
"trapped" by arbitration such as the Large Tbwn Allowance. As a 
result, this was no longer strictly limited to the London Allowance, 
and proposals to buy it out completely were introduced in 1983 by the 
Federation. Second, it led to a reassertion of control over those 
items which although negotiable always impinged upon the employers' 
prerogative, such as hours of opening/Work, and Christmas Holidays. 
Third, it has, in the view of management, also permitted them to come 
to grip with major items such as national salaries, and the London 
supplement by changing the basis of determination without fear of a 
reference to arbitration. For these reasons the procedural changes 
represented a significant shift from which the employers were able to 
apply their new strategies, although by itself the ending of 
arbitration did not ensure that these would occur. At the same time 
this change was likely to affect the outcome of the inter-union 
competition, having been, as we saw, a significant factor in this issue 
during the operation of the joint staff side. To what extent this has 
influenced the fortunes of the unions is considered in the concluding 
chapter. 
CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has attempted to broaden the analysis by looking at the 
industrial relations policies of the banks, including the issue of 
union representation, in terms of their business strategies it has 
aimed to explain why, despite the considerable changes in corporate 
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policies, the national bargaining arrangements have remained 
relatively similar to the 1968 agreement. 
An increasing concern with profitability and costs, including those of 
labour, was noted. But it was pointed out that the extent of 
competition between the banks was limited and that they remain 
fundamentally oligopolistic. Banking also remains labour intensive 
and the banks relatively similar in organisation, and these factors 
have determined the ability and the desire to continue to fix wages 
collectively. As these are actual rates this represents a 
considerable delegation of power away from the domestic level which 
has been questioned by some managers. However, the period of domestic 
bargaining (1978-80) coincided with considerable negotiating 
difficulties for the banks, and a return to national bargaining 
coincided with a resumption of control. 
Constitutionally, the key change for the banks in this resumption of 
control over bargaining appeared to be the change in the procedure 
bringing about the removal of compulsory arbitration facilities. It 
was argued that this was in fact an enabling move, the real changes 
being in managerial policies with regard to all negotiable items. In 
turn these were seen to stem from the shift in corporate objectives, 
which although coinciding with changes in the economy and the labour 
market which facilitated a firmer line, were nevertheless concluded to 
be independent of them. A return to the sort of priorities prevalent 
in the 1960's, and relating to the maintenance of peace therefore seems 
unlikely. With this in mind, we turn in the concluding chapter to 
survey the position of the unions since 1978, and the prospects for the 
future. 
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FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 
DEPOSITS OF PERSONAL SECTOR 
Market shares at and of period 
Banking 
sector 
% 
Building 
Societies 
% 
National 
Savings' 
% 
Other 
.- Aw, 
Total 
5r. 
1963 34.2 21-6 42-5 1.7 100 
1972 34.5 37j 26 2 1.5 100 
1974 :7).0 36.0 21-1 0.9 100 
1977 31.5 47.5 20-4 0 6 100 
1979+ 31.9 47.1 20.4 0.6 100 
Changes in market share (percentage points) 
% 	 % % % 
1963-72 -0.3 +16.2 —16.3 —0 2 
1972-74 —5.5 + 0.2 — 5.1 —0.6 
1974-77 — 8.5 + 9-5 — 0 7 —0 3 
1977-79t —0.4 — 0.4 — — 
1963-79 —2-3 =25.5 —22.1 —1.1 
• Includes total depos:3 :f the National Savings Bank and the trustee savings banks and the instru,nents aornirnstered 
by t-.e Depanner.: of 	Sayings. 
t Second quarter. 
Source: Financial Sta::Sti:S. 
Percentage shares of interest-bearing depositft of UK main 
financial institutions 
London 
Clearing 
Banks 
Other 
Banks 
Building 
Societies 
National 
Servings 
Trustee 
Savings 
Banks 
1921 SO N/A 7 42 1 
1930 42 NIA 17 38 2 
1938 34 N/A 25 37 3 
1948 25 . N/A 13 62 1 	*. 
1958 24 N/A 26 47 3 
1968 22 N/A 40 31 7 
1970 16 22 36 21 S 
1971 17 	, 23 . ' 36 19 S 
1977 17 25 42 13 3 
1978 16 2S 42 13 3 
1979 18 26 40 12 3 
Percentage shares of sterling advances to private and 
overseas sectors by UK banks and building societies 1971-79 
Logsdon Scottish and 
acarig Northern Other Total for Building 
Banks Ireland Banks Banks all Banks Societia 
1971 30 4 13 47 S3 
1977 30 4 19 S3 47 
1978 30 4 18 52 48 
1979 30 5 18 53 47 
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TABLE 11 . 2  
Big Four London Clearing Bank Groups 
Consolidated Profits Before Taxation  
Year Profit before taxation 
Em 
1969 210 
1970 214 
1971 278 
1972 380 
1973 580 
1974 449 
1975 424 
1976 700 
1977 896 
1978 1084 
1979 1563 
1980 1455 
1981 1678 
1982 1501 
Sources: 1969-1976 CLCB Evidence to the Wilson Committee 
1973-1980 Hansard: C.9 April 1981 
1981-1982 CLCB 
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TABLE 11.3 LONDON CLEARING BANKS' EMPLOYMENT FIGURES FROM 1970 
(Group Figures exciuuing ioreign workforces and Channel Islands). 
DATE 
• 
MEN wOCEN 
PART TIME 
101'AL AVERACZ • ID 
:97C nirch 81,20D 88,70) 169,900 
June 80,900 88,000 168,900 173,275 
Sept. 82,400 95,000 177,400 
Dec. 83,103 93,800 176,900 
1971 March 82,700 92,700 175,400 
June 82,200 91,000 173,200 176,600 
Sept. 83,4C0 95,900 179,300 
Dec. 83,600 94,600 178,200 
1972 Parch 83,100 93,100 176,200 
June 	- 82,200 91,700 173,900 177,760 
Sept. 83,200 97,700 180,900 
Dec. 83,400 96,200 179,600 
1973 March 83,000 95,300 178,3010 
June 82,400 94,800 177,200 182,280 
Sept. 85,700 102,700 188,400 
Dec. 86,100 101,800 187,900 
1974 March 86,200 102,500 188,700 
June 85,400 106,200 13,500 191,600 196,120 
Sept. 89,400 116,800 13,800 206,200 
Dec. 90,500 115,700 14,000 206 ; 200 
1975 March 89,600 112,600 13,700 202,200 
June 88,700 109,500 13,400 198,200 202,020 
Sept. 90,200 112,400 13,200 202,600 
Dec. 90,400 110,500 12,600 200,900 
1976 March 90,200 109,500 12,400 199,700 
June 89,600 108,300 12,400 197,900 201,260 
Sept 91,600 112,500 12,200 204,100 
Dec. 91,600 112,100 12,000 203,700 
1977 March 91,400 111,600 127000 203,000 
June 90,700 109,900 12,100 200,600 
Sept. 93,600 116,800 12,000 210,400 
205,460 
Dec. 93,500 116,100 12,100 209,600 
1978 March 92,900 115,100 12,100 208,000 
June 92,600 115,700 12,500 208,300 
Sept. 94,500 121,200 12,500 215,700 
211,320 
Dec. 94,300 120,700 12,600 215,000 
1979 March 93,500 119,700 12,900 213,200 
June 92,600 119,000 13,500 211,600 218,660 
Sept. 96,600 129,900 13,600 226,500 
Dec. 96,800 130,200 14,000 227,000 
1980 March 96,300 129,300 14,300 225,600 
June 
Sept. 
96,000 
99,200 
129,800 
139,500 
15,200 
15,200 
225,800 
238,700 
230,940 
Dec. 99,000  138,600  15,300 237,600 
98,400 136,690 15,300 235,000 
97,600 
96,cu 
134,500 
134,200 
15,C00 
15,000 
232,100 
. 232,200 
233,580 
97,700 133,300 15,500 231,000 
97,300 132,900 15,600 230,200 
96,800 133,000 16,000 229,800 232,480 
99,100 ,136,600 16,300 235,700" 
98,0°0 137,700 18,400 235,700 
97,000 138,000 18,8.00 235,700 1 i983 March 
June 	97,200 	138,300 	19,400 	235,500 
March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
march 
June 
Sept. 
Dec • 
11 98 J 
11 9" 
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PART TIME 	 .* 
NED;, 	 WOVEN 	 WOMEN 
	
TOTAL 
	AVERAGE . 
cart time women not available until June 1974. ** Average of previous December and 
rert March, June September and December. 
gums rounded to nearest hundred. 
CIAPIER 12  
CaCLUSIONS  
Trends since the Demise of Joint Working 
1. Membership 
2. Negotiating Rights 
3. Subscription Costs 
4. The Results of Separate Negotiations 
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OaCTLISIMIS 
Having been concerned with the interaction of two major issues, namely 
the nature of the rivalry between the staff bodies, and its impact upon 
the operation of national machinery, the concluding remarks are 
intended to draw together the strands of the aforegoing analysis and to 
place them into perspective by looking at certain key trends and issues 
since the demise of joint working. The chapter first surveys the 
impact of separate negotiations upon membership trends in the Banking 
Insurance and Finance Union (KIM and the Clearing Bank Union (CBU) 
which was set up by the three staff associations on the demise of the 
Johnston talks in 1980. It examines the effectiveness of this 
development in terms of the objectives and achievements of the unions, 
and then looks at current plans and thinking among the leaders of each 
union, before considering the prospects for a merger' particularly in 
the light of the most recent exploratory talks. Finally, the changes 
in the strategies of the banks are explored, it being argued that 
separate negotiations presently favour their harder-line on pay and 
conditions as well as the fundamental issue of technological change. 
In speculating about future developments, it is concluded that the 
impetus for further national level initiatives by the employers to 
resolve the division of representation presently appears remote. 
TRENDS SINCE THE DEMISE OF JOINT WORKING 
1. Membership 
Clearly, the relative memberships of the staff bodies have always been 
of central importance to the outcome of their rivalry. Here the trends 
since 1977 will be surveyed to examine whether separate arrangements 
have made any difference to the position, and thus to test out the 
argument of BIFU's officials that joint working was, in terms of 
achieving a majority position, not only an unworkable strategy, but 
the worst option they could pursue. (1)  Hence during the period from 
1968 to 1977 NUBE's overall membership grew at a rate that was so much 
lower than that of the associations that even with the dissolution of 
the MBSA and the merger in Williams & Glyn's Bank it could not overhaul 
the CBSA. (See diagram 12.1, showing poll-vote figures at the end of 
this chapter). 
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(i) BIFU 
In 1982 BIFU had one of the highest rates of growth of all the 
unions, (2) and since 1977 it has shown consistent expansion from 
116,759 members to 151,985 by the end of 1982. (3) But the majority of 
this growth has occurred outside the clearing banks where it has 
assimilated the staff associations and small company unions. Its rate 
of turnover is still high however (1982: 13,551 joined; 10,799 lost) 
and its recruits are still mainly new entrants to jobs. In the 
clearing banks at least, it has failed as yet to achieve any 
significant membership boost among existing staff, and its membership 
is still weighted towards the junior grades much more than the staff 
unions/associations. 
In the same period (1977-82) the number of BIFU's clearing bank members 
has risen from 67,044 to 73,130 (an increase of 9%) although this 
represents a drop from 57.7% to 44% of total members. Membership 
actually fell by 1,805 in 1981, and rose by only 300 in 1982, while 
during the last year of joint working (1977) there was a net growth of 
3,000 (Appendix 1). 
TABLE 12.2  
BI RT MEMBERSHIP  
1977 1982 
W&G 4757 5215 + 9.6% 
Midland 13774 29825 +51% 
18531 26040 +40.5% 
Barclays 19693 14176 -28% 
Lloyds 14448 16057 +11.1% 
Nat West 14372 16857 +17.3% 
48513 47090 - 3% 
Total 67044 73130 + 9% 
(Source: BIFU) 
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Looking at the position in the individual banks (from table 12.3 and 
Appendix 3) a very mixed set of trends is evident overall. BIFU has 
done well where it does . not face a CBU rival, growing by 9.6% in 
Williams & Glyn's, to sustain a density of around 70%. In the Midland 
its growth has accelerated rapidly, membership rising by over 51%. 
Indeed in this bank staff numbers have fallen by nearly 2,000 since 
1979, so its'density is actually rising even more rapidly, while that 
of its rival, ASTMS, is not. ASTMS's membership in the Midland is now 
around 4,000, and has fallen by several thousand since the mid-1970's. 
A shift in membership from one union to the other does not explain 
BIFU's growth completely, and clearly it has managed to broaden its 
appeal among former non-members. 
In the three banks where BIFU competes with the CBU there are also 
differing trends. In Lloyds and National Westminster it has made gains 
and while in the former bank this is largely attributable to a growth 
in the T&S Section where BIFU has sole rights, in National Westminster 
the rise of over 2,000 members is due to improvements in both clerical 
and T&S membership. Indeed in this bank the rate of growth in the last 
three years is comparable to the non-CBU banks, being 16.9%, while in 
the Midland it was 19.1% and in Williams & Glyn's 16.3%. 
In Barclays however, the decline of BIFU's membership since the early 
1970's has continued, with a loss of 3,000 in the last three years and 
a fall of 28% in members since 1977. This aggregate also disguises the 
growth in non-clerical membership which compensates for the drop to 
13,110 members in the clerical category, the lowest absolute figure in 
any of the "Big Four" clearers. In the last three years this was the 
only bank where BIFU failed to •raise its membership, suffering a 
decline of 11.7%. When it is noted that ten years previously (1972) 
its clerical membership was 24,826 and that there has been a consistent 
decline since that date at a time when the number employed by the bank 
has risen almost consistently, this haemorrhage is clearly the most 
serious problem facing the union's membership committee. 
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'(ii) CBU 
In the period of separate bargaining the overall superiority of the 
staff associations/unions has been sustained, but again the overall 
picture disguises several trends. Total membership rose from 87,301 
at the end of 1977 to 92,388 in December 1982 (4) an increase of 5.8%, 
compared to BIFU's growth of 9%. But apart from an initial jump in the 
NWSA the rise in membership of the CBU has been wholly attributable to 
the 12% rise in the BGSU's position. In contrast the other two 
divisions of the CBU have experienced falling memberships. Overall 
the density of the CBU has declined marginally from its 1977 position 
but remains around 40% of total clearing bank staff. Combining the two 
unions together, total density still averages around 70%, the figure 
noted by Blackburn (5) in the period prior to NUBE's recognition which 
means with over 60,000 staff unorganised there is. still room for 
growth in both unions. The exception to this average density figure in 
the "Big Four" remains the Midland, 'with a density of 46.8%, although 
this is higher than the 1977 figure of 44%. (6)  Here, of course ASTMS 
has never been able to recoup the decline experienced by the Midland 
staff association in the years before its transfer of engagements, and 
in that sense remains something of an anomaly, as Johnston argued in 
1978. 
It appears then that although BIFU has lost out to the staff union in 
Barclays its fortunes have turned in the other two CBU banks. In 
particular, in National Westminster the union has outperformed the 
staff association since the CBU was set up, and in Lloyds as well it 
appears now to be doing better than its rival. Inasmuch as the CBU 
divisions have not done as well as they expected to from separate 
arrangements, and certainly not as well as they projected in 1980 when 
a target of 100,000 members was their short-term aim, (7) BIFU might 
argue that separate negotiations have been justified in the relative 
sense that its rate of growth has been higher than that of the CBU. 
This is expressed in table 12.4 which includes estimates of 1983 
figures given by CBU and BIFU representatives. 
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TABLE 12.4  
RELATIVE 1JNICN 
MEMBERSIUP  
1977 
BIFU 	67044 
03U 87301 
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE TO CBU 30.4%  
1983 (ESTIMATE)  
BIFU 	78600 
CBU 	 96000 
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE 22.1%  
But in terms of membership, it could be argued that the real nadir of 
the union's fortunes occurred in 1972, and that it had started to 
rebuild from 1975 onwards, that is prior to the demise of joint 
working. In fact its rate of growth in the years from 1975 to 
December 1978 inclusive was better than subsequent years which 
reinforces the point that the advantage to the union of separate 
negotiations appears to be relative rather than absolute. 
Moreover, whilst BIFU's position has improved, the change cannot yet 
be said to be significant; it remains the minority body overall and by 
a long way, in the three CBU banks. The pay-off in terms of membership 
growth of separate negotiations is clearly not a short-term matter. 
That the strategy of separate negotiating rights has not generated a 
radical improvement to the union's position at the expense of the staff 
associations is plausibly explained by reference to several other 
factors. 
2. Negotiating Rights 
First the associations (or staff unions) have achieved equal, though 
separate negotiating rights to the union. Indeed in Lloyds, the staff 
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union still has exclusive negotiating rights for managerial staff. 
Both nationally and domestically there were interim periods before 
formal procedures were introduced, and in Barclays for example the 
union had signed a separate agreement some time before the staff union, 
but in no case was there any possibility of the associations losing 
recognition. As such these delays presented no fundamental threat to 
the CBU members. 
3. Subscription Costs  
Second, the cost differential for equal representation facilities 
still exists and plausibly remains as much of a disadvantage to the 
union as it was during the period of joint regulations. (8) 
Subscription charges in January 1984 were for example. 
BIFU January 1984  
Members 25 yrs and over 	£36 pa 
Members under 25 	£24 pa 
Part-time employers £12 pa 
Pensioners 	£2.40 pa 
BGSU January 1984  
Board Appt Holders: 	£30.88 pa 
Gen Man Appt Holders: 	£21.20 pa 
Unappointed Staff over 21: 	£16.60 pa 
Staff under 21 and Auxiliaries £11.56 pa 
Staff under 18 & Part-time: 	£8.40 pa 
Indeed on the narrowest instrumental grounds of union membership, the 
associations provide a superior range of discount offers, such as 
property insurance which further improves their cost-benefit position 
to prospective members. 
4. The Results of Separate Negotiations  
Moreover the union appears to have won no significant concessions by 
acting separately. Fbr instance during pay negotiations in 1982 and 
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1983 BIFU's chief point of differentiation with the CBU concerned its 
"low pay" claim, whereby it pressed for 
(i) a national minimum wage of £80 per week (in 1982) and 
(ii) a rise of 9% or £10 per week whichever was the greater (in 
1983). 
Both of these claims went to a ballot whereupon the majority accepted 
the Federation's offer. As the settlements were standard percentage 
increases throughout the national grades (8.5% in 1982; 5% in 1983) 
the union's attempt to compress the clerical differential structure 
has quite clearly been unsuccessful. 
Neither staff body appears to have sufficient power individually to 
demonstrate a clear pre-eminence over the other in the bargaining 
process. Certainly however, if the employers were to reach agreement 
on an issue with one side which appeared more favourable than that 
which was achieved by the other, then a differential in bargaining 
power might be demonstrated. But in practice the logic is not that 
simple, because each union guards itself .against demonstrating 
relative weakness in bargaining as well. For instance the 1983 pay 
settlement was agreed between BIFU and the Federation, but not the CBU. 
It was then imposed upon CBU members, but rather than allowing BIFU to 
take the initiative in the propaganda exercise by suggesting that this 
imposition demonstrated the CBU's weakness, the CBU made great play of 
what it saw as BIFU's failure to stand firm in its claim suggesting 
that this was the reason why a better deal was not achieved. (9) 
Conversely, BIFU was overruled in the Christmas Holiday claim in 1980, 
but like the CBU immediately criticised its rival for not standing 
firm. 
The national union has always claimed that its superiority derives 
from its ability to rely upon the use of sanctions in the final resort. 
If therefore it could use industrial action successfully it might 
redound to its advantage in terms of membership as in 1967/68, but in 
the present economic climate it seems unlikely that a large national 
issue could develop to the stage where widespread action would be 
supported. The union has clearly tried to use this tactic however, as 
for example when it called for strike action to respond to the banks' 
insistence on staying open all day on the last working day before 
Christmas in 1983. Local skirmishes on other issues have also taken 
place , (10) sometimes with apparent success, as in the Midland Bank 
Heathrow branch dispute' of 1983, but the Christmas stoppage 
demonstrated the risks involved in this strategy. In the event of a 
failure to cause widespread disruption, as in this dispute, BIFU 
risked revealing a lack of power, and thus deflating its claims to 
greater effectiveness. (11)  Moreover it exposes itself to the 
propaganda of its rivals, as well as the banks in taking such action. 
In view of their apparently continuing moderate outlook, accusations 
that BIFU's methods are too extreme may plausibly carry weight with a 
great number of bank staff even if they support the cause for which 
BIFU is fighting. (12) 
The increased likelihood of industrial action has been brought about 
by the abolition of compulsory and unilateral arbitration both 
domestically and nationally, although the agreements do provide a 
conciliation clause. Both the staff unions and BIFU protested at the 
ending of this facility, which assisted them in achieving favourable 
settlements cheaply and without having to rely upon the deployment of 
sanctions when working as a joint side. But arguably this change has 
affected the staff unions/associations more than BIFU, because it 
reveals their essential lack of power in the bargaining process. While 
this move ostensibly offers the banks the means to re-establish 
control over those issues which the staff side defended so 
successfully in the joint machinery, at the same time the longer term 
,implications may be less advantageous. Already the associations have 
considered strike action, and incorporated strike clauses into their 
constitutions. Under the pressure of competition from BIFU they may 
well be forced to adopt more orthodox methods and downplay their 
cooperative ethos even more, in order to demonstrate their continuing 
effectiveness as bargaining agents without third party adjudication. 
So while separate negotiations do present difficulties for the 
employers they are at present mitigated by the weaknesses of the staff 
bodies and the moderation of their staff. For the Federation, the 
complications presented by separate negotiations relate more to the 
difficulties in coordinating negotiations than to making a settlement 
stick, despite the fact that it may be having to negotiate on different 
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claims and yet try to reach a single and simultaneous settlement. It 
may therefore be in differing stages of the bargaining process, or have 
reached a settlement with one side which then effectively has to be 
imposed on the other. In the national machinery the instability is 
further raised by the non-representativeness of the CBU in two of the 
five Federation banks. If therefore it is with the CBU that agreement 
is reached, this has to be imposed on staff in Midland and 
Williams & Glyn's Banks without representation. 
These represent potentially serious sources of instability for the 
banks, and the fact that thus far they have not inconvenienced them 
seriously reflects not only the current economic environment, but the 
way that division has weakened the power of the unions which now 
compete overtly with each other. Bargaining has thus become a three-
way fight. Nonetheless the banks have also tried to minimise the 
potential for disruption by several procedural safeguards. Both 
nationally and domestically there is provision for conciliation via 
ACAS. In some banks there is provision for voluntary arbitration, 
although this is not unilaterally institutable, and in the national 
agreement the possibility of independent arbitration, on the agreement 
of all parties, is not precluded. There is also a restriction in most 
agreements on the use of industrial action until after the procedure 
has been exhausted. The national procedure also includes a clause 
stipulating prior consultations with management before action is 
taken, thus curtailing the use of lightening or surprise campaigns. So 
while there is no longer an absolute priority of conflict avoidance, 
there are still several significant procedural mechanisms designed to 
minimise the possibility, and the impact of conflict. 
Our analysis has suggested that separate bargaining currently weakens 
the position of the staff bodies vis-a-vis the banks. At present the 
divided - bodies display all the weaknesses of multi-unionism in the 
duplication of resources and energy, and the lack of coordination over 
long term objectives and strategies which Turner noted in his study of 
the motor industry. (13)  While this prospect is disturbing to officials 
of both sides, particularly in an era of unprecedented business change 
which will have profound effects on the nature of work career 
opportunities and job security, each side continues to express the 
view that its particular policies are correct and that the other's are 
deficient, as a reason for justifying the existing division. 
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Fbr example, a more hawkishly optimistic view which endorses the 
necessity for separate representation is evident among BIFU 
officials. (14) This derives firstly from the view that the dangers the 
union faced immediately the post-Johnston time of de-recognition are 
no longer as great. Secondly, the membership decline is now past its 
nadir (even in Barclays) and the CBU has not been the challenge it 
threatened to-be when it first formed. Thirdly, BIFU takes the view 
that technological change will reduce total employment in banking, 
deskill work, and deteriorate career prospects, unless it can 
negotiate the pace and direction at which change occurs. Believing 
that this will become increasingly self-evident to bank staff, it 
expects them to support the strong stand it is taking on the matter 
although until now it has failed to achieve any significant membership 
boost this way. 
The union has pressed for the banks to sign New Technology Agreements 
nationally and domestically, but has only achieved partial success in 
Midland where a tripartite Security of Employment Agreement has been 
signed. (15) While this commits the bank to regular consultations  
through a Staffing Review Committee with a view to minimising any job 
losses which might arise from new technologies and changing business 
practices, it does not ensure complete security of employment. This 
move has not so far been imitated in the other banks. The union has 
had no success with its model New Technology Agreement which although 
not seeking to restrict or ban technological change, does propose that 
the introduction of all new systems and equipment shall be subject to 
joint agreement between the individual bank and the union. It also 
proposes a reduction in the working week to 28 hours to avoid any 
reduction in overall employment. The banks have rejected this mode as 
an unacceptable challenge to managerial prerogative, and stated that 
the implications of technological change are at present so 
indeterminate that they could not commit themselves to such a binding 
arrangement. They may nonetheless reach more diluted and limited 
agreements in due course nationally and/or domestically. 
But whether it can establish the consent of the banks to negotiate 
change or has to adopt a more combative approach, new technology is a 
key issue for the union. Firstly, because its policy is differentiated 
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from the staff unions it is believed that this is exactly the sort of 
broad-based issue affecting all staff around which it . may demonstrate 
its greater effectiveness. At another level, new technology 
represents a strategic shift in the "frontier of control" which the 
union is trying to occupy because it is attempting to establish 
bilateral authority on questions of work organisation, planning and 
capital investment which have been until now very much at the heart of 
managerial prerogative. The impact of this union strategy depends 
however on issues such as job security and career prospects which are 
presently indeterminate. 
Moreover, BIFU faces considerable problems in its structure and 
directibn. In pursuing its diversification of recruitment it has 
become organisationally over-complicated, even in the view of its own 
officials. (16) Apart from the implications this has for its ability to 
act effectively and develop coherent policies, its sec tional structure 
may not be seen as appropriate by clearing bank staff whose orientation 
is, in the view of many BIFU officials acknowledged to be primarily 
towards their own bank, and not towards the finance sector as a whole. 
One way of resolving this problem has been to try and develop an 
institutional branch structure, based on places of work. The number of 
institutional branches has grown rapidly since the middle of the 
1970's, and now overlays the geographical branch structure quite 
significantly. 
Again, however this threatens to over-complicate the union's 
organisation. Furthermore, as the reaction to Johnston's proposals on 
branches showed, BIFU cannot go too far down this road without running 
into opposition from lay members who are keen to preserve the trans-
institutional structure to distinguish the union from internalism. 
The union has also tried to extend the Jointly Accredited Office 
Representative (JAOR) schemes in the clearing banks. These lay 
representatives, who are given facilities by the employers, perform a 
local consultative role and process grievances, but also act as 
recruiters and establish a stronger network of contacts between the 
union and its members, which was previously a weakness of its 
traditional reliance upon full-time officials. In Barclays however, 
BIFU has not been able to set up a JAUR scheme, and here its membership 
position is most fragile. It has exposed itself to the charge of 
unrepresentativeness, and after Johnston faced a real risk of loss of 
recognition. If the current trend of declining membership continues 
it may become more than a hypothetical question to ask whether the 
arguments, which were so instrumental to the union's cause when used by 
Lord Cameron, that NUBE had sufficient membership to warrant 
recognition on grounds of equity, will become operable in reverse to 
justify de-recognition. In this respect it is pertinent to note that 
in Barclays Bank PLC, BIFU's density is now only about 21% (in 1968 it 
claimed 52%) and considerably lower than that in the ranks of 
managerial staff. 
Moreover, it faces additional problems from the decision to merge the 
domestic and international divisions of Barclays from January 1985. 
This will mean the integration of the currently sep.iiate bargaining 
units, opening the union up to the prospect of competition with the 
BGSU in the present Barclays Bank International, where until now the 
union has held exclusive recognition. The record suggests BIFU will 
suffer substantial membership losses as a result. 
Secondly, the decision to merge Williams & Glyn's into the Royal Bank 
of Scotland will undoubtedly lead to job losses (17) and a reduced 
membership for the union. BIFU is also sensitive that in the one 
London clearing bank were it has exclusive recognition it will appear 
unable to resist these job losses, because it can then hardly claim 
that it is a more effective representative body than the supposedly 
quiescent associations. There is also the possibility that the newly 
merged bank will not be represented among the FLCBE, but operate 
instead in the Scottish Employers' Federation. This would not only 
reduce BIFU's membership, but make its rival, the CBU, much more 
representative overall. 
The hawkish optimism within the union must therefore be tempered by its 
present weaknesses, and the prospect of these changes in the clearing 
banks' structure. This presumably explains the decision by BIFU to re-
establish merger talks with the CBU after its 1982 Delegate 
Conference. After a series of meetings that summer, a five-point 
framework for further discussions was established, but the national 
-347- 
executive of the CBU then declined to endorse this, offering instead to 
enter a working party without any prior agreed points. It was also 
indicated that the discussions should take place between the full NECs 
of each side, a proposal which BIFU thought unwieldy. It has thirty 
people on its executive, the CBU, nine. (18) 
The five points were very general statements, proposing a full 
amalgamation to form a new Banking Insurance and Finance Union, and 
establishing no more than the basic organisational structure agreed in 
the ABFU talks, and in Johnston. One . contentious point did commit the 
new union to membership of the TUC and the Scottish TUC, however this 
much had been accepted by the associations in Johnston Mark II. It 
would appear that the failure of this latest initiative related to 
internal disagreement within the CBU executive over the propriety of 
entering any form of merger initiative at this stage, given the 
relatively recent collapse of Johnston on what was seen among the 
associations' officials as an unjustified display of intransigence by 
BIFU. 
In explaining the willingness to enter discussions on amalgamation so 
soon after the collapse of the Johnston Enquiry, BIFU officials 
reiterate their view that the union did not collapse that initiative, 
and that they have always seen an amalgamation as ultimately the best 
means of safeguarding the interests of bank staff. (19) The talks were 
therefore entirely consistent with union policy, and the question of 
joint or separate arrangements seen as a discrete matter. But it is 
doubtful whether the initiative could have progressed far, 
particularly as the five points made no mention of those issues upon 
which BIFU wanted further discussions post Johnston Mark II. And on 
its own, this proposal is insufficient evidence to suggest that there 
is now enough common ground to predict a merger in due course, or that 
BIFU has substantially shifted its ground since late-1979. 
Because it was BIFU's decision to withdraw from joint working we have 
concentrated upon its aims and achievements under separate 
negotiations. The particular problems facing the staff 
associations/staff unions must be considered as well however. 
Firstly, in working together as the CBU they have not reached the 
membership target they set in 1980, of 100,000 members, and as 
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membership has remained relatively static in the NWSA and LBGSU, the 
densities of these bodies has in fact fallen considerably since the 
mid-1970's. Constitutionally the CBU represents a complex attempt to 
compromise the institutionalism of the associations with the perceived 
need to sustain a trans-institutional organisation. FOr example, it 
has research facilities and issues a newsheet as well as being a 
negotiating body. However there are signs that the operational 
functions of the CBU are still not coherently worked out. Tensions 
have persisted between internalist orientations on the one hand and 
the interests of the national body, which may require the coordination 
of policies and even a subordination of institutional decisions, on 
the other. (20) 
Apart from their constitutional inter-relationships, the staff unions 
have had to decide how best to compete with BIFU in the new bargaining 
context. One strategy might be to stress the benefits of the 
traditional cooperative emphasis of internalism, but this could be 
inappropriate in the face of the more competitive context of retail 
banking, and in the absence of the support of compulsory arbitration. 
At the other extreme they could try and emphasise bargaining 
effectiveness and downplay cooperation in order to compete with BIFU 
as in effect, a rival orthodox union. In reality the internalists 
appear to have adopted a course which tries to combine the best of both 
strategies. In some ways they have moved closer to orthodox trade 
union methods, as we noted above, and each constituent of the CBU was 
willing to endorse the call for industrial action made by the executive 
of the Barclays Group Staff Union in 1982, over the unilateral decision 
of Barclays Bank to reintroduce Saturday opening. The name change is 
also significant: they now prefer to be known as staff unions rather 
than associations. Nationally as.well as domestically they claim to 
defend the interests of their members as well as BIFU, although in pay 
bargaining a clear differentiation in objectives has emerged with the 
CBU pressing to defend the existing differentials rather than pursue 
low pay especially. Perhaps more significantly the claimed 
superiorities in technique and methods of operation which were used to 
justify the distinctiveness of the internalist approach prior to 
national machinery have re-emerged. These focus around a greater 
expertise in solving local problems (which inevitably constitute the 
majority of the unions' case-loads) through the employment of "home- 
grown" officials (although it must be noted that the Lloyds Staff union 
recently took the unprecedented step of appointing an.outsider to the 
post of General Secretary, while ironically BIFU have appointed an ex-
Lloyds Bank employee as Assistant General Secretary with 
responsibility for Lloyds). 
The associations do not deny that conflicts at work can arise, but they 
still see no systematic conflict of interests between management and 
staff in a career occupation such as banking. (21) They therefore 
believe that a cooperative approach which focusses upon problem-
sloving is more appropriate than orthodox trade unionism, and that 
this differentiation is more than just a matter of rhetoric. Rather it 
informs their policy-making and action in a significant, concrete 
manner, as the following quote emphasises. 
Fbr example, to quote the General Secretary of one of the staff unions; 
"Because of our knowledge of the Bank, and because the structure 
of our membership goes from the new entrant to the pensioner at 
all levels of grade and status, we do not lack the means of 
getting to the root of problems, and we have set ourselves up to 
react speedily to such problems ... 
... it is very important to understand that this problem-sols4951 
philosophy may not be general in the Trade Union movement."' 
But the implementation of technological changes may render this 
distinctive approach less plausible or even redundant. Several 
elements of the special employment relationship in banking may be 
diluted with the further automation of the clearing system (the 
"CHAPS" or Clearing House Automated Payment System is currently being 
brought on-stream) new information storage mechanisms and developments 
in the distribution of cash and banking facilities to non-branch 
outlets (such as "supermarket banking" and home-banking). It is 
notable for example that the Director of the Federation of London 
Clearing Bank Employers recently suggested that recruitment between 
the banks could develop and that the opportunities for long-term 
career development may decline. (23)  In effect then, it is predicted 
that the organisational impact of technological changes will not be 
completely cushioned by the non-career group of staff but will also 
affect the chances of the career groups. A reduction in job security 
and career opportunities which until now have been taken for granted 
arguably stand as an unprecedented test of the mutuality, trust and 
goodwill which the internalists still suggest underpin the conduct of 
representation. 
-350- 
Quite apart from the philosophical implications, the associations have 
not yet responded to the issue of technological change in terms of 
bargaining strategies. Failure to generate the fullest discussions on 
what is admitted by the banks to be a fundamental organisational 
question is evidence perhaps of how their traditional emphasis upon 
the legitimacy of management aims, and emphasis upon cooperation has 
made them reluctant to abandon a reactive approach. While watching 
developments, ,the staff unions have decided not to act unless and until 
it becomes clear that staff interests are detrimentally affected. 
They feel vindicated in such a policy by the continuing membership 
support, although as was noted above-this is not as strong as was hoped 
for when the CBU was started. Additionally the CBU is aware that its 
present non-existence in two of the London clearers weakens claims to 
representativeness, and the likelihood that it will seek to re-
establish staff unions in the Midland and Williams & Glyn's Banks has 
recently emerged. In particular the low density of union membership in 
the Midland, and the failure of ASTMS to sustain its popularity suggest 
that this would be a fertile recruiting ground. The CBU is also aware 
that even 100,000 members is insufficient to take full advantage of 
economics of scale in organisation and operation. (24) 
There are therefore grounds for concern over the future, in the 
clearing banks, of both the CBU and BIFU, although both organisations 
remain optimistic that they can survive separately there. At present 
the prospects for an amalgamation seem delicately balanced. On the one 
side there is no evident crisis which would make the two sides 
positively look for a merger, as existed prior to the ABM talks or to 
the Johnston Enquiry. There is also currently no strong employer 
pressure to try and force the sides together. In addition it has also 
been repeatedly emphasised that while those officials who conducted 
the merger attempts in the last•decade remain in charge, entrenched 
attitudes and personality differences will inevitably result in a 
stalemate. (25) On the other side, talks (if only about talks!) and 
initiatives continue to be offered. There does appear to be a mutual 
concern to resolve the division. This may stem from the view that the 
continuing division in unpopular with members (and non-members) as a 
piece of research done in one clearer in 1979/80 suggested, and thus it 
may act as a brake to further growth. (26) Alternatively, it may be 
that the difficulties noted above which both sides are experiencing, 
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and particularly the failure to achieve rapid membership growth, are 
more serious than either side will admit. Arguably much will depend 
therefore on the policies of the banks collectively in the Federation 
and individually both on staffing issues such as pay, hours of work, 
the introduction of new technology, job security and whether they 
decide to resume the interventionist strategies of .the 1970's. At 
present however that seems unlikely. 
This brings us finally to a brief consideration of new developments and 
trends in the banks' policies which are likely to affect the issue of 
divided representation. 
Firstly, the membership of the Bankers Clearing House, and 
participation in the clearing system; we noted that it was the common 
ownership and operation of the clearing system which made the banks 
inter-dependent and organisationally highly similar.' 'While this is 
still broadly so, and there is relatively little variation between 
them either in product or prices, technological factors and the 
greater competitiveness in the retail banking sector have brought new 
developments. For example, there are now thirteen functional members 
of the clearing house, although the five London clearers are still the 
only members of the CLCB. (27) For the other functional clearers 
membership of the Federation would be a logical step, and one which the 
present Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers' members may in 
due course find acceptable, despite the differences in pay structures 
and conditions. In that case the CBU could well find its dominant 
membership position eradicated, and that its representation of an 
increasingly small minority of banks necessitates either a merger or 
attempts to establish new staff unions. 
Secondly, the technological development in money transfers, automated 
payments and cashing facilities and the storage of account information 
can only be touched upon, but will clearly have a profound influence 
organisationally. From this second wave of automation it is likely 
that the existing branch systems will be substantially altered, with 
each branch no longer existing as a microcosm of the bank. Already 
there has been a shift towards satellite branches operating around a 
central information storage and retrieval office in one bank, and such 
changes have profound implications for the deployment of manpower, 
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career development and the recruitment policies of the banks. In 
making changes to the organisation of branch structure which has 
historically been the basis of the banks, the whole organisation of 
labour evidently becomes subject to fundamental alteration. 
Thirdly, the prospect for national arrangements must be considered. 
Until now of course the banks have fixed actual rates of pay rather 
than minima in - their national machinery, and despite the compromise of 
introducing a two-tier bargaining structure, each bank must still 
forego some domestic discretion in decision-making. Under certain 
conditions this may not be problematic: as in the 1970's for example 
when high inflation necessitated the minimum of cost of living 
increases which the Federation negotiated, while avoiding the 
susceptibility to leapfrogging engendered previously by domestic 
bargaining with arbitrations. Lower inflation and greater variations 
in profitability were two factors which rendered employer cooperation 
less appropriate, because profitability then became a more significant 
determinant of pay. Yet in national bargaining it is only average 
levels of return which can be discussed meaningfully, and although the 
Federation has recently argued strongly that in real terms bank 
profits are low compared to a decade previously, (28)  the outcome has 
not taken into account the variations in levels of return which the 
average disguises, and the disadvantage the less profitable banks are 
under. A return to domestic negotiations in order to align pay more 
closely with falling profits was probably most likely in the 1979/80 
period however, when two high settlements were conceded consecutively, 
and the national premium was significant. In the light of the much 
lower settlements from 1981 onwards this possibility appears to have 
receded. 
But this demonstrates the general point that there is no inevitability 
about national machinery; its continuation is predicated upon the 
test of utility. The Federation is after all effectively no more than 
the joint negotiating committee of the banks themselves, and thus 
easily dissolved or changed. 
A shift towards company level bargaining does seem predictable. To 
come back to the general issue of technological change for instance, it 
may be that the optimal way to manage change is seen to be at company 
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level because of the flexibility required, and because each bank has 
its own plans and systems derived from different marketing strategies. 
In this case the advantage of mutual support and protection which 
industry wide negotiation offers may neither be appropriate nor 
sufficiently important to accept the reduction in individual 
discretion which it necessitates. Thus far in fact the banks have 
dealt with this issue at both national and domestic level, although 
they have been - reluctant to negotiate on any substantive points, nor 
accept BIFU's New Technology proposals. 
It is certainly plausible to suggest that collective employer action 
is past the peak established in 1968. The restructuring exercise of 
1971 devolved a degree of power on pay back to the domestic banks, and 
by 1983 for example the size of the domestic element of pay increases 
for merit was equal to the 5% given at national level in some of the 
clearers. National machinery was after all seen to be•predicated upon 
resolving the problem of divided representation in a period of 
relative unrest among staff as well as being a permanent means of 
taking wages out of competition. It was therefore a response to 
certain political and economic conditions as much as a reflection of 
the oligopsonistic structure of banking. National machinery may thus 
not be a permanent feature of the clearing banks' mode of pay 
determination, at least not in its present scope. In view of the 
growing concern of the banks to relate pay to performance or 
productivity, it is arguable for example that further domestic 
discretion in pay determination will emerge, in which case minima 
rather than actual rates might be fixed nationally. • 
In terms of further employer initiatives to resolve the division of 
representation, this might imply that the interventionist period is 
also past its peak, at the national level at least. The Federation no 
longer regards the formal division, which separate negotiations 
involve, as inevitably problematic; indeed it is acknowledged that 
division currently weakens the staff representative side, although 
this is only a recent conclusion. (29)  Even in 1980 when the structure 
of representation was seriously explored a priority was accorded to 
the re-establishment of joint working and the present arrangements 
were considered hightly unsatisfactory. Since then more domestic 
level thinking has taken place on this subject and a variety of 
solutions have emerged. Midland for example has formalised separate 
arrangements with BIFU and ASTMS and placed strong emphasis upon 
conciliation in its procedure. Another bank considered trying to 
establish sole bargaining. rights in several domestic units through a 
system of staff ballots, although it subsequently dropped this plan at 
least for the time being. But the differentiation in proposals 
indicates that each bank not only faces a different form of division as 
well as having' different objectives: even within the three CBU/BIFU 
banks, the variance in the significant factor of relative membership 
strength influences managerial thinking on for example the importance 
of third party facilities in the negotiating procedure, or the breadth 
of each bargaining unit. 
It should be evident then that the banks are entering a period of 
massive change, commercially, technologically and organisationally. 
In such circumstances the duality of representation .is bound to be 
affected, although as yet marked institutional developments have not 
occurred, and in many ways the ideological division seems similar to 
the position thirty years ago. While this study has presented a 
consideration of joint working at national level, more needs to be 
known about company level decision making, particularly to tease out 
the differences in objectives and the relationshipe between corporate 
strategies and industrial relations management. All of which begs the 
case for' further research and analysis into this increasingly complex 
and important sector of the economy. 
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APPENDIX 1 
NUBB 'S 	CLEARING 	BA NK MEMBERSHIP 
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APPENDIX 2 
POLL-VOTE 'It7EAIS  
MBE VERSUS THE CBSA AT TEE BANKIM SWF COMM 
A poll vote arrangement was necessary within the BSC, to resolve any 
differences that might arise. In the ten years that the BSC existed 
NUBE was never in a position to carry a poll vote. This arrangement 
caused much resentment and frustration to NUBE, as they were never able 
to implement any of their policies at this council. 
YEAR CBSA NUBE 
1968 68,069 59,264 
1969 66,928 62,261 
1970 68,446 62,558 
1971 69,454 64,577 
1972 73,109 66,154 
1973 81,092 60,637 
1974 75,225 54,236 
1975 78,823 53,549 
1976 81,426 57,396 
1977 83,747 60,031 
Source: the Secretariat of the BSC 
79 83 8o 22 . 71 
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